Judgment :- 1. The Kuravilangad Service Co-operative Society is the petitioner in both the petitions. In O. P. No. 1700 of 1981 the petitioner seeks to quash Ext. P5 order of the 3rd respondent, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, dated 12-3-1981. In O. P. No. 1821 of 1981 the prayer is to quash Ext. P6 dated 31-3-1981 passed by the 3rd respondent. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the common 4th respondent in the two OPs. who was a former Secretary of the Petitioner Society is entitled to get, "subsistence allowance". The 4th respondent was the Secretary of the petitioner Society. While so, he was suspended on 12-10-1977 pending an enquiry against him for alleged falsification of account and misappropriation of funds. We are not concerned in this case with the vicissitudes of the enquiry or the final stages thereof. Suffice it to say, that based on the findings of the commissioner appointed by the petitioner Society for conducting the domestic enquiry and after considering the explanations of the 4th respondent, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-society passed a resolution on 29-11-1979 evidenced by Ext. P1, resolving to demote the 4th respondent as junior clerk and to cancel the suspension and directing the 4th respondent to join duty as clerk on 6-12-1979. This resolution of the petitioner society was communicated to the 4th respondent by Ext. P2 dated 30-11-1979. It was also specifically stated in Ext. P2 final order that the period of suspension of the 4th respondent will remain in force till he rejoins as clerk or till 6-12-1979. Thereupon the 4th respondent did not join the society but initiated proceedings before the 3rd respondent, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, and obtained Ext. P3 order dated 5-12-1979 in Arbitration case No. 93 of 1979, whereby the operation of Ext. P2 order was stayed till the disposal of the case. It is seen from Ext. P3 that Society was also heard before passing the order. It is common ground that Ext, P3 order of stay was not vacated till the passing of Ext. P5 and Ext. P6 orders impugned in the two O.Ps. The petitioner Society paid subsistence allowance to, the 4th respondent till 5-12-1979. The 4th respondent claimed that in view of Ext. P3 order of stay the order of suspension passed against him continued or is brought back to life. P5 and Ext. P6 orders impugned in the two O.Ps. The petitioner Society paid subsistence allowance to, the 4th respondent till 5-12-1979. The 4th respondent claimed that in view of Ext. P3 order of stay the order of suspension passed against him continued or is brought back to life. In so far as the order of stay, Ext. P3 was not vacated or final proceedings passed in the arbitration case, the "suspension" order will continue to be in force. According to the 4th respondent he is entitled to subsistence allowance on the ground that the suspension order passed against him on 12-10-1977 continued in view of Ext. P3 order dated 5-12-1979 passed by the 3rd respondent. 2. The 4th respondent claimed subsistence allowance for the period 6-12-1979 to 6-3-1980 which was allowed by the 3rd respondent by Ext. P5 order dated 12-3-1981 in O. P. No. 1700 of 1981. For the period 6-3-1980 to 5-10-1980 it was allowed by the 4th respondent by Ext. P6 order dated 31-3-198! in O. P. No. 1821 of 1981, The short question is whether the 4th respondent is entitled to the subsistence allowance and Ext. P5 in O. P. 1700 of 1981 and Ext. P6 in O. P. 1821 of 1981 are valid and legal. 3. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Raman Pillai, forcefully argued the only crucial and vital question that arose for consideration in passing the impugned orders, Exts. P5 and P6. That relates to the legality of the orders passed by the 3rd respondent in deciding that the order of suspension was in force during the relevant time. The question for consideration is whether the suspension of the 4th respondent ordered by the petitioner society on 12-10-1977 remained or continued after 6-12-1979 and for the period for which subsistence allowance was claimed (6-12-1979 to 5-10-1980). According to the 4th respondent, when once the final order (Ext. P2) of the petitioner society demoting him as a clerk and cancelling the suspension was stayed by the 3rd respondent Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, evidenced by Ext. P3 dated 5-12-1979, the suspension order passed earlier will continue or will be brought back to life. According to the 4th respondent, when once the final order (Ext. P2) of the petitioner society demoting him as a clerk and cancelling the suspension was stayed by the 3rd respondent Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, evidenced by Ext. P3 dated 5-12-1979, the suspension order passed earlier will continue or will be brought back to life. It is common ground that the provisions of Kerala Subsistence Allowance Act (Act 27 of 1973) will apply and the 4th respondent will be entitled to the allowance only if there is a valid or enforceable order of suspension against the 4th respondent at the relevant time. 4. The petitioner's counsel Mr. Raman Pillai contended that the order of suspension passed by the petitioner Society against the 4th respondent dated 12-10-1977 merged in the final orders Exts. P1 and P2 and therefore the said suspension order did not and cannot remain in force. Nor can the order of suspension be brought back to life or revived by the order of stay granted by the 3rd respondent by Ext. P3. It should be noted that the suspension order passed by the petitioner society is only an order passed pending an enquiry against the 4th respondent and not by way of substantive punishment or penalty. Counsel for the 4th respondent sought to sustain the orders allowing subsistence allowance on the ground that the effect of the order, Ext. P3 is to suspend Exts. P1 and P2 proceedings and restore the status quo ante or in other words, to revitalise the order of suspension passed on 12-10-1977. The order of suspension will be effective and will operate on its own. 5. Petitioner's counsel, Mr. Raman Pillai, brought to my notice the following decisions to substantiate that the order of suspension dated 12-10-1977 has merged in the final orders passed, evidenced by Exts. P1 and P2. Thereafter the order of suspension will not remain in force. See Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1955 SC. 600), Probodh Chandra Ghose v. Executive Engineer (AIR. 1956 Cal. 447), and Jaiwant Rao v. State of Rajasthan (AIR. 1963 Raj. 203). P1 and P2. Thereafter the order of suspension will not remain in force. See Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1955 SC. 600), Probodh Chandra Ghose v. Executive Engineer (AIR. 1956 Cal. 447), and