JUDGMENT : V.S. Kotwal, J. A systematic strategy adopted by the Respondent after easily systematic manoeuvring though under the camoulflage of purported good faith, to defeat the lawful claim of the petitioner herein who is the landlady, has landed her in an uncomfortable situation. The characteristic peculiarity of this proceeding, however, which is more surprising is that the learned Appellate Judge was persuaded to accept not only the untenable but almost fraudulent claim which has entailed into utter mis-carriage of justice. The petition must succeed even under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. House No. 563 located in Deolali Camp area in Nashik District is of the ownership of the petitioner and she purchased it in the year 1973 for her personal occupation. The respondent herein was inducted as a monthly tenant at the rate of Rs. 13 even prior to the purchase and attornment was made with reference to the said tenant after the purchase. The petitioner on account of some differences with her husband was obliged to stay with her parents and the accommodation was wholly inadequate. It is claimed that she required the premises bonafide and reasonably for her personal use and occupation. A further claim was made that the respondent acquired alternate suitable accommodation. It is on all these counts that the tenancy was terminated and the rental arrears and possession was demanded by notice dated 26.11.1973 which was received by the Petitioner on 27.11.1973. Though he transmitted the amount of rental arrears, the demand for possession was not complied with which obliged the plaintiff to file Civil Suit No. 32 of 1974 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nashik. 3. Resisting the suit on all counts the respondent denied that he was in rental arrears or that the petitioner require the suit premises for her personal use and occupation. As regards the alternate accommodation he came out with a specific case admitting that he did secure the alternate premises from his tenant under a decree by the Court though according to him the tenant's son forcibly took possession of the said premises and as such he has been deprived of the benefit of the decree and consequently he cannot be said to have acquired alternate suitable accommodation. 4. 4. The learned trial Judge negatived the contentions of the petitioner under section 12(3)(a) or section 12(3)(b) as also under section 13(1)(g) vis a vis the default in payment of rental arrears and plea of bonafide requirement for personal use and occupation of the suit premises. However, a firm finding recorded that the respondent has acquired suitable alternate accommodation and therefore on that count under section 13(1)(i) the decree for eviction came to be passed. 5. Civil Appeal No. 175 of 1977 was directed against the decree in the district Court at Nashik. Surprisingly, the learned District Judge was persuaded to accept the respondents plea about forcible possession having been taken by tenant's son on account of which respondent was deprived of the other premises and as such according to the District Judge the respondent had not acquired possession of the alternate premises. Consequently, the decree was up set and the petitioner plaintiff's suit was dismissed on July 20, 1979, which decree is being placed under challenge in this proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. In so far as findings under section 12(3)(a) and 12(3))b) as also under section 13(1)(g) are concerned though those were sought to be challenged, the said was not permissible since no appeal was preferred in the District Court against that part of the decree. Even assuming otherwise that such challenge is permissible without filing any formal petition on this forum also still on merits there is nothing much in favour of the petitioner, inasmuch as the rental arrears have been cleared up within one month after the receipt of the notice and there is a finding of fact that the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner is adequate. That finding, need not be disturbed. 7. Thus remains in the field the only item under section 13(1)(i) about the respondent having acquired suitable alternative accommodation. In that behalf a few dates are materia. The suit property was purchased by the Petitioner on 18th of July, 1973. On 26th of November, 1973 the petitioner issued notice to the respondent Exh. 35 and the suit was filed on 7th of January, 1974. In that behalf a few dates are materia. The suit property was purchased by the Petitioner on 18th of July, 1973. On 26th of November, 1973 the petitioner issued notice to the respondent Exh. 35 and the suit was filed on 7th of January, 1974. This would make it very clear that the respondent's tenancy was terminated and possession demanded by the notice dated 26th of November, 1973 which the Respondent had admittedly received soon thereafter as he had sent a reply to that notice on 4th of December, 1973 under Exh. 41. This completes the first category. In the second category, there figures the respondent herein as the landlord of his own premises located in house No. 654 at Deolali Damp in which was he inducted one Waghmare as a tenant. The Respondent had filed Civil Suit for eviction of his tenant Waghmare in the Civil Court at Nashik and the said suit was decreed on 25-4-1973. It is significant to note that on 26th of December, 1973 the Respondent obtained possession of his own premises for which the regular possession receipt was executed by his tenant Shri Waghmare at Exh. 40. This means that this even occurred after the receipt of the notice from the petitioner and before the petitioner filed the suit. However, at that point of time came into existence a very queer development which is manifestly a creation of the respondent himself and there is reasons to believe that this was so manoeuvred with the active assistance and aiding of the said tenant Waghmare and his son Sahadu. The Respondent admit in the Trial Court that he did receive possession of his premises House No. 654 from his tenant Waghmare on 26-12-1973 and he was accepted the receipt for possession at Exh. 40. However, according to him on the same day, that is, on 26-12-1973 after he received possession from the father, the son i. e. Sahadu Waghmare forcibly took possession of the same premises and that is how he lost possession on the same day, To pat a glass on this make belief show, respondent claims that he had filed a criminal trespass. On that basis it is submitted by Shri M. A Rane, the learned counsel for the Respondent, it may be genuine and without his fault that the Respondent lost possession and therefore provisions of section 13(1)(i) would not apply. On that basis it is submitted by Shri M. A Rane, the learned counsel for the Respondent, it may be genuine and without his fault that the Respondent lost possession and therefore provisions of section 13(1)(i) would not apply. It is impossible to accept this suggestion which in my opinion is Dot only unsustainable but is almost atrocious. 