S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) MAJMUDAR J. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged an order passed by the Deputy Collector Navsari directing summary eviction of the petitioner from the land in question under sec. 9 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the said Act and as confirmed by the Deputy Secretary Revenue (Appeals) in revision under sec. 35 of the said Act. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner a few relevant facts may be noticed at the outset. The petitioner is the owner of the land and super-structure situated on block No. 7 in village Samroli of Chikhli taluka of Valsad district. The petitioner had purchased by a registered sale deed land admeasuring 0 acre-3 gunthas and 36 sq. ft. for Rs. 1 851 on 2-1-1967 from respondent No. 3 who was the owner of the said land. The purchased land formed part of block No. 7 which totally admeasured 0 acre-9 gunthas. It appears that the said block was subjected to the provisions of the consolidation scheme made applicable to the village in question. As the petitioner purchased part of this land from opponent No. 3 without obtaining previous permission of the Collector under sec. 37 of the said Act proceedings were initiated against him and opponent No. 3 under sec. 9 of the said Act. The said proceedings appeared to have been initiated after lapse of 7 years i. e. somewhere in the year 1974. Now in the meantime the petitioner who had purchased the said land which was a house site for the purpose of putting up residential house spent substantial amount of Rs. 25 0 and put up a house having facilities of latrine kitchen and store room. In response to the notice issued by the Deputy Collector under sec. 9 of the said Act the petitioner and opponent No. 3 the vendee and vendor-appeared and submitted that possession may be regularised and that the petitioner should not be disturbed and that opponent No. 3 had no objection in getting the transaction regularised. However the Deputy collector took the view that the transaction was violative of sec. 9 and hence the petitioner was liable to be summarily evicted. However the Deputy collector took the view that the transaction was violative of sec. 9 and hence the petitioner was liable to be summarily evicted. The petitioners contention that after purchase of the house he had put up construction at substantial cost of Rs. 25 0 and hence he should not be summarily evicted was rejected by the Deputy Collector. The sale in his favour was declared to be null and void. Under sec. 9 (2) of the Act. opponent No. 3 was fined Rs. 250. 00 and under sec. 9 (3) the petitioner was ordered to be summaily evicted. That order of the Deputy Collector passed on 21 resulted into a revision under sec. 35 of the Act by the petitioner before the Special Secretary (appeals ). The Deputy Secretary revenue department heard the revision application and dismissed the same. The revisional authority refused to accept the contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that lot of time-ten years-had elapsed between the date of the transaction and the date of the impugned order of the Deputy Collector and in the meantime the petitioner had changed his position and on account of such gross delay powers of summary eviction may not be exercised against him. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present proceedings in this court. ( 3 ) MR. Sanjanwala learned advocate for the petitioner amongst others submitted that after lapse of almost ten years the Deputy Collector had set aside the transaction in favour of the petitioner and had ordered summary eviction. That such order passed after gross delay was unjustified and that the said submission was wrongly rejected even by the revisional authority. ( 4 ) NOW it is obvious that the authorities under the Act have been enjoined to pass proper orders under sec. 9 for declaring the transactions contrary to the said Act to be null and void and also to pass consequential orders of fine as well as summary eviction. But the said statutory powers like any other statutory powers have to be exercised within reasonable time. If that concept is kept out any statutory powers would be exercised after a number of years or decades. In the meantime the affected parties would have materially altered their position and irreparable injury would be caused to them and it would be impossible to put the clock back. If that concept is kept out any statutory powers would be exercised after a number of years or decades. In the meantime the affected parties would have materially altered their position and irreparable injury would be caused to them and it would be impossible to put the clock back. If such powers can be exercised after unduly long delay. On the peculiar facts of this case it has got to be held that the power exercised by the concerned authorities under sec. 9 was at grossly belated stage and as there was unreasonable delay in exercise of that power the exercise would be ex facie unreasonable unjust and illegal. It may be recalled that the petitioner purchased a part of the block on 2-1-1967 by a registered sale deed. It is true that ignorance of law is no excuse and merely because the petitioner pleaded that he was ignorant of the legal requirement of obtaining prior permission of the collector the same cannot stand in good stead to him. Consequently if the authorities would have been vigilant enough for enforcement of the provisions of the Act and had initiated proceedings under sec. 9 at the earliest the petitioner would have no defence in such proceedings. But on the facts of this case the situation is entirely different. The authorities acting under the Act did not initiate any proceedings against the petitioner and opponent No. 3 for 7 long no of years. In the meantime the petitioner who had purchased the land for the purpose of putting up a residential house spent a large amount of Rs. 25 0 and constructed a residential house with facilities of latrine bathroom and a store room. It is obvious that when no proceedings were initiated against them for a long time there could arise a resonable belief for the petitioner that there was nothing wrong with the sale deed under which he had purchased the land and he had become full owner of the land. He could never have dreamt that after 7 years he would be presented with a show cause notice under sec. 9. During that time the petitioner had irretrievably changed his position to his detriment. He could never have dreamt that after 7 years he would be presented with a show cause notice under sec. 9. During that time the petitioner had irretrievably changed his position to his detriment. Such an inaction on the part of the authorities exercising powers under the Act for a number of years and waking up one fine morning after 7 years by issuing notice to the concerned parties for showing cause why the transaction entered into by them should not be declared as null and void has got to be held on the facts of this case to be quite unreasonable. It is also to be appreciated that the Deputy Collector passed the order of summary eviction against the petitioner in 1974 almost 10 years after the date of the original transaction of 1967. Hence the exercise of such power would be unjust on the facts of this case. If any authority were needed in support of my conclusion to which I have reached on the facts of the case it is supplied by the decision of the Supreme Court in MANSARAM V. S. P. PATHAK AND OTHERS (CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1262 (N) OF 1978 DECIDED BY D. A. DESAI AND R. B. MISRA JJ. ON 29-9-1983 ). D. A. Desai J. speaking for the Supreme Court has made the following pertinent observations:"where the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inhers its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. However. one is readily available in STATE OF GUJARAT V. PATEL RAGHAV NATHA AND OTHERS (1970) 1 SCR 335 ". ( 5 ) IT is true that no period of limitation is laid down by the said Act indicating as to within what period the concerned authorities can initiate proceedings under sec. 9. It is also true that power given to the authorities is coupled with duty to act as per the provisions of sec. 9 if power under sec. 9 can be validly invoked. But that does not mean that power can be exercised at any time may be after years or decades. 9. It is also true that power given to the authorities is coupled with duty to act as per the provisions of sec. 9 if power under sec. 9 can be validly invoked. But that does not mean that power can be exercised at any time may be after years or decades. Exercise of power has to be justified on the facts of each case and if on the facts of a given case it is found that exercise of power a-fter lapse of sufficiently long period between the impugned transaction and the date of exercise of that power would be arbitrary and unreasonable due to the fact that in the meanwhile parties had changed their position irretrievably oblivious of any possibility of future action by the authorities functioning under the Act on account of prolonged inaction on the part of these authorities and any attempt to put back the clock would result in irreparable injury to the concerned parties then such exercise has to be treated to be unjust and illegal. In that view of the matter as seen above on the facts of this case the exercise of the power under sec. 9 against the petitioner would be unreasonable and arbitrary. Only on this short ground and without going into other contentions which are sought to be canvassed by Mr. Sanjanwala in support of the petition this petition will have to be allowed. [rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] petition allowed. .