AVADH BEHARI ROHATGI, J. ( 1 ) THESE are eight landacquisition appeals. Four are by the owners: Four are by theacquiring authority, the Union, of India. This judgment willgovern them all. ( 2 ) THESE appeals were heard in the first instance by Yogeshwardayal, J. Before him the question arose whether a postnotification sale can be taken into consideration in determiningthe market value of the land on the date of the notificationunder Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act ). Two rulings were cited before him. One was a decision of thedivision bench of this Court (Jagjit Singh and Safeer, JJ) in M\s. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, ILR (1972) Delhi554 (1 ). The other was a decision of one of us (Avadh Behari. J.) in *delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese v. Union of India (RFA363 of 1968 decided on 24-4-79) (2 ). The learned judge foundthat these two decisions were conflicting. He, therefore, referredthe matter to a larger bench by his order dated 1/12/1980. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the question which arose beforethe learned Judge and which arises on these appeals before us,it is necessary to recite a few facts. The land of the ownersin all these appeals was acquired by a notification dated 7-3-1962issued under Section 4 of the Act. The owners relied upon asale transaction of 24-5-1962 by which a plot of land measuring756 sq. yards situate in South Extension Part II was sold@ Rs. 58. 60 per sq. yard. This very plot was originally sold on11-10-1961 (@ Rs. 26 per sq. yard. After a few months it wasresold on 24-5-1962 at Rs. 58. 50 per sq. yard, as we havesaid. The owners strongly relied upon this post-notification saleto show the rising trend of the prices, though there is a gap of2-112 months between the notification under Section 4 i. e. 7-3-1962 and the resale i. e. 24-5-1962. The question for decision is whether this post-notification sale can be accepted as aguide for determining the market value of the land on 7-3-1962. This question troubled the learned Judge. It may be mentionedhere that though the resale took place on 24-5-1962 the agreement to sell was entered into on 20/04/1962. The question for decision is whether this post-notification sale can be accepted as aguide for determining the market value of the land on 7-3-1962. This question troubled the learned Judge. It may be mentionedhere that though the resale took place on 24-5-1962 the agreement to sell was entered into on 20/04/1962. It will benoticed that between the first sale of 11-10-1961, the agreementto sell on 20-4-1962 and the actual resale on 24-5-1962 thereis a ciose proximity of time which, in our opinion, ought tomake the sale as well as the resale admissible in evidence. Thefirst sale is anterior in point of time by nearly five months. The resale is posterior in time by 2-112 months. Should thecourt refuse to look at the post-notification sale ? There is nodispute that the sale dated 11-10-61 can be classed as a guideto the market value of the land. ( 4 ) IN Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. the facts were that the appellant purchased the land in May, 1957, after the date of thenotification under Section 4 of the Act which was issued inthat case on 2-1-1957. The question arose whether the pricewhich the purchaser had paid could be taken into considerationin determining the market value of the land. The learned Judgesheld that the price which the purchaser had paid after Section4 notification could not be taken into consideraion. They refiedon Section 24, clause seventhly which says "24. But the Court shall not take into consideration--Seventhly, any outlay or improvements on. or disposalof, the land acquired commenced, made or affectedwithout the sanction of the Collector after thedate of the publication of the notification undersection 4, sub-section (1 ). "the learned Judges said: "it is the market value of the land as on the date of thepublication of the notification under section 4 whichis to be taken into consideration for determiningcompensation. " ( 5 ) AS regards the purchase by Modi Sugar Mills alter thenotification under section 4 had been issued the judges said : "the effect of clause "seventhly" quoted above, is thatwhile computing compensation the price evidencedby any transactions which may have taken place afterthe date of the publication of the notification undersection 4 of the Act, cannot be taken into consideration. " (page 560 ). ( 6 ) IN our opinion the learned Judges were perfectly rightin deciding as they did. " (page 560 ). ( 6 ) IN our opinion the learned Judges were perfectly rightin deciding as they did. Section 23 (1) says : "23 (1) In determining the amount of compensation to beawarded for land acquired under this Act, thecourt shall take into consideration first, the market value of the land at tile dateof the publication of the