Judgment Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. 1. While admitting these civil revision applications, a learned single Judge of this Court directed the case to be heard by a Division Bench on the ground of importance of the point involved. The question relates to the interpretation of Sec.14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. 2. The petitioner in C.B 1406 of 1983, who is the owner of a building in Patna town, has filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Patna, for a decree for eviction against his tenant, defendant opposite party, on the grounds of personal necessity, default in payment of rent and breach of the terms of tenancy. After service of notice, the defendant appeared and prayed for time to file his written statement. The plaintiff objected on the ground that the defendant had failed to file an affidavit and obtain the leave of the Court to contest the suit, as contemplated by Sec.14 of the Act. 3. Sec.11 of the Act enumerates the grounds on which a decree for eviction of a tenant can be passed, which include bona fide requirement in Clause (c) and expiry of the period of tenancy in case of a lease for a specified period in Clause (e) Sec.14 prescribes special procedure for trial of a suit for eviction of a tenant on these two grounds. The object is to ensure expeditious disposal of the suit. The object is to ensure expeditious disposal of the suit. Sub-sections (3) to (7) lay down the procedure in the following terms: (3) (i) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case as require also direct the publication ; of the summons in the Official Gazette or in newspaper circulating in the locality, in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, (ii) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the Court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer, for eviction from the premises unless be files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed of the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in Sub-clauses (c) and (e) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed of the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in Sub-clauses (c) and (e) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite Court-fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later, The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this Section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. 4. Sub-section (8) bars an appeal or a second appeal against a decree for eviction. The proviso thereto, however, vests the High Court with power to examine the legality of such a decree. 5. The plaintiff filed a petition claiming that the defendant was debarred from filing a written statement and the suit should be tried summarily in accordance with the special procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge 1st Court rejected the plea holding that Sec.14 was applicable only to such suits in which the grounds other than those of personal necessity and expiry of terms of lease are not involved. 6. The opposite party landlord in C.R. 1433 of 1983 filed the suit out of which the revision application arises in the Court of Subordinate Judge II, Patna, for eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the grounds of personal necessity, expiry of the terms of the lease and non-payment of rent. He also claimed a decree for arrears of rent and damages. The Subordinate Judge refused to accept the written statement of the defendant and the petitioner moved this Court by C.R. 806 of 1983. It was disposed of by the following order passed by Mr. Justice B.P. Jha: 29-4-1983. He also claimed a decree for arrears of rent and damages. The Subordinate Judge refused to accept the written statement of the defendant and the petitioner moved this Court by C.R. 806 of 1983. It was disposed of by the following order passed by Mr. Justice B.P. Jha: 29-4-1983. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the State. I have been informed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he has already filed a composite written statement. The allegation of the plaintiff is that the defendant petitioner should be evicted from the suit premises on the grounds of nonpayment of rent, expiry of the fixed period of tenancy and personal necessity. So far as the personal necessity and the expiry of the fixed period of tenancy are concerned, the defendant is required to take permission of the Court for filing written statement. I direct that the petitioner may obtain permission for the aforesaid purpose. So far as the ground of non payment of rent is concerned, the written statement be accepted With this observation, the petition is disposed of. 7. Thereafter, the petitioner moved the Court below for leave to contest the suit, so far it rested on the grounds of personal necessity and expiry of the period of lease. By older under revision, the learned Subordinate Judge rejected the prayer and decreed the suit directing the petitioner to vacate the building on the aforesaid two grounds. So far as the relief of eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent and for a money decree are concerned, the Court below accepted the written statement and fixed a date in the suit for settlement of issues. The defendant has challenged the decision by the present revision application. It has been contended that the learned Subordinate Judge II illegally refused leave to the petitioner to contest the case so far as the grounds of personal necessity and expiry of the period of the lease are concerned. 