JUDGMENT - Waikar, J.- This judgment shall dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 1980 and Criminal Revision Application No. 248 of 1980. 2. The Criminal Appeal preferred by the State of Maharashtra is directed against the acquittal of the two respondents of the. offence punishable under section 302/34 Indian Penal Code, and of accused No. 2 Waman of the offence punishable under section 201 Indian Penal Code. 3. The victim of the offence is one Anantrao Laxmanrao Shende. He was serving as a Head Master of Dnyanodaya High School, Nagpur, and was residing mostly at Nagpur. He owned some agricultural land and a farm- house at village Parsodi and he often used to visit this village to look after the cultivation. This farm-house, referred to as bungalow in the evidence, was about one furlong away from this village. Both the accused are resi- dents of this village Parsodi. The nearest Police Station for this village is Dighori which is at a distance of one mile. Dighori is the first Railway Station from Nagpur. One Maroti, who died during the investigation, was the trusted servant of deceased Anantrao. In fact, he used to look after the cultivation of Anantrao and was also brought up by him from childhood. 4. The facts wellnigh established and not disputed are that Anantrao left Nagpur for Parsodi on 11-7-1979 and thereafter never returned to Nagpur. His dead body was found buried in the sandy bank of the rivulet and it was discovered on 18-7-1979. In the autopsy, it was found that there were as many as seven stab-wounds on the face and neck. There was a fracture of the Maxilla, cheek-bone and right fore-arm lower ends. The injuries were all antemortem. Evidently, Anantrao was brutally done to death by causing these injuries. 5. The prosecution which holds these two accused responsible for cau- sing the homicidal death of Anantrao rested wholly on the evidence of Maroti. But, unfortunately, this only available eye-witness, after having made some important disclosures to some witnesses and after his statement under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code was recorded, committed suicide on 18-7-1979 as he was jeered at by his father for being so treacherous and infidel to one who had reared him up. 6. It was only on the disclosure being made by Maroti, though belate- dly, that the police could bring these two accused to book. 6. It was only on the disclosure being made by Maroti, though belate- dly, that the police could bring these two accused to book. Admissibility of the statements made by Maroti and the evidentiary value thereof is a, subject of hot debate to which we would advert shortly. 7. Now, as Anantrao did not return from Parsodi till 15th, Eknath (P. W. 3), the peon of the said High School, working under him, visited Parsodi on 15th and finding the bungalow locked, returned to Nagpur and informed Dyaneshwar (P. W. 1), the elder brother of deceased-Anantrao. Dnyaneshwar then sent his son Arun (P. W. 2) and Eknath (P. W. 3) again to Parsodi to make enquiries about his brother Anantrao. They met Maroti in the village who told them that he had, in fact, reached his master upto Dighori Railway Station on 13th itself. Arun and Eknath brought Maroti with them to Nagpur. To Dnyaneshwar also Maroti repeated the same version. Dnyaneshwar sent his other brother Vinayak (who is also since deceased) along with Arun to lodge a report in the Police Station. Accordingly, Vinayak visited Mouda Police Station and lodged the report dated 15-7-1979 (Exhibit-15) that his brother Anantrao was missing since 11-7-1979. 8. Dnyaneshwar himself with Maroti, Lilabai, the lady peon of the High School, and others visited Parsodi to make enquries, but returned without any useful information. Dnyaneshwar suspected that Maroti was suppressing something. He, therefore, again sent Arun, Lilabai and Eknath to Parsodi on 17-7-1979 to make enquiries with Maroti by taking him into confidence. 9. It was on 17-7-1979 that Maroti, for the first time, disclosed to Arun and others that accused No. 1 Damu with an axe and accused No. 2 Waman with a stick attacked Anantrao while he was asleep in the bungalow on the night of 1 lth/12th July, 1979. He (Maroti) was sleeping in the same room where his master was sleeping, and he was threatened to keep quiet. 10. Thereafter Maroti was taken by these persons in a jeep to the Office of the Police Commissioner at Nagpur. Shri Gujale, the P. S. I., of Mouda Police Station (P. W. 18), happened to be there and Maroti was entrus- ted to him, who also interrogated Maroti. Then they came to village Parsodi and on the way Vinayak visited the Police Station, Mouda, and lodged the report dated 17-7-1979 (Ex. Shri Gujale, the P. S. I., of Mouda Police Station (P. W. 18), happened to be there and Maroti was entrus- ted to him, who also interrogated Maroti. Then they came to village Parsodi and on the way Vinayak visited the Police Station, Mouda, and lodged the report dated 17-7-1979 (Ex. 36) in which he mentioned that Anantrao was murdered by these two accused. 