Judgment Ramaswamy, J.: Accused 1 and 3 in S.C. No. 84 of 1981 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Krishna are the appellants. They and another accused (A-2) were charged for an offence punishable under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code for causing the death of one Parise Dharmaraju on 25th March, 1981 at about 10 a.m. in front of the tailoring shop of P.W.8 in Santha Bazaar of Challapalli town, Krishna District. The Sessions Court acquitted A-2 and convicted the appellants for an offence under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The case of the prosecution, shorn of the redundant details unfolded at the trial, is as follows: The deceased and the accused are the residents of Devarakota village which is situated at a distance of 3 to 4 miles from Challapalli town. The accused belong to the Communist Marxist Patty and the deceased and P.Ws.1 and 2 belong to the Congress-I party. There were political factions in the village. The impetus to faction was erupted with the selection of the house sites for the Harijans and the other weaker sections. The deceased and others on one hand and the accused party, though suggested diverse lands as suitable, the Revenue Divisional Officer on enquiry, ultimately selected the lands suggested by the deceased, several cases were filed on either side. As on the date, all the cases had been compromised between the parties. But on 26th March, 1981 at about 8-30 a. m. the deceased, P.W.2 and others attacked one Chalamaiah in the village. A complaint in that regard was laid under section 307, Indian Penal Code, against them at the police station, Challapalli. P.W.16 the Sub Inspector, registered a case in Crime No. 34 of 1981 at about 9-30 a.m. He deputed the police constables P.Ws.5 and 7 to go to the village and to guard over the scene of offence, 3. In the meanwhile the deceased came to Challapalli to purchase fertilizers. Similarly P.W.2 also came to purchase fertilizers. P.W.8 set up a sewing machine on the pial of one Vana Rangarao. On seeing the deceased at the shop of P.W.8, P.W.1 enquired the deceased of his purpose to come and his informing of his intention, to purchase fertilizers. While they were talking, they saw P.W.2 coming there. Similarly P.W.2 also came to purchase fertilizers. P.W.8 set up a sewing machine on the pial of one Vana Rangarao. On seeing the deceased at the shop of P.W.8, P.W.1 enquired the deceased of his purpose to come and his informing of his intention, to purchase fertilizers. While they were talking, they saw P.W.2 coming there. When asked for, he also told them that he came there to purchase manures. While they were talking, the accused came with tappers’ knives. A-1 stabbed the deceased on the left shoulder. A-2 stabbed him on the right hand and the left flank. A-3 struck him on the right leg. P.Ws.1 and 2 receded to a distance of ten yards and saw the accused continuing their attack on the deceased indiscriminately. Thereafter P.Ws.1 and 2 ran away from the scene and went to the house of a relation of P.W.1 and asked P.W.2 to go to the village and inform the relations of the deceased. After one hour, P.W.1 came to the scene. By then he saw the Sub-Inspector (P.W.16) and police constables. 4. P.Ws.5 and 7, the constables, while they were proceeding to the village Devarakota they had seen the deceased being cut on the pial of Vana Rangarao. Seeing them, the accused ran away. They chased the accused. P.W.5 caught hold of A-3 and P.W.7 caught hold of A-1, and A-2 escaped. Then they brought Accused 1 and 3, in the ricksaw of P.W.9 to the police station. 5. The Sub Inspector of Police, P.W.16, after the assignment of duties to P.Ws.5 and 7, was proceeding to Devarakota and on the way he saw the deceased struggling for life with bleeding injuries on the pial of Vana Rangarao. When questioned, the deceased stated that the accused cut him. He recorded the report of the deceased, Exhibit P-16. After recording the statement, the deceased was taken to the police station. The Sub-Inspector registered Crime No 35 of 1981 and issued F.I.R. Exhibit P-17 and was again examining the injured. At that time, P.Ws.5 and 7 brought A-1 and A-3 to the police station. The Sub-Inspector asked them to wait till the statement of the injured was completed. Thereafter, the accused were taken into custody. He seized M.Os.1 to 6 knives and the blood stained clothes from A-1 and A-3 under Exhibit P-7 mahazarama. The accused were kept in lock up. The Sub-Inspector asked them to wait till the statement of the injured was completed. Thereafter, the accused were taken into custody. He seized M.Os.1 to 6 knives and the blood stained clothes from A-1 and A-3 under Exhibit P-7 mahazarama. The accused were kept in lock up. Then he sent the injured in a taxi to the Machilipatnam he adquarters hospital for treatment. Then the Sub-Inspector went to the scene of offence and prepared the observation report Exhibit P-8. He examined P.W.1 and P.W.4, a neighbour having shop at the scene of offence. He sent for P.Ws.5 and 7 and examined them. 6. After the deceased was taken to the hospital at Machilipatnam, the doctor, P.W.14 examined him at 11.20 a.m. He noticed seventeen injuries and he issued the wound certificate Exhibit P-15. The Doctor sent a requisition Exhibit P-10 to the Magistrate to record the dying declaration of the deceased. P.W.3 Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Machilipatnam came to the hospital and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Exhibit P-1, at 12 40 p.m. The Doctor P.W.14 appended a certificate that the deceased was conscious. The deceased died at 2-05 p.m. P.W.14 sent the death intimation to the Sub Inspector P.W.16. P.W.16 came and held the inquest over the dead body between 8 a. m. to 11 a.m. on the next day i.e. 26th March, 1981, Exhibit P-9 is the inquest report He examined P.Ws.2 and 9 and others at the inquest. The Doctor P.W.16 conducted autopsy on 26th March, 1981 at 2-30 p.m. and he noticed eighteen injuries and he opined that the deceased died due to shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries. According to the Doctor, the said injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. He issued Exhibit P-2 postmortem certificate. The accused No. 2 was arrested and the charge-cheet was filed on 23rd June, 1931. 