Judgment :- 1. This revision petition comes up before us on a reference order of Janaki Amma, J. 2. The petitioners are defendants in a Small Cause suit on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kottayam. The plaint claim is based on a chitty security bond. The chitty was subscribed by the first defendant. He prized the ticket on the sixth auction held on 10-12-1971. Ext. Al security bond was executed by the first defendant. Defendants 2 and 3 were sureties. The bond stipulates that in case any future instalment is defaulted the plaintiff-foreman gets the right to recover all instalments in a lump sum. The revision petitioners defaulted payment of subscription from the 23rd instalment. 23rd instalment was on 10-5-1973. The foreman issued a registered notice Ext. A6. It is dated 21-6-1974, The foreman demanded the full amount including the future subscriptions. The chitty terminated on 10-10-1974. The suit was filed on 4-6-1977. 3. Several contentions were raised by the defendants. Only one survived for consideration, viz., the contention based on limitation. The trial court found that the suit is not barred by limitation. The contention of the defendants failed. The suit was decreed. 4. The defendants challenged the decree, being a decree in a Small Cause suit by filing this Civil Revision Petition, In this court the main contention raised is that the suit is barred by limitation. According to the petitioners, since under the terms of the bond the plaintiff got the right to recover all the future subscriptions on the date of default, the cause of action for the suit arose on 10-5-1973, the date of first default and the suit should have been brought before 10-5-1976. Further it was strongly urged that since the suit was brought only on 4-6-1977, at any rate, instalments which fell due beyond three years prior to that date got barred and therefore if at all, the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to a decree, it is only for the instalments which fell due within a period of three years prior to the date of suit. 3. The question regarding limitation in similar circumstances was considered in a Division Bench decision, Sukumaran v. Sankaran reported in 1977 KLT. 833 The Division Bench had occasion to decide the question of applicability of Art.37 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases arising under the Chitties Act, 1120. 3. The question regarding limitation in similar circumstances was considered in a Division Bench decision, Sukumaran v. Sankaran reported in 1977 KLT. 833 The Division Bench had occasion to decide the question of applicability of Art.37 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases arising under the Chitties Act, 1120. In that case the security bond was executed on 7-10-1970. The default was from 10-6-1971. The chitty terminated on 10-5-1973. A notice under S.32(1) of Chitties Act. 1120 was issued on 14-2-1974 and the suit was filed on 8-10-1974. The Division Bench accepted the view expressed in Kunjamma George v. Kesava Pillai (1963 KLT 68). that unless a demand in writing under S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act, 1120 was made by the foreman for consolidated payment of the future instalments, his right under the contract did not become enforceable and limitation could not have run against him regarding all the future instalments. The court held that the suit having been instituted only on 8-10-1974 the instalments which fell due beyond a period of three years prior to that date became barred and the plaintiff is entitled only to a decree for the balance. 4. If we accept the correctness of the decision reported in 1977 KLT. 833 and we have no doubt about it, the plaintiff in this case is entitled only to a decree for the instalments which fell due after 4-6-1974; i.e. within three years of the date of suit and not to the instalments prior to 4-6-1974 and therefore the decree as such granting the full amount claimed is unsustainable in law. 5. The respondent's counsel challenges this view and presents his case in a slightly different manner. According to him, the cause of action for the entire suit claim arose only on issuing the demand notice under S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act, 1120. The section reads thus: "32(1) A foreman shall not be entitled to claim consolidated payment of all the future subscriptions from a defaulting prized subscriber unless he shall have demanded the same in writing." This section was considered by Madhavan Nair, J. in V.H.M.D. Paripalana Sabha v. Ibrahim (1963 KLT. 6). The learned counsel for the respondent relied on this decision for the proposition that even the cause of action for the already defaulted subscriptions also would arise only after the issuance of the notice under S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act. 6). The learned counsel for the respondent relied on this decision for the proposition that even the cause of action for the already defaulted subscriptions also would arise only after the issuance of the notice under S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act. On a careful reading of the decision (1963 KLT. 6) it can be seen clearly that what Madhavan Nair, J. held in the decision is only to the effect that in regard to the right of the foreman to claim future subscriptions, his cause of action commences only after the issue of notice under S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act. It is confined only to future subscriptions and really in regard to defaulted subscriptions. S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act as such has no application. 6. The general propositions which occur in a judicial decision must always be taken with reference to the specific peculiarities of the case. For, as the proper purpose of the judge is the decision of a specific case, any general proposition which does not properly concern it is extra judicial and unauthoritative. Madhavan Nair, J. was not considering the question pointedly posed in this case, namely, the real date of cause of action in respect of defaulted subscriptions. No argument is seen to have been advanced before Madhavan Nair, J. in 1963 KLT. 6 in regard to the commencement of limitation in respect of the defaulted subscriptions and Madhavan Nair, J. has not answered that question. Since no two cases are precisely alike, the decision of a specific case may partly turn upon reasons which are suggested to the judge by specific peculiarities or differences. And that part of the decision which turns on those peculiarities, cannot serve as a precedent for subsequent decisions and cannot serve as a rule or guide of conduct Before we can find the import of the general principle or rule, we must exclude the peculiarities of the cases to which it was applied, and must consider the decision to which the court would have come, if its decision had not been modified by those specific differences. Without this process of abstraction, no judicial decision can serve as a guide of conduct, or can be applied to the solution of subsequent cases. Without this process of abstraction, no judicial decision can serve as a guide of conduct, or can be applied to the solution of subsequent cases. For as every case has features of its own, and as every judicial decision is a decision on a specific case, a judicial decision as a whole, can have no application to another, and therefore a different case. It is difficult to accept the argument of the learned counsel that we must hold that what has been held in 1963 KLT. 6 is to the effect that even claims in regard to defaulted instalments will get a fresh starting point of limitation when a notice under S.32(1) of Act 26 of 1120 is issued. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in 1977 KLT. 833. 7. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the whole claim is barred since the question of limitation has to be decided de hors the provision contained in S.32(1) of the Chitties Act and the question has to be decided solely on the terms of the security bond. He expands his argument by submitting that the security bond provides for recovery of the entire future subscription as and when the prized subscriber defaults one instalment. According to him the starting point of limitation for the entire amount is the date on which the subscriber defaults for the first time. It is difficult to accept this argument. The security bond has to be read along with the statutory provision. The statutory provision has to be treated as a proviso or a term in the security bond. Though it is stipulated in the bond that the foreman is entitled to claim all the future subscriptions, when the prized subscriber commits default of payment of any instalment; the statute intervenes and makes it obligatory on the foreman to exercise that right stipulated in the security bond only after making a demand in writing. It is clear from the statutory provision that the foreman's entitlement to claim consolidated payment of all the future subscriptions depends on making a demand in writing by the foreman. It is significant to note that the words used in the provision are 'entitled to claim'. This denotes that the title enabling the foreman to recover the entire future subscriptions is dependant on the demand in writing for the future subscriptions. It is significant to note that the words used in the provision are 'entitled to claim'. This denotes that the title enabling the foreman to recover the entire future subscriptions is dependant on the demand in writing for the future subscriptions. The terms in the contract may at best enable the foreman to make a demand in writing; but it is the latter event of demand in writing that gives him the right to consolidated payment. The consolidated payment becomes due only on the making of a written demand and hence the starting point of limitation is only when the written demand is made. 8. The contention raised by the counsel for the petitioners that the whole claim is barred is totally unsustainable and we reject the same. In this view we are supported by the decisions of this court reported in 1963 KLT. 6,1963 KLT. 68,1963 KLT. 277 and 1977 KLT. 833. 9. The Division Bench in 1977 KLT. 833 observed in Para.6 that the "counsel for the revision petitioners is well-founded in the further contention advanced by him that even if it is Art.113 and not Art.37 of the Act that governs the case, the plaintiff can recover in the suit only the amount of such of the instalments as had fallen due within three years prior to the date of institution of the suit." For the reasons stated earlier, we are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations in 1977 KLT. 833. 10. In the result, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the instalments which fell due after 4-6-1974, that is, within three years of the date of suit and not to the instalments prior to 4-6-1974 and therefore the decree so far as it grants amounts due under the instalments prior to 4-6-1974 is unsustainable in law and is, vacated. The decree passed by the lower court stands modified to this effect. There will be no order as to costs.