Judgment P. S. Mishra, J. 1. Defendants faced with the decree of eviction from a building to-which the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) applies, have moved this Court in revision in Civil Revision No.3 of 1984 against the judgment and decree of eviction and in Civil Revision No.2010 of 1983 against the order refusing to set aside the ex pane decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure code. Plaintiffs opposite party filed the suit for eviction of the defendants-tenants from a shop situate in holding No.540, ward No.3 in the town of biharsharif, oh the ground of bona fide requirement for the occupation by the sons of plaintiff No.2 opposite parties No.2, a ground covered by Sec.11 (l) (c) of the Act. A suit numbered as Title Suit No.35 of 1983 of the court of Munsif at Biharsharif was entertained in accordance with the special procedure prescribed in this behalf under Sec.14 of the Act. The learned Munsif on 18th April, 1983 ordered for the issuance of summons for service by ordinary process through nazarat as also by registered post with acknowledgment due addressed to the tenants. There is nothing on the record to show whether the summons issued by ordinary process were served upon the tenants or not. But the summonses sent by registered post were returned unserved with the endorsement "refused". On 14th June, 1983, the learned Munsif adjourned the suit for 21st July, 1983 with a view to granting "to the tenants further time for appearance. On 21st July, 1983, however, when he found that the tenants had not appeared he excepted the plaintiffs prayer for ex parte hearing and accordingly passed an order. Plaintiffs adduced their evidence in due course and the suit was finally disposal of on ,18th August, 1983. The learned Munsif ordered that the tenants would hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs by 30th September, 1983 failing which the plaintiffs would be entitled to get vacant possession of the suit premises from the defendants through the agency of law at the cost of the defendants and also ordered that the defendants would be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs.42 - per month until vacant possession was delivered to the plaintiffs. Tenants however, filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code on 1st November, 1983 before the learned Munsif stating that on 27th October, 1983 they learnt about the ex parte judgment and decree from one Fahim Mian and after inspecting the records and coming to know about the proceedings and the allegations they filed the said application. The application under Order. IX, Rule 13 of the code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) was, however, rejected by the learned Munsif on the ground that the same was not maintainable. Learned Munsif also decided the issue on the question of the service of notice and held that the post-man deposed to the effect that he contacted all the four tenants individually, but they declined to acknowledge the registered letter containing the notice and refusal in such circumstance, constituted a valid service. Petitioners filed two separate civil revision applications, one against the order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree and the other against the decree itself in view of the provisions under Sec.14 (8) of the Act. 2. Before considering the contentions raised on behalf of the parties i may indicate that in the Act some special provisions have been incorporated for disposal of cases covered by the grounds of eviction under Sec.11 (1) (c)and 11 (1) (e) of the Act. These provisions are incorporated in Sec.14 of the act. Sec.13 of the Act has given overriding effect to the provisions under section 14 saying that the provisions of Sec.14 or any rule made there under shall have effect notwithstanding any thing inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force. Sec.14 runs as follows : "14. Special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement.- (1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c)or (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed from in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed from in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (3) (i) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require also direct the publication of the summons in the official Gazette or in news papers circulating in the locality, in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for 1 gain. (ii) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the Court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the court as hereinafter provided and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the request court-fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section : provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction, the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. (9) Where no application has been made to the High Court in revision as laid down in sub-section (8) above, the Court, which passed the order for eviction may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provisions of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908 ). Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety day of the date of order of eviction. " This law is new for the State of Bihar but not so far other State. Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety day of the date of order of eviction. " This law is new for the State of Bihar but not so far other State. A special procedure like one envisaged under Sec.14 of the Act was introduced in the delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by introducing similar provisions by the Delhi rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976. The Delhi Amendment Act, came before the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh V/s. Lajwanti, ( AIR 1980 SC 161 ). The supreme Court observed as follows :- "the objects and reasons clearly reveal that the amendment has been made for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation. It is a matter of common knowledge that even though the landlord may have an immediate and imperative necessity for vacating the house given to a tenant he is compelled to resort to the time consuming and. dilatory procedure of a suit which takes years before the landlord is able to obtain the decree and in most cases by the time the decree is passed either the landlord dies or the need disappears and the landlord is completely deprived of getting any relief. It appears to us that it was for these reasons that the Legislature in its wisdom thought that a short and simple procedure should be provided for those landlords who generally want the premises for their bona fide necessity so that they may be able to get quick and expeditious relief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The landlords having personal necessity have been brought together as a separate class because of their special needs and such a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable particularly when the Legislature in its wisdom feels that the landlords should get this relief as quickly as possible. " In a recent case in Ravi Dutt Sharma V/s. Ratan Lal Bhargava, [ (1984) 2 SCC 75 ] the Supreme Court has once again reiterated the observations made in Kewal singhs case (supra) in the following words :- "it is common experience that suits for eviction under the Act take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and ending up with the Supreme Court. In many cases experience has indicated that by the time the eviction decree became final several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared and if there was further delay in securing eviction and the family of the landlord had by then expanded, in the absence of accommodation the members of the family were virtually thrown on the road. It was this mischief which the Legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new procedure in Chapter III-A. The Legislature in its wisdom thought that in case where the landlords required their own premises for bona fide and personal necessity they should be treated as a separate class along with the landlords covered by Sec.14-A and should be allowed to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction within the quickest possible time. " 3. Obviously for the reasons that have been noticed as the object of the delhi Amendment Act by the Supreme Court, Sec.14 of the Bihar Act, has placed the landlord seeking recovery of possession of a house by ejecting a tenant for his own occupation or for the occupation, of any person for whose benefit the premises is held by the landlord or in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy, in a separate class. The procedure in such case has been simplified with the primary object of avoiding delays in the disposal, of the suits by ensuring that the court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every such suit in addition to and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants by registered post with acknowledgment due, and if the circumstances of the case so require by the publication of the summons in the official Gazette or news papers circulating in the locality, in which the tenant last resided or carried on business or worked for gain, by providing that the tenant on whom summons is duly served whether by ordinary mail or registered post shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains relief from, the court as provided and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction ; and even in the case in which the leave is granted, the Court shall follow the procedure of the Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. The attempt to avoid delays is carried as far as making no provisions for appeal or second appeal in cases in which the decree for the recovery of possession is made in the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Sec.11 of the Act safeguarding of course the right to seek review of the order of eviction in accordance with the provision of Order XLVII of the first Schedule of the Code and a revision to the High Court. 4. In the instant case the tenant petitioners failed to appear in pursuance of the summonses and the learned Munsif has granted a decree for eviction to the landlord-opposite party. The petitioners also moved an application under order IX, Rule 13 of the Code. The said application has been dismissed by the learned Munsif as not maintainable as also on merits. Petitioners have preferred two separate applications, one against the decree of eviction and the other against the order refusing to set aside the said decree. The petitioners also moved an application under order IX, Rule 13 of the Code. The said application has been dismissed by the learned Munsif as not maintainable as also on merits. Petitioners have preferred two separate applications, one against the decree of eviction and the other against the order refusing to set aside the said decree. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the learned Munsif has committed error of jurisdiction by not complying with the requirements of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act. According to him, the learned Munsif was obliged to ensure the issuance of summonses for service upon the petitioners simultaneously by ordinary process and by registered post with acknowledgment due. He has submitted that although the learned Munsif ordered for issuance of summonses by ordinary process and directed nazarat to do so, there is nothing on the record to show that summons were issued as directed and/or ever reached the petitioners. He has contended that the acceptance of the service by registered post as valid on the basis of a report that it was refused, was not warranted on the facts proved before him. Me has committed error of law in holding that the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code was not maintainable. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the learned Munsif has committed error of law in holding on facts that the service by post was proved in the proceeding under Order IX, Rule 13 having held at one stage that the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code was not maintainable. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has developed his contention by arguing that by a mere technical compliance i. e. saying in an order on some date that summons should be issued without any attempt to actually issue summons and similarly by sending notices by registered post and mechanically accepting the report without any attempt to specify whether there was any genuine attempt to serve the summons or not, cannot be accepted as compliance of the requirements of sub-section (3) of Sec.14 of the Act. He has sub-milted that the purose of the special provision is not to put defendants in unfavorable circumstances of a summary procedure without informing them about the action proposed/ Learned Counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Dehli High Court in the case of Chaman Lal V/s. Sq. Ldr. Ved Prakash, [ (1980)1 Rent Control Reporter, 300] in which considering the provisions under Sections 25-B (2)and 25-B (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it has been observed ;-"the declaration under Sec.25 (b) (3) (b) has to be made only when the Controller has done his duty in issuing summons both in the ordinary manner as well as by registered post. But if he does not issue summons in the ordinary manner at all, I do not think he can make the declaration regarding valid service of summons under clause (3) (b) of Sec.25-B of the Act. The reason is that the condition precedent to the declaration is that summons must go to the tenant both in the ordinary manner as well as by registered post. If that is done and then the controller finds that the tenant has refused to take delivery of the registered article he may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. It is not open to the Controller to dispense with service in the ordinary manner and resort straight to service by registered pest. On a proper construction of the statute it appears to me that Legislature is insistent on service in both the modes. The word shall is a clear pointer. The question of service in the sight of the Legislature is so important that it has made ample provisions in the section to see that the tenant is duly served. All the three modes of summons have been harnessed into service, namely, the ordinary method, service by registered post and service by publication. The reason is plain. The legislature was introducing a new procedure. This procedure abridges the defence of the tenant. The door to defense has been narrowed down by a chain of stiff provisions. Therefore, the Legislature is taking great care to see that the tenant is duly served before eviction proceedings commence against him. " on principle there is nothing to comment upon the view taken in Chaman Lals case (supra ). The door to defense has been narrowed down by a chain of stiff provisions. Therefore, the Legislature is taking great care to see that the tenant is duly served before eviction proceedings commence against him. " on principle there is nothing to comment upon the view taken in Chaman Lals case (supra ). Undoubtedly service of summons by one or the other mode of service is a must before the proceedings are taken up in the court. It is, however, not necessary that the summons should be served in more than one way. Subsection (4) of Sec.14 of the Act makes it amply clear that the tenant on whom summons is duly served whether by ordinary process or registered post shall be subjected to the procedure prescribed and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant for eviction on the ground aforesaid. The words "in addition to" and "simultaneously with" in subsection (3)of Sec.14 indicate that summons, both in the ordinary manner and by registered post, be sent to the tenant or his agent together but if the tenant is approached by the courts summons either in the ordinary manner or by registered post, the requirement of the Jaw as to summons is complied with. Sending notices/summons simultaneously and in addition to, only means that in case the notice sent by one process fails to reach the tenant, the notice sent by the other process may reach him. I have already noticed that urgency attached to the need of the landlord is the cause for this special procedure. Acceptance of this argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners shall make the procedure for the service of summons more stringent than the procedure prescribed under Order V of the Code. That, in my opinion, shall defeat the very purpose for which the special procedure has been introduced. Publication of the summons in the official Gazette or in the news papers circulated in the locality as provided in sub-section (3) of Sec.14 of the Act shall, not be adopted in all cases where the tenant fails to respond to the summons/notice issued by the court. This is qualified by the expression "if the circumstances of the case so require. This is qualified by the expression "if the circumstances of the case so require. " If the court is satisfied that the summons was duly served and it did reach the tenant by one of the modes prescribed under sub-section (3) of Sec.14, it can proceed under sub-section (4) thereof to decide the case. In the instant case the service was effected upon the defendant-petitioners by registered post on refusal. Whether the summonses were duly served upon them or not, shall depend not upon anything else but whether the summonses were delivered to the defendants by the service peon or not and his report that they refused to receive the summonses is correct or not. I am not prepared to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that that courts order for issuing summonses by ordinary process was not carried out by the nazarat. There is nothing on the record to take the view that the nazarat failed to carry out the directions given by the learned munsif. It has come on the record that the service by post was delivered to the parties concerned but they declined to accept the same. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that a report by the service peon that the petitioners refused to acknowledge the receipt alone is not enough to constitute a valid service. He has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mahboob Bi V/s. Alvala Lachmiah, (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 314), wherein considering the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, (15 of 1960), particulary Sec.10 thereof, Munikannaiah, J, has stated that sending of notice by registered post is not by itself a service of the notice. According to him, the notice sent by post must actually reach the person sought to be served and further that mere refusal of a postal notice without more, cannot be considered as a service of notice and there cannot. te a presumption of service even where there is refusal to receive the same. In coming to the said conclusion munikannaiah, J. considered the provisions of Sec.114 of the evidence Act, and the presumptions arising there from. But the view taken by munikannaiah, J. , in my opinion, cannot hold good in view of a special provision in the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act. In coming to the said conclusion munikannaiah, J. considered the provisions of Sec.114 of the evidence Act, and the presumptions arising there from. But the view taken by munikannaiah, J. , in my opinion, cannot hold good in view of a special provision in the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act. Sec.31 of the said act says :- "where any Bihar and Orissa Act, or Bihar Act, authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression serve or either of the expression give or send or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. " it is obvious that a presumption shall arise that the notices/summonses were validly served upon the petitioners. It is not stated that the summonses were not issued at all, rather it is on the record that the learned Munsif ordered for issuance of the summonses by registered post and directed the nazarat to take steps for service of summons or notice in the ordinary manner. Jurisdictional facts regarding the issuance of the summons, as directed by the learned Munsif to the nazarat are absent. It is not possible, I have already said earlier to accept the statement at the Bar that the nazarat did not comply with the direction of the learned Munsif. So far as summonses sent by registered post are concerned, it is on the record that the plaintiffs-opposite party duly complied with the order of the learned Munsif and filed the requisites properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post The plaintiffs-opposite party, therefore, are entitled to the benefit of the presumption under Sec.31 of the General Clauses Act. It was/is for the petitioners to prove if they contested the service of summons that they did not receive any notices/summonses. 7 Coming to the question as to whether the application filed under order IX, Rule 13 of the Code on behalf of the petitioners was entertain able or not, I am of the view that the learned Munsif has committed no error of law. 7 Coming to the question as to whether the application filed under order IX, Rule 13 of the Code on behalf of the petitioners was entertain able or not, I am of the view that the learned Munsif has committed no error of law. True, there is some scope for argument as to whether in view of the provisions under Sec.14 (8) and (9) of the Act, an application under Order ix, Rule 13 of the Code is maintainable or not. I am not required to go into this aspect of the dispute because the learned Munsif his found on merits that the petitioners had knowledge of the institution of the suit and the notices/ summonses by post were served upon them on refusal. Whether an application under Order IX, Rule 13 is also an application for review or not and whether such an application in view of the language that the court passing the order for eviction, may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provision of Order XLVII of the First Schedule of the Code, shall exclude any application under Order IX, Rule 13 or not, is not required to be gone into in this case. My view that the learned Munsif committed no error of jurisdiction or law in accepting the landlords claim in default of the appearance of the tenant petitioners, admits no case for review of the order passed by the learned Munsif. As the learned Munsif could not decide the question of maintain ability merely by looking to the provisions of law and the contents of the petition, he committed no error of jurisdiction in deciding the question of maintainability along with the issues on merits while disposing of the application under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code. 8. In the result, I find no merit in either of the two applications and accordingly they are dismissed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case there shall, however, be no order as to costs. Revisions dismissed.