JUDGEMENT R. C. Patnaik, J.:- In this application for habeas corpus, the wife of the detenu Sri Sanyasi Dora alias Tukuna Dora seeks the quashing of the detention of her husband by order dt. 19-11-83 passed by the District Magistrate, Cuttack opposite party No. 2, in exercise of powers conferred on him under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, by notification of the Home Department dt. 31-10-83. 2. The order of detention was approved by the State Government on 1-12-1983 (Annexure-2). The detenu was served with the grounds of detention and the documents on which the grounds were based on 24-11-83 (Annexure-3). The grounds referred to four incidents. The first incident took place at 9p.m. 28-3-83. It was alleged that the detenu with his associates Sarat Sahoo and others armed with lathi, Bhujali, sword and revolver attacked Sri Bhagirathi Mohapatra at his shop located at Jholasahi crossing. The associates of the detenu without any cause pelted stones at shop-keepers there. The detenu and his associates further created an atmosphere of panic by whirling bhujali and swords and by their shouts. The shops closed down in fear of them and the people ran helter-skelter and the traffic came to a stop for some time. It was further alleged that as a consequence of the violent acts of the detenu and his associates normal life in the area came to a stand-still and public order was affected. In respect of the incident Purighat P. S. Case No. 180 dt. 28-3-83 was lodged. A copy of the information was enclosed with the grounds. The second incident referred to took place at 19.30 p.m. on 3-9-83. It was alleged that when Sri Pravat Kumar Mohapatra alias Pagli of Rajabagicha was proceeding towards his house on a scooter, the detenu and his associates, namely, Sarat Sahoo, Babuli and others, attacked him all of a sudden with deadly weapons, such as knife, Farsa etc. and injured him. The detenu and his associates assaulted with a view to killing him due to their previous enmity with Manu, the elder brother of Pagli. In view of the violent acts of the detenu and his associates who were armed with deadly weapons, on a crowded thoroughfare and the shrieks, the people were fear-stricken and ran hither and thither. Shops of the area closed down and the traffic came to a stand-still for some time. In view of the violent acts of the detenu and his associates who were armed with deadly weapons, on a crowded thoroughfare and the shrieks, the people were fear-stricken and ran hither and thither. Shops of the area closed down and the traffic came to a stand-still for some time. Normal life was disturbed and public order was prejudicially affected. P. S. Case No. 539 dt. 3-9-1983 of Lalbag/Purighat P. S. was registered. A copy of the information was enclosed with the grounds. The third incident took place at 9 p.m. on 12-9-83 when the detenu and his associate Sarat Sahoo armed with knife entered 'Hotel Asoka' located at College crossing and demanded of Sri S. K. Das, the receptionist, allotment of a room free of charge. When he remonstrated, the detenu and his friend threatened to assault him and damaged and broke various articles of the hotel. Both of them chased the employees of the hotel to attack them with knifes. In the circumstances, the customers and visitors who were present inside the hotel left in panic and boarders shut the doors of their respective rooms. Because of the terror created, shops in the area closed down and the passers-by ran helter and skelter. Public order was affected for some time. The last incident took place at 5 minutes past 9 p. m. on 17-9-83 when the detenu and his associate Sarat Sahoo armed with swords entered Hotel Asoka and damaged and destroyed articles and materials inside it. They further put Sri Umesh Chandra Misra, the receptionist, in fear and on the point of a sword removed Rs. 450/- from the drawer at the counter. Both of them threatened by shouts and whirling of swords. The people were terror-stricken. The guests, boarders and the employees of the hotel ran away. Members of the public took to their heels in fear and shop keepers closed down their shops. Normal life came to a stand-still and traffic was disturbed. On account of the violent acts of the detenu and his associate, public order was affected. PW Cases No. 564 dated 12-9-83 and 574 dated 17-9-83 were lodged in relation to the aforesaid acts. Copies of the informations lodged at the P. S. were furnished to the detenu. The detenu was called upon to make his representation before the State Government or the Advisory Board against the order of detention. 3. PW Cases No. 564 dated 12-9-83 and 574 dated 17-9-83 were lodged in relation to the aforesaid acts. Copies of the informations lodged at the P. S. were furnished to the detenu. The detenu was called upon to make his representation before the State Government or the Advisory Board against the order of detention. 3. The petitioner has alleged that the various incidents may relate to law and order but could not be held to have prejudicially affected the public order. It has been contended by Mr. R. N. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the copies of the reports which were supplied to the detenu being partly in English and partly in Oriya, the detenu who does not know English was deprived of his right of making any effective representation against the order of detention. He has further contended that the detenu was not supplied with all the materials those were taken into account by the detaining authority in passing the impugned order of detention. He has further urged that the incident referred to in ground No. 1 took place on 28-3-83 whereas the subsequent incidents happened in Sept., 1983. Hence, the first incident was a stale one there being no proximity or link between the first and the other three. Hence the satisfaction of the detaining authority founded on a stale incident made the order void, the next submission of the learned counsel has been that the detenu made a representation on 30-11-83. The State Government disposed of the same on 15-1-84. The inordinate delay in the disposal of representation made the continued detention of the detenu illegal. Lastly it has been urged that the State Government had not applied its mind to the materials and facts and circumstances while approving and confirming the detention order. 4. The return initially filed on behalf of the opposite parties was sworn to by the District Magistrate. No separate return or affidavit sworn to by an officer competent to swear an affidavit on behalf of the Government had been filed. In view of the allegations against the State Government it was imperative that separate affidavit by a person competent to testify should have been filed. The traverse by the District Magistrate would not satisfy the requirement of law. He would not be in a position to state how the matter was dealt with at government level. In view of the allegations against the State Government it was imperative that separate affidavit by a person competent to testify should have been filed. The traverse by the District Magistrate would not satisfy the requirement of law. He would not be in a position to state how the matter was dealt with at government level. In such matters, therefore, it is imperative that the State Government who take the ultimate responsibility of approving and affirming the order of detention, come forward with an affidavit wherever allegations have been made against the State Government. To meet the challenge of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Deputy Secretary to Government of Orissa in the Home Department, filed a supplementary affidavit in course of the hearing. The challenge on the technical ground of non-traverse has, therefore, been given a quietus. 5. Of the contentions raised, we taken up first for consideration the contention that there was inordinate delay in the disposal of the representation. 6. The detenu made a representation on 30-11-83. The same was disposed of by the Government on 15-1-84, i.e., on the 46th day. The span is long enough. Unless explained, the delayed disposal would by itself render the continued detention illegal. 7. In the course of argument it has been submitted by Mr. Patra, the learned Additional Government Advocate on behalf of the opposite parties, that this ground has been for the first time taken in the rejoinder and in course of argument. There is no pleading in the original writ petition in support of it. So we should not entertain any submission on the ground of delay in the disposal of the representation. 8. In our opinion, it is now too late in the day to repel the attack on the ground of absence of pleadings. We draw attention to the case of Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 at P 1987). Bhagwati. J. observed : "It is also necessary to point out that in case of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the practice evolved by this Court is not to follow strict rules of pleading nor place undue emphasis on the question as to on whom the burden of proof lies. Bhagwati. J. observed : "It is also necessary to point out that in case of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the practice evolved by this Court is not to follow strict rules of pleading nor place undue emphasis on the question as to on whom the burden of proof lies. Even a postcard written by a detenu from jail has been sufficient to activise this Court into examining the legality of detention. This Court has consistently shown great anxiety for personal liberty and refused to throw out a petition merely on the ground that it does not disclose a prima facie case invalidating the order of detention. Whenever a petition for a writ of habeas corpus has come up before this Court, it has almost invariably issued a rule calling upon the detaining authority to justify the detention. This Court has on many occasions pointed out that when a rule is issued, it is incumbent on the detaining authority to satisfy the Court that the detention of the petitioner is legal and in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the law authorising such detention, vide Niranjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1972 SC 2215 ); Shaikh Hanif, v. State of West Bengal (1974 Cri LJ 606) and Dulal Roy v. District Magistrate, Burdwan (1975 Cri LJ 1322). It has also been insisted by this Court that, in answer to this rule, the detaining authority must place all the relevant facts before the Court which would show that the detention is in accordance with the provision of the Act. It would be no argument on the part of the detaining authority to say that a particular ground is not taken in the petition : vide Nizamudin v. State of West Bengal (1975 Cri LJ 12). Once the rule is issued it is the bounden duty of the Court to satisfy itself that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed and the citizen