Order: 1. The petitioner, an employee under the respondents, is seeking to quash, by a writ of certiorari the proceedings No. Staff/Con. 607 dated 5rd May, 1977 on diverse grounds, To decide the points raised, it is necessary to state the facts in a nut-shall. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Money Testor, on 19th August, 1946 and on securing various stages of promotion, in the year 1974 he was working as Branch Manager and was posted at Mappalla. He was kept under suspension by proceedings dated 13th February, 1976. He was served with a Memo containing seven charges on 27th October, 1976. The gravnmen of the charges levelled a gainst him is that he as obtaining illegal gratifications from that temporary attenders, watchman, etc. In his written statement dated 7th November, 1976, he denied all the charges and opted or an oral hearing. It was given. But instead, of passing orders thereon, the respondents communicated the impugned order, compulsorily retiring him from service, in exercise of the power conferred under the second proviso to rule 20 of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, for short, “the Rules”. 3. Sri Innayya Reddy, learned Counsel for petitioner put on the forefront of the contentions that the order though innocuous in that the order though innocuous in form, but in substance, is a stagmatisation as dishonest officer and would tantamount to punishment. Under the grab of compulsorily retiring him from service, the respondents cannot take the aid of the power under the second proviso to rule 20 of the Rules. The charges of corruption is the foundation and the form of compulsory retirement is the cleak of terminating the services of the petitioner. Therefore, the Court can go behind the form of the order and see whether the order, in substance, is in the nature of punishment. If it is in the nature of punishment, the failure to pass the order as contemplated under rule 5 of the Rules, vitiates the entire order; thus an error apparent on the face of the record crept in. 4. Sri Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank contended that though the proceedings by way of penalty was initiated as contemplated under. rule 50 of the Rules, in fact, the compulsory retirement is not a penalty as explained under rule 49 and explanation thereto. 4. Sri Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank contended that though the proceedings by way of penalty was initiated as contemplated under. rule 50 of the Rules, in fact, the compulsory retirement is not a penalty as explained under rule 49 and explanation thereto. Under clause (ii) of sub rule (2) of rule 50, the respondents have the power and authority. Instead of passing the order under rule 50 , the authorities passed the order compulsorily retiring him from service in exercise of the power under the second proviso to rule 20. There is no stigma attached to the order. The petitioner is entitled to the benefits which an employee is entitled after retirement or on completing of 25 years of pensionable service. 5. In order to appreciate the respective contentions, we have to see the impugned order, the material part of which reads: “With reference to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against you vide your letter Staff/Con. No. 2252 of the 27th October, 1976, we have to advise that the Executive Committee of the Central Board at its meeting held on 13th April, 1977 after full consideration has resolved that in terms of proviso 2 to rule 20 of the State Bank of India (Supervisory Staff) Service Rules, you be retired from the Bank's service and that you be allowed with immediate effect to avail yourself of such leave as may be due to you preparatory to retirement. The Executive Committee has further resolved that the period during which you were under suspension be treated as not a duly and that no adjustment reed be made in the remuneration already paid to you during the period of suspension. 2. You are accordingly permitted 5 months 22 days of ordinary leave at your credit, as leave preparatory to retirement with effect from the date of receipt of this letter, at the expiry of which you will stand retired from the Bank's service”. 6. rule 20 of the Rules postulates that an employee shall retire from the service of the Bank on attaining the age of fifty-right years or upon the completion of thirty years’ pensionable service, whichever occurs first. 7. 6. rule 20 of the Rules postulates that an employee shall retire from the service of the Bank on attaining the age of fifty-right years or upon the completion of thirty years’ pensionable service, whichever occurs first. 7. The second proviso to the above Rule, reads thus: “Provided further then an employee may, at the discretion of the Executive Committee, be retired from Bank's service after he has attained 50 years of age or has completed 25 years’ pensionable service by giving him three months’ notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof”. 8. rule 49 prescribes penalties. Clauses (a) to (d) are the minor penalties and (e) to (h) are the major penalties. In Explanation thereto, the following item shall amount to no penalty within the meaning of the Ruless “(XI) retirement of an employee in term of rule 20” 9. rule 50 deals with disciplinary proceedings against an employee, which has to be followed. It is not in dispute that charge memo was given and an opportunity of representation was also given to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his written statement and he opted for an oral hearing and it was accorded. Short of passing the order under rule 50, the procedure prescribed Hereunder has been followed. In the light of these rules and the contentions raised, the first question that arises for consideration is, whether the petitioner, in substance, is terminated from service and it casts a stigma. 