11. When the police reached Parsodi on 17-7-1979, the accused were arrested. That night, in the bungalow, Maroti,it is said, disclosed to Dnyane-shwar that he was threatened by these two accused and at their command he carried the dead body on a plough and buried the same in the sands of the rivulet. On the night of 17-7-79 when Arun and Madhukar were sleeping in the school-building of Parsodi, Maroti, who was also in their company, it is alleged, gave the same description as to how Anantrao was murdered and how his dead body was disposed of. 12. It is then alleged that in pursuance of the statement made by accused No. 1 in the presence of panchas, the two accused took them to the river-side and showed the spot from where the dead body of Anantrao was discovered. Again accused No. 1, pursuant to a statement, produced one tin-box from his house which was found to contain a gold-chain and a wrist-watch which belonged to deceased-Anantrao. He also produced an axe. Accused No. 2, in his turn, produced from a manure-pit one half-burnt belt used for Hernia which Anantrao used to wear and a glass of spectacles of Anantrao. Accused No. 2 also produced a fountain-pen which belonged to Anantrao. 13. Lastly, it is alleged that accused No. 1 had an axe to grind against Anantrao as several civil and criminal cases were pending between them. Accused No. 2 had sold one land to Anantrao in the year 1974 and his con- tention was that he had mortgaged it and as such he also bore grudge against Anantrao Broadly, on this material is based the prosecution against these two accused. 14. Both the accused pleaded not guilty and denied every thing. 15. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found that there was some evidence showing that the relations between the deceased and accused No. 1 were strained, but there was no immediate cause for him to commit his murder. 14. Both the accused pleaded not guilty and denied every thing. 15. The learned Additional Sessions Judge found that there was some evidence showing that the relations between the deceased and accused No. 1 were strained, but there was no immediate cause for him to commit his murder. Accused No. 2, however, he observed, had no motive for commit- ting such an offence. He doubted the alleged discovery of the spot in the river-bed at the instance of these accused. The spot was already known to Maroti and he was also present when the accused were taken to the river with the panchas by the police. 16. The evidence of the recovery of articles at the instance of accused Nos. 1 and 2 again, according to him, was highly suspicious. The recorded statement of Maroti under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, by P. S. I. Gujale, according to him, was inadmissible. He accepted the evidence of Arun and Eknath that Maroti had made a disclosure to them on 17th, since the two accused came to be arrested on the disclosure so made by him. He, however, did not accept the evidence that on the night of 17th again in the village School, Maroti narrated the incident to Arun, Eknath and Madhukar as there was no occasion and no necessity for him to do so, as the dead body was already discovered and the accused were arrested, and also the incrimina- ting articles were produced. No human blood was detected on the axe alleged to have been discovered by accused No. 1 and, hence, the learned Judge attached no importance to this discovery. There was no blood found on the Gof which, it is alleged, was recovered from the house of accused No. 1. 16-A. That Anantrao met with a homicidal and a violent death is not and could not be disputed. The only question is about the alleged complicity of these two accused, or any one of them, in the alleged offence. Shri Gaikwad, the learned Counsel for the applicant in Criminal Revision Application No. 248 of 1980, submitted that it is not a case based on circumstantial evidence alone as observed by the learned Judge. It is a case of an eye witness who, unfortunately, could not be made available at the trial. Shri Gaikwad, the learned Counsel for the applicant in Criminal Revision Application No. 248 of 1980, submitted that it is not a case based on circumstantial evidence alone as observed by the learned Judge. It is a case of an eye witness who, unfortunately, could not be made available at the trial. Are the statements made by deceased Maroti to several persons, including the one to the police during investigation, admissible in evidence? If admissible, are they credit-worthy and beyond cavil? The answer to these two questions is the sheet-anchor of the present prosecution. Was Maroti an accomplice is also a ques-tion. The primary meaning of an accomplice is any party to the crime charged and some one who aids and abets the commission of crime, as observed in Sheshanna v. State of Maharashtra1. Here, according to the statement of Maroti, he only assisted the accused in removing the dead body and burying it in the river bed, which he did under duress. Mo charge is framed for caus-ing disappearance of the dead-body. Both the accused are charged of the offence punishable under section 302/34 Indian Penal Code. The accused No. 2 was separately charged of the offence under section 201 Indian Penal Code for causing disappearance of the clothes which was evidence of the commission of the offence of murder. Maroti, therefore, may not be termed as an accomplice. 