8. As stated, in November, 1973, and before 4th of December, when there was exchange of notice, the respondent aware of the stand by the petitioner. The suit was actually filed in January, 1974 in the Respondent's suit was already recorded in July, 1973. However. actually got possession of his premises on 26-12-1973. That means, all happened during the exchange of notice when the respondent was fully aware of the stand taken by the petitioner. It is almost ridiculous to accept the father surrendered the premises in favour of the respondent on 26th of December, 1973, by passing a possession receipt. on the same day the so alleged to have forcibly entered in the premises and thereby making the respondent helpless, The manoeuvering is so apparent that it requires hardly any ground to un-mask it, especially it has been done in a very crude manner It is glaringly clear that this was a make belief show with the father and the son i.e. Waghmare with the oblique motive for the respondent to claim in the Petitioner's suit that be had not acquired actual physical possession of his own premises Lodging of a criminal case is obviously apart and parcel of that claim of which filing of the criminal case also with it an oblique motive. It is significant to not that a private criminal complaint was filed against the said Sahadu has been acquitted as according to his defence in the criminal case it was the respondent who had inducted Sahadu as a tenant creating fresh tenancy in favour of the son for which a document at Exh. 71 has been produced. It is significant to not that a private criminal complaint was filed against the said Sahadu has been acquitted as according to his defence in the criminal case it was the respondent who had inducted Sahadu as a tenant creating fresh tenancy in favour of the son for which a document at Exh. 71 has been produced. The document been relied upon by the lower Appellate Court on the ground that it is not property proved That is a certified copy of the receipt executed by the respondent in favour of Sahadu Significantly the genuiness of that document is not seriously doubted, Even the learned Judge himself felt extremely hesitant when he observed that it is not likely that the Respondent, would induct his tenant's son a few hours after getting the possession. In my opinion circumstances of the case fully justify taking into consideration the unusual defence of the Respondent that Sahadu took forcible possession his father has delivered possession and the defence of Sahadu that he was lawfully inducted as a tenant by the landlord can well be taken account. Even for the limited purpose the final order of acquittal by the Court can will be admissible and relevant. The bare minimum fact that remains in the field is that on 26th December, 1973, father voluntarily surrended the premises when through some machansim the son entered the premises. The oblique design is patently Shri Dalvi, the learned counsel is fully justified in submitting that the agency of these three persons namely, the respondent, his tenant Waghmare and the tenant's son Sahadu have hatched a very crude plan to work off the petitioners claim under section 13(1)(i). I opinion, the position is so manifestly clear that the said contention of Shri Dalvi deserves to be upheld out right. The contention raised by Shri Rane contrary thereto is equally manifestly un-sustainable and un-acceptable. 9. The net result would be that the respondent had acquired alternate accommodation of his own premises of which he did get possession. Depriving himself of the said premises is only an artificial mode and not a genuine one and that too undertaken with an oblique motive. Therefore, it must be held that the respondent did acquire the said alternate accommodation. 10. As regards the suitability of the said accommodation, the trial Court has recorded a correct finding in favour of Petitioner. Depriving himself of the said premises is only an artificial mode and not a genuine one and that too undertaken with an oblique motive. Therefore, it must be held that the respondent did acquire the said alternate accommodation. 10. As regards the suitability of the said accommodation, the trial Court has recorded a correct finding in favour of Petitioner. Those premises consist of two rooms as against one room of the suit premises. Further more, the respondent had claimed the other premises for his own personal use and occupation meaning thereby that those were suitable him for residence. The said premises can thus be reasonably said to be suitable for residence and occupation with reference to the respondent's need. Thus both the ingredients of section 13(1)(i) are fully satisfied and the petitioner deserves to get the decree on that count. The learned trial Judge has recorded better and more cogent reasons while those assigned by the lower Appellate Court are extremely vulnerable. Consequently, the petition must succeed even under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. The decree recorded by the District Court in Civil Appeal No. 175 of 1977 is set aside and instead the one recorded by the learned trial Judge on 30-4-1977 in Civil Suit No. 32 of 1974 decreeing the plaintiff's suit for possession restored. Rule made absolute.