Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in OP. No. 5206 of 1984 challenged Ext. P7(a) proceedings of the 2nd respondent-Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Audit) Ernakulam, who was the returning officer in respect of election to the Board of Directors of the Kerala State Co-operative Rubber Marketing Federation Ltd. No. 4331 (hereinafter called 'Federation'). 2. In terms of Clause.14 of the bye-laws of the 1st respondent-Federation a delegate who could exercise vote in the election to the Board of Directors of the Federation should be a director of the affiliated society. The appellant-petitioner has no case that he is one of the directors of the society of which he is a member. It is the admitted fact that during the material time, he was only a member of that society. 3. It is for the reason that the appellant-petitioner was only a member, not a director of the society, in terms of Clause.14 of the bye-laws of the Federation the returning officer rejected the appellant-petitioner's nomination to be a delegate. In support of his contention the appellant-petitioner submitted that Clause.14 of the bye-laws of the Federation is clearly ultra vires the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. S.21(2) of the Act reads as follows: "21. Manner of exercising vote. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1). a society or corporation or a statutory or nonstatutory Board, Committee or other body of persons which is a member of another society may, subject to any rules made under this Act, appoint one of its members to vote on its behalf in the affairs of that other society." It may be noticed that the general rule as provided in sub-section (1) of S.21 of the Act is that every member of the society shall exercise his vote in person. What is contained in sub-section (2) is really in the nature of exception which could not be treated as the 'rule'. The counsel submitted that in the absence of any rule made under the Act providing a different mode of voting, any member should have been considered as eligible for voting despite the fact that the bye-laws of the Federation laid down that it was only a director of the society who would be entitled to be nominated. It is true that the sub-section enabled any member of the society to vote on behalf of the society. There is. It is true that the sub-section enabled any member of the society to vote on behalf of the society. There is. however, no bar against another society to which the society is affiliated providing a provision that among its members it is only a member who is a director of this society, that would be eligible to vote. The election was to be conducted, and had been conducted in accordance with that bye-law. This was not an election to the Board of one of the societies affiliated to the Federation; on the contrary this was an election to the Committee of the Federation itself. The byelaws of the Federation lay down the qualification of the delegate of an affiliated society that could exercise vote at the election, representing the society. That qualification is applicable to all the affiliated societies uniformly and the appellant petitioner is not entitled to claim an exception for his being permitted to exercise vote at the election without being a director of the society of which he was only a member. 4. It has also to be noted that the affiliation of the society which the appellant petitioner claims to represent at the election, was subject to and in terms of the byelaws of the Federation. The society of which the appellant petitioner was a member, could not claim membership of the Federation, subscribing to its byelaws, and at the same time claim a privilege not to be bound by one of its byelaws which lays down that it is only a director, not a member of an affiliated society that would be entitled to cast votes at the election to its Board of Directors. S.21 of the Act, in our opinion, has to be read and understood to mean that the minimum requirement for voting on behalf of the society is that he should be a member of the society. It might, however, be open to the Federation, to which the Society is affiliated to fix a qualification that the delegate who wants to cast vote at the election should not only be a member, but also a director, of the society The section intends to exclude any person who is not a member of the society from the category of persons eligible to vote at the election. That requirement remains without being changed, and it would stand fulfilled even when the byelaws insisted that such person should as well be a director of the affiliated society. When the provisions of S.21 of the Act, and the terms of Clause.14 of the byelaws of the Federation are properly reconciled and harmoniously construed no other conclusion is possible; and in that view we have no hesitation to hold that Ext. P7(a) impugned in the writ petition is perfectly valid, and was within the competence of the Returning Officer. 5. In this context we would like to make reference to a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Prathapan v. Registrar of High Court of Kerala (1984 KLT. 625). That was a case in which the Registrar of the High Court published a notification dated 27-10-1983 stating inter, alia that it was proposed to prepare a select list of candidates for appointment to the post of Assistant Grade II in the High Court as and when vacancies arose. It proceeded to say, so far as relevant, that applications were invited from first and second class Graduates/Post Graduates/Law Graduates from any recognised University to reach the Registrar on or before 15-11-1983, with copies of certain documents which were specified therein. The petitioner in the writ petition was a graduate in Arts of the Kerala University, but he was only a third class degree-holder. He nevertheless sent an application to the Registrar for the post of Assistant Grade II. In response to that application the Registrar sent to him a communication dated 11-11-1983 stating that, while his difficulties were appreciated, the High Court was not in a position to relax the qualification for appointment in the High Court service. It is to challenge the notification dated 27-10-1983 in so far as it restricted the right to apply to those who had first and second class degree holders that the writ petition was filed. 6. It is to challenge the notification dated 27-10-1983 in so far as it restricted the right to apply to those who had first and second class degree holders that the writ petition was filed. 6. Annexure I to the High Court Service Rules, 1970, prescribed the qualification for the post of Assistant Grade II, which is category 11, as the same as category 8, Assistant Grade I. Category 8 for Assistant Grade I lays down the following qualifications: 3) a degree of University in the Indian Union in Arts or Science or Commerce or a degree of any other University which is recognised as an equivalent degree by the Kerala University." 7. The argument advanced in the writ petition was that the notification dated 27-10-1983 issued by the Registrar involved modification of the statutory rules and the qualifications prescribed thereunder and, therefore, it was liable to be quashed. Repelling this contention the Division Bench held that the notification only laid down a process for screening the candidates by narrowing the field of choice by eliminating third class graduates from scrutiny to minimise the difficulties of screening and to secure the better level of talent for the High Court Service, and that as such the notification was not illegal or unauthorised. The rationale behind the decision in Prathapan's case (1984 KLT. 625) could be profitably applied to the facts of the present case also. Though the minimum requirement was that the person who voted on behalf of the society should be a member of that society, it would certainly be open to the Federation to prescribe a qualification restricting the eligibility to a person having higher qualification in order to secure better representation. In this view the writ appeal fails and is dismissed. Dismissed.