JUDGMENT - Waikar M.R. J.-The House Allotment Officer, Nagpur (called for short HAO), having rejected the prayer of the petitioner that she needs the premises for her own occupation, directed her to let them to respondent No. 2, acting under clause 23 of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (called for short “the Rent Control Order”). Aggrieved by this order, she filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the same. 2. The petitioner is an old woman aged about 65 years, has no issues and resides all alone in part of the premises in question. The first floor rented premises having fallen vacant, she sent an intimation to the Collector as required by clause 22 of the Rent Control Order, stating further that she is a patient of ulcer and blood pressure and she does not propose to relet the premises but desires to keep her sister's son in those premises to take care of her in her old decrepit age. She appeared before the HAO and also deposed to the same effect. The HAO rejected the prayer with these observations: “The landlady has deposed that she is the only member of the family. Now, she is seeking release of her house to bring the married son of her sister in the suit house. This person cannot be treated to be the member of the family of the landlady Indirabai. Hence, her application is rejected and the house is allotted to D. V. Hedaoo, the applicant.” 3. What is submitted by Shri Vyawahare, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the HAO did not seem to doubt the truth of the petitioner's statement that she is ailing and in her old age, she needs a helping hand, but rejected the prayer because her sister's son is not a member of her family, construing the proviso to clause 23 very narrowly. I find this submission well-grounded and merited. The proviso to clause 23 of the Rent Control Order is in these terms : “Provided that if the landlord has, in the intimation given under clause 22, stated that he needs the house for his own occupation, the Collector shall, if satisfied after due enquiry that the house is so needed, permit the landlord to occupy the same.” 4. The proviso to clause 23 of the Rent Control Order is in these terms : “Provided that if the landlord has, in the intimation given under clause 22, stated that he needs the house for his own occupation, the Collector shall, if satisfied after due enquiry that the house is so needed, permit the landlord to occupy the same.” 4. Now, when the premises are in occupation of a tenant and the landlord needs them for his occupation, he has to apply for grant of permis sion to give notice to terminate the lease under clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order which is worded thus: “13 (3) (vi). That the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation, provided he is not occupying any other house of his own in the city or town concerned.” 5. The word “his” in the above clause has been interpreted liberally and the person for whom the premises are required need not necessarily be dependent on him. It includes not only the members of the landlord's family but also those whose responsibilities have been accepted. See (Balbhadra v. Premchand)1, (Badamibai v. Lakhkar)2 and (Narayanibai v. Kishorilal)3. 6. Should the tenanted premises be made available, secured or released from the operation of the Rent Act for the purpose of bona fide requirement of the landlord, is the common object of both the above provisions, with the only difference that one operates when the tenant in occupation is requir ed to be evicted for that purpose, while the other operates when the premises having fallen vacant are to be made available to the landlord and not required to be relet again for the very same purpose. The legislative draftsman, no doubt, has used the expression “his bona fide occupation” in clause 13, but used the expression “his own occupation” in the proviso to clause 23. The former expression has been constantly interpreted liberally, not limited necessarily to the needs of the members of the family of the landlord. The need of a widowed sister or daughter or of those whose responsibility has been accepted by the landlord, or the need to accommodate the family of an adopted son and servants, has been held as duly covered by clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. The need of a widowed sister or daughter or of those whose responsibility has been accepted by the landlord, or the need to accommodate the family of an adopted son and servants, has been held as duly covered by clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. It is true that the normal course of construction requires that when we find in a statute two different expressions used, as far as possible, two different meanings must be given to these expressions, but instances are not unknown when two different expressions have been used to convey the same meaning. From this variation of language, variation of intention cannot necessarily be inferred in construing the two expressions, taking into account the legislative intent. Suppose the Controller had granted permission to the landlord under clause 13(3)(vi) on a liberal interpretation of the clause, but the proceedings in the Civil Court ended in a compromise, or the tenant voluntarily surrendered before any decree is passed, and the landlord, on (the premises so falling vacant, applies to the Collector under clause 22 for release on the very same grounds, rejection of his prayer by the Collector under the proviso to clause 23 on a narrow interpretation of the words would lead to an absurd result and an injustice to the landlord, presumably not intended by the Legislature. Replacement of the expression “his bona fide occupation” occurring in clause 13 by the expression “his own occupation” in the proviso to clause 23, it Appeared, is only due to draftsman's unskilfulness and not for indicating any different intention. 7. In this view of the matter, the HAO was not justified in rejecting the .prayer of the petitioner on a narrow interpretation that sister's son not being the member of her family, it could not be said to be the need of the petitioner, if the landlady in her old decrepit age needed the help of her near relative, has decided to accommodate him and accepted his responsi bility, the prayer could not be rejected only because he is not the member of her family. It is pertinent to note that the truth or genuineness of her state ment and her need was never doubted by the HAO The HAO, thus, refused to exercise his jurisdiction, having structured the same on such narrow interpretation of the above provision of law The order passed by him, rejecting the petitioner's prayer, therefore, has to be set aside and quashed. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed The rule is made absolute and the order dated 22-11-1979 passed by the HAO (Annexure 'C') is quashed and hereby set aside. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----