JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - The petitioner was appointed as a Driver under the Orissa Road Transport Company Limited, Berhampur (Ganjam) by its General Manager on 8-5-1951. A disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner by opposite party No. 1. By Memo No. 2267 dated 29-9-1976, it was alleged that on 10-1-1976 the petitioner had taken away 2 litres of engine oil in a castrol (grease) tin from the garage in Bus No. ORG 2392 of which he was the driver. The said Bus was scheduled to go on Berhampur-Jagannath Prasad route when the aforesaid theft and unauthorised act of the petitioner was detected. It was alleged that the aforesaid action of the petitioner amounts to gross misconduct under the provisions of subclause (3) of clause 14-A of the modified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner denied the charge and contested the proceeding. After the enquiry was concluded, opposite party No. 1 by his order dated 30-3-1977 found the petitioner guilty of the charge and discharged him from service as per the provisions of clause 14-B(ix) of the Standing Orders. Opposite party No. 1 there after, filed Misc. Case No. 11/1977 before the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, opposite party No. 2, under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to approve the action taken by opposite party No. 1 as I.D. Case No. 14/1969 concerning the petitioner and other workmen was pending adjudication before the said Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 1-5-1979 in Misc. Case No. 11/1977 (Annexure-I) approved the action taken by opposite party No. 1 against the petitioner. The petitioner challenges the order of the Tribunal in Annexure-I in this writ application 2. The order of Tribunal (Annexure-I) has been assailed mainly on the ground that the same has not taken into consideration the evidence on record and therefore, the finding of the disciplinary proceeding confirmed by the Tribunal is based on no evidence. It was argued that the conclusion reached by opposite party No. 1 finding the petitioner guilty of the charge and the punishment awarded amount to unfair labour practice and intended to vitimise the petitioner on false allegations. 3. In a proceeding under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was argued that the conclusion reached by opposite party No. 1 finding the petitioner guilty of the charge and the punishment awarded amount to unfair labour practice and intended to vitimise the petitioner on false allegations. 3. In a proceeding under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. it has been held by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Tribunal is not required to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute and that it has only to consider where the ban which has been imposed should be lifted. For that purpose, the employer has to make out a prima facie case justifying the lifting of the ban. In a decision reported in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh A.I.R, 1972 S.C. 1031, their Lordships have observed that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is only to satisfy itself whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer and that the employer has not acted mala fide and that the enquiry has been held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the procedure indicated in the Standing Orders, if any Their Lordships have further said that once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the management has not acted mala fide and that there has been a proper enquiry and the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is a possible one on the evidence led before it, the Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Enquiry Officer though it may have come to a different conclusion on the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer. 4. Applying the aforesaid principles, we find that the Tribunal has rightly come to a conclusion that all reasonable opportunities were given to the present petitioner in the enquiry conducted against him. Nothing has been brought to our notice during the course of argument by the petitioner from which it can be said that the employer has acted mala fide or that the enquiry was held in violation of the principles of the natural justice or the procedures prescribed in the Standing Orders. Nothing has been brought to our notice during the course of argument by the petitioner from which it can be said that the employer has acted mala fide or that the enquiry was held in violation of the principles of the natural justice or the procedures prescribed in the Standing Orders. We have gone through the statements recorded during the enquiry copies of which were supplied to us by the learned counsel for the petitioner during the hearing of this case As a matter of fact the petitioner all through the proceeding begged to be excused and plea taken by him that he did know the contents of the statement signed by him has been rightly rejected. The Tribunal after considering the statement of witnesses and the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that the findings arrived at in the enquiry by opposite party No. 2 art prima facie reasonable and does not suffer from any defect. The plea of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceeding against him and the punishment awarded by opposite party No. 1 involve unfair labour practice and mallicious victimisation is not supported by any evidence whatsoever. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is to give permission asked for. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the offence alleged for which the Tribunal should have interfered and imposed punishment commensurate with the guilt of the petitioner. It is well settled in law that the Tribunal has no power to substitute another punishment in a proceeding under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act the scope of which is limited. The petitioner, if advised, may move the employer in that behalf in which event the employer may, if permissible under law, pass appropriate orders. 5. In the result, the writ application fails and is accordingly dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed