Judgment :- 1. The legality and correctness of the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Tiruvannamalai in A.S. 7 of 1978, regarding the interpretation of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, are challenged in this second appeal. 2. The facts of the case are briefly as follows:— One Sadaya Achari died on 21st November, 1918 leaving behind him his widow Kishtammal. his son Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari and his two daughters Rajammal and Chinnathayammal. Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari married one Pachiammal, the appellant herein (the plaintiff in the suit). Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari died on 30th October, 1946. The genealogical table showing the relationship among the parties is given below Pacbaiammal, the widow of Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari filed the above suit for a declaration that she is the absolute owner of the suit properties and for possession of the same. It is alleged in the plaint that the defendant, viz., the respondent herein, by means of the sale deed, dt. 1st January, 1975 purported to purchase the suit properties from Kishtammal, the widow of Sadaya Achari and Rajammal and Chinnathayammal, the daughters of Sadaya Achari and that the vendors had no right to convey the suit properties in favour of the respondent. It is also alleged in the plaint that the respondent trespassed upon the suit properties shortly after the purchase in January 1975 and had taken possession of the same, Hence the appellant/plaintiff came forward with the suit for the relief of declaration and for recovery of possession. The contention of the respondent/defendant is that the suit properties originally did not belong to Sadaya Achari, on the other hand, it belonged to Kishtammal. The respondent also contended that the patta in respect of the suit properties stood in the name of Kishtammal for more than 40 years, that it is not correct to say that since the said Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari was a minor the patta stood in the name of Kishtammal and that the patta always stood in the name of Kishtammal till it was purchased by the respondent. Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari was never in possession of the suit properties and he did not enjoy the same. It was only Kishtammal who was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari was never in possession of the suit properties and he did not enjoy the same. It was only Kishtammal who was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. At the time of death of Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari, that is 32 years prior to the filing of the suit, the appellant could not have succeeded to the estate of the deceased Kuppa Achari. According to law as it stood then the estate of Kuppa Achari devolved by survivorship upon the next reversioners since Kuppa Achari had no brothers. As the law then stood the appellant will not be entitled to the agricultural properties of her husband but she is only entitled to non-agricultural properties. The allegation that the appellant had been in separate possession and enjoyment of the suit properties for more than 30 years and thus she had perfected title by adverse possession is also denied. It was also alleged that Kishtammal was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and perfected title to the same by adverse possession. The learned District Munsif after considering the documentary and oral evidence in the case came to the conclusion that the suit properties originally belonged to Sadaya Achari and that they were not the absolute properties of Kishtammal. The learned District Munsif also held that the appellant/plaintiff is the sole heir of Nagappan alias Kuppa, Achari. Considering the documents Exs. A5 to A7 relating to possession the learned District Munsif came to the conclusion that the appellant/plaintiff had perfected title by adverse possession. The learned District Munsif also held that the respondent/defendant had not perfected title by adverse possession. The District Munsif came to the conclusion that the respondent is not a bona fide purchaser for value. In view of the findings arrived at the learned District Munsif passed a decree as prayed for. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant, viz., the respondent herein, preferred A.S. No. 7/78 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Tiruvannamalai. In view of the findings arrived at the learned District Munsif passed a decree as prayed for. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendant, viz., the respondent herein, preferred A.S. No. 7/78 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Tiruvannamalai. The learned Subordinate Judge on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence in the case came to the following conclusion: Kishtammal as the wife of Sadaya Achari had in law a right to maintain herself out of the joint family properties perties of late Sadaya Achari and that right is deemed to be an interest in the immovable property which had become absolute as per S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Consequent to the enactment of S. 14(1) Kishtammal is entitled to an absolute right and as such the along with her daughters is entitled to sell a half share in the suit properties. In view of the conclusion arrived at the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and passed a decree for partition and possession of a half share in respect of the suit properties. The plaintiff had filed the above second appeal challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. 3. Since the determination of the question in this second appeal turns round on the true interpretation of the two sub-sections of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the same is set out below:— “14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation:— In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act, (2) Nothing contained in sub-S. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property”. Before the enactment of S. 14, the Hindu law, as it was then in operation, allowed only a restricted interest to a Hindu female in the property, inherited by her and even as regards the nature of this restricted interest there was a divergence of opinion. The intention of the Legislature in enacting S. 14 is to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in the property, however, restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu Law may be, into absolute estate. By the enactment of the ab ove said section absolute rights are conferred upon the female Hindus with full rights of inheritance and the traditional limitation on her powers of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu Law as inherent in her estate are done away with. Sub-S. (1) of section 14 lays down that any property possessed by a female Hindu shall be her absolute property without any limitation and the term “any property” occurring in S. 14(1) includes both movable and immovable properties acquired by a female Hindu b y inheritance or device, or at partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by a gift from any person. The Supreme Court in a series of decisions had given an elaborate interpretation of Sub-S. 1 of S. 14 bearing in mind the social purpose of the legislation. The Supreme Court in a series of decisions had given an elaborate interpretation of Sub-S. 1 of S. 14 bearing in mind the social purpose of the legislation. In the case reported in Gummalepura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva 1 the words ‘possessed of’ occurring in S. 14(1) have been interpreted as the state of owning or having in ones hand or power. It need not be actual or physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. It may be actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law. In the case reported in Mangal Singh v. Rattno 2 the Supreme Court pointed out that S. 14 covers all cases of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of the property, provided of course, that she has not parted with her rights and is capable of obtaining possession of the property. Thus it is seen that sub-S. 1 of S. 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencenwnt of the Act, or was subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property. Sub-S. (2) of S. 14 is more in the nature of a proviso to sub-S. (1) and as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Badri Pershtd v. Smt. Kanso Debi 3 sub-S. 2 excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-S. (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu Society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-S. (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-S. (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-S. (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-S. (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-S. (1). The intention of the Legislature is to make the property possessed by a female Hindu which is acquired by her in lieu of maintenance or by a gift, her absolute property. But in the process of acquisition of such rights prior to the commencement of the Act it was always natural to describe the incidence of the right in the document relating to such acquisition. In other words in all cases where the Hindu females were put into possession of a portion of the family property in lieu of the maintenance prior to the Act it was usual to insert the recital that the property should be enjojed by the female for her life time and afterwards it would revert to the heirs of the last male owner. If this recital is taken to be a restricted estate to which S. 14(2) applies then the very purpose in enacting S. 14(1) viz , converting the restricted estate of a woman into an absolute estate, will fail. The Supreme Court taking into consideration the intention of the Legislature laid down that in cases where the possessory right emanated from a pre-existing right, such as maintenance, then even if the document contains a restricted estate S. 14(1) would be attracted and S. 14(2) cannot be applied to such cases. In the case reported in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi 1 the Supreme Court after considering the entire decisions rendered by the Supreme Court earlier and the several High Courts, laid down the law positively that in cases of acquisition of rights by Hindu females in pursuance of a pre-existing right in spite of restricted covenants only S. 14(1) will apply and the property will enlarge into an absolute estate. But where the property is acquired by a Hindu female under an instrument for the first time without any preexisting right sotely by the virtue of an instrument, she must hold it on the terms on which it is given to her and if what is given to her is a restricted estate, it would not be enlarged by reason of sub-S. (2). 4. 4. Having understood the legal position we will have to consider the facts of this case to see whether the conclusion arrived at by the first appellate court is correct. The first appellate court came to the conclusion that Kishtammals right to maintenance out of the family property is itself a right to property possessed by her in the family property which had converted itself into an absolute estate as per S. 14(1). It is seen from the evidence in this case that soon after the death of Sadaya Achari the registry of the entire family property including the suit property was transferred in the name of Kishtammal as guardian mother of the minor Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari. After the attainment of majority the registry had been transferred in the name of Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari and Ex. A4 is the patta book issued to Nagappan alias Kuppa Achari. After his death kist had been paid by Pachiammal, the appellant herein, in respect of the entire property as evidenced by Ex. A5 series. There is no evidence to show that Kishtammal was put in possession of any item of property in lieu of her right to maintenance. Of course there is also no evidence to show that Kishtammal relinquished her right to maintenance. 