JUDGMENT - Mohta J. - 1. A point of some importance is involved in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is whether the Collector has jurisdiction to stay the calendar of events for election to “Market Committee” notified under Rule 43 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Rules, 1967 (“the Rules'. for short). Subsidiary question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the power has been properly exercised. 2. Two petitioners - Gayaprasad Tiwari and Nandkumar Yende are respectively trader and agriculturist residing at Pulgaon Tahsil and District Wardha. As elections to the Market Committee were due and on 21st February, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Rule 42(2) of the Rules, fixed the programme for election according to which last date, for filing nomination papers was 7th March, 1984 the date for scrutiny of nomination papers was 8th March, 1984, date for withdrawal of nomination papers was 19th March 1984, date for poll was 6th April, 1984, and the date for counting was 7th April, 1984. The petitioner no. 1 was the only candiadate for traders' constituency under section 13(l)(b) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1963 (“the Act” for short).and petitioner no. 2 was a candidate for agriculturists' credit societies and multipurpose credit societies' constituency under section 13(1)(a) of the Act. Their nomination papers, were duly accepted in a scrutiny and after that event was over, the poll scheduled on 6th April, 1984, was stayed till further order in accordance with the direction of the Collector. Being aggrieved by this order dated 8th March, 1984, the petitiosers have filed the present petition. 3. We-will examine point number one first. Several enactments relating to elections deal with the subject of countermending of the poll of varying the calender of events for the election under several contingencies such as (i) death of a candidate before commencement of poll (ii) emergencies (iii) destruction of ballot boxes and (iv) destruction 6r loss of ballot papers at the time of counting. Sections 52,57, 58, and 64-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, deal with all such four situations. Sections 52,57, 58, and 64-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, deal with all such four situations. Rules 23,46,47 and 48 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Election Rules, 1966 framed under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, Maharashtra Zilla Parishad Election Rules, 1966, framed under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, Maharashtra Zilla Parishad Election Rules, 1962, framed under the Zilla Parishad Act, Rules 14(A), 7(4), 31 and 31-A of the Bombay Village Panchayat Election Rules, 1959, framed under the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, deal with the first three contingencies. The Rules, however, provide only for contingency number one viz. death of a candidate (Rule 55). On a comparative analysis of these different enactments it is submitted that as power to adjourn poll on emergencies is not specifically given under the Rules though it is given under other enactments the legislative intention is to exclude such power. We' find it difficult to accept this as a valid submission, as, in our judgment, power to fix programme includes implied power to change or cancel the same. Answer lies in Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, which reads as under: “Whereby any Bombay Act (or Maharashtra Act), a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions (if any), to add te, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules, or bye laws so issued.” The Bombay General-Clauses Act like any other similar enactment is a consolidating and amending Act, the purpose of which is to avoid superfluity and repetition of the language and to place in single Act the provisions as regards definition of words and legal principles of interpretation which would otherwise have to be incorporated in many different Acts, Rules and Regulations. Definitions and Rules of interpretation contained in the General Clauses Act have to be read in every other statute governed by it provided the Statute does not contain anything repugnant to them or the subject or context does not exhibit a different intention. 4. Doctrine of implied powers is also relevent. To accept the contention of the petitioners, it will have to be held that even in cases where it is physically impossible to hold elections there will be no power either to cancel or to postpone the same. 4. Doctrine of implied powers is also relevent. To accept the contention of the petitioners, it will have to be held that even in cases where it is physically impossible to hold elections there will be no power either to cancel or to postpone the same. Take examples like national calamities, fire, flood,1 earthquakes, riots, war etc. by the very nature of things this list can only be illustrative and not exhaustive. It is a salient legal principle that nobody can be compelled to do the impossible. In the very constitution of certain authorities burdened with public duty certain powers are always implied. In the absence of such implied powers the very purpose for which authority is constituted would be defeated end preposterous result will follow. Thus, the express power to do something includes implied power to do all that is necessary to properly exercise the said power barring of course all that is prohibited expressly or by necessary implication. Close scrutiny of the scheme of the Act or the Rules in general and Rules 43 and 55 in particular discloses nothing which is either repugnant to the provisions of the General Clauses Act or the implied powers. There is no particular statutory guideline mandating the fixation of calendar of events to the election in particular way only. Minimum 45 days time between (i) date of publication of notification of election and poll and (ii) 14 days time between that date and date of making nomination has to be kept and barring these limitations the rest is left to the sole discretion of the Collector. In this case we are concerned with postponement of day of poll. For these reasons, we are clear that there is no lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Collector to postpone the day of poll and the contention that his power relating to fix calendar of events is exhausted as soon as it is exercised, cannot be accepted. 