Judgment 1. Plaintiff of Title Suit No. 194/66 of 1961/65 of the Court of 1st Additional Munsif, Gopalganj, has moved this Court after the dismissal of his appeal being Title Appeal No. 35/10 of 1966/74 by the Subordinate Judge, Gopalganj. He had sought declaration of his title over 2 bighas 1 Dhur of land described in Schedule 1 of the plaint and also for redemption of 1 Bigha 17 Kathas 7 Dhurs of Zerpeshgi land described in Schedule 2 of the plaint and recovery of possession of the land not covered by Zerpeshgi deed as also mesne profits. 2. Plaintiffs case stated in brief is as follows : The suit lands belonged to defendants 1 and 2. They executed a Zerpeshgi deed in respect of Schedule 2 lands in favour of defendant 3 and thereafter on 12-6-1961 sold the said lands for a sum of Rs. 2,000.00 by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 300.00 in cash to him before the execution of the sale deed. Out of the remaining sum, Rs. 1500.00 being the Zerpeshgi money of defendant 3, was kept in amanat as also a sum of Rs. 200.00 taken as loan by the plaintiff on a hand-note from defendant 3. Plaintiff demanded the registration receipt from the defendants 1 and 2 but they declined to give the receipt on the plea that Rs. 200.00 which the plaintiff was required to pay to defendant 3, was yet unpaid. The plaintiff accompanied with defendants 1 and 2 went to defendant 3 and tendered the sum of Rs. 200.00 but defendant 3 refused to accept the same. On 20-6-1961 the plaintiff tendered the entire sum of Rs. 1700.00 to defendant 3 but he refused to accept on the ground that the Zerpeshgi deed was not with him. On 28-6-1961 also when the plaintiff tendered the said sum of Rs. 1700.00 he was told by defendants 1 and 2 that they had already executed a deed of cancellation as also a fresh sale deed in favour of defendant 3. Plaintiff thereafter obtained copies of the deed of cancellation and the sale deed executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of defendant 3. 1700.00 he was told by defendants 1 and 2 that they had already executed a deed of cancellation as also a fresh sale deed in favour of defendant 3. Plaintiff thereafter obtained copies of the deed of cancellation and the sale deed executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of defendant 3. He found from the recitals of the sale deed that defendants 1 and 2 had wrongly stated that the plaintiff had not paid the consideration money in full and as such no title had passed in his favour. The plaintiff accordingly filed the suit seeking the reliefs as stated above. 3. Defendants 1 and 2 as also defendant 3 filed their respective written statements. Their common case was that defendants 1 and 2 badly needed a sum of Rs. 300.00 to meet the marriage expenses of defendant 1 for which purpose they agree to sell the suit land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, failed to pay the said sum and as the payment of the said sum was a condition precedent the sale did not take effect. Since even after the execution of the sale deed the plaintiff did not pay to defendants 1 and 2 any money and as they urgently needed money for marriage expenses, they approached defendant 3 who agreed to pay the full price amounting to Rs. 3000.00 before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration of the document and accordingly defendants 1 and 2 executed the deed of cancellation and the sale deed in favour of defendant 3 and having received the purchase money put defendant 3 in possession. 4. There had been another plea also that defendants 1 and 2 belonged to backward class and the plaintiff before purchasing their property had to obtain permission from the Collector and since no permission, as required, was obtained before the execution of the sale deed it demised no title in favour of the plaintiff. 5. The trial court as also the court of appeal below dismissed the suit on the common ground that no title passed to the plaintiff on the basis of the sale deed executed by defendants 1 and 2. The trial court, however, found that defendants 1 and 2 were the members of the backward class and since no permission from the Collector was obtained for the transfer, it created no valid title in favour of the plaintiff. The trial court, however, found that defendants 1 and 2 were the members of the backward class and since no permission from the Collector was obtained for the transfer, it created no valid title in favour of the plaintiff. The court of appeal below, however, although recorded difference of opinion on the question that defendants 1 and 2 belonged to the backward class held that it was of no consequence because the plaintiff failed to prove his title. 6. Facts admitted and/or found by the courts below are that defendants 1 and 2 executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for stipulated sum of Rs. 2,000.00 but the plaintiff did not pay the entire consideration money to defendants 1 and 2, the registration receipt was not handed over by defendants 1 and 2 to the plaintiff, plaintiff did not come in possession of the vended property, defendants 1 and 2 executed a second sale deed in favour of defendant 3 and also executed a deed of cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and defendant 3 assumed possession upon the suit land after making full payment of the purchase money to defendants 1 and 3. 7. Mr. Binod Kumar Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, had contended that the courts below have committed error of law by taking into account collateral evidence for holding that no title passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant even after the execution and registration of the sale deed. He has submitted that the courts below were obliged to examine the contents of the sale deed and if they found no preservation in the document, the only course open to them was to hold that the title passed in favour of the plaintiff with the execution of the sale deed. In short his submission before me is that in the instant case the sale deeds" recitals conclude the transfer of title as no condition like full payment of purchase money etc. is attached to the passing of the title to the vendee. In short his submission before me is that in the instant case the sale deeds" recitals conclude the transfer of title as no condition like full payment of purchase money etc. is attached to the passing of the title to the vendee. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has submitted that the title passes on execution and registration of a deed or only on payment of consideration depends upon the intention of the parties to be gathered from the deed but parties contesting the claim cannot be prevented from adducing evidence to show that the recitals in the sale deed are untrue and/or that the vendee did not acquire title because he failed to fulfil his part of the contract of sale. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the provisions under S.91 and S.92, Evidence Act. Section 91, Evidence Act, provides that no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of a contract or of a grant or of any other disposition of property, if the terms of such contract have been reduced to the form of a document. Section 92, Evidence Act, says that no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. To this, however, there are several exceptions. Such exceptions include evidence as to the fact that the document is invalid on account of fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want or failure of consideration, want of capacity in any contracting party or mistake in fact or law, and the fact of existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which the document is silent and which is not inconsistent with its terms including existence of any separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property. Of course existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property may not be proved in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing or has been registered according to law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents. What follows from these provisions is that parol or collateral evidence as to a condition precedent to any such contract or disposition of property is permissible, but existence of any distinct subsequent agreement to rescind or modify the same in cases in which such terms are incorporated in a document registered in accordance with law is not permissible. Though the general principle is that extrinsic parol evidence contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of solemn written instrument is inadmissible, there are numerous exceptions and qualifications to it. Strict application of the rule may operate harshly if the exceptions are not allowed their full say because a person unwittingly falling a prey to a fraud, intimidation or similar designs shall not get opportunity to prove the same and the rule shall operate not in the interest of justice but against it. This Court has found itself facing contentions of this nature beginning from the case of Makhan Lal Marwari, AIR 1917 Patna 514 up to the case of Baldeo Singh 1978 Pat LJR 255: (AIR 1978 Patna 97). Several decisions on this question are Division Bench judgments including the two referred to above. In Baldeo Singh"s case N. P. Singh, J. with whom P. S. Sahay, J. concurred, has stated the law in the following words:- "On the basis of the aforesaid decision it can be said that it is almost settled that the question whether title passes on mere execution and registration of a deed or only on payment of consideration depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the deed. It has also been held that though the sale deed may recite that the consideration has been paid, but there is nothing to prevent the parties from adducing evidence to show that the recital is untrue and that, in fact, the consideration was not paid; this will not be barred by S.92, Evidence Act." After stating the said law N. P. Singh, J. noticed that the sale deed in question recited that consideration money had been paid and there was nothing due from the vendee to whom the possession had also been delivered but the plaintiff admitted that neither the consideration money was paid nor possession delivered to them at the time of the execution and registration of the sale deed. Two questions thereafter were posed : (i) Whether even without payment of the consideration money, title had passed to the plaintiffs or not and (ii) Whether title passed at a later stage when the consideration money was offered by the plaintiffs to the defendants first set or not. It transpired from the recitals of the sale deed that the title could pass only on the payment of the full consideration money as it was stated in the sale deed that possession was delivered on payment of the full consideration money but it was found that the full consideration money had not been paid. The first question was answered against the vendee on this basis. On the second question N. P. Singh, J. noticed the authorities and the principle embodied under S.55, Contract Act, and pointed out that S.55, Contract Act, does not lay down any principle which differs from those under the law of England as regards contract to sell land and extracted a passage from a Privy Council Judgment in Jamshed Khodaram Irani V/s. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, AIR 1915 PC 83 that, "under that law equity which governs the rights of the parties in cases of specific performance of contracts to sell real estate, looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain whether the parties, notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place really and in substance intended more than that it should take place within a reasonable time." Following this, N. P. Singh, J. has said : "A vendor cannot be expected to wait indefinitely to enable the vendee to perform his part, and he is at liberty in such a situation to sell the property to another person." In the instant case the courts below have found that payment of full consideration money was a condition precedent to the transfer of the property in favour of the plaintiff and since the plaintiff did not pay the full consideration money, before the deed of cancellation was executed, the plaintiff got no title under the sale deed in question. Although, however, quite a few cases explaining and reiterating the law including the case of (1) Md. Although, however, quite a few cases explaining and reiterating the law including the case of (1) Md. Murtaza Hussain V/s. Abdul Rahman AIR 1949 Patna 364, (2) Motilal Sahu V/s. Ugrah Narain Sahu AIR 1950 Patna 288 (3) Panchoo Sahu V/s. Janki Mandar, AIR 1952 Patna 263, (4) Shiva Narayan Sah V/s. Baidya Nath Prasad Tiwary, AIR 1973 Patna 386 and Mosst. Orhulia V/s. Prasad Yadav (Second Appeal No. 386 of 1971, disposed of on 29-7-1977), Reported in ILR (1977) 56 Patna 943 were noticed and followed in the case of Baldeo Singh (supra), learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the case of Pritam Singh V/s. Jagannath Sarawagi AIR 1947 Patna 1 which has not been noticed in the judgment of Baldeo Singh"s case. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the law stated in unambiguous term is that investigation into attending facts is not permissible once it is found that the document conveys title. According to him Baldeo Singh"s case (supra) has not correctly stated the law and it substantially conflicts with what has been held in the case of Pritam Singh (supra). I notice, however, no conflict between the two. Nothing has been stated in the case of Pritam Singh (supra) beyond reiterating the objective principle enshrined under S.92, Evidence Act, that parol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid instrument. I have already noticed the exception that want or failure of consideration, the condition precedent to the transfer, irrespective of the recitals of the document, can be proved by independent evidence. Whether the consideration is executed or is still executory or in other words whether the consideration is actually paid and accepted or not is a question which a Court can determine on such evidence that the parties may lead and the contents of the document of disposition shall not be conclusive for the said purpose. There is no other contention raised before me and since I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, this appeal must fail. 9 In the result this appeal is dismissed but without costs.