17. Maroti's statement at Exhibit 72 was recorded by P.S.I. Gujale (P.W. 18) on 17-7-1979 under section 162 Criminal Procedure Code, during investigation. The bar to the use of any statement recorded under section 162 Criminal Procedue Code is removed and relaxed only to the statements falling under clause (1) of section 32 and to the provisions of section 27, Evidence Act (vide section 162 (2) Criminal Procedure Code). Here, section 32(1), Evidence Act, obviously has no application, since the cause of death of Anantrao here is not in question. The statement, at best, may fall under clause (3) of section 32, Evidence Act. Since Maroti was under a legal obli-gation to give information to the nearest Magistrate or the Police Officer of the commission of the offence under section 302 Indian Penal Code, as required by section 39(5) Criminal Procedure Code, he had exposed himself to the offence punishable under section 202 Indian Penal Code. Since Maroti was under a legal obli-gation to give information to the nearest Magistrate or the Police Officer of the commission of the offence under section 302 Indian Penal Code, as required by section 39(5) Criminal Procedure Code, he had exposed himself to the offence punishable under section 202 Indian Penal Code. If it is a state-ment falling under section 32(3), Evidence Act, the bar of section 162 Criminal Procedure Code would operate and the recorded statement of Maroti by P.S.I. Gujale during investigation, therefore, would be inadmissible. 18. The earliest statement of Maroti was to Arun and Eknath on 17-7-1979 at Village Parsodi. All that he disclosed to them was that on the night of 11th, the two accused had murdered Anantrao, without disclosing as to the manner of killing or anything about the corpse. 19. Next, he made the disclosure to P.S.I. Gujale the same day which he recorded and which, as observed above, is inadmissible. In the night of 17th, Maroti is said to have made a detailed statement to Dnyaneshwar, Arun and Eknath in the school-building that accused No. 1 by an axe and accused No. 2 with a stick attacked Anantrao and killed him, that the dead body was buried in the bank of the river and that he was commanded and coerced on the pain of death to help them in carrying the dead body from the bungalow to the river and he, therefore, had carried the same on the plough. 20. It cannot be said that it may be a figment of imagination of wit- nesses Eknath and Arun to attribute such a statement to deceased Maroti. The two accused came to be arrested on 18-7-1979 by the police and it was solely on such a disclosure being made by Maroti implicating them. It may be that earlier Maroti made a broad statement that these accused had murdered Anantrao on the night of 12th in the bungalow and that a detailed account was given by him to the elder brother of deceased Anantrao, viz., Dnyaneshwar, and others on the night of 17th. Let us assume that Maroti did make such a disclosure to Arun, Eknath and Dnyaneshwar. 21. There can be little difficulty again about the admissibility of these statements of Maroti being covered by section 32(3), Evidence Act. The question is about its evidentiary value. Let us assume that Maroti did make such a disclosure to Arun, Eknath and Dnyaneshwar. 21. There can be little difficulty again about the admissibility of these statements of Maroti being covered by section 32(3), Evidence Act. The question is about its evidentiary value. What is the value and worth of such statements of Maroti. It is, at best, a piece of untested evidence. It must satisfy the Court that what deceased Maroti disclosed was unalloyed and whole truth and that it is absolutely safe to act on it. That Maroti is unfortu- nately no more, is neither a redeeming feature nor brings any credit to the prosecution. Credit of deceased Maroti's declaration can be impeached or confirmed in the same manner as that of any other witness in cross examina- tion. 22. It is well-settled that so far as a dying declaration is concerned (section 32(1), Evidence Act), even in the absence of other corroborating evidence, there can be a conviction on the basis of a dying declaration alone. In commending such an evidence, it is always said that a dying man normally would not quit this world with a lie lingering on his lips, implicating falsely an innocent man. On the other hand, the person indicted of a serious offence legitimately complains that he is not examined on oath and is not subjected to any cross-examination. In evaluating such an evidence, though the Judge may not look for or insist on any corroboration, but bearing in mind the above factors, the Judge must be able to say unhesitatingly, “It is truthful. It is sterling.” Now, though it could be said equally of the statement falling under section 32 (3), Evidence Act also, such a statement, in our opinion, cannot be compared with a dying declaration and both do not stand on the same footing. In the assessment of a dying declartion, some special consider- ations arise. A sense of an apprehension of death, it is said, produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious responsible man under oath. Barring the cases where the injuries are accidental or self-inflicted or when suicide is attempted, the dying man