5. Inviting our attention to the case of State of Bihar Vs. D.N. Ganguly and others1 dealing with the power of the Government to cancel or supersede a reference made under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is contended that the ratio laid down therein squarely applies to the present case. We do not agree. 5. Inviting our attention to the case of State of Bihar Vs. D.N. Ganguly and others1 dealing with the power of the Government to cancel or supersede a reference made under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is contended that the ratio laid down therein squarely applies to the present case. We do not agree. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act's applicability is considered in the context of the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act which has been discussed threadbare and thereafter the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the order of reference once made cannot be called back. It is, however, observed as under:- It is well settled that this section embodies a rule of construction and the question whether or not it applies to the provision of a particular statute would depend on the • subject matter, context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the said statute.” The case of (Tahsildar and Returning Officer Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Shivajirfio and others)2 no doubt supports the petitioners. It has been held that election programme once declared under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Market Regulation Act, cannot be varied in the absence of specific power and that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be called in aid to infer implied power. It is observed : “ We asked the learned High Court Government Advocate as to whether the Act has conferred any power on the Tahsildar to cancel the notification fixing the calendar of events for election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman after the process of election is once started. He fairly conceded that there is no such provision express or implied. His submission was that under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Tahsildar who has got the power to issue a notification has necessarily the power to denotify. He was unable to support that contention with any authority in regard to election matters But in general the principal of law is that once the process of election is started, the same cannot be interrupted except by an order of Court. The result of the action of the appellant Tahsildar is to interrupt the process of election after the nominations had been filed and accepted. The result of the action of the appellant Tahsildar is to interrupt the process of election after the nominations had been filed and accepted. If the principle of section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be availed of by Returning Officers, then it is likley to be seriously abused wherever the persons in authority find that their candidates are not likely to win or their nominations are not valid. As at present advised we are of the opinion that unless there is an express power conferred by the Statute, the Tahsildar has no power to cancel the notification once he has issued a calendar of events and pursuant to the same nominations have been filed and accepted”. With great respect it is not possible for us to endorse this line of reasoning. Likelihood of abuse of power is no answer to the point whether power exists. We cannot imagine any power on earth which is incapable of being misused. It is that cancellation of an election programme is a very serious matter and cannot be resorted to excepting when exceptional circumstances exist. The improper exercise of the power is justiciable and the aggrieved person is not without remedy But to hold that even in proper case the power cannot be exercised, can lead, as stated above, to prenpsterous results. Moreover, it seems to us that the attention of the Karnataka High Court was not drawn to the case of Mohd. Yunus Saleem Vs. Shivkumar Shastri and others3, in which it has been held that the election programme declared under section 30 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, can be altered on the grounds de hors of Sections 52, 57, 58 and 64-A of the said Act in terms of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The following observations are to the point : “ The election commission in this case also exercised power under section 30 of the Act and issued the notification appointing the various dates mentioned therein for the purposes specified. Once this power is conferred under section 30 upon the election commission, the power to amend the same which will include alteration of the dates of poll can be exercised under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Once this power is conferred under section 30 upon the election commission, the power to amend the same which will include alteration of the dates of poll can be exercised under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that the election commission had no power or jurisdiction to alter the date of the poll from 3rd March, to 9th March, 1971?. Thus, the very assumption of the Karnataka High Court that in election matter Section 21 of the General Clauses Act has not been held to be applicable in any judicial decision is itself erroneous. It is unfortunate that attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the above decision of the Supreme Court. It is thus clear that Kamataka decision is per incuriam. Our attention was also invited to the following observations in Swamp's Legislation and Interpretation (Pages 273 and 275). “The power of officers in all such cases is limited by the manner and condtions prescribed for its exercise. If a statute directs a thing to be done in a certain way, that thing shall not even if there be no negative words, be done in any other way. The statutes shall be deemed to have prohibited the doing of that thing in any other way”. There can be no quarrel over these principles which are basic in interpretation of statute. We have already referred to the scheme of the Act and the Rules and it is thereafter that we have upheld the power in the Collector to vary the programme. 