7. In all, the prosecution examined sixteen witnesses of whom P.Ws.1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are the direct witnesses. But P.W.8 did not support the prosecution. When the incriminating circumstances were put to the accused, they have pleaded innocence and stated that they were falsely implicated on account of factions in the village. The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of P.W.2 He believed the evidence of P.Ws.1, 4, 5 and 7. But P.W.8 did not support the prosecution. When the incriminating circumstances were put to the accused, they have pleaded innocence and stated that they were falsely implicated on account of factions in the village. The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of P.W.2 He believed the evidence of P.Ws.1, 4, 5 and 7. So far as the dying declarations made by the deceased are concerned, as stated earlier, there were three declarations, Exhibits P-16, P-18 and P-1 respectively in the order of time. The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved Exhibit P-18 on the ground that it reached the Court at a belated stage and therefore its authenticity was doubted, but accepted the dying declarations Exhibits P-16 and P-1. In Exhibit P-1 the deceased omitted to mention the part played by A-2 in the attack on him and therefore, the learned Sessions Judge gave the benefit of doubt to A-2 and acquitted him. His acquittal has become final since no appeal has been filed by the State. 8. In this appeal, Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that the entire prosecution case is replete with tissues of lies. P.Ws.4, 5 and 7 are unreliable witnesses and their evidence cannot be accepted for more than one reason. He sought to wriggle out from Exhibit P-1 contending that despite the Magistrate recording it and the doctor appending a certificate that the deceased was conscious while making the statement, the Magistrate put no question regarding the mental capacity of the deceased to give the statement nor an endorsement was made by the doctor to the effect that the dec eased was in a fit state of mind to give the declaration, Exhibit P-1 cannot thereby be relied upon. Exhibit P-1 is the outcome of tutoring by the enemies of the appellants and therefore, no reliance can be placed upon it. With regard to Exhibit P-16, he contends that after Exhibit P-1 was received by the police, P.W.16 succumbed to the pressure of the political opponents to implicate A-2 also and therefore, he was falsely implicated. The thumb impression of the deceased was obtained. Under these circumstances, it is highly unsafe to rely on Exhibit P-16 and it is liable to be rejected on that ground. He further contended that in Exhibit P-16 the name of P.W.1 was mentioned and the name of P.W.2 was not mentioned. The thumb impression of the deceased was obtained. Under these circumstances, it is highly unsafe to rely on Exhibit P-16 and it is liable to be rejected on that ground. He further contended that in Exhibit P-16 the name of P.W.1 was mentioned and the name of P.W.2 was not mentioned. The presence of P.W.1 was not reiterated in Exhibit P-1. There are suspicious circumstances which stare on record and the dying declarations are also liable to be rejected outright and no conviction can be based on these dying declarations. In support of these contentions, he lied upon Balak Ram v. State of U.P. Balak Ram v. State of U.P. (1975)3 S.C.C. 219 : (1975) 1 S.C.R. 753 : (1974) Crl.L.J. 1456:(1974) S.C.C. (Crl) 837: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2165; K.R. Reddy v. Public Prosecutor K.R. Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1977) 1 S.C.J. 36: (1976) Crl. L.J. 1548; (1976) 3 S.C.C. 618 : (1976) S.C.C. (Crl) 473: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1984 and Pompiah v. State of Mysore Pompiah v. State of Mysore (1965) 2 S.C.J. 157: (1965) MLJ. (Crl.) 510: The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, stated that P.W.1, though a partisan witness, his presence of offence was quite natural and his presence at the seene was mentioned in Exhibit P-1 recorded immediately after the occurrence P.W.4 is a disinterested witness and he has no axe to grind against the accused and therefore, his evidence was rightly accepted by the trial Court. P.Ws.5 and 7, constables, while were proceeding on duty, saw the occurrence chased the accused and apprehended the fleeing accused 1 and 3 and therefore, they were caught on the spot and there is nothing on record to suspect their evidence given in the Court. He further contended that though the Sessions Court rejected Exhibit P-18, Exhibits P-16 and P-1 are most authentic documents and the lower Court has rightly based convictions on the basis of the dying declarations. Therefore, the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. He did not cite any authorities 9. Upon these respective contentions, the sole question for consideration is whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. He did not cite any authorities 9. Upon these respective contentions, the sole question for consideration is whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not disputed that it cannot be disputed that the deceased died due to homicidal death in Challapalli town due to infliction of eighteen injuries on the person of the deceased and whoever may be the assailants, they clearly committed an offence of murder. The only question is whether the appellants are the assailants of the deceased. The case of the prosecution rests on two pieces of evidence namely the dying declarations Exhibits P-16 and P-1 given by the deceased and the direct evidence of P.Ws.1, 4, 5 and 7. Let us take first the dying declaratios as such. It is not disputed that the offence has taken place at about 10 a.m. in broad day light in Challapalli town. Though there is a dispute as to the place of actual occurrence whether it is on the oppial of Vana Rangarao or in the street of Santha bazaar, it is established and fairly not challenged that the occurrence has taken place in Santha Bazaar. P.W.16 has reached the scene of offence at 10-25 a.m. and to the narration of the deceased, the recorded the statement Exhibit P-16. in Exhibit P-16 the deceased has given a very short statement. Within 25 minutes the deceased made the declaration and it reads thus: “I belong to Devarakota. There are two factions in our village. On this day i.e., on 25th March, 1981 at about 10 a.m. while I was near, the Santha Bazar in Chaliapalli-Bandar road Bolem Bhaskara Rao and his brothers Bolem Venkateswara Rao and Mohana Rao came to me and Bhaskara Rao hacked me with a knife on my left should. Venkateswara Rao hacked with Penaka Kathi on my right hand. He stabbed me in left flank also. Mohana Rao hacked me on my right leg. All the three hacked me indiscriminately. They hacked me due toprior grudges. This all happened before Koppula Potharaju and others, At last police people saw and chased the accused. Read over to me and found correct. L.T.M. of P.Charmayya”. Then the deceased was taken to the police station. P.W.16 registered the crime and issued F.I.R., Exhibit P-17. All the three hacked me indiscriminately. They hacked me due toprior grudges. This all happened before Koppula Potharaju and others, At last police people saw and chased the accused. Read over to me and found correct. L.T.M. of P.Charmayya”. Then the deceased was taken to the police station. P.W.16 registered the crime and issued F.I.R., Exhibit P-17. The Magistrate at Avanigadda received the F.I.R. including Exhibit P-16 at 2 p.m. on the same day. Thereafter, the deceased was taken in a taxi to Machilpatnam and he was admitted in the hospital. On intimation of P.W.14, the Doctor, P.W.3 the Magistrate recorded the dying declaration Exhibit P-1 at 12 40 p.m. In Exhibit P-1 he mentioned the attack by A-1 and A-3 and he reiterated the places on which he was beaten. The Doctor certified that the deceased was conscious at the time of recording the statement. In view of the specific contention raised by Mr. C.Padmanabha Reddy that no question regarding the mental condition of the deceased was put by the learned Magistrate and no certificate to that effect was appended by the Doctor, we have to see whether this infirmity would create any real doubt in our mind regarding the mental capacity of the deceased to give the statement Exhibit P-1. Before considering that question, it is necessary to state the law on the subject. The leading decision on the subject is Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay 1958 S.C.J. 198: (1958) MLJ. (Crl.) 100: (1958) Crl.L.J. 106: 1958 S.C.R. 552: A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 22. Before considering that question, it is necessary to state the law on the subject. The leading decision on the subject is Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay 1958 S.C.J. 198: (1958) MLJ. (Crl.) 100: (1958) Crl.L.J. 106: 1958 S.C.R. 552: A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 22. Therein, their Lordships of the Supreme Court speaking hrough Sinha, J. (as he then was) laid down he following tests: “It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; a dying declaration stands on the same, footing as another pieces of evidence and has to be judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; a dying declaration which has recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, bad not been impaired at the lime he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control, that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it, and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arise not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that the Court in a given case, has come the conclusion to that the particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities”. This was affirmed by a constitution Bench in Harbans Singh and another v. State of Punjab Harbans Singh and another v. State of Punjab (1962) 2 S.C.J. 662: (1962)MLJ. (Crl.) 685: A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 439 at 443. 10. In a recent judgment of this Court in T.Venkatakrishniah and others v. State (Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1983 rendered on 26th March, 1984) we have considered the entire case law and we have held: “Under section 32 of the Evidence Act, a statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in case in which the cause of that person's death comes into question are themselves relevant facts. A dying declaration is not a weak piece of evidence. It by itself forms a basis for conviction without any further corroboration provided it is truthful and reliable. The truthfulness, reliability and the acceptability of the dying declaration has to be adjudged in the light of attendant facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be subjected to strict scrutiny like any other piece to evidence, either direct or circumstantial. The truthfulness, reliability and the acceptability of the dying declaration has to be adjudged in the light of attendant facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be subjected to strict scrutiny like any other piece to evidence, either direct or circumstantial. A dying declaration recorded by a competent magistrate stands on a higher footing than an oral declaration or one recorded by the investigating officer. But it must be remembered that it was recorded in the absence of the accused who are denied of an opportunity to test it on the touchstone of cross-examination to find its credibility. With regard to reliability, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity to the victim to observe his assailants; his capacity to remember the facts stated; his state of mind at the time of making declaration; the consistency of the declaration, if made more than once and whether the declaration was made at the earliest. It has also to be found whether it has been stemmed from tutoring or interference by any other persons. The deying declaration if admissible in evidence of necessity by way of an exception to the general principle that hearsay evidence is not admissible, by operation of section 32 of the Evidence Act. This is on the premise that great solemnity and sanctity is to be attached to the words of the dying man because a person on the last lap of breath and on dying bed would be unlikely to speak falsehood or be animated to weave out a false version of attack on him excluding his real assailants and implicating innocent persons. Court would keep these factiors in view while considering and subjecting the declaration to close scrutiny.” Keeping these principles in view, we have to consider whether the dying declarations Exhibits P-1 and P-16 are truthful and reliable; if they are found to be truthful and reliable they can form the basis for conviction. On the other hand, if the material part of the declaration Exhibit P-1 is untrue or unacceptable then it would be unacceptable, then it would be unsafe to convict the accused, on the sole basis thereof without any further corroboration. At the time Exhibit P-1 was recorded, none were present with the deceased. The Magistrate put questions and recorded the answers in the language of the deceased in Telugu. At the time Exhibit P-1 was recorded, none were present with the deceased. The Magistrate put questions and recorded the answers in the language of the deceased in Telugu. The doctor alone was pre sent. 11. The immediate question is whether the omission on the part of the Magistrate toput a direct question ascertaining the mental condition of the deceased to give the statement and the omission on the part of the Doctor to make an endorsement to that effect would by itself be sufficient to discard the dying declaration. Exhibit P-1 as being untrustworthy. In this regard no doubt their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K.R.Reddy v. Public Prosecutor K.R.Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1977) 1 S.C.J. 36: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1994 speaking through Fazal Ali, J. held that the omission by the judicial magistrate who knew law to put a question regarding the mental condition would throw a good deal of doubt on the fact whether the deceased was really in a fit state of mind to make a statement Preceding to this their Lordships also observed that the magistrate appears to have committed a serious irregularity in not putting a direct question to the injured whether he was capable mentally to make any statement. Their Lordships relied upon the decision in Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat (1972) Crl.L.J. 828: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1776, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the omission of the person who recorded the dying declaration to put a question to the deceased regarding his state of mind to make the statement is a serious one. But the prime point is whether their Lordships intended to lay down as of law that the omission by itself would be a circumstance to throw out the dying declaration recorded by the magistrate. To consider that question, it is necessary to see the law laid down in Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat (1972) Crl.L.J. 828: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. (1776) Palekar, J. speaking on behalf of the Court held in paragraph 10: “According to Mr. To consider that question, it is necessary to see the law laid down in Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat (1972) Crl.L.J. 828: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. (1776) Palekar, J. speaking on behalf of the Court held in paragraph 10: “According to Mr. Mehta, though the witnesses stated in the evidence that Sharda was conscious and was able to speak, it did not necessarily mean that she was in a proper mental condition to make a consciously truthful statement and unless clear evidence about her mental state was produced the statement would not be regarded as reliable evidence.” In support of that Contention the Counsel (‘therein) relied on an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Crl.A.No. 225 of 1967, dated 12th November, 1968). While considering that contention, Pakekar, J. has held: “There can be no doubt that when a dying declaration is recorded the person who records the statement must be satisfied that the person who makes the statement is consciously making the statement is understanding the implications of the words he uses. The expression ‘fit state of mind’ used in the case referred to above means no more than that……” Explaining the case relied on, it was said that: “The facts of that case go to show that though the dying man Trilok Singh had purported make a statement implicating Sucha Singh and Mahendra Singh as his assailants this Court was not prepared, on the evidence to accept that statement as having been consciously made by Trilok Singh …… ….. …. …… In other words what the case suggests is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the dying man was making a conscious and voluntary statement with normal understanding; and the responsibility of the court is greater in holding that it was so made when in fact it is found that the man dies a few minutes afterwards”. Then their Lordships considered the facts in (1972) Crl.L.J. 828, and accepted the dying declaration made to the head constable in the presence of the doctor. Even in (1977) 1 S.C.J. 36, two declarations recorded were rejected by the Sessions Court and this Court relied upon the dying declaration recorded by the executive magistrate. Even the Doctor also certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. Even in (1977) 1 S.C.J. 36, two declarations recorded were rejected by the Sessions Court and this Court relied upon the dying declaration recorded by the executive magistrate. Even the Doctor also certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. Relying upon that, this Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant and another on the basis of the dying declaration. In the appeal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the facts and circumstances of the case. There it was found that there was sufficient opportunity for the deceased to make the statement at three stages to name his assailants, but he did not came his assailants at any time, till the magistrate recorded the statement and P.W.2 therein was present by the side of the deceased when the statement was recorded. There was evidence on record to show hat the deceased therein had no previous acquaintance with the names of the assailants and the occurrence had taken place in darkness. Under those circumstances, though the Doctor certified that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, their Lordships considered the declaration and found it to be not acceptable without any independent corroboration. Though their Lordships held that it is necessary for the magistrate recording the statement to put a question regarding the state of mind of the person giving the declaration, on a consideration of the judgment, we are inclined to take the view that their Lordships d id not intend to lay down as of law that mere omission to put a direct question regarding the fit state of mind would by itself constitute as infirmity regarding the reliability of the dying declaration. Even the endorsement by the doctor to that effect is also not conclusive. The Magistrate recording the statement must be satisfied that the dying man was making a conscious and voluntary statement with normal understanding. Fit state of mind is an important aspect and has to be assessed not solely on the basis of the endorsement or a statement by the Magistrate. It has to be assessed from the questions put and the way in which the deceased gave answers, the seriousness of the injuries sustained and the situs at which the injuries were inflicted and the surrounding circumstances. It has to be assessed from the questions put and the way in which the deceased gave answers, the seriousness of the injuries sustained and the situs at which the injuries were inflicted and the surrounding circumstances. The ratio of their Lordships in (1977)1 S.C.J. 36 clearly shows that all the facts and circumstances have to be considered while considering the reliability of the declaration. In Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1975) 3 S.C.C. 219 , relied upon by the appellants, Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Court considered the effect of declaration in paragraphs 53 to 55. In that case also, all the friends and the admirers of the declarant were present when his declaration was recorded and in view of the acute factions and the presence of those persons and in view of the medical evidence, their Lordships were not prepared to make the dying declaration the basis for convicting the appellant therein. That decision is also distinguishable on the facts. In Habib Usman v. State of Gujarat Habib Usman v. State of Gujarat (1979) 2 S.C.J. 445: (1979) Crl.L.J. 708: (1979) 3 S.C.C. 358 : (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 671: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1181, Chinnappa Reddy, J. on behalf of the Court has held: “Great weight must naturally and necessarily be attached to a dying declaration recorded very shortly after the occurrence. Merely because some friends and relatives happened to be with the deceased before the statement was recorded, the statement cannot be thrown out as tutored.” In that case the Sessions Court discarded the dying declaration, but on appeal, the High Court accepted the dying declaration and reversed the order of acquittal. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court accepted the dying declaration and also relied upon the evidence of the direct witness. In Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 519: (1979) Crl.L.J. 1122: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1505, S.M. Fazal Ali, J. speaking on behalf of the Court has held that though the victim had sustained a number of injuries, he was in a position to speak or give the dying declaration. In Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 519: (1979) Crl.L.J. 1122: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1505, S.M. Fazal Ali, J. speaking on behalf of the Court has held that though the victim had sustained a number of injuries, he was in a position to speak or give the dying declaration. Their Lordships considered the nature of the injuries and held that there was no injury which may have affected the brain or the heart and the only serious injuries are on the abdomen which will not make the deceased unconscious immediately. Considering those circumstances, their Lordships have accepted the declaration and confirmed the conviction. In Somappa v. State of Mysore Somappa v. State of Mysore (1979) Crl.L.J. 1358: (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 910: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1831, there was a conflict of evidence between the Doctor who examined the deceased immediately and the postmortem Doctor. The Doctor who examined the deceased immediately stated that in view of the injuries sustained by him, the shock would have been instantaneous and as a result, he could not give a statement, whereas the postmortem Doctor has stated that the deceased would not have become unconscious immediately and he would have been conscious for sometime and thereafter, be would have become unconscious. In that case the Sub Inspector recorded the statement of the deceased, the first information report which subsequently turned out to be the dying declaration. The trial court rejected the declaration and on appeal, the High Court accepted and convicted the accused. While considering the question of mental state of the deceased, the Supreme Court considered the evidence of the Doctor and accepted that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a declaration. In Kusa v. State of Orissa Kusa v. State of Orissa (1980) Crl.L.J. 408: (1980) 2 S.C.C. 207 : (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 389: A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 559, S.M.Fazal Ali, J. speaking on behalf of the Court had to consider the dying declaration vis-a-vis a passage in Taylor's ‘Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence’. The learned Counsel appearing therein contended that the medical evidence was in conflict and the declaration cannot be accepted. The learned Counsel appearing therein contended that the medical evidence was in conflict and the declaration cannot be accepted. Fazal Ali, J, accepted the dying declaration and held that a bare perusal of the dying declaration showed that coherent and consistent statement was made by the deceased who clearly stated the motive for the occurrence and had also named the four appellants and stated that he and his brother were assaulted by lathis and it was not disputed by the prosecution that the appellants were armed with these weapons. Their Lordships further held that: “…the deceased was fully conscious and was not suffering from any confusion or hallucination and that in the absence of any question put to the doctor by the accused in his cross-examination regarding the view expressed by the author regarding the state of mind of the deceased, the dying declaration could not be attacked on the ground that the deceased was in a state of shock.” A resume of the above decisions would clearly lead to the following conclusions: 1. The Magistrate must be satisfied that the dying man was making a conscious and voluntary statement with normal understanding: 2. It is incumbent upon the Magistrate who records the declaration to put a questions regarding the mental state of the declarant. It is salutary to mention that there is no opportunity to the accused to test the veracity of the statement by cross examining and they are denuded of that right. Under these circumstances, a clemn duty is cast on the Magistrate recording the declaration to take all the precautions to find out the state of mind of the person making the declaration. But the omission thereof does not by itself constitute any infirmity regarding the reliability of the declaration made unless there are attendant circumstances to show that the declaration is not reliable and it is not voluntary or truthful. 3. It is the duty of the Court to carefully scrutinize the declaration and find out whether it is truthful and reliable. The certificate appended by the Doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, though has a great material bearing, is not by itself conclusive. The Court can go into the evidence and find out whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of recording his statement. The certificate appended by the Doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, though has a great material bearing, is not by itself conclusive. The Court can go into the evidence and find out whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of recording his statement. It has to be assessed from the questions put and the way in which the deceased gave answers, the seriousness of the injuries sustained and the situs at Which the injuries were inflicted and the surrounding circumstances. 12. Keeping these principles in view, let us first consider the evidence on record. P.W. No. 3, the Magistrate stated: “Before recording the dying declaration I was satisfied that the person making the declaration was conscious and he was in a fit condition to make a voluntary statement. The statement was recorded in the form of question and answer. Exhibit P-1 is the statement recorded by me. At the time of recording the statement the doctor on duty was present and after the statement was recorded he has made an endorsement that the patient was fully conscious at the time of making the statement”. In the cross-examination nothing has been brought out to discredit the above evidence. After all the Magistrate has been discharging the solemn duty of recording the statement. Though he did not specifically put a direct question to the deceased, he stated that the deceased was conscious and he was in a fit condition to make a statement. To the statement of P.W.3 there is sufficient corroboration from the evidence of the doctor. We have to find whether the deceased would be in a fit state of mind. P.W.3 put many as ten questions and he elicited answers. To the sixth question, “What has happened to you, when and where,” the deceased has narrated the entire circumstances of his coming to Challapalli, his presence at the Santha Bazaar, the attack by the accused, the parts of the body on which the attack was made and of their subsequent indiscriminate stabbing with tappers’ knives. To question No. 7, when motive was asked for, he clearly stated that the attack on his made by the accused was due to factions. To question No. 9 “Whether any statement was recorded by the Police?”, he stated that the police have recorded the statement. To question No. 7, when motive was asked for, he clearly stated that the attack on his made by the accused was due to factions. To question No. 9 “Whether any statement was recorded by the Police?”, he stated that the police have recorded the statement. We have carefully scanned the declaration and a reading of the declaration would clearly indicate that for every question put by the Magistrate, he gave relevant, coherent, specific and definite answers without any hesitency or hallucination. Therefore, from these circumstances, keeping in view the evidence of P.Ws. No. 3 and 14, we are satisfied that the declaration Exhibit P-1 was made by the deceased in a conscious and fit state of mind and the omission on the part of the Magistrate to put a specific question in that regard or an endorsement to that effect by the Doctor, does not constitute any infirmity to doubt the mental capacity to make the statement or veracity or voluntary nature or reliability of the declaration made by the deceased. 13. Next comes the declaration Exhibit P-16 recorded immediately after the occurrence by P.W. No. 16. As stated earlier, the occurrence has taken place undoubtedly at 10 a.m. and it was recorded at 10-25 a.m. In that statement also, he expressly mentioned the attack by A-1 and A-3 apart from A-2. He also mentioned the presence of P.W.1. In Exhibit P-1 he expressly stated that the police have recorded the statement. Though Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, learned Counsel contended the Exhibit P-16 is a subsequent fabrication by P.W.16 at the behest and pressure of the political opponents of the accused, we are unable to accede to or accept the said contention. One important factor to be taken note of is that Exhibit P-16 reached the Magistrate at Avanigadda at 2 p.m. and the deceased died at Machilipatnam at 2-05 p.m. The statement Exhibit P-1 was recorded at Machilipatnam and there is a specific and express mention made by the deceased regarding the statement recorded by the police. From these circumstances, we can safely conclude that deceased made the statement Exhibit P-16 immediately after the occurrance and that formed the F.I.R. for the police to set in motion to investigate into the offence. No doubt in Exhibit P-1 he did not mention the attack by A-2. From these circumstances, we can safely conclude that deceased made the statement Exhibit P-16 immediately after the occurrance and that formed the F.I.R. for the police to set in motion to investigate into the offence. No doubt in Exhibit P-1 he did not mention the attack by A-2. At this stage it is necessary to refer to the decision in Pompiah v. State of Mysore Pompiah v. State of Mysore (1965) 2 S.C.J. 157, relied on for the appellants. Therein, there were two successive declarations and clear improvement in the latter one. Therefore, their Lordships were not prepared to accept the declaration without any independent corroboration. The facts of the above case are distinguishable. In the first declaration he named two assailants. Later in the second declaration he named four assailants. The Supreme Court has held that the inclusion of two more accused was an afterthought. In that view, their Lordship held that it was not safe to accept the declarations when the deceased himself falsely implicated two more persons in the second declaration. It is no doubt true as pointed out by Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, from the medical evidence of P.W.14 that the general condition of the deceased was very weak. His pulse was feeble. He was conscious and coherent and his blood prescure was not recordable. His respiration was 40 per minute. From this factual condition of the victim at the timeof admission into the hospital, though the learned Counsel has contended that the deceased was not a fit state of mind to give the statement, we are unable to accede to his contention. No doubt, at the time of admission into the hospital the condition of the victim may be serious. Though it has not been brought on record with regard to the nature of the treatment given during the interregnum from the time of admission till the time of recording the declaration Exhibit P-1, it is common knowledge that the Doctor would extend all possible medical assistance and we cannot suspect the evidence of P.W.14. From the facts and circumstances we hold that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the declaration Exhibit P-1 and declaration itself is sufficient to base a conviction without corroboration. As far as the appellants are concerned, there is consistency in the two declarations. From the facts and circumstances we hold that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give the declaration Exhibit P-1 and declaration itself is sufficient to base a conviction without corroboration. As far as the appellants are concerned, there is consistency in the two declarations. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay 1958 S.C.J. 198: (1958) MLJ. (Crl.) 100, though one of the accused was acquitted and the rest were convicted, their Lordships relying upon the dying declarations confirmed the convictions to the extent of the accused found to be consistent in the declarations. The ratio clearly applies to the facts of this case. In this case Exhibit P-16 is the first declaration in point of time and Exhibit P-1 is the next declaration. As stated earlier, the occurrence has taken place at 10 a.m. Exhibit P-16 was recorded at 10.25 a.m. The deceased was admitted in the hospital at 11-20 a.m. and Exhibit P-1 was recorded at 12-40 p.m. The deceased died at 2.05 p.m. From the time point of view and in view of thenature of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased, a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances would show that the condition of the deceased was deteriorating and was becoming serious. The omission to mention the attack made by A-2 and the details thereof in Exhibit P-1 is attributable to this aspect. It is not a case of overstatement or implicating any persons other than his real assailants. It is a case of an omission due to fading of memory. In this context, it is necessary to consider the nature the injuries inflicted on the deceased. We find as many eighteen injuries and most of them are lacerated injuries of a very grave nature though not on vital parts. Under these circumstances, it must be held that the attack was made by more than one person. Considering from this perspective, we hold that Exhibit P-16 is a truthful and reliable statement made by the deceased immediately after the occurrence and it contains all the necessary details of the attack by A-1 and A-3. Medical evidence of P.W.6 (postmortem Doctor) and P.W.14 furnishes enough corroboration. Considering the facts and circumstances, we hold that Exhibit P-1 and P-16 are sufficient to base the conviction. In addition to that, there is the evidence of P.W.1 in this case. Medical evidence of P.W.6 (postmortem Doctor) and P.W.14 furnishes enough corroboration. Considering the facts and circumstances, we hold that Exhibit P-1 and P-16 are sufficient to base the conviction. In addition to that, there is the evidence of P.W.1 in this case. His name was mentioned in Exhibit P-1 Though he was partisan witness, it is no ground to disbelieve his evidence on that score. If the evidence of P.W.1 alone is there, no doubt it would not be safe to base a conviction. But however, his evidence can be used as a corroborative piece of evidence to Exhibits P-1 and P-16. Accordingly we accept his evidence and his evidence lends corroboration. We are not prepared to accept the evidence of P.W.4 for more than one reason. Firstly his statement was recorded under section 167, Criminal Procedure Code. In Bolak Ram v. State of U.P. Bolak Ram v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 S.C.C. 219 , Chandran, J.(as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Court: “The investigating officer says that he got the statements recorded by way of precaution. That could be true and it would be wrong to find fault with the investigating officer merely because he got the statements of these witnesses records under section 164. Nor can the evidence of a witness be discarded for the mere reason that his statement was recorded under section 164. But the High Court overlooked that the evidence of witnesses whose statements are recorded under section 164 must be approach with caution Ram Charan v. State of U.P. Ram Charan v. State of U.P. (1968) 2 S.C.J. 826(1968) Crl.L.J. 1478: (1968) 3 S.C.R. 354 : A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1270. Such witnesses feel tied to their previous statement given on oath and have but a theoretical freedom to depart from the earlier version. A prosecution for perjury could be the price of that freedom. It is, of course, open to the Court to accept the evidence of a witness whose statement was recorded under section 164, but the salient rule of caution must always be borne in mind. That is all the more necessary almost all the eye-witnesses are subjected to this tying-up process. It is, of course, open to the Court to accept the evidence of a witness whose statement was recorded under section 164, but the salient rule of caution must always be borne in mind. That is all the more necessary almost all the eye-witnesses are subjected to this tying-up process. Even Aryendra, the sister's son of Dharma Pal, was not thought to be above suspicion.” The evidence on record discloses that he was kept in the custody of the police for several days and his wife had taken out search proceedings and also sent telegrams to higher officials, and in view of the admission made by P.W.4 that he was not present in the village and that he did not disclose either to his wife or his brother of his whereabout the suggestion made by the accused that he was kept illegality in the custody by the police before recording his statement Under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, appears to be correct. Under these circumstances, his evidence is suspect and therefore no absolute reliance can be placed upon it. Therefore, we are not prepared to accept the evidence of P.W.4. Similarly the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7 who have stated that they chased the accused and apprehended the appellants cannot be relied upon for the reason that the investigating officer P.W. 16 has admitted during the cross-examination that the case diary and the remand reports sent to the Court on the earlier occasion do not contain the statements of these witnesses that they chased the accused. Though they profess to have acquaintance with the accused, their evidence in the cross-examination demonstrates that they are strangers. If we exclude their apprehending the accused on the spot, then their identification becomes very doubtful. Under these circumstances, it is not safe to place reliance on the evidence of these witness as well. Accordingly we do not place any reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.4, 5 and 7. But from the evidence of declarations, Exhibits P-1 and P-16 and the evidence of P.W.1 we hold that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond any shadow of doubt and it does not warrant interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.