is the victim of an act of some one, and the danger is one of false implication. Barring the cases where the injuries are accidental or self-inflicted or when suicide is attempted, the dying man is the victim of an act of some one, and the danger is one of false implication. However, in making a statement which may expose the deceased for a criminal prosecution, a blameworthy conduct attaches itself to the maker. The illustration (f) to section 32, Evidence Act, would explain the point: “(f) The question is, whether A and B were legally married. The statement of deceased clergyman that he married them under such circumstances that the celebration would be a crime, is relevant.” In respect of the statement of the deceased which might expose him to a criminal prosecution (a case falling under section 32(3) of the Evidence Act), we do not think, it would be safe to accept its veracity without looking for any corroboration. A perpetrator of a criminal act, after successfully dodging and hoodwinking for quite some time may falsely implicate an innocent person and thereafter may, either because of his death or other circumstances contemplated under section 32, render himself incapable of giving evidence in Court. In such a situation, it would he extremely hazar-dous to accept implicitly the statement of such a person without any corro-boration and convict the persons named by him only because the statement happens to fall under section 32(3) of the Evidence Act, viz., that he had exposed himself to the offence under section 202, Indian Penal Code. The test of a dying declaration under section 32(1), Evidence Act, cannot, there-fore, be applied to a statement under section 32(3). It is a weak type of evidence, and in the absence of any corroboration, it has little evidentiary value. 23. Sub-section (3) of section 32, Evidence Act, is worded thus : “When the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.” The expression, “if true”, preceding the last limb of the provision is signifi-cant and meaningful. According to Shri Gaikwad, it refers to proof of the fact that the deceased really made the statement and it has nothing to do with the truth or otherwise of the alleged main offence. With respect, it is difficult to accept such an interpretation. According to Shri Gaikwad, it refers to proof of the fact that the deceased really made the statement and it has nothing to do with the truth or otherwise of the alleged main offence. With respect, it is difficult to accept such an interpretation. In fact, section 32 comes into play only after it is established as a fact or assumed that a particular state-ment was made by such a person, and the question of its relevancy arises for consideration. The expression “if true” appearing in clause (3) does not apply to earlier part but governs the last limb, and the reason is obvious. The statement against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person, itself, partakes the character of an admission and it binds the maker and his successor unless disproved; where as a civil or a criminal liability can arise only if certain facts are established against him. The expression “if true” in the context of the last limb (with which we are concerned here), in our opinion, means not the fact of the concerned statement but the truth of the content of that statement which really exposes him to a criminal prosecution or a civil suit for damages. It is necessary, therefore, that what is stated is corroborated by independent evidence or attending circumstances in order to establish its truth. 24. Maroti remained in the village from 12th after his master was done to death till 15th. When Eknath and Arun made enquiries with him, he laid false trails by saying that Anantrao was reached to the Station by him on the 13th itself. He repeated the same version to Dnyaneshwar, the elder brother of Anantrao. It was not his version that after 12th night also he was being threatened by the accused in the village on the pain of death not to disclose to anyone. It was on 17th when he was either cajoled or threatened by Arun and others that he gave this version implicating the accused and ascribing himself the role of a helpless victim in the act of carry- ing the dead body and burying it in the river bed. 25. It was on 17th when he was either cajoled or threatened by Arun and others that he gave this version implicating the accused and ascribing himself the role of a helpless victim in the act of carry- ing the dead body and burying it in the river bed. 25. The circumstances supplying corroboration to the alleged state- ment of Maroti, according to the prosecution, are-(l) there existed the motive for committing this crime, (2) discovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused and (3) recovery of the articles belonging to the deceased at the instance of the accused. 26. As regards the motive for accused No. 1, Dnyaneshawar stated that his brother Anantrao had disputes with accused No. 1. Advocate De (P. W. 16) stated that he filed some proceedings in the Civil Court on behalf of Anantrao in the year, 1979 for perpetual injunction. He also proved that a criminal complaint was filed by Anantrao against accused No. 1, the Criminal Case being 1463 of 1977. There is, thus, reason to believe that strained relations existed between deceased Anantrao and accused No. 1. 