JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - The petitioner was a temporary auditor Co-operative Societies and Panchayat in the Cane Department of the State Government. In 1972 the U.P. Co-operative Cane Union Federation made him an offer for appointment on the post of Accounts Officer (Fertilizer). He accepted this appointment and was relieved by his appointing authority on 19-7-1972. Thereafter he continued to serve under the Federation. On 4-9-1974 an order was passed in the Governments Cane Department confirming him in his original post with effect from 26-1-1966. Thereafter on 26-10-1973 an order was passed requiring him to come back to the parent department. This was followed up by three reminders, the last being dated 17-2-1979 & On 6-2-1979 the petitioner wrote back that he had been continuing since 1972 to serve under the Federation and that as he had still not been confirmed by the Federation, his lien in the Government's Cane Department should be retained. He further prayed that in case this request was not to be acceded, he may be treated as having voluntarily retired on the expiry of a period of three months under Fundamental Rule 56 (1) (c). This was reiterated by the petitioner in his letter dated 24-11-1979. This was replied to by the appointing authority on 9-4-1980 and it was stated, it seems, incorrectly that the petitioner did not fulfil the conditions of voluntary retirement. He was asked again to join the department by 15-5-1980. The petitioner replied back on 19-6-1980 pointing out that he did fulfil the conditions for voluntary retirement and asking the appointing authority to reconsider the matter. Thereafter on 19-7-1982 he was recalled from deputation and posted as Auditor in his parent department and on 20-7-1982 the Cane Federation also ordered him to be relieved and ordered to go back in the parent department. Aggrieved by these orders the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioners contention is two fold; firstly he has contended that he was not on deputation at all and that his link with the Government Department stood snapped since he was substantively appointed by the Cane Federation in 1972. Aggrieved by these orders the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioners contention is two fold; firstly he has contended that he was not on deputation at all and that his link with the Government Department stood snapped since he was substantively appointed by the Cane Federation in 1972. Secondly, it is in the alternative, that even if he was to be treated as on deputation then after having served a notice for voluntary retirement it was not open to the appointing authority not to treat him having voluntarily retired or to insist on his coming back to the parent department. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Pradeep Kant who has argued the case with ability and tenacity and has placed the entire material fairly before us. 4. It has been contended that the petitioner being a temporary Government servant was not required to resign from the Government service and that since he accepted the appointment in the Cane Federation, he should be deemed to have severed his links from the parent department. He has placed his reliance on certain Government orders which say that a temporary Government servant who applies for appointment in foreign service may be allowed to send his application without being required to resign from the Government service. These Government Orders merely imply that a temporary Government servant who seeks to better his prospects should not be denied, the opportunity to do so and should not be placed in jeopardy of having severed his links from the Government Department even before he has established his links in another organisation. The Government Orders therefore cannot be construed to imply that as soon as a temporary servant gets a job elsewhere he should be deemed to haw resigned or to have severed his links from the parent department in the Government service and there is no automatic termination of Government service. It has been held in some decisions that in cases even of long unauthorised absence the Provisions of Fundamental Rules and similar rules providing for automatic cessation of service are bad as unconstitutional. 5. Although in case of a temporary Government servant he may not have a right to come back to the Government Department, that circumstance also does not imply automatic cessation of service under the Government. 5. Although in case of a temporary Government servant he may not have a right to come back to the Government Department, that circumstance also does not imply automatic cessation of service under the Government. The provision that a temporary Government servant has no lien on a temporary post or that he has no claim to come back only implies that if the Government has filled up the post by another appointment or if the post has been abolished or reduced then he shall have no claim; but if the Government itself chooses to retain him in service he cannot say that his services have automatically came to an end, unless he formally resigns from the service. 6. It is true that in 1972 the petitioner was a temporary Government servant, but the fact of his subsequent confirmation in 1972 with retrospective effect from 1966 which order was duly communicated to the petitioner, cannot be ignored. The petitioner did not at any time protest against the confirmation order, and he instead acquiesced in the position that he had become a confirmed Government servant since 1966. It will therefore be deemed that at the time of his appointment in the Cane Federation in 1972 he was a permanent Government servant. Under Rule 13 of the U.P. Fundamental Rules a person holding substantively a permanent post retains his lien on the post while on a foreign service. In respect of his service in the Cane Federation, it would, therefore, be deemed that he had been allowed by the Government to join there and further that he was paid from the source other than the Govt, revenue. Thus though the service in the Federation might have been described as substantive yet the petitioner continued to be a Government servant, and as such he would be deemed to be on deputation with the Cane Federation. 7. We then come to the alternative contention of the petitioner, namely, that he is to be deemed to have voluntarily-retired from the Government service. The petitioner being on deputation it was open to the lending and borrowing employers to terminate the deputation at any time with their mutual consent. Even on 26-10-1978 the decision had been taken to terminate the petitioners deputation. It was, therefore, not open to the petitioner thereafter to insist on his continuing on deputation by trying to severe his links from, the parent department. Even on 26-10-1978 the decision had been taken to terminate the petitioners deputation. It was, therefore, not open to the petitioner thereafter to insist on his continuing on deputation by trying to severe his links from, the parent department. Severance of links from the parent department in such circumstances would have left the petitioner with no employment inasmuch as he could not continue in the Federation either. By letter dated 6-2-1979 the petitioner clearly expressed his desire to be allowed to continue in the Federation while he sought premature retirement as a last resort. The subsequent communications of the petitioner were also mere reiterations of the same letter, even though the condition mentioned in the letter dated 6-2-1979 may not have been expressly repeated. It was in the interest of the petitioner that he was not treated to be voluntarily retired, as his deputation under the Federation had come to an end through the mutual consent between the Government Department and the Cane Federation. It has also been mentioned in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government that the case of the petitioner for promotion on the basis of his seniority will also be duly considered. We are informed by the learned counsel for the respondents that such orders have already been passed in pursuance of our interim order dated 6-9-1982. 8. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. S. R. Tripathi v. State of U.P. Writ Petn. No. 2596 of 1983 decided on 26-5-1983 that a deputationist has no right to continue on deputation. 9. Before parting with the case a reference may be made to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. These decisions are: State of U.P. v. Dr. M.J. Siddiqui, 1980 (UP LBEC 644 : (1980 Lab IC 644) (SC) para 10, State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (1983) 2 SCC 33 : (1983 Lab IC 391) para 27 and Dr. Ranjana Saxena v. Vice Chancellor, Rohilkhand University (1980 UP LB EC 225. None of these cases deals with the question of deputation. As such it is not necessary to discuss the cases. Suffice it to say that they do not go to help the petitioner. 10. We thus find no force in this petition and it is dismissed. No order as to cost.