is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law : vide Mohd. Once the rule is issued it is the bounden duty of the Court to satisfy itself that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed and the citizen is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law : vide Mohd. Alam v. State of West Bengal (1974 Cri LJ 770) and Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975 Cri LJ 446)." His Lordship has drawn attention to the departure as regards practice that this country has made from that prevailing in England, where observance of the strict rules of pleadings is insisted upon even in an application for writ of habeas corpus. Reference was made to Khudiram's case (1975) 2 SCC 81 : (1975 Cri LJ 446) where the Supreme Court observed : "The constitutional imperatives enacted in this Art. (Art. 22(5)) are two-fold :(1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) and detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security." Art. 21 of the Constitution is the touch-stone. Whenever there is any deprivation of life or personal liberty, the authority responsible for such deprivation must satisfy the Court that it has acted in accordance with the law. As has been said in Icchu Devi's case ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 at P 1988) : "......This constitutional right of life and personal liberty is placed on such a high pedestal by this Court that it has always insisted that whenever there is any deprivation of life or personal liberty, the authority responsible for such deprivation must satisfy the Court that it has acted in accordance with the law. This is an area where the Court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the slightest measure, the Court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention or to direct the release of the detenu even though the detention may have been valid till the breach occurred. The Court has always regarded personal liberty as the most precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade." 9. The petitioner look the plea in the rejoinder though not in the writ petition. By the time of argument the opposite parties were not unaware of it. Nevertheless we afforded the opposite parties an opportunity to explain. Two affidavits were filed one by the Deputy Secretary to Government of Orissa in the Home Department tracing the course of the representation till its final journey and the other by the District Magistrate for the period from 30-1 1-83 till 19-12-83 when the representation was forwarded by him to the State Government. We would deal with the affidavits and the documents filed by way of explaining the delay a little later. 10. Coming to the legal position : It is well settled that no rigid or inflexible period of time within which the representation of the detenu shall be considered and disposed of can be fixed. The question is not to be considered with reference to any set formula or by a mere arithmetical counting of dates. Each case would depend upon its own facts and circumstances. The principle underlying, however, is that it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the representation has been considered with reasonable despatch and diligence. If on examination the Court finds that there has been uncondonable remissness or avoidable delay on the part of the detaining authority/State Government in dealing with the representation, the continued detention of the detenu would be rendered illegal. If the delay has been due to unavoidable circumstances and for reasons entirely beyond the control of the authorities, such delay would not be a ground for nullifying the detention. If the delay has been due to unavoidable circumstances and for reasons entirely beyond the control of the authorities, such delay would not be a ground for nullifying the detention. As was observed by Bhagwati, J., in Manilal's case: AIR 1976 SC 456 : 1976 Cri LJ 353) : ".....The Court would have to consider judicially in each case on the available material whether the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the State Government is so unreasonably long and the explanation for the delay offered by the State Government so unsatisfactory as to render the detention order thereafter illegal. We must examine the facts of the present case in the light of this principle for the purpose of determining whether there was any undue delay in consideration of the representation of the Ist respondent by the State Government." 11. The opposite parties have sought to explain the delay thus : After receiving the representation, the District Magistrate called for comments from the Superintendent of Police and after receiving the comments, the representation was forwarded to the State Government on Dec. 19, 1983. In the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate details are lacking as to why the representation remained pending at the level of the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate for 19 days. In the affidavit of the Deputy Secretary it has been stated that the representation was received by the Home Department on Dec. 20, 1983 and submitted to the Additional Secretary on Dec. 21, 1983. On Dec. 24, 1983, the Additional Secretary submitted his note to the Secretary and the Secretary endorsed the file to the Chief Minister on Dec. 26, 1983. The Chief Minister was away at Calcutta from Dec. 26, 1983 to Dec. 30, 1983 and was on tour for 10 days thereafter. The