notification under section4, sub-section (1 ). ( 7 ) "the law is well settled that the market value for purposes of compensation under the Act has to fixed on thedate of the notification under section 4. It is equally wellsettled that a purchaser who purchases the land after the notification under section 4 cannot claim that he should be paidcompensation according to the price which he had paid. Northat the price which he had paid reflects the market price ofthe land. The crucial date for the determination of the marketvalue is the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 (1) of the Act. The seventhly clause of section 24 saysthat any outlay or improvements on such land made, commenced or affected, with the intention of enhancing the compensation to be awarded under the Act, is a matter to be "neglected" in determining compensation. This is a sound principle. Otherwise the owner of the land will increase the burden ofthe taker of the laid nv making additions or improvements onthe land acquired (Mercer v. Liverpool St. Helens and Southlancaster Railways, (1904) AC 461 (3), Modi Nagar Mills, inour opinion, was correctly decided. ( 8 ) THE question with which we are concerned in the present appeals really arose not in Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. but indelhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese. A post notification sale canbe helpful in determining the market value of the land in agreater or a lesser degree. It may show the rising trend of prices. The material date, no doubt, for awarding compensation is thedate of notification under section 4 (1 ). But a sale made immediately after the notification or a few days after cannot hedisregarded entirely. It may show the rising trend of prices. The material date, no doubt, for awarding compensation is thedate of notification under section 4 (1 ). But a sale made immediately after the notification or a few days after cannot hedisregarded entirely. In Melwood Units Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissionerof Main Roads, (1979) All E. R. 161 (4), the Privy Council said: "now it is plain that in assessing values for the purposeof compensation for resumption on compulsory acquisition a tribunal is not required to close its mindto transactions subsequent to the date of resumption:they may well be relevant or of assistance to a greater or lesser degree. " (page 166 ). ( 9 ) THIS is what one of us (Avadh Behari, J.) said in Delhisimla Catholic Archdiocese. A sale at or about the materialtime can be taken into consideration. What evidentiary valueshould be attached to that sale is a question of fact which hasto be determined by the tribunal assessing the compensation,taking all the circumstances of the case into account. In Delhisimla Catholic Archdiocese reference was made to Mugneerambengur and Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 Calcutta369 (5), where it was said : "there is no rule that a post-notification transaction ofsale of land similar to the acquired land cannot belooked into. If in considering a post-notification sale. the court finds that after the publication of the notification, the price of the lands in the locality hasbeen affected, in that case it will not be proper forthe court to rely on such a transaction of sale, forit will not be any guide for the determination ofthe market value of the acquired land. " (page 376 ). ( 10 ) THESE appeals illustrate vividly the value to be attachedto a post-notification sale. On 11/10/1961, a plot of landmeasuring 756 sq. yards was sold at Rs. 26. 50 per sq. yard. On24-5-1962 it was resold for Rs. 58. 50 per sq. yard. Bymailing adjustment one can well arrive at the value of the landon 7-3-1962, the valuation date. During this period of nearlyeight months the rise in the price of the land was nearlyrs. 4 per month. From Rs. 26. 50 per sq. yard the price shotto Rs. 58. 50 per sq. yard. here was an increase of Rs. 32per sq.-yard. It will be unjust to the owners if Rs. 26. 50 per sq. During this period of nearlyeight months the rise in the price of the land was nearlyrs. 4 per month. From Rs. 26. 50 per sq. yard the price shotto Rs. 58. 50 per sq. yard. here was an increase of Rs. 32per sq.-yard. It will be unjust to the owners if Rs. 26. 50 per sq. yard is taken as the yardstick to measure the value of the land,the resale shows, if anything, that there has been an upwardtrend in the value of the land. Prices were increasing by leapsand bounds. The resale certainly shows this. The price ofrs. 58. 50 per sq, yard was agreed upon between the parties. us we have said, on 24/04/1962, though the sale was consummated on 24/05/1962. So between 7-3-1962 and20-4-1962 the difference is only of a month or so. That Rs. 58. 50per sq. yard mirror the market value is, in our opinion, a safeconclusion to arrive at with the help of this post-notificationsale. This post-notification sale is a reliable guide to the valueof the land in this locality. More so when we have dependableevidence of sale of this very plot on 11-10-1961 when it wassold for Rs. 26. 