8. The question is whether Sec.14 applies to a suit filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the grounds covered by Clauses (c) and (e) of Sec.11 as also on the other grounds mentioned in the Section and, if so, to what extent. 8. The question is whether Sec.14 applies to a suit filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the grounds covered by Clauses (c) and (e) of Sec.11 as also on the other grounds mentioned in the Section and, if so, to what extent. The stand taken by the landlord in the Court below that the special procedure under Sec.14 shall govern the suit in its entirety including all the grounds cannot be accepted. The tenant has unrestricted right of defending a suit based on the grounds other than Clauses (c) and (d) and by giving full application to Sec.1 4 to a suit based on both categories of grounds, the tenant will be deprived of this right. The special procedure also takes away the right of appeal and a second appeal. It is firmly established that availability of a remedy by way of appeal is a matter of substantive right and is not merely, a matter of procedure. A statute cannot be interpreted as depriving a person of a substantive right unless the language expressly says so. In Sec.14 or for that matter in any other Section of the Act, there is no indication from which it can be gathered that the legislature intended to deprive the parties from the right of appeal. By subjecting the right of defending the suit to the Courts permission, the tenant has been deprived of his unconditional right in this regard. The language in the Section does not indicate that this was intended with respect to the grounds other than those mentioned in Clauses (c) and (e). If the Section is interpreted as suggested by the landlord, the result would be that even where a plaintiff excluding those in Clauses (c) and (e) he may deprive the defendant of his unrestricted right to defend the suit and to file an appeal from the decree by merely inserting the grounds mentioned in Clauses (c) and (e). The suggested interpretation, therefore, will render the Section highly unjust and inequitable. 9. On the other hand, if Sec.14 is completely exclued from applying to a suit filed on the basis of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (c) and (e) as well as other grounds, the plaintiff will be deprived of the benefit of the special procedure so far as the grounds (c) and (e) are concerned. 9. On the other hand, if Sec.14 is completely exclued from applying to a suit filed on the basis of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (c) and (e) as well as other grounds, the plaintiff will be deprived of the benefit of the special procedure so far as the grounds (c) and (e) are concerned. The point is whether the problem can be resolved without depriving either party of its rights by a lawfully valid solution. I think, it can be. 10. The first course to avoid the situation is for the plaintiff to file two suits instead of one, one suit based on the grounds (c) and (e) and the other on the other grounds available under Sec.11. The two plaints may be filed together, but even if the suits are commenced one after another, there will not be any technical difficulty during the hearing, a doubt was expressed by one of the learned advocates that the second suit would be barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. I do not think so. Rule 2 requires inclusion of the whole of the claim in the first suit "in respect of the cause of action " Can it be said that two suits filed on different grounds are based on the same cause of action ? Earlier this Court had ruled that notice under Sec.106 T.P. Act was necessary for maintainability of the suit. The service of notice gave rise to a cause of action. This view was over-ruled by the decision in V. Bhanapal Chettier V/s. Yasodei Ammal -- . It was held that a notice under Sec.106 T.P. Act. is unnecessary and a mere surplus age. It follows that cause of action arises when a ground as mentioned in the Buildings Control Act is made out. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh V/s. Lajwanti A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 161. although given while interpreting Delhi Control Act, fully supports this view. The Delhi Act is very similar to the present Bihar Act. The plaintiff in the case before the Supreme Court started an action for eviction of the tenant on several grounds. One of them was withdrawn. Subsequently, by a second amendment, the plaintiff wanted to press that ground. The prayer was allowed. The Delhi Act is very similar to the present Bihar Act. The plaintiff in the case before the Supreme Court started an action for eviction of the tenant on several grounds. One of them was withdrawn. Subsequently, by a second amendment, the plaintiff wanted to press that ground. The prayer was allowed. The tenant defendant challenged the decision inter alia on the ground that the prayer was barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court rejected the plea by holding that each of the three grounds mentioned in the proceeding gave rise to separate causes of action and Order 2 Rule 2 was. therefore, inapplicable. It cannot be suggested that the second suit may attract the principles of res-judicata. Although the relief will be common, the issues in the two suits will be clearly different. The provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot, therefore, apply. 12. Now let us consider the case where the plaintiff files a single suit on his categories of grounds. The solution can be found by following the procedure indicated by Rule 2 Order 6 which is in the following terms: Rule 2 Power of Court to order separate trials. Where it appears to the Court that any causes of action joined in one suit can not be conveniently tried or disposed of together the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient. 13. I fail to discover any reason, and none has been suggested at the bar, why the provisions cannot be followed and separate trials of different causes of action be held. So far as the claim based on grounds (c) and (e) are concerned, it should be investigated by special procedure laid down under Sec.14 of the Act and a separate ordinary regular trial with respect to the other causes of action should follow, Although Mr. Justice B.P. Jha did not mention this provision in his order in C.R. 606 of 1983 I presume that he must be having this in mind. Apart from his judgment being binding on the patties in C.R. 1433/83, I would like to say with great respect that the view expressed was perfectly correct. The two suits pending in the Courts below should, therefore, proceed accordingly. 14. Apart from his judgment being binding on the patties in C.R. 1433/83, I would like to say with great respect that the view expressed was perfectly correct. The two suits pending in the Courts below should, therefore, proceed accordingly. 14. Since the position in law was not quite clear, the defendant in T. Section 165/ 83 should not be penalised for having not taken steps in regard to the plaintiffs claim based on grounds (c) and (e) in accordance with Sub-sections (4) to (6) of Sec.14 promptly. He should file an affidavit on the next date in the suit and pray for Courts leave to contest the suit. The Court shall hold separate trials and take up the cases with reference to grounds (c) and (e) in accordance with special provision without delay. The suit will be tried in usual course in relation to the other grounds. Thus there will be two decrees in the suit. The losing party shall not have any right to appeal from the first decree. 15. The impugned order in T. Sec.165 of 1953 is set aside and C.R. 1406 of 1983 is allowed in the above terms. There, will be no order as to costs. 16. In T.S. 130 of 1982 giving rise to C.B. 1133 of 1983, the defendant, after disposal of C.R. 606 of 1983 filed an affidavit denying the allegations in the plaint that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith required the premises for his own occupation and that the period of lease has expired. He detailed the facts in support of this plea which can be proved only by leading evidence, The learned Subordinate Judge considered some of the evidence (without formal proof, as trial had not started) of the plaintiff opined that the defendants plea must be untrue. This approach is clearly untenable. A dispute of facts dependant on evidence cannot be resolved or assumed against a party without giving him adequate opportunity of leading his evidence. The provisions of Sec.14 (5) quoted above are consistent with this position they could not have been otherwise. The language of the sub-Section indicates that the defendant is entitled to leave to contest the suit if his affidavit "disclosed such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction." The object of this provision is to prevent the frivolous pleas taken by a tenant to avoid eviction. The language of the sub-Section indicates that the defendant is entitled to leave to contest the suit if his affidavit "disclosed such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction." The object of this provision is to prevent the frivolous pleas taken by a tenant to avoid eviction. As was observed in Kewal Singh V/s. Lajwanti case (supra), a tenant cannot claim a legal right to take all sorts of frivolous, baseless or irrelevant pleas, but if he presents a plausible defence which, if accepted, may non-suit the plaintiff, there is no reason to refuse leave to him to substantiate his defence by leading evidence. In the present case, the learned Subordinate Judge committed a serious mistake in refusing leave to the defendant-petitioner by rejecting the statements of facts mentioned in the petitioners affidavit which, if accepted, would defeat the suit. The error is fit to be corrected both under Sec.115 and under proviso to Sec.14 (8). It may be observed that the present application was filed in this Court within three weeks from the date of the impugned older. lam, therefore, of the view that the decision of the Court below must be set aside and the case must go back on remand to the Court below for fresh disposal in accordance with law. 17. In the result, the decree of eviction passed against the petitioner is set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial Court. The learned Subordinate Judge will now grant leave to the petitioner to contest the suit and then proceed for holding separate trials as mentioned earlier in this judgment. The civil revision application is allowed, but without costs.