JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. The petitioner is a public limited company. It owns Thirumbadi Estate. One P.C. Avarankutty was a tapper in the Estate. In a domestic enquiry against Avarankutty, it was found that he was guilty of theft, fraud or dishonesty in respect of 2.28 kilograms of scrap rubber. The management dismissed him from service by order dated 15th December 1974. It is stated that the then prevailing price of scrap rubber was about Rs. 6 per kilogram. The order of dismissal was referred for adjudication. The 2nd respondent, Labour Court, in I.D. 104 of 1977 by order dated 5th July 1979 found that the domestic enquiry conducted against the worker Was proper and valid. The case was posted for enquiry on the question of punishment. By Ext. P-1 award dated 29th July 1980 the 2nd respondent modified the punishment and held that the worker, P.C. Avarankutty, will be reinstated without continuity of service and back wages. The order of dismissal was set aside. The. petitioner assails Ext. P-1 award in so far as the 2nd respondent modified the punishment. 2. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. E. R. Venkateswaran contended that the 2nd respondent in ordering reinstatement of the worker, Avarankutty, in exercise of the powers vested in it under S.11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has failed to give any cogent reason for interfering with the punishment of dismissal imposed by the petitioner employer. It was further contended that the reasons given by the 2nd respondent for interfering with the punishment of dismissal are erroneous, whimsical and perverse. So, the interference with the punishment of dismissal by the 2nd respondent is unauthorised and illegal. Counsel for the 1st respondent Union contended that the reasons given by the 2nd respondent for modification of the punishment awarded to the workman are reasonable, fair and based on material. The attack against Ext. P-1 is unsustainable. Says counsel, this court in exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution is only exercising a supervisory jurisdiction in order to satisfy itself that Ext. P-1, was passed with jurisdiction and in accordance with law. The petitioner has failed to allege or prove that the 2nd respondent passed Ext. P-1, without jurisdiction or in excess of it or failed to act in accordance with law. Counsel pleaded that Ext. P1 is legal and valid and no interference is called for. 3. P-1, was passed with jurisdiction and in accordance with law. The petitioner has failed to allege or prove that the 2nd respondent passed Ext. P-1, without jurisdiction or in excess of it or failed to act in accordance with law. Counsel pleaded that Ext. P1 is legal and valid and no interference is called for. 3. S.11A of the Industrial Disputes Act provides as follows: "11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen. - Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter." In Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management ( 1973 (1) LLJ 278 ) the Supreme Court adverting to S.11A of the Act, observed at page 299 as follows: " If a proper enquiry is conducted by an employer and a correct finding arrived at regarding the misconduct, the Tribunal, even though it has now power to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the management, will have to give every cogent reason for not accepting the view of the employer." It should be borne in mind, as held by the Supreme Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. ( AIR 1952 SC 192 at 195) (at p. 195 para 20): "Such writs as are referred to in Art.226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made." Again in Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property ( AIR 1952 SC 319 ) at p. 322 the Court said: "It is plain that (such) a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice ......" This later decision was cited with approval in a still later case by the Supreme Court in Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Sourashtra ( AIR 1957 SC 264 at 268). In the light of the above guide-lines laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the scope or limit of interference by the Tribunal, (the 2nd respondent) and also the limited grounds on which interference by this Court in exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is permissible, let us examine whether the 2nd respondent has given cogent reason for not accepting the view of employer and in interfering with the punishment of dismissal and if so whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution is in any way attracted. 4. The 2nd respondent in Ext. P1 order in Para.8, considered the matter thus: "8. The main contention advanced on behalf of the workman is that the punishment awarded by the management is disproportionate to the charge found to have been proved against him and as such the same has to be interfered under S.11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The charge found to have been proved against the workman is that he was carrying 280 gms. of scrap rubber in his scrap basket on 13th October 1974 and another 2 kgs. of scrap rubber was found and recovered from the line room on the same day. According to the management, the same is a misconduct of theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property which is a misconduct under sub clause (c) of standing order No. 22 of the certified standing orders applicable to the workman of the estate. The certified standing orders has not been produced in this case to show that the extreme penalty of dismissal is the proper punishment to be inflicted in a matter like this. The case of the workman is that scrap rubber is valueless and as such even though the carrying of the same may technically amount to theft, cannot be visited with the extreme penalty of dismissal. The evidence of W.W. 1 and W.W. 2 is that the material found to have been taken by W.W. 1 and recovered from his line room has no value. W.W. 1 in his re-examination stated that scrap rubber is valuable for industrial purposes. The value of the articles found to have been stolen or in respect of which theft is stated to have been committed has not been stated in the charge sheet, Exhibit M-1. W.W. 1 in his re-examination stated that scrap rubber is valuable for industrial purposes. The value of the articles found to have been stolen or in respect of which theft is stated to have been committed has not been stated in the charge sheet, Exhibit M-1. There is only oath against oath that scrap rubber is of no value and that it is valuable. There is no evidence to show what is meant by 'scrap rubber'. The case of the workman that scrap rubber is valueless accords with the meaning of the terms 'scrap' "useless remains" among others viz., 'small detached piece of something, fragment, remnant in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English edited by H.W. Fowler and F.G. Fowler Fifth Edition. In the absence of the value of the material in respect of which theft is committed, shown in Exhibit M-1, the contention raised on behalf of the workman that the scrap rubber is of no value has to be accepted in view of what is stated earlier. It