50 per sq. yard. ( 11 ) SO on the question referred to us by the learned judgeour conclusion is that it is all a question of proximity of time. A sale of neighbouring land. no matter how similar to the loadtaken, is not admissible unless the sale was so near in pointof time as to furnish a test of present value, and the determination of this fact is left to the discretion of the trial court. Remoteness in point of time, however, will condemn the evidentiaryvalue of a sale only where there has been such a change inconditions during the interval as to make the sale an unreliabletest of value. By proving a change in market conditions eitherparty may explain away the significance of the sale (Nichols oneminent Domain, Vol. 5, pages 286-287 ). ( 12 ) SO the principle is that the evidence of the price paidat voluntary sales of land similar to that taken at or about thetime of the taking is admissible as independent evidence of thevalue of the land. Such evidence has considerable probativevalue. Market value, of course is the price at which an articlesells in the open market. This price is fixed by sales actuallyconsumated. Such evidence has considerable probativevalue. Market value, of course is the price at which an articlesells in the open market. This price is fixed by sales actuallyconsumated. Such sales, when made under normal and fairconditions are necessarily a better test of the market valuethan the speculative opinions of witnesses; for truly, here iswhere "money talks. " The question whether such evidence shallbe admitted does not depend upon any fundamental principleof the law of evidence, but is a purely practical one. dependingupon whether the post- notification sale is of any help in arriving at the market value. It may well be relevant or of assistanceto a greater or lesser degree, having regard to the proximity intime. As the Privy Council said the tribunal is not required toclose its mind to transactions subsequent to the date of the notification for the purpose of determining compensation. ( 13 ) HAVING dealt with the question referred to us by thelearned judge we now turn to the appeals. First, we will takeup the appeal of Gurmukh Singh Chawla. RFA No. 479 of 1969; (S. Gurmukh Singh Chawla, deceased through S. Joginder Singhchawla v. Union of India ). ( 14 ) THE owner s land measuring 8 bighas l6 biswas invillage Masjid Moth was acquired by the Government pursuantto a notification under section 4 dated 7-3-1962. In duecourse the Land Acquisition Collector made the award (Awardno. 1351 ). He divided the acquired land into two blocks__aand B. For Block a he assessed the market value at Rs, 4,000per bigha. For Block b he fixed Rs. 3,000 per bigha. . ( 15 ) DISPLEASED with the award the owner asked for areference under section 18 of the Act. On reference the learnedadditional District Judge fixed the market value of the landat Rs. 28. 50 per sq. yard. Neither side was satisfied with thisoutcome. The owner appeals to this Court for further enhancement. He claims compensation. @ Rs. 39/64 per sq. yard. Theunion of India appeals for reduction. It may be mentioned here that the appellant purchased theland in question at an auction held by the Ministry of Rehabilitation in 1959 @ Rs. 10 per sq. yard. ( 16 ) BEFORE the Additional District Judge evidence of various sale transactions was given. He discarded all of them. Heaccepted the sale of 24/05/1962, though a post-notificationsale, as a safe and reliable guide to the market value of theland. 10 per sq. yard. ( 16 ) BEFORE the Additional District Judge evidence of various sale transactions was given. He discarded all of them. Heaccepted the sale of 24/05/1962, though a post-notificationsale, as a safe and reliable guide to the market value of theland. This land which was sold on 24/05/1962 at Rs. 58. 50per sq. yard touches the land of the appellant. It is situatedin close vicinity. It has the closest proximity in space. Adjoiningsale is the best evidence to estimate the market price. The judgedid not find other sale transactions of any assistance. ( 17 ) SALE dated 16-1-1962 at Rs. 166 per sq. yard of aplot of 250 sq. yds. was rejected on the ground that it wassituated on the Ring Road and was more valuable than theappellant s land. Another sale dated 8-6-1962 where a plot of250 sq. yards was sold for Rs. 120 per sq. yard was rejectedon the ground that it was a sale of shop-cum-residential plot. All the sales except the sale of 24-5-1962 were rejected eitheron the ground that the land was more advantageously situated,as for example on Ring Road, or that the transaction was ofresidential-cum-shop plot, or that the plot sold was a smallplot or that the sale was not proximate in time because it wasmade much after the notification under section 4, sometimein June or July of 1962. On the sale of 24-5-1962 the learnedjudge said: "the sale deed Ex- A-36 gives us the value of plotsin the adjacent colony at a time nearest to the dateof publication of notification under section 4 inthe present case (i. e. 7-3-62 ). It is, therefore, plainthat the transaction covered by the sale deed Ex. A-36 is the best possible instance comparable intime and situation to the acquired land I, therefore,follow the same and hold that the market valueof the residential plots in the immediate vicinity ofthe land in question was Rs. 58. 50 per square yard. " ( 18 ) IT is admited that the sale of 24-5-1962 related to adeveloped plot of land in the colony of South Extension Part II,and that all the amenities like water, electricity, sewerage etc. were available in that locality. The owner s land in the presentappeal is undeveloped land. Therefore, the judge reduced theprice of Rs. 58. 50 to Rs. 28. were available in that locality. The owner s land in the presentappeal is undeveloped land. Therefore, the judge reduced theprice of Rs. 58. 50 to Rs. 28. 50 by taking into account thedevelopment charges and the area to be left out for roads,open spaces etc. The manner in which he arrived at the priceof Rs. 28. 50 per sq. yard is depicted in the following calculation which he adopted:with mathematical accuracy the judge found that the valueof the land on the valuation date was Rs. 28. 50 per sq: yard. ( 19 ) BEFORE the judge evidence was given that the presentappellant S. Gurmukh Singh and S. Amar Singh. appellant inappeal No. 502 of 1969, and two others took concrete stepsto develop the land by dividing it into plots and with this endin view they actually submitted a layout plan to the authorities concerned. Their registered architect went into the witnessbox. On the evidence led before him in the case the judge summed up his conclusion in these words: "it is obvious from the oral and documentary evidencediscussed above that S. Gurmukh Singh and SAmar Singh along with some other persons tookconcrete steps to develop the land into plots abouta year before its acquisition and that they wouldhave achieved their object if the land had not beenacquired on 7-3-62. The land in question was infact adjacent to a developed colony of South Extension Scheme No. 11 and the same, after development, would have become a part of that colonyif it had not been acquired. In these circumstancesthe petitioner is justified in claiming compensationon the basis of hypothetical building scheme andnot on the rates of agricultural land. " ( 20 ) IN our opinion the judge ought to have taken intoconsideration this fact that the present appellant had associatedwith him. Amar Singh and two others who had vast lands nextto him and had proposed to develop their lands by framing acommon scheme and by pooling all their resources together. When an owner of the land puts his land into a common lothe is likely to make a greater profit. If two or more contiguousplots are to be developed under one common scheme they willadmit of a larger and more advantageous disposition or improvement than a single lot. When an owner of the land puts his land into a common lothe is likely to make a greater profit. If two or more contiguousplots are to be developed under one common scheme they willadmit of a larger and more advantageous disposition or improvement than a single lot. Where two or more contiguouslots are developed under a joint scheme, real estate appraisersfrequently accord to them as a group a greater value than theaggregate value of the land separately considered. This isknown as the doctrine of plottage in American Law. in thatdoctrine the ownership of all the contiguous lots is one. Hereit is not so, it is true. Four owners have agreed to build on theirlands according to a common building scheme and for thispurpose they submitted a lay out. Therefore it cannot bedoubted that they can ask for a greater value than the valueof their lands separately considered, (See alfred D. Jahr Eminent Domain: 1953 Edition, page 114: Nichols On Eminentdomain, Vol. 5, page 143 ). If a single building had to comeup as a housing complex, as was the idea of these four owners,it was the best use to which they had planned to put theirproperty. The constituent lots considered separately will nothave the same price in the market than the assemblage of theselots. The housing scheme which was submitted to the Delhidevelopment Authority by these four owners ought to havein our opinion, a greater value than the separate value of theconstituent lots. ( 21 ) THE learned judge did not consider this aspect of thematter. All elements of value which are inherent in theproperty merit consideration in the valuation process. It has,in fact, been said that no general rule can be inflexibly adheredlo. Each case necesarily differs from all others in so far asits factual situation is