27. So far as accused No. 2 is concerned, there is, in fact, no evidence of motive. Admittedly, accused No. 2 had sold one field to Anantrao under a registered sale deed in the year 1974. Though Dnyaneshwar stated that Anantrao used to say that accused No. 2 was alleging that it was a mortgage, the accused No. 2 himself denied this fact. No notice was served by accused No. 2, nor any suit filed contending that it was a transaction of mortgage. Thus, the evidence of motive, so far as accused No. 2 is concerned, is, in fact, non-existent. 28. As regards discovery of the dead body, the panch witness Kond-baji (P. W. 15) and Eknath (P. W. 3) stated that the accused made a statement that they would show the place where the dead-body of Anantrao was buried, and that the statement of accused No. 1 to that effect (Ex. 59) was recorded in the morning of 18-7-1979. Thereafter they took the police and the panchas and showed the place from where the dead body was taken out. 59) was recorded in the morning of 18-7-1979. Thereafter they took the police and the panchas and showed the place from where the dead body was taken out. During cross-examination, this is what Kondbaji admitted: “One policeman whose name I do not remember had come to call me at my house at about 7.00 a. m. That policeman told me that a dead body was found on the bank of the river and that, therefore, I should go with him for panchanama. With that policeman I went to the river. (Volunteers all of us went there). Everything was kept written. The policeman asked me to sign it there and hence I signed it. After signature, I returned to the master's bungalow.” 29. Now, it is pertinent to note that the memorandum at Exhibit-59 shows that accused No. 1 promised to show the dead body, the gold chain, the wrist watch and also the axe. According to the above statement of panch Kondbaji, the corpse was already discovered at the bank of the river and he was, therefore, taken there. At the river, he signed documents which were kept ready and from the river, he came to the bungalow, though in his examination-in-chief, be deposed that from the river, they visited the house of accused No. 1. In fact, in further cress-examination on behalf of accused No. 2, he repeated the very same things “The policeman came to ray house at about 8.06 a. m. I then went to the river and from there, to the bangalow.” Thus, the evidence of this independent witness raises serious doubt as to whether accused No. 1 really had discovered the corpse or any articles as alleged, in pursuance of Exhibition-59. 30. The evidence regarding the alleged seizure of a pen from accused No. 2 again Appeared highly suspicious. The panch Suryabhan (P. W. 17) in this examination n-chief, no doubt, stated that in pursuance of the statement made by accused No. 2, be took out a pen from his house. During cross-examination, however, this is what he stated : “A policeman came and asked me to accompany him to accused Woman's house, He alse told me that a pen was also to be seized from Waman.” 31. During cross-examination, however, this is what he stated : “A policeman came and asked me to accompany him to accused Woman's house, He alse told me that a pen was also to be seized from Waman.” 31. Even assuming, therefore, that the gold-chain, the wrist-watch and the pen belonging to the deceased Anantrao, as deposed to by Dnyaneshwar, were recovered, it is highly doubtful whether they were discovered by these accused in pursuance of a statement made before the panchas. 32. Curiously enough, Dnyaneshwar at the fag end of his cross-examin- ation deposed thus: “It is true that nothing was seized from the accused in my presence.” 33. The P. S. I. Gujale (P, W. 18) in his cross-examination stated: “At that time during investigation, I suspected that even that recorded statement of Maroti might be false. In the night I thought it proper to go to the river first to ascertain if the dead body was really there but we could not go. We had no torch light with us at that time On inter- rogation Maroti told that the dead-body was at such and such place. It was about 11 or 11-30 a.m. I received information from Maroti as to the place where the body was lying. Till I was not satisfied about the occurrence of murder I did not think it necessary to record Maroti's state- ment as memorandum of discovery, I had decided not to record such memorandum, till 1 personally saw the dead body.” 34. This means that the exact location of the spot was known and was-within the knowledge of Maroti. The P. S. I. did not proceed to recover the dead body after recording the statement of Maroti on the night of 17th because they had no torch, that he suspected the truth of the version of Maroti and lastly he thought it proper not to record Maroti's memorandum till he actually visited the spot. Thus, his handicap in the way of recovery of the corpse was not that the exact location of the spot was not known to Maroti but the above factors narrated by him. 35. The recovery of the axe from the house of accused No. I, on which no blood was detected as per the report of the Chemical Analyser, in our opinion, has little significance. 