5. The question to be considered is whether the right of Kishtammal for maintenance can be considered as a right in the family properties. If it can be said that the right to maintenance is the right to property then S. 14(1) will apply to such a right since the Supreme Court in the case reported in Mangal Singh v. Rattno 2 held that the words ‘possessed of’ occurring in S. 14(1) need not even he actual or physical possession of the property and will include even a mere right of possession and S. 14(1) takes in its fold the jutisdical possession also. A Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in Muthu Bhatttar v. D. Cokku Bhattar 1 , a case arising uader S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, observed as follows:— “Before doing so, it is necessary to understand as to what is a maintenance right. The components of maintenance understood both in civil and criminal law are many and varied. Inter alia, it contains the right to claim food, attire and shelter. The components of maintenance understood both in civil and criminal law are many and varied. Inter alia, it contains the right to claim food, attire and shelter. These and other ingredients of the right of maintenance are to be consolidated and not to be treated disjunctively. In the case of the right of maintenance of a Hindu Female or a Hindu widow, until the passing of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1936, this was governed by the personal law of the parties. A peculiar situation, however, is always demonstrable with reference to the pre-1937 widows. In the case of such widows or female members, when a maintenance right is recognised either by the act of parties or by an involuntary measure, such as a decree of court, then that right so secured by the Hindu female has to be understood with reference to the facts and circumstances under which the grant was made. But, as was stated by a Full Bench of our court in Ramanadan v. Rengammal 2: “The correct view is that the obligation to maintain the mother is strengthened by giving her an interest in immovable property and thereby enabling her to constitute that interest into a specific charge, or an actual existing proprietary interest for the term of her life, and to protect her right of maintenance against improvident alienation of the fund from which it is to be satisfied. To this extent, the right of maintenance is a right in re or an interest in ancestral property”. 6. We will have to consider whether the mere right of maintenance available to Kishtammal in the family properties can be considered as property possessed by her to which S. 14(1) applies. The joint family estate of the deceased husband of Kishtammal is liable to provide maintenance to Kishtammal and Kishtammal has a right to be maintained out of the joint family properties. But it remains as a mere right until such maintenance is determined and made a specific charge either by an agreement or by a decree of court. Kishtammals right to maintenance is not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of her claim. But it remains as a mere right until such maintenance is determined and made a specific charge either by an agreement or by a decree of court. Kishtammals right to maintenance is not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of her claim. The widow can for the purpose of her maintenance follow the joint family property “into the hands of any one who takes it as a volunteer or with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance”. The Supreme Court in the case reported in Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunanden Ram 3 had specifically laid down that the right to maintenance itself transfers into a charge only when it is ascertained by means of an agreement or by a decree of court. In the case reported in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi 4 while dealing with the rights of a widow for maintenance Bhagwati, J., observed as follows:— “The right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rem, since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property, but it is certainly jus ad rem, i.e., a right against the joint family property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow. The widow would be getting the property by virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving the property being merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right and not making a grant of the property to her for the first time without any antecedent right or title”. 7. Taking into consideration the views expressed by the Supreme Court as well as this Court and also in view of the fact that the maintenance right of Kishtammal, a pre-1937 widow, cannot be said to be ripened into a charge on the family property since the same had not been ascertained by means of an agreement or by a decree of the court the maintenance right of Kishtammal remains only a mere right. As per the decisions cited above that right in order to become a right in immovable property an ascertainment by mutual agreement or by a decree of court is necessary. In this case there is no evidence to show that Kishtammals maintenance right was ascertained so as to form a charge on the immovable property. Hence the view taken by the first appellate court that Kishtammals right to maintenance out of the family estate is an interest in the property which becomes an absolute right as per S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is not correct. I have no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court. 8. In the result the second appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the first appellate court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. However, there will be no order as to costs.