Jaiwant Rao v. State of Rajasthan (AIR. 1963 Raj. 203). In these cases, the question that arose for consideration was, whether an order of suspension made, pending an enquiry will revive, once as a result of the enquiry an order of dismissal or termination of the service was passed and this final order of dismissal or termination was declared as illegal or unsustainable by the court. In the Supreme Court decision, speaking for the Bench Imam J. held at page 603: "The order of suspension made against the appellant was clearly one made pending an enquiry. It certainly was not a penalty imposed after an enquiry. As the result of the enquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty had been passed against the appellant. With that order, the order of suspension lapsed. The order of dismissal replaced the order of suspension which then ceased to exist. That clearly was the position between the Government of the United Provinces and the appellant. The subsequent declaration by a Civil Court that the order of dismissal was illegal could not revive an order of suspension which did not exist." The facts and the ratio laid down in the decisions of the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Court referred to above are also substantially the same. It is true, that once the final order of dismissal or termination from service is passed, the order of suspension made pending the enquiry will merge in the final order. But, if the final order passed is not one of dismissal or termination of service, but one of reinstatement in service, though to a lower post or rank, the above said principles will not apply. In Baldev Raj Guliani v. The Punjab and Haryana High Court (1976(2) SLR 758) Goswami J. delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 770, while rejecting the applicability of the theory of "merger" to such cases: "The character of the order of dismissal and that of the order of reinstatement in a departmental enquiry is absolutely different. Suspension is a step to dismissal and may culminate in dismissal. Suspension is a step to dismissal and may culminate in dismissal. When an officer is suspended no work is taken from him but he does not Cease to be in service. When he is dismissed the link with the service is snapped and naturally the order of suspension merges in dismissal. Nothing remains to be done about his suspension; when however, a suspended officer is reinstated an order which is different in content and quality from that of suspension takes effect. The suspended officer, on reinstatement, goes back to service. A further order may have to be passed by the authority as to in what manner the period of suspension will be treated." (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the above decision of the Supreme Court, on general principles, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the order of suspension dated 12-7-1977 merged in Exts. P1 and P2 orders. The effect of Exts. P1 and P2 proceedings in this case, is that the suspended officer (the 4th respondent) on being demoted was reinstated as a clerk and goes back to service. A further order should be passed as to in what manner the period of suspension is (to be) treated. The order of suspension will not merge in the final orders passed, Exts. P1 and P2, reinstating the suspended officer in service. The principle of merger which is generally invoked when an order of dismissal or termination of service is passed against an officer under suspension will not apply in the case of reinstatement in service, even if it be to a lower post. On this short ground, the contention of the petitioner's counsel, to the effect that Exts. P5 and P6 orders attacked in the O. Ps. are illegal in holding that the order of suspension was in force daring the relevant time, is repelled. 6. The matter can be approached also from another and a different angle. That requires consideration of the scope and legal effect flowing from Ext. P3 order dated 5-12-1979 passed by the 3rd respondent staying the operation of Ext. P2 till the disposal of arbitration case No. 93 of 1979. It should be remembered that in passing Ext. 6. The matter can be approached also from another and a different angle. That requires consideration of the scope and legal effect flowing from Ext. P3 order dated 5-12-1979 passed by the 3rd respondent staying the operation of Ext. P2 till the disposal of arbitration case No. 93 of 1979. It should be remembered that in passing Ext. P2 final order the petitioner specifically stated: (i) that the fourth respondent is demoted from the post of the Secretary to that of a junior clerk & (ii) that the period of suspension of the fourth respondent will remain in force till he rejoins as a clerk or till 6-12-1979. It was this composite order that was stayed by the 3rd respondent by Ext. P3 order. As stated by Raman Nair J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench in S.T.B. Transport v. R.T Officer (1957 KLT.1252) at page 1254: "The effect of a stay granted by an appellate authority is to suspend the order of the original authority until the disposal of the appeal and then give effect to it subject to the decision in the appeal." The legal effect of the order (Ext. P3) is to stop further action from the date of knowledge. In this case in view of Ext. P3 order, the composite order passed by the Society (Exts. P1 and P2) could not be given effect to. Exts.P1 and P2 stood "eclipsed"; they cease to be enforceable. The result will be that the 4th respondent could not be directed to join the service as a junior clerk and also the direction that the period of suspension of the 4th respondent will remain in force till he rejoins as a clerk or till 6-12-1979 cannot be given effect to. The entire order was stayed by Ext. P3. On this ground, also in view of the order of stay passed in Ext. P3 proceedings, the order of suspension dated 12-10-1977 continued, untrammelled or unaffected by anything said or done by Exts.P1 and P2 proceedings. In this view of the matter also, it cannot be contended that the orders passed by the 3rd respondent evidenced by Ext. P5 dated 12-3-1981 and Ext. P6 dated 31-3-1981 are in any way illegal or without jurisdiction. 7. No other point was raised or argued by the counsel. The net result is: the attack against Ext. In this view of the matter also, it cannot be contended that the orders passed by the 3rd respondent evidenced by Ext. P5 dated 12-3-1981 and Ext. P6 dated 31-3-1981 are in any way illegal or without jurisdiction. 7. No other point was raised or argued by the counsel. The net result is: the attack against Ext. P5 in O.P. No. 1700 of 1981 and the attack against Ext. P6 dated 31-3-1981 in O.P. No. 1821 of 1981 are devoid of force. The O.Ps. are. without merits. They are dismissed.