6. This takes us to the second point. The impugned notice of stay of poll (Annexure A), which Appeared to have been issued on 8th March, 1984, gives no reasons. All that is mentioned is that it is issued in pursuance to the order of the Collector. The file recording the message from the Collector was also placed before us. It also makes not even a whisper about the reasons for this sudden decision after scrutiny of the nomination papers. No return is filed but the reasons have been disclosed in the submissions filed before us at the time of admission of this matter. The substance of these submissions can be stated in nutshell. As far back as on 19th June, 1982, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Wardha, was empowered and directed to hold elections. No return is filed but the reasons have been disclosed in the submissions filed before us at the time of admission of this matter. The substance of these submissions can be stated in nutshell. As far back as on 19th June, 1982, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Wardha, was empowered and directed to hold elections. Accordingly, the task of preparation of voters list commenced. There “are various constituencies under Section 13 of the Act from which the members of the Committee are to be elected. One such constituency is the village Panchayat constituency, consisting of members of the panchayats from which three agriculturists are to be elected. The Block Development Officer prepared the voters list of existing members of the panchayats. The general elections to the village panchayats were postponed for six months vide the Government Resolution dated 5th May, 1983. Then came the Ordinance called the Maharashtra Ordinance No. XIX of 1983, dated 8.11.1983, which was replaced by the Act No. XLVI of 1983 providing for temporary postponement of elections to the village panchayats. As a result of these developments the general elections to the village panchayats were postponed till 31st March, 1984. On 20th February, 1984, the Government directed to hold the elections of the village panchayats after issuing the notification under section 5 of the Act of XLVI of 1983. “Despite several requests” to postpone the village panchayat elections the Government did not agree to postpone the same and, therefore, the tahsildars in the district issued election programme. In pursuance of the election programme the new membe'rs of the Gram-Panchayats were to be elected on 20th March, 1984, and new panchayats were to be constituted on 7th April, 1984. The election to the Market Committee was fixed on 6th April, 1984, as a result the new members elected in recent elections would not have been in a position to cast their votes and the old members whose names were included in the voters list would alone be entitled to vote. Market Committee which cannot be constituted without at least 12 out of 18 members could not be validly constituted in the absence of members from this constituency and hence it was thought “only equitable to revise the voters list” and to postpone the poll till then. . . 7. It seems to us that the stand taken is without justification. Market Committee which cannot be constituted without at least 12 out of 18 members could not be validly constituted in the absence of members from this constituency and hence it was thought “only equitable to revise the voters list” and to postpone the poll till then. . . 7. It seems to us that the stand taken is without justification. In the first place the election programme has been fixed on 21st February 1984, after full knowledge of the impending elections of the village panchayats. In the return there is reference to “several requests to postpone the village panchayat elections” but it is not known as to who made these several requests. The impression that Market Committee could not be constituted without holding elections from panchayat constituency is also incorrect. Section 13(l)(a) to (g) categorises the constituencies of 18 members. Out of these only two members who are governed by sub-sections (0 and (g) have no right to vote. Thus even in the absence of three members from village panchayat constituency committee of 13 members having voting powers could be easily constituted. Section 14(4) refers to the manner of publishing names of the members of the committee. It is provided that if at a general election the names of any persons to be elected cannot for any reason be notified* and if with the available election results the Committee will consist of not less than twelve members, then the State Government shall publish the names of these members in the official gazette. Second proviso provides that after every general election upon the publication of the names of all the members of the Committee or as the case may be, the publication of not less than 12 members as aforesaid in the official gazette the Market Committee shall be deemed to be duly constituted. It is thus clear that for the constitution of the Market Committee the requirement is of election of 12 members and not of all the members. The word “general election” as found in Section 14(4) has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Raghvendra Vasantrao Deshpande and others v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and others)4. In this case as a result of the stay granted by the Court the election to the traders' constituency as contemplated under section 13(l)(b) of the Act, could not be held. In this case as a result of the stay granted by the Court the election to the traders' constituency as contemplated under section 13(l)(b) of the Act, could not be held. It was, therefore, contended that in the absence of whole election, valid managing committee could not be elected. This contention was repelled relying upon provisions of Section 14(4) of the Act, and it is held that merely because no elections have been held in respect of traders' constituency it cannot be said, that the other members who are more than 12 in number cannot validly constitute *the committee. Thus all the grounds for staying the poll are nonest and the action of stay of poll is plainly vitiated being wholly without any justification. What is more intriguing is the order of stay, “till further orders”. At the time of hearing we tried to know as to whether at least by now the Collector has fixed the date for poll. It Appeared that till this day no such decision has been taken. Point about mala fides was not pressed before us. 8. To conclude, the petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed and set aside. The Collector and S.D.O Wardha (respondents nos. 2 and 3) are directed to fix the date for poll within a period of one month from today. Rule is thus made absolute in the above terms. Under the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed ----