ORDER In this writ petition, the adjudication made by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 in P.W.A. Case No. 56 of 1972 awarding a total sum of Rs. 2,39,626.43P. to the applicants before the said Authority is under challenge. 2. The Managing Director, Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Co. Ltd. is the petitioner in the instant petition. The applicants before the said Authority under the Payment of Wages Act ale respondents and the West Bengal State Electricity Board and State of West Bengal have also been impleaded as respondents in the instant writ petition. It appears that during the pendency of the Rule, some of the applicants died. The application made before the Payment of Wages Authority out of which the said P.W.A. Case No. 56 of 1972 arose, has been annexed to the writ petition being Annexure 'A'. The said applicants made another application under S. 17 A of the Payment of Wages Act before the said Authority (hereinafter referred to as the said Authority) inter alia praying for attachment of the properties of the Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Co. Ltd. and also the purchase price to be paid by the West Bengal State Electricity Board to the said Company. Such application under S. 17A has also been annexed to the writ petition and marked with the letter 'B'. In the main application before the Authority, the applicants made a claim of a total sum of Rs. 2,14,235.17P. on account of unpaid wages from 1st February, 1971 to 18th February, 1971, gratuity, leave wages, compensation under S. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act and the bonus for the year 1970-71 and compensation for Rs. 25/- on account of delay in payment of wages. The petitioner filed a written statement in the said proceeding being P.W.A. Case No. 56 of 1972 infer alia denying the allegations made by the applicants. The petitioner specifically denied in the said written statement that the services of the applicants had been terminated by the petitioner or by the said Company on 18th April, 1971 or prior to the acquisition of the business of the Company by the West Bengal State Electricity Board The petitioner also denied that the respondents were entitled to gratuity, earned leave, bonus or any compensation under S. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was pleaded by the petitioner that the respondents had voluntarily accepted the service under the West Bengal State Electricity Board with effect from 19th February, 1971 viz. from the date of acquisition of the business of the petitioner and as such there had been no interruption in the service of the said applicants. It was also contended that the Managing Director was not a person responsible for payment of wages to the respondents and there was a Manager in the concern of the said Company where the said applicants had been employed and on that score also the said claim petition of the applicants should be dismissed. A copy of the said written statement has been annexed to the writ petition being Annexure 'C'. The petitioner also filed a petition of objection to the said application for attachment under S. l7A of the Payment of Wages Act. The Authority, however, passed an order directing the West Bengal State Electricity Board to withhold payment to the extent of Rs. 200,000/- to the petitioner till the disposal of the said proceeding before it. The Authority thereafter passed an ex parte order in favour of the applicants for a total sum of Rs. 1,77,05695. The petitioner thereafter made an application for restoration and the said case was restored for rehearing on merits on payment of costs of Rs. 350/-. During the pendency of the said proceeding before the Authority, some of the applicants withdrew their claims against the petitioner and one of the applicants filed a separate case after withdrawal of his claim in the group application. After that, the applicants who had been contesting the said application filed an application for amendment of the claim from Rs. 2,39,626.43 to Rs. 1,59,115.36P. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the said contesting applicants and one witness was examined on behalf of the petitioner. After that, the applicants who had been contesting the said application filed an application for amendment of the claim from Rs. 2,39,626.43 to Rs. 1,59,115.36P. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the said contesting applicants and one witness was examined on behalf of the petitioner. The Authority inter alia came to the finding that the Managing Director could be deemed to be the Manager under S. 3 of the Payment of Wages Act and as such he had been rightly impleaded by the application/workmen, that applicants could be deemed to be the persons employed in the factory and the office where they worked as Clerk being attached to the factory did not constitute a commercial establishment under the Shops and Establishment Act, that the services of the applicants had been interrupted by the transfer of the industry from the petitioner to the West Bengal State Electricity Board and as such the services of the said applicants stood automatically terminated with effect from date of taking over by the West Bengal State Electricity Board even though the petitioner did not formally terminate the services of the said applicants. The Authority also held that the gratuity claimed by the said applicant was payable to them. It was also held by the said Authority that the said applicants were entitled to get retrenchment compensation under S. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act and they were also entitled to claim the leave wages. In that view of the matter, the Authority passed an award for Rs. 1,49,626.43 in favour of the said applicants and also directed payment of compensation for Rs. 90,000/- at the rate of the Rs. 2,000/- in favour of each of the said applicants, thereby giving an award for a total sum of Rs. 2,39,624.43P. A copy of the adjudication of the Authority has also been annexed to the writ petition being Annexure 'E'. It has been contended by the petitioner in the instant writ petition that the direction passed against the Managing Director who was not the Manager of the factory nor occupier of the factory was illegal any claim against the said Managing Director was not entertainable or maintainable in law because the said Managing Director was not responsible for the payment of wages. It is also contended that the claim petition filed by the said applicants did not bear the signatures of the said applicants and the said application was also not made in the statutory form supported by certificate of authorisation in form 'D' in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and the rules framed thereunder. The petitioner has also contended that the gratuity has been excluded from the definition of wage in the Payment of Wages Act. There is no time limit fixed for payment of gratuity and there was also no contract for payment of gratuity. The petitioner has further contended that the services of the applicants not having been terminated by the said Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Co. Ltd. and/or by the petitioner and/or by any other officer of the said Company, the claim for gratuity was, in any event, outside the purview of the Payment of Wages Act. It has also been contended that in view of the existence of dispute as to whether or not on taking over the ownership and management and control of the industries of the said Company by the West Bengal State Electricity Board there has only been a change in the management without affecting the service of the applicants and also in view of the disputed fact that the services of the applicants have not been terminated by the Company and as such there was no question of payment of retrenchment compensation under S. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, the application before the Authority is not maintainable. It has been contended that in the fats of such dispute involving complicated questions of law and facts, it was a pre-eminently a fit case to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act and not by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. Accordingly, such disputes should not have been entertained by the said Authority and the adjudication is illegal or without jurisdiction. It has also been contended that the applicants claimed compensation amounting to Rs. 25/- only on the ground of delayed payment of wages and there was no claim for compensation on the ground of deduction of wages. In such circumstances, the finding of the Authority that there had been deduction of wages and consequential direction for payment of Rs. 90,000/- as compensation to the said applicants at the rate of Rs. 25/- only on the ground of delayed payment of wages and there was no claim for compensation on the ground of deduction of wages. In such circumstances, the finding of the Authority that there had been deduction of wages and consequential direction for payment of Rs. 90,000/- as compensation to the said applicants at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- each by the Authority is contrary to the claim preferred by the said applicants. 3. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the claim of the applicants is unfounded and as the services of the applicants had been only transferred under the West Bengal State Electricity Board, there was no occasion for termination of their services and there was no occasion for the said applicants to suffer any prejudice because of transfer of management and consequential absorption of the applicant under the West Bengal State Electricity Board Mr. Banerjee has contended that Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Co. Ltd. was a licensee under the Electricity Act and had been supplying electricity to the consumers. As it was decided by the West Bengal State Electricity Board to take over the management of the said Company in the matter of supply of electricity to the consumers, the licence of the company was cancelled and the West Bengal State Electricity Board started supplying electricity to the consumers. As a result, the employees including the applicants of the said Company were absorbed from the very date of taking management by the West Bengal State Electricity Board. In the circumstances, the said applicants have not suffered any prejudice Mr. Banerjee has also contended that in any event the services of the applicants had not been terminated by the said Company or by any other officer of the said Company, but the said applicants on their own had accepted their service under the West Bengal State Electricity Board. In the aforesaid circumstances, there was no occasion to pass any order for retrenchment compensation. Mr. Banerjee has contended that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act cannot entertain complicated questions of law and fact involving the right of workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. For such adjudication, the proper authority is the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Banerjee has contended that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act cannot entertain complicated questions of law and fact involving the right of workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. For such adjudication, the proper authority is the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the application made before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, the claim for retrenchment compensation under S. 25FF was raised by the said applicants and the contention as to whether or not in the facts of the case the applicants should be deemed to have been retrenched under the Industrial Disputes Act and as such were entitled to retrenchment compensation under S. 2SFF was required to be decided. Such adjudication should not be made by the Authority and in the fitness of things, the Authority should have returned the said applications for presentation before the appropriate authority viz. the authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. In support of this contention, Mr. Banerjee has referred to the decision or the Supreme Court made in the case of Payment of Wages Inspector Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta, reported in AIR 1969 SC page 590. It has been held in the said decision by the Supreme Court that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act in an application under S. 15(2) of the Act cannot entertain claim for compensation under S. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. For entertaining such claim, the proper authority is the Labour Court. The Supreme Court has held that although compensation under S. 25FF or under S. 25FFF are 'wages' within the meaning of S. 2(vi)(d) of the Payment of Wages Act, but when in an application under S. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act claiming compensation under S. 25FF of the industrial Disputes Act, a defence is taken by the ex-employer that such compensation was not payable or the same was defeated by reason of Proviso to S. 25FF because the concerned workmen continued to be in the employment by the new employer and the terms and conditions of their new employment were not unfavourable than those under ex-employer, the Authority exercising jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act should not entertain such application and deal with such complicated problems of both law and fact in view of limited jurisdiction of such authority under the Payment of Wages Act. In paragraph 11 of the said decision, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the claim for unpaid wages on the footing that compensation under Ss. 25FF and 25FFF have not been made cannot be entertained under S. 15(2) of Payment of Wages Act on two grounds, viz. (i) firstly, it is not a simple case of deduction having been unauthorizedly made beyond the wage period and the time of payment as fixed under Ss. 4 and 5 of the Payment of Wages Act and (ii) secondly, because objection is raised about the maintainability of such claim on the ground that there was no retrenchment is the eye of law and the conditions of service were not changed. Mr. Banerjee has contended that the facts of this case squarely come under the decision of the Supreme Court made in the said case of Surajmal Mehta (supra). Objections similar to the objections raised in the said case have been raised by the petitioner before the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act and it was contended by the petitioner before the said Authority that there had been no retrenchment in the eye of law and the terms and conditions of the service of the said applicants under the West Bengal State Electricity Board were similar and they had been absorbed from the very date of taking over management. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Authority should not have entertained the said application and proceeded to determine the complicated questions of law and fact for basing its award. 4. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Counsel appearing for the applicants respondents has, however, contended that the facts and circumstances under which the said decision of the Supreme Court was made are different and the said decision can be distinguished in the facts of the present case Mr. Dasgupta has also contended that the Supreme Court has not held that whenever any dispute about the liability to pay retrenchment compensation is raised by an ex-employer, the application before the Authority should not be entertained. He has submitted that if such view is taken then the application before the Authority can be defeated by raising unjust and unfounded plea by the ex-employer, thereby placing the poor workmen to serious hardship and prejudice. Mr. He has submitted that if such view is taken then the application before the Authority can be defeated by raising unjust and unfounded plea by the ex-employer, thereby placing the poor workmen to serious hardship and prejudice. Mr. Dasgupta has contended that the Supreme Court, as a matter of fact, has held that retrenchment compensation is also 'wage' within the meaning of Payment of Wages Act. He has contended that S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act has been amended in 1965. Prior to such amendment, the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was limited and in the context of such limited jurisdiction of the Authority prior to amendment of S. 15, the decision of the Supreme Court was made in the said Surajmal Mehta's case Mr. Dasgupta has contended that the authority exercising jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act can decide questions incidental to the claims made before it arising out of deductions or delay in payment of wages and it will be incorrect to contend that such incidental questions cannot be entertained by the said Authority simply on the score that such decision involves decision of some complicated questions of law and/or fact. In support of this contention, Mr. Das Gupta has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S. B. Bhatt, reported in AIR 1961 SC page 970. It has been held in the said decision that an Authority under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act has jurisdiction to decide questions incidental to claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages. The Supreme Court has, however, struck a note of caution to the effect that care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters, the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The Supreme Court has also, held that the Authority under the said Act if gets jurisdiction to decide particular claims, such jurisdiction cannot be ousted simply on the score that such question can also be decided by the Industrial Court Mr. The Supreme Court has also, held that the Authority under the said Act if gets jurisdiction to decide particular claims, such jurisdiction cannot be ousted simply on the score that such question can also be decided by the Industrial Court Mr. Dasgupta has also referred to a decision of the Mysore High Court made in the case of B. Narasimha Rai v. Damodaran Bhatt reported in 1971(1) Labour Law Journal, page 452. It has been held in the said decision that the right of the workmen to recover the amount due to them can be enforced either under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act or under the provisions of S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. These remedies are independent to each other Mr. Dasgupta has also referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court made in the case of Rahim Hajubhai Shankh v. Shiraj Kasim Nadar, reported in 1969(1) Labour Law Journal, page 226. It has been held in the said decision that the Authority under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act can decide incidental questions relating to the claim of the concerned workmen He has also referred to a decision of the Punjab High Court made in the case of Uttam Chand v. Kartar Singh reported in 1967(1) Labour Law Journal, page 232. It has been held in the said decision that an application under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for recovery of earned wages in lieu of earned leave and retrenchment compensation is no bar, although the Industrial Court has jurisdiction under S. 33C(2). Mr. Dasgupta has also held that Orissa High Court has also taken a similar view and for this contention, he has referred to a decision of the Orissa High Court made in the case of Rameswarlal v. Jogendra Das reported in AIR 1970 Orissa, page 76. In the said decision the jurisdiction under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act has been discussed and it has been held that retrenchment compensation being wage within the extended meaning of wage under the Payment of Wages Act, the claim for retrenchment compensation can be entertained by the Authority under the said Payment of Wages Act. Mr. In the said decision the jurisdiction under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act has been discussed and it has been held that retrenchment compensation being wage within the extended meaning of wage under the Payment of Wages Act, the claim for retrenchment compensation can be entertained by the Authority under the said Payment of Wages Act. Mr. Dasgupta, has, therefore, contended that in view of preponderance of decisions of various High Courts including the Supreme Court that retrenchment compensation is 'wage', there is no manner of doubt that such claim can be entertained by the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act notwithstanding the fact that such claim can also be entertained by the competent authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Dasgupta has contended that the Authority in the instant case has given good reasons in coming to the finding that the applicants although absorbed under the West Bengal State Electricity Board had to accept such employment under less favourable terms because continuity of their previous service had not been given In the aforesaid circumstances, the Authority was justified in holding that in the facts of the case it must be held that the applicants' service could not be retained any further because of the cancellation of licence of the said Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Co. Ltd. resulting in automatic termination of the service of the said workmen. He has, therefore, contended that the Authority is quite justified in passing the said Award in favour of the applicants Mr. Dasgupta has also, contended that the Managing Director is the principal Executive Officer of the Company and the Managing Director has ultimate liability to make payment to all the employees under the Company. Therefore, the award passed against the Managing Director is also justified and no exception can be taken by the Writ Court. Mr. Dasgupta has submitted that even it is assumed that on the score of expediency, the Industrial Court was a better forum for adjudication of the claims of the applicants it cannot be held that the adjudication of the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act is a nullity or without jurisdiction for which interference by the writ court is called for. In the circumstances, the Rule must fail. 5. In the circumstances, the Rule must fail. 5. After giving my anxious consideration to the respective contentions made by the learned Counsels for the parties, it appears to me that the retrenchment compensation is 'wage' within the meaning of Payment of Wages Act and Mr. Dasgupta is correct in his contention that the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act have been widened after the amendment of the said section in 1965. There is no manner of doubt that the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act in exercise of its power under S. 15(1) of the said Act, has a right to decide incidental relating to the claims arising out of decisions or delay in payment of wages. The Supreme Court in Ambica Mills case ( AIR 1961 SC 970 ) has held that care must be taken to see that the scope of the incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the Authority, but at the same time, the Supreme Court has also struck a note of caution that under the guise of deciding incidental matters, the limited jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is not unreasonably or unduly extended. There may not be inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Authority under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act in entertaining certain claims of a workman relating to the question of 'wage' and deduction of such 'wage'. But in the facts of a case it may be necessary to go into intricate questions of law and fact relating to such claims of 'wage'. The claim for retrenchment compensation may not be admitted or founded on the