Judgment 1. BY anaward, passed on a reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioners in this Rule were directed to reinstate one of their employees. The a ward was published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary dated 25. 9. 76. As the petitioners did not implement the said award a complaint was filed against them on 12. 4. 79 under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes act ('act' for short), read with section 32 of the Act. On that complaint the learned chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, took cognizance and, after the petitioners entered appearance, transferred the case to the file of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Calcutta for disposal. In the transferee Court an application was filed on behalf of the petitioners challenging the maintainability of the prosecution on the ground of limitation. As the learned magistrate rejected the said application, the petitioners moved this Court and obtained this Rule. 2. IT was contended on behalf of the petitioners that in view of section 19 (3) of the act the award was to remain valid period of one year from the date it became enforceable under section 17a of the Act, that is from 25.10.76, and as such the petitioners were under no obligation to implement the award thereafter nor were they liable for prosecution for its non-implementation after the expiry of the said period. Accordingly, it was submitted, the period of limitation was to run lastly from 25. 10. 77, on which day, the period of one year us. 19 (3) of the said Act expired and since admittedly cognizance was taken thereafter it was barred by limitation. The submissions so made are without any substance whatsoever. Section 19 (3) has to be read with section 19 (6) of the Act and once so read, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the obligation of the petitioners to implement the award continues so long as the award is not terminated in accordance with section 19 (6) of the Act; and in the complaint it has been specifically stated that the award has not been terminated. It necessarily follows that so long as the award remains valid and operative the petitioners are bound to implement it and their liability for prosecution under section 29 of the Act for non-implementation continues. The learned Magistrate was therefore fully justified in rejecting the application of the petitioners. 3. It necessarily follows that so long as the award remains valid and operative the petitioners are bound to implement it and their liability for prosecution under section 29 of the Act for non-implementation continues. The learned Magistrate was therefore fully justified in rejecting the application of the petitioners. 3. IT was also submitted that as the petitioner no. 2 was the proprietor of petitioner a teacher of an admittedly minority institution was removed. A suit was filed by the said teacher and the District Judge concerned granted a modified order of injunction in her favour. During the pendency of the appeal and the suit, the said teacher fifed a writ petition. The said petition was disposed of, directing the Deputy director of Public Instruction for Anglo-Indian Schools to consider the representation of the petitioner within a certain date. An order was passed by the said Deputy director directing the respondents herein to re-instate the removed teacher. On failure of compliance by the said respondents the said Deputy Director directed stopping of payment of the Government dearness allowance; then an Administrator was appointed. The respondents then preferred a writ petition challenging the legality of the above orders. The writ petition was allowed. The State of West Bengal urged in this appeal that the State Government has the right to impose regulatory measures on minority institutions and has the authority to ensure their observance by such institutions and that Regulations 3 and 4 of chapter 3 of the "code of Regulation for european (now Anglo-Indian) Schools in Bengal permitted the issuance of the order of reinstatement. Held, there can be no doubt that regulatory measures can be taken by the state in regard to minority institutions for the smooth and efficient running of the same, but the measures should be such as not to interfere with the administration and management of the School [paragraph 10] by imposing certain regulatory measures, the State can not infringe or interfere with the fundamental right of religious or no. 1 the latter could not be prosecuted, being not a body corporate. Prima facie there is some substance in this contention materials now obtaining on record, it cannot be ascertained whether the petitioner no. 1 is a body corporate or not. If however fit is found subsequently that petitioner magistrate will drop the proceeding as against it, and continue with the same against petitioner no. 2 only. Prima facie there is some substance in this contention materials now obtaining on record, it cannot be ascertained whether the petitioner no. 1 is a body corporate or not. If however fit is found subsequently that petitioner magistrate will drop the proceeding as against it, and continue with the same against petitioner no. 2 only. If, however, petitioner no. 1 is a body corporate it is liable for prosecution along with the petitioner no. 2 with the aid of section 32 of the Act.