is in respect of scrap rubber weighing 2 kgs. and 280 grams. that theft is stated to have been committed. The workman joined the service at the time of the occurrence. There is no evidence to show that there was any charge against the workman previously. Therefore, the extreme punishment of dismissal appears to be disproportionate to the charge found to have been proved against the workman. In the decision reported in 1979 II LLJ. page 280 in the case between the management of Binny Limited and Additional Labour Court, Madras and another, Madras High Court held that: 'It (Labour Court) clearly states in para 16 of the award that the petitioner had put in a service of about 11 years, having joined the respondent as a compounder on 26th April 1965. It is not the case of the respondent that the worker was found guilty of a similar misconduct on any earlier occasion during his period of service. This important factor has weighed very much with the Labour Court and it is very well justified on this singular circumstance to interfere under S.11A' In the case the Award of the 3 Labour Court to reinstate the workman without continuity of service and back-wages was confirmed by the High Court. The circumstances of this case are also more or less similar. The circumstances of this case are also more or less similar. I have found earlier that the material found to have been stolen by the workman is of no value. He has put in more than 9 years of service and has no previous bad record. The above clearly shows that the workman should be given a chance to turn a new leaf. Therefore, I modify the punishment awarded to the workman and hold that he will be reinstated without continuity of service and back-wages. The above issue is found accordingly." (Emphasis supplied) 5. It is true that the acts of theft, fraud, or dishonesty are treated as acts of misconduct justifying dismissal in industrial law. But it should not be forgotten that it is not every theft, fraud or dishonesty that will entail the extreme punishment of dismissal. There are different degrees in such criminal acts. Some may be very serious in nature. The nature and degree of the offence committed is an important factor in the award of punishment. It cannot be said that every theft, fraud or dishonesty, irrespective of its nature, or gravity will ipso facto warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from service. In cases of minor or trifling acts of theft the extreme punishment of dismissal may be unwarranted and also untenable in law. Every person or authority imposing a punishment should act honestly, fairly and reasonably. Such person or authority should apply "his mind" to the facts of the case and should not act mechanically. In imposing the extreme punishment, even for trifles, the action is open to attack as "unreasonable" or acting mechanically or in excess of jurisdiction or unfairly or "arbitrarily". In M/s P. Orr and Sons (P) Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1974 (1) LLJ 517) the workman was dismissed for theft of an empty oil-tin. Its value was only 30 paise. The workman had nearly 24 years of service. There was no blemish or other unworthy past conduct of the concerned workman. In such circumstances, the order of dismissal for theft was held to be disproportionate having regard to the offence and also too harsh, Ismail, J observed at page 521, as follows: "In this case, as I have pointed out already, the finding is one of theft of an empty oil tin, which is said to be worth 30 paise only. In such circumstances, the order of dismissal for theft was held to be disproportionate having regard to the offence and also too harsh, Ismail, J observed at page 521, as follows: "In this case, as I have pointed out already, the finding is one of theft of an empty oil tin, which is said to be worth 30 paise only. The Labour Court has referred to the above provisions of the standing Order No. 18 and pointed out that the third respondent had a continuous service of about 24 years, that there was nothing on record to show that she had received any warning or had any black mark during the entire service, that in that context it was the duty of the management to take into account the gravity of the offence as well as her past record before it could impose any punishment on her for the misconduct of which she is found to have been guilty and that the management failed to do the same. It is only on this ground, though the language might not have been felicitous, the Labour Court interfered with the punishment imposed by the management and pointed out that the ends of justice would be met if the third respondent was reinstated with half back wages. I am clearly of the opinion that this conclusion of the Labour Court cannot be said to suffer from any error of law or want of jurisdiction so as to warrant an interference by this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India." In Management of Binny Limited v. Additional Labour Court ( 1979 (2) LLJ 280 ) at p. 283 the Court held: "It is not the case of the respondent that the worker was found guilty of a similar misconduct on any earlier occasion during his period of service. This important factor has weighed very much with the Labour Court and it is very well justified on this singular circumstance to interfere under S.11A." (Emphasis supplied) 6. This important factor has weighed very much with the Labour Court and it is very well justified on this singular circumstance to interfere under S.11A." (Emphasis supplied) 6. In the light of the above, and also keeping in view the decisions of the Madras High Court in M/s P. On and Sons (P) Ltd. case (1974 (1) LLJ 517) and also the case of Management of Binny Limited v. Additional Labour Court ( 1979 (2) LLJ 280 ), it cannot be said that the interference by the 2nd respondent with regard to the punishment awarded to the workman is without jurisdiction or illegal or not in accordance with law. The 2nd respondent has found that the scrap rubber is of no value that there is no evidence that there was any charge against the workman previously and so in the circumstances the extreme punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the charge found to have been proved. These findings of fact are based on material. This is not a case of a finding by a Tribunal based on no evidence or entering a finding by addressing itself a wrong question. It cannot also be said that the finding arrived at is in any way whimsical or perverse or so "unreasonable" as to merit interference by this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. - [Wednesbury principle -1947 (2) All E.R. 680]. There is no infirmity either in the reasoning or in the conclusion of the 2nd respondent in modifying the punishment awarded to the workman and in reinstating the workman, P. C. Avarankutty, without continuity of service and back wages. The 2nd respondent has given cogent reasons and the reasoning and conclusion in Para.6 of Ext. P-1 - Award is not in any way vitiated or open to any attack as contended by the petitioner. 7. In the result the attack against Ext. P1 - Award fails. No interference is called for. The O.P. is without merit. It is dismissed with costs.