concerned. Exceptional circumstancesrender a fair degree of elasticity in the application of the fundamental rule. It seems almost unnecessary to point out the selfevident fact that in the method adopted for the ascertainmentof such value, it is incumbent upon the State to endeavour toreach a result that is truly "just compensation", that is, a resultthat is just to the public as well as to the owner of the propertytaken. (Nichol s on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pp. (Nichol s on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pp. 2-5) : "it is the duty of the valuer to take into considerationevery intrinsic quality and every intrinsic circumstance which tends to push the value either up ordown, Just because it is relevant to the valuationand ought therefore to be cast into the scales ofthe balance before he looks to see the resultantfigure on the dial at which the pointer finallyrests. "[per Scott L. J. in Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. vhoughton and Chesterls Street Assessment Committee, (1937) 2kb 445 at p. 469] (6 ). ( 22 ) ONE common argument which has been raised betoreus in all these appeals is that we should have regard for thevalue of the commercial plots in the New Delhi South Extension Colony which were being sold at prices ranging betweeni (X) and 166 per sq. yard. In this connection we were referred to a decision of division bench in S. L. R. Sawhney v. Unionof India, R. F. A. No. 105-D/66, decided on 2/08/1978 (7) (Prakash Narain and Leila Seth, JJ.) and a decision byone of us (Avadh Behari, J.) in Union of India v. Uttam Chandkohli, R. F. A. No. 512 of 1971 (8), decided on 5/09/1979. ( 23 ) COUNSEL in these appeals, one after the other, submittedthat to ascertain the market value of the appellants land weshould not confine ourselves only to residential plots but alsotake into account the fact that these appellants could have puttheir property to commercial use also. We cannot accept thisargument. It is abundently clear from the evidence on therecord of these appeals that the owners in all the four appealswanted to use the land which they had purchased from theministry of Rehabilitation only for residential purposes. It isnow too late in the day to say that their intention was also touse it for commercial purposes. The burden of proof for establishing the market value of the land is on the owner. He hasto establish by affirmative evidence that the highest and thebest use of the land was commercial and that he could so useit. "the owners in their evidence have not deposed that theywere intending to put the property to commercial use. ( 24 ) COUNSEL next submitted that we should take the marketvalue of the residential plots and the commercial plots and findout the average price for the purpose of determining the marketvalue. "the owners in their evidence have not deposed that theywere intending to put the property to commercial use. ( 24 ) COUNSEL next submitted that we should take the marketvalue of the residential plots and the commercial plots and findout the average price for the purpose of determining the marketvalue. This reasoning does not appeal to us. ( 25 ) IT must be remembered that the comparison is madewith lands which are similar to the land taken. It is true thatthe two parcels are exactly alike. Only such parcels may becompared where the dissimilarities are reduced to a minimum,and allowance is made for such dissimilarities. It is, therefore,imperative to consider such differences as may exist in the physical and environmental conditions and a proper allowance madeto cover any differential that may exist by virtue of the difference in the time of the sales. It is evident that there may beconsiderable difference in the size, shape, situation and immediate surroundings of two estates, and yet the price which onebrought may be of substantial assistance in determining thevalue of the other. Market value of the land in the vicinitycan be considered in arriving at the value of the acquired land. It is bound to be helpful in some degree. ( 26 ) MARKET value is dependent upon activity in the marketand its existence is generally considered a question of fact. Actual sales as a criterion of value in cases of similar lands "arealmost as conclusive as the daily quotations of the exchange inthe case of corporate stocks". ( 27 ) GENERALLY, certain preliminary requirements must beobserved before evidence of comparable sales may be adduced. Thus, it must first be demonstrated to the satisfaction of thecourt that the property involved in such sale is sufficiently similar and proximate to the property in litigation as to be of utilityin reflecting the market value of the latter. ( 28 ) PROPERTY similarly situated need not exactly confirm tothe property in suit. When property, in the same or an adjoining street, is described as bearing a close resemblance, or nearlycorresponding, to the one in