tour programme of the Chief Minister has been filed. It has further been stated that the Chief Minister was engaged in attending various meetings including cabinet meeting on Jan. 2, 4, 7 and 15, 1984. On the last date the representation was disposed of. 12. It is necessary at this stage to refer to a few decisions on the point. In Rajkishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 10 : (1983 Cri LJ 629), the representation was made on Oct. 19, 1981 and it was rejected on Nov. 16, 1981. On the last date the representation was disposed of. 12. It is necessary at this stage to refer to a few decisions on the point. In Rajkishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 10 : (1983 Cri LJ 629), the representation was made on Oct. 19, 1981 and it was rejected on Nov. 16, 1981. By way of explanation it was stated that the representation was received by the State Government on Oct. 29, 1981 and comments of the District Magistrate was called for. The District Magistrate submitted his comments on Nov. 4, 1981. The Deputy Secretary examined the representation on Nov. 5, 1981. The Special Secretary received the representation on Nov. 6, 1981 and endorsed the same to the Chief Minister on Nov. 10, 1981. It was observed by the Supreme Court: "......The District Magistrate took more than nine days in examining the representation and in forwarding his comments and for this there is no explanation. But for the provision contained in S.8, which requires the representation to be made to the appropriate Government, the District Magistrate as a detaining authority would have been under an obligation to examine the representation. Even though he received it on Oct. 22, 1981, he forwarded his comments on Oct. 31, 1981. In this connection there is an affidavit of one Rajendra Prasad Singh, Deputy Collector of Gopalganj. He is not the detaining authority. As stated in his affidavit even though the District Magistrate was asked to send his comments by special messenger latest by Oct. 27, 1981, the District Magistrate sent his comments on Oct. 31, 1981, presumably by post which was received by State Government on Nov. 4, 1981. Barring giving out the dates there is not the slightest explanation for the delay for the District Magistrate as also the State Government. Even the rotating of the files from the Deputy Secretary to the Special Secretary and then the Chief Minister has taken unusually long time. On the whole we consider in the circumstances of this case delay of 28 days in disposing of the representation as inordinate delay which would vitiate the order ......" In Afsari Begum's case (1981) 2 SCC 480 : (1981 Cri LJ 606), the grounds of detention was served on the detenu on Nov. 12, 1980. On the whole we consider in the circumstances of this case delay of 28 days in disposing of the representation as inordinate delay which would vitiate the order ......" In Afsari Begum's case (1981) 2 SCC 480 : (1981 Cri LJ 606), the grounds of detention was served on the detenu on Nov. 12, 1980. It was stated that after the representation was received, the same was forwarded to the District Magistrate for his comments. The District Magistrate had to gather informations from many sources. His comments were submitted to the Home Secretary on Nov. 25, 1980. Thereafter the Law Department was consulted and the file reached the Home Minister on Dec. 5, 1980. The representation was rejected on Dec. 8, 1980. It was observed that "administrative red tape was the only explanation offered". The order was set aside on the ground of unreasonable delay in the consideration of the representation. In Harish Pahwa v. State of U. P. (1981) 2 SCC 710 : (1981 Cri LJ 750), the representation was made on June 3, 1980. The State Government received the representation on June 4, 1980. For 2 days no action was taken. On June 6, 1980 comments were called for from the Customs Authority with regard to the allegations made. The comments were received on June 13, 1980 and on June 17, 1980 the representation was referred to the Law Department. Opinion was received on June 19, 1980 and the representation was rejected on June 24, 1980. The Supreme Court observed : ".....There is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on June 4, 5 and 25, 1980. It is also not clear what consideration was given by the Government to the representation from June 13, 1980 to June 16, 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department, nor it is apparent why the Law Department had to be consulted at all. Again, we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to table for six days before reaching the Chief Minister who was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear, as we have done on numerous earlier occasions, that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. We may make it clear, as we have done on numerous earlier occasions, that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. We would emphasise that it is the duty of the State Government to proceed to determine representation of the character above mentioned with utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu ...." (Emphasis supplied). In H. G. Ravindra v. State of Karnataka, 1984 Cri LJ 45 (Kant), the order of detention was invalidated on the ground that there was no explanation for the period from 24-1-83 to 28-1-83 and again from 28-1-83 to 3-2-83. The explanation that the Law Department was looking into the file and the file was being processed during the period was held to be unsatisfactory. In Prasant Kumar Pasayat v. State of Orissa, 1975 Cri LJ 1188 (Orissa), the representation was received on Aug. 19, 1974 and was disposed of on Sept. 20, 1974, i.e., a period of 31 days was taken to dispose of the representation. On behalf of the State an explanation was offered that the representation was received by the detaining authority on Aug. 19, 1974. As several questions of fact has been raised, investigation was necessary and so, the Superintendent of Police was requested to submit his comments. Comments were received on Sept. 15, 1974. Without awaiting however for the comments the representation was sent to the Government on Sept. 3, 1974. After the report was received, the same was sent to the Government on Sept. 16, 1974. The time taken for submission of the comments by the Superintendent of Police was sought to be explained by stating that the Superintendent of Police was busy during the period. The State Government disposed of the representation within 4 days from the date of receipt of the comments. 16, 1974. The time taken for submission of the comments by the Superintendent of Police was sought to be explained by stating that the Superintendent of Police was busy during the period. The State Government disposed of the representation within 4 days from the date of receipt of the comments. This Court observed : "The explanation for the delay in making the enquiry also does not seem to be appropriate enough so as to satisfy judicial conscience in the matter. The enquiring authority has not given any affidavit to explain the position. It is nowhere the case that the Superintendent of Police made a personal investigation into the allegations in the detenu's representation. Even if the Superintendent of Police was busy as stated in the affidavit of the detaining authority the enquiry could have been entrusted to some other person. We are not at all satisfied that the delay of 25 days at the level of the detaining authority has been explained so as to condone the same." 13. No explanation has been given for the period from November 30, 1983 till Dec. 19, 1983. The file at our request was produced by the Additional Government Advocate. It appears therefrom that the District Magistrate called for comments on Dec. 2, 1983 and the comments were sent on December 9, 1983 and were received in the office of the District Magistrate on Dec. 10, 1983. No explanation has been given as to why it took 7 days to make the comments on the representation. The comments were received in the office of the District Magistrate on Dec. 10, 1983. He forwarded the representation along with the comments on Dec. 19, 1983. There is no explanation whatsoever for the period from Dec. 10, 1983 to Dec. 19, 1983. Though an opportunity was afforded and the District Magistrate filed an affidavit, he failed to discharge the obligation. So, the delay of 9 days at the level of the detaining authority has not been explained at all. We even treat the period taken by the police as uncalled for and unjustified. If the representation has to be disposed of with utmost dispatch, the sense of urgency should be evident from the course of the representation. The representation was received by the Government on Dec. 20, 1983 and was endorsed to the Chief Minister on Dec. We even treat the period taken by the police as uncalled for and unjustified. If the representation has to be disposed of with utmost dispatch, the sense of urgency should be evident from the course of the representation. The representation was received by the Government on Dec. 20, 1983 and was endorsed to the Chief Minister on Dec. 26, 1983 and in the meanwhile it was travelling from one table to another. The disposal, at the Secretariat level is, therefore, not in consonance with the observation of the Supreme Court repeatedly made. The Supreme Court has gone to the extent of saying that each days delay has to be explained. No explanation has been offered for Dec. 22 and 23, 1983. There was also delay after the representation was endorsed to the Chief Minister. The representation should have been placed before the Chief Minister on the date he was available at headquarters. Disposal of representation is no less an urgent matter than "different meetings". There is also no explanation as to why the representation was not placed before the Chief Minister on Jan. 3 and 13, 1984. It has not been said that the Chief Minister was out of headquarters on the 3rd and the 13th. 14. The conclusion, therefore, is that though there is satisfactory explanation for a part of the period, in regard to the rest either there is no explanation for a portion thereof or the explanation is not satisfactory. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that there was unreasonable and undue delay in the disposal of the detenu's representation and that the utmost dispatch which is required to be shown was lacking. The processing and movement of the representation lacked that sense of urgency which was essential in such matter. 15. In view of the aforesaid, it is unnecessary to examine the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 16. We therefore hold the continued detention invalid, allow the writ application and quash the order of detention (Annexure-1). The detenu Sri Sanyasi Dora alias Tukuna Dora be set at liberty forthwith. There would be no order as to costs. D. P. MOHAPATRA, J.:- I agree. Petition allowed.