35. The recovery of the axe from the house of accused No. I, on which no blood was detected as per the report of the Chemical Analyser, in our opinion, has little significance. According to Shri Gaikwad, existence or non-existence of blood is not the determining factor and be relied upon; (Moharu v. State)2. There the identity of the concerned sword, which was the weapon of the offence was duly and clearly established by eye-witnesses and, hence, non-existence of blood assumed no importance. Here, there is nothing: to establish independently that this particular axe was the weapon of the offence. 36. Again, no blood was found on the gold chain (Gof). The learned Additional Sessions Judge rightly observed that if this Gof was around the neck of the deceased when he was so brutally hacked to death, it would be soaked with blood. 37. To sum up, therefore, no motive existed for accused No. 2 to commit this offence. The relations between accused No. 1 and the deceased, no doubt, were strained since many years, but there was no immediate cause for him to take such an extreme, step. The conduct of Maroti, who was in charge of the cultivation of the deceased, in laying false trails and giving false information to the relatives, was highly suspicious. That he was tight-lipped for full five days and adopted such a course because he was under duress and threats, is incredible. A belated disclosure implicating these two accused by him after five days, after he was pestered, may be admissible under section 32(3), Evidence Act. It is, firstly, a weak type of evidence and, secondly, it cannot be accepted in the absence of any corroboration. Apart from the fact that the corroboration that is sought to be offered is not proved, it could not necessarily connect the accused with the offence of murder. Once the statement of deceased Maroti is eliminated as highly unreliable and suspicious, the bare circumstance that accused No. 1 was found in possession of certain articles belonging to deceased Anantrao can- not lead us to the inference that he is the murderer. Though reliance was placed by Shri Gaikwad on (Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh)3 and (Baiju v. State of Madhya Pradesh)*, we find that the facts present there were altogether different. Though reliance was placed by Shri Gaikwad on (Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh)3 and (Baiju v. State of Madhya Pradesh)*, we find that the facts present there were altogether different. In Wasim Khan's case, the deceased had travelled with his goods with the appellant on his bullock-cart. The appellant-accused in his statement admitted that he and the deceased were the only two persons in the cart. He explained that some people called the deceased, while the cart was on the journey. He was found in possession of deceased's goods three days thereafter and he made no efforts to trace the whereabouts of the deceased nor lodged information about his disappearance from his bullock-cart. It was under these circumstances that it was observed that the cir- cumstantial evidence adduced at the trial established the offence of murder and robbery against the appellant and not merely the minor offence of robbery. 38. In Baiju's case, the prosecution had proved beyond doubt that the commission of the murders and the robbery formed part of one transaction and, hence, the recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property by the accused justified the presumption that it was he, and no one else, who had committed the murders and the robbery. It is observed that the question whether a presumption should be drawn under illlustration (a) of section 114 is a matter which depends on the evidence and the circumstances of each case. 39. In (Sanwoi Khan v. State of Rajasthan)5, this is what the Supreme Court, in fact, observed: “From the solitary circumstance of the unexplained recovery of the two articles from the houses of the accused the only inference that can be raised in view of illustration (a) to S. 114 is that they are either receivers of stolen property or were the persons who committed the theft, but it does not necessarily indicate that the theft and the murders took place at one and the same time.” 40. In the instant case, as observed above, once the statement of Maroti is eliminated from consideration as highly suspicious and unreliable, the cir- cumstance that property of the deceased was found with the accused No. i cannot necessarily lead to the inference that he was the murderer. 41. In the instant case, as observed above, once the statement of Maroti is eliminated from consideration as highly suspicious and unreliable, the cir- cumstance that property of the deceased was found with the accused No. i cannot necessarily lead to the inference that he was the murderer. 41. Lastly, it is an appeal against acquittal and we find that the possi- ble view in favour of the accused as expressed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is more than reasonably probable and we, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. 42. The appeal as well as the Criminal Revision Application are both dismissed. Appeal and Revision Application dismissed. ----