question as to improvements, size,location, general adaptability, and within the same businesscenter, it may be said to be similarly situated. There can beno fixed definition of "similarly situated". Similarity. does notmean identical, but having a resemblance. When property, in the same or an adjoining street, is described as bearing a close resemblance, or nearlycorresponding, to the one in question as to improvements, size,location, general adaptability, and within the same businesscenter, it may be said to be similarly situated. There can beno fixed definition of "similarly situated". Similarity. does notmean identical, but having a resemblance. Obviously, no twoproperties can be exactly alike, and no general rule can be laiddown regarding the degree of similarity that must exist to makesuch evidence admissible. ( 29 ) WHETHER a property is similar depends on a number offactors. It depends on the location, the character, the surroundings and the topographical features of the property. It hasalso to be seen whether the sale was made near about the timeof acquisition. Nearness or remoteness in point of time willhave to be seen. A sale sufficiently near in point of timemakes the evidence of the price paid helpful in ascertainingthe market value of the land. The proximity between the landin controversy and the land the price of which is in evidencehas also to be established. ( 30 ) THEREFORE, the rule is that evidence of the price paidat sales of other land, to be admissible in a land acquisitioncase, must be confined to land similarly situated and of thesame character as that taken; and, as a general proposition, toland in the same neighbourhood. It cannot be said, however,as a matter of law how large an area, in feet or blocks, consttutes a neighbourhood, and no hard and fast rule can be laiddown on the subject. In determining the value of the landthe court must have regard to the requirements of proximityas well as of similarity. A sale of neighbouring land, no matterhow similar to the land taken, is not admissible linless the salewas so near in point of time as to furnish a test of presentvalue. The judges have deplored the practice of determinationof compensation on the value of small plots. Again and againwe are told that undue importance must not be given to saleof small plots. The court may properly exclude evidence ofthe price paid for similar land in close proximity to the landtaken if the land sold is much smaller than the land in controversy. ( 31 ) THE use to which the property is to be put is oftenrelevant. (Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pages 280to 289 ). The court may properly exclude evidence ofthe price paid for similar land in close proximity to the landtaken if the land sold is much smaller than the land in controversy. ( 31 ) THE use to which the property is to be put is oftenrelevant. (Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pages 280to 289 ). ( 32 ) APPLYING these principles to the facts of these cases itis abundantly plain that the land of the appellants was to beused for purposes of a residential property. It will be wrongto evaluate it according to the value of the commercial property. Nor do we agree with the method of averages whichcounsel pressed upon us. Residential and commercial valuesare entirely different. It will be improper to combine themboth and to give compensation on the average arrived at bysuch combination Only the likes can be compared. Unlikescannot be compared. To give to the appellants the value of acommercial plot in these cases will be unfair to the State, Inbauman v. Ross (167 U. S. 548) (9), decided in 1896,grey, J. , in one of his characteristic opinions cleared up thesubject. The compensation, he says, must be "just, not merely to the individual whose property istaken, but to the public which is to pay for it. Thejust compensation required by the constitution tobe made to the owner is to be measured by theloss caused to him by the appropriation. He isentitled to receive the value of what he has beendeprived of, and no more. To award him lesswould be unjust to him : to award him more wouldband unjust to the public". ( 33 ) WE, therefore, reject the argument of averages. Wealso cannot take the value of the commercial or residentialcum-commercial plots into account for ascertaining the marketvalue. In agreement with the learned judge we hold that thesale of 24-5-1962 is a safe and a reliable guide to the valueof the land at the critical time. We will be unfair to the Stateif we award more than what the evidence jusifies as regardsthe value of residential plots at the relevant time. ( 34 ) COMMERCIAL plots are not only dissimilar but alsomuch smaller in size as compared to the acquired lands ofthe appellants. They do not furnish relevant evidence ofvalue. The learned judge rejected these transactions in hisprocess of evaluation and we think he was right. ( 34 ) COMMERCIAL plots are not only dissimilar but alsomuch smaller in size as compared to the acquired lands ofthe appellants. They do not furnish relevant evidence ofvalue. The learned judge rejected these transactions in hisprocess of evaluation and we think he was right. That theland had a commercial potential was never put forward as thecase for compensation. The learned judge promised hisassessment on the fact that these were residential plots. Heaccepted the sale of 24-5-1962 as a highly relevant piece ofevidence for the evaluation of compensation in the case ofgurmukh Singh and Amar Singh. Since these two owners withtwo others had planned a housing complex scheme we havetaken the view that this single factor significantly added to thevalue of the land in the hands of these two appellants. Thisis why we have increased the value. In the case of Dhawan. anddr. Satyawati their lands had the added advantage of location. They were right on the road. We have given them more. Thatthere was an upward trend in market value generally is affirmatively supported by satisfactory proof. In our judgmentthe sale and resale of the residential plot of 756 sq. yds. nearabout the time of section 4 notification is a comparable instanceand ought to be adopted as a yardstick for measuring compensation in these appeals. That it was a developed land andtherefore allowance will have to be made for this differencein any process of evaluation. ( 35 ) THESE cases vividly illustrate the point referred to us. The Post-notification sale can be realy helpful in determiningthe market value of the land in question. In Delhi Simlacatholic Arthdiocese v. Union of India, 1980 Rajhhani Lawreporter 98, one of us (Avadh Behari, J.) held on the factsthat the post-notification sale of 10/04/1957 could besafely relied upon and accepted as a guide to the value of theland. The date of notification under section 4 in that casewas 2/01/1957 and 10/04/1957 was the date of thesale. The facts in these cases are very much similar so far asthe post-notification sale is concerned. The judge acceptedit as a reliable guide. We are in agreement with him. Theprivy Council said the same thing in. Melwood (supra ). The date of notification under section 4 in that casewas 2/01/1957 and 10/04/1957 was the date of thesale. The facts in these cases are very much similar so far asthe post-notification sale is concerned. The judge acceptedit as a reliable guide. We are in agreement with him. Theprivy Council said the same thing in. Melwood (supra ). ( 36 ) GIVING the matter our best consideration we are ofthe opinion that the lands of Gurmukh Singh (now represented by his legal representative) and Amar Singh, appellantinappeal No. 502 of 1969, ought to have been valued at aprice higher than Rs. 28. 50 per sq. yard. Taking the topographical situation and the locality of the land we fix the market value of the lands of these owners at Rs. 35 per sq. yard. ( 37 ) THE appellant is awarded compensation @ Rs. 35,000per bigha Whatever has been paid will be deducted. Inaddition the appellant will be entitled to solatium at 15 percent and interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date ofdispossession till the date of payment and proportionate costs. Cross R. F. A. No. 433 of 1969: (Union of India v. S. Gurmukh Singh Chawla, deceasedthrough S. Joginder Singh Chawla ). ( 38 ) AS the owner S. Gurmukh Singh Chawla (now represented by his legal representative) has succeeded in his appeal. this appeal of the Union of India automatically fails and isdismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. R. F. A. No. 502 of 1969 : (S. Amar Singh and others v. Union of India) ( 39 ) AS we have said, Amar Singh s land adjoins the landof S. Gunmukh Singh. His case is identical with the case ofgurmukh Singh. The appellants land admeasuring 5 bighas5 biswas was acquired by the Government pursuant to thenotification dated 7-3-1962 under section 4 of the Act. By acommon judgment dated 6/05/1969 the learned Additional District Judge decided his appeal as well as the appeal ofgurmukh Singh Chawla. He awarded to these appellantscompensation at the rate of Rs. 28. 50, as he did to Gurmukhsingh Chawla. ( 40 ) THE appellants claim in this appeal compensation atthe rate of Rs. 39. 64 per sq. yard. ( 41 ) IT may be mentioned here that the appellants purchased the land in 1959 at an auction held by the Rehabilitationministry at the rate of Rs. 13. 50 per sq. 28. 50, as he did to Gurmukhsingh Chawla. ( 40 ) THE appellants claim in this appeal compensation atthe rate of Rs. 39. 64 per sq. yard. ( 41 ) IT may be mentioned here that the appellants purchased the land in 1959 at an auction held by the Rehabilitationministry at the rate of Rs. 13. 