face of it. In such circumstance, on tin ground of expediency, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act exercising limited jurisdiction should not entertain complicated questions of law and fact relating to the claim of wage and such claim should be left to be decided by the Authority under the Industrial Dispute, Act. There is no manner of doubt that the Authority under the Industrial Disputes Act is basically concerned with the claims of the workmen concerning their Wages, retrenchment compensation, leave salary and various other conditions of service. There is no manner of doubt that the Authority under the Industrial Disputes Act is basically concerned with the claims of the workmen concerning their Wages, retrenchment compensation, leave salary and various other conditions of service. The Industrial Disputes Act is a special Act for dealing with all such questions between the workmen and an employer and the Authority under the Industrial Disputes Act has undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide all claims about arrear wages and other benefits and allowances payable to a workman. In Surajmal Mehta's case (AIR 1969 SC page 590), the Supreme Court has held that retrenchment compensation is 'wage' within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act but the Supreme Court has also pointed out that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act has a limited jurisdiction to entertain only certain types of claims of a workman and where tile very basis of the claim on account of the retrenchment compensation is under challenge and the decision of such claim depends on adjudication of certain facts and interpretation of law, in the fitness of things, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act should refrain from entertaining such claim notwithstanding the fact that it does not inherently lack such jurisdiction. In my view, the amendment of S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act in 1965 has not altered the position and well reasoned principle evolved by the Supreme Court based on the ground of expediency. It may not be possible to precisely enumerate as to when the Authority under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act should exercise jurisdiction or when it should refrain from exercising such jurisdiction, because such exercise of power on the ground of expediency will depend in the facts of the case and the nature of disputes raised. It may not be possible to precisely enumerate as to when the Authority under S. 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act should exercise jurisdiction or when it should refrain from exercising such jurisdiction, because such exercise of power on the ground of expediency will depend in the facts of the case and the nature of disputes raised. Simply because some claim is disputed, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act should not be justified in refusing to entertain the application presented before it and such authority should keep in mind the observation of the Supreme Court in Ambica Mill's case that under the guise of deciding incidental matters, the limited jurisdiction should not be unreasonable and unduly extended but care should also be taken to see that the scope of incidental questions relating to the claim on account of deduction or delay in payment of wage is not unduly limited, thereby affecting or impairing the limited jurisdiction conferred on the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. In the instant case, it, however, appears to me that the service of the employees and/or the applicants had not been expressly terminated by the said Electric Supply Co. Ltd. but after the cancellation of licence of the said Company under the Electricity Act, the West Bengal State Electricity Board took up the responsibility of supplying electricity to the consumers. As a result, there was hardly any scope for the said Company to maintain the said establishment for supplying electricity to the consumers in the locality and to retain its employees employed in connection with supply of electricity to the consumers. It appears that the West Bengal State Electricity Board, in the facts of the case, had offered employment to the employees of the said Company including the applicants under the West Bengal State Electricity Board and as a matter of fact the said applicants had been employed from the date of taking over such management by the West Bengal State Electricity Board and there has not been any gap between employment under the company and the employment under the Electricity Board. In the facts of the case, it is therefore necessary to determine as to whether or not a retrenchment in fact and in law had taken place. It is also necessary to decide the extent of loss suffered by the applicants for change in the employment. In the facts of the case, it is therefore necessary to determine as to whether or not a retrenchment in fact and in law had taken place. It is also necessary to decide the extent of loss suffered by the applicants for change in the employment. In my view, in the aforesaid circumstances, it is essentially necessary to probe little deeper into the rival contentions made by the parties and in the exercise of limited jurisdiction of the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act, it is not desirable or expedient that the Authority should entertain such questions. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned adjudication made by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act is set aside and the applicants are given liberty to raise the dispute and/or claim before the appropriate authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. To enable the applicants to make proper application under the Industrial Disputes Act, the operation of this judgment win remain stayed for a period of three months from today. Award set aside; applicant to raise dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act.