50 per sq. yard. ( 42 ) THE case of present appellants is the same as of Gurmukh Singh Chawla. For reasons given above we award to theappellants compensation at the rate of Rs. 35,000 per bigha. Whatever has been paid will be deducted. In addition theappellans will be awarded solatium at the rate of 15 per centand interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the dateof dispossession till payment and proportionate costs. Cross R. F. A. No. 435 of 1969 : (Union of India v. Amar Singh Sadana and others) ( 43 ) AS the owners have succeeded in their appeal, this appeal of the Union of India automatically fails and is dismissed,leaving the parties to bear their own costs. R. F. A. No. 130 of 1972 : (Chaman Lal Dhawan and Ors. v. Union of India) ( 44 ) THE appellants land admeasuring 5 bighas 12 biswaswas acquired by the Government pursuant to the notificationdated 7-3-1962. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded themrs. 4,000 per bigha. On a reference the Additional Districtjudge raised the compensation to Rs. 20 per square yard. Theappellants claim compensation at the rate of Rs. 60,500 perbigha. ( 45 ) IT may be mentioned here that the appellants purchasedthe land in question at auction in 1959 at about Rs. 7 persquare yard. ( 46 ) THE appellants land is more favourably situated thanthe lands of Gurmukh Singh and Amar Singh. Apart from thefact that their land adjoins the Medical Enclave and the D. L. F. South Extension Colony, which advantage they enjoy in common with other appellants in other appeals, their land abuts ona 60 feet wide road. Another advantage the owners of theland enjoy is that adjoining their land is the bunglow of theex-Auditor General of India. We think that the appellantsought to be awarded a higher compensation than Gurmukhsingh and Amar Singh. We fix the value of their land atrs. 40,000 per bigha. This, in our opinion, is just and faircompensation for the acquired land. Another advantage the owners of theland enjoy is that adjoining their land is the bunglow of theex-Auditor General of India. We think that the appellantsought to be awarded a higher compensation than Gurmukhsingh and Amar Singh. We fix the value of their land atrs. 40,000 per bigha. This, in our opinion, is just and faircompensation for the acquired land. ( 47 ) WE, therefore, award compensation to the appellantsat the rate of Rs. 40,000 per bigha. Whatever has alreadybeen paid will be deducted. In addition they will be entitledto solatium at 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per centper annum from the date of dispossession till payment andproportionate costs. Cross R. F. A. No. 123 of 1972 : (Union of India v. Chaman Lal Dhawan and Ors.) ( 48 ) AS the owners have succeeded in their appeal, this crossappeal of the Union of India automatically fails and is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. R. F. A. No. 283 of 1975 : (Dr. K. Satyawati v. Union of India) ( 49 ) THE appellant s land admeasuring 5 bighas and 8 biswas in Village Masjid Moth was permanently acquired by thegovernment pursuant to the notification dated 7/03/1962. In due course the Land Acquisition Collector made the award (award No. 1351 ). He awarded Rs. 4,000 per bigha, placingthe appellant s land in Block a . On a reference the learnedadditional District Judge awarded her compensation at therate of Rs. 20 per square yard. In appeal she claims Rs. 60,000per bigha. We may mention here that the appellant purchased thisplot in the year 1959 at an auction held by the Ministry ofrehabilitation at about Rs. 7 per sq. yard. ( 50 ) THE facts of this case are similar to the case of Chamanlal Dhawan. The Additional District Judge has found thatthe land enjoys an advantageous situation. It is adjacent tovillage Masjid Moth, and All India Institute of Medical Sciences. It is quite close to the Ring Road and posh colonies suchas New Delhi South Extension, Yusuf Sarai and Green Park. "the judge awarded her compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 persquare yard. ( 51 ) FOR the reasons we have given in Chaman Lal Dhawan'sappeal we fix the market value of the appellant's land at Rs. 40per square yard. "the judge awarded her compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 persquare yard. ( 51 ) FOR the reasons we have given in Chaman Lal Dhawan'sappeal we fix the market value of the appellant's land at Rs. 40per square yard. ( 52 ) WE, therefore, award to the appellant compensation atthe rate of Rs. 40,000 per bigha. Whatever has already beenpaid will be deducted. In addition she will be entitled to solatium at the rate of 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of dispossession till payment andproportionate costs. Cross R. F. A. No. 272 of 1975 : (Union of India v. Dr. K. Satyawati ). ( 53 ) AS the owner has succeeded in her appeal, this appealof the Union of India fails and is dismissed, leaving the partiesto bear their own costs. ( 54 ) THIS disposes of all ths eight appeals. At the conclusion of the hearing we annuonced our decision on 18/05/1984. Now we have given reasons for our decision.