19. It is now well settled law that the form of order is not conclusive. The Court can lift the veil and find the substance, whether it is in the nature of imposition of penalty or whether it is an innocuous order. If the Court finds that the order is only a cloak or a colourable device to camouflage the real effect of the order, than the Court on consideration of the facts and the attendant circumstances, could construe the order to be one as a punishment or casts a stigma or exercised to achieve collatoral or oblique purpose, though innocuously worded to be a simple order of compulsory retirement. If the order has such seeds that sprout pernicious affection the efficient function of service, the Court would under it. On the other hand, if the Court finds that the order is not in the nature of punishment then (he order can be sustained. If the order has such seeds that sprout pernicious affection the efficient function of service, the Court would under it. On the other hand, if the Court finds that the order is not in the nature of punishment then (he order can be sustained. In Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees' Union Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees' Union (1960) 3 S.C.R. 441 : A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 919 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that if the termination of service is a colourable exercise of the power vested in the management… the Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such termination. In order to find whether the order of termination is one of termination simpliciter under the provisions of the contract or of standing orders, the Tribunal has ample jurisdiction to go into all the circumstances which led to the termination simpliciter. The form of the order of termination is not conclusive of the true nature of the order, for it is possible that the form may be merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct. It is therefore always open to the Tribunal to go behind the form and look at the substance and if it comes to the conclusion that though in form the order amounts to termination simpliciter it in reality cleaks a dismissal for misconduct, it is open to it to set aside the order as a colourable exercise of the power The same was the view in Tata Oil Mill's Co. v. Workmen Tata Oil Mill's Co. v. Workmen (1965) 1 S.C.J. 281: (1964) 7 S.C.R. 555 : A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 155 and All India Corporation v. A.V.Rebello All India Corporation v. A.V.Rebello (1972) 3 S.C.R. 606 : A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1344. A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of seven Judges considered the question again in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 1 S.C.R. 814 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192, Ray, Chief Justice, speaking on behalf of the Court held in paragraph 63: “No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are termination it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing causes against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution”. In paragraph 64 it was held: “The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases, the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection”. On the facts and circumstances in that case, their Lordships have held is paragraph 80: “The order of termination of the services of Ishwar Chand Agarwal is clearly by way of punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court not only denied Ishwar Chand Agrawal the protection under Article 311 but also denied itself, the dignified control over the subordinate judiciary. The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment. Even the innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provisions of Article 311. In such case the simplicity of the form of the order will not give any sanctity. That is exactly what has happened in the case of Ishwar Chand Agarwal, The order of termination it illegal and must be set aside.” 11. In State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh (1974) 1 S.C.C. 218 : (1974) Lab. I.C. 253: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 423. Mathew, J., speaking on behalf of the Court held: “If, on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311. In State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh State of U.P. v. Sughar Singh (1974) 1 S.C.C. 218 : (1974) Lab. I.C. 253: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 423. Mathew, J., speaking on behalf of the Court held: “If, on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311. But even in this case, he cannot be reverted in a manner which will show conclusively that the intention was to punish him. The order itself may expressly state that the officer concerned is being reverted by way of punishment. In fact, the order may in various other ways cast a stigma on the officer concerned. In all such cases, the order is to be taken as a punishment. Some times again, the order of reversion may bring upon the officer certain penal consequences like forfeiture of pay and allowances or less of seniority in the subordinate rank or the stoppage of postponement of future chances of promotions is such cases also the government servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the substantive rank must be treated as a reduction in rank. In such a case Article 311 will be attracted”. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in J.D.Srivatsava v. State of M.P. in J.D.Srivatsava v. State of M.P. (1984) Lab. I.C. 337: (1984) 2 S.C.C. 6: (1984) 1 S.C.J. 364: A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 630 Venkataramaiah, J. speaking on behalf of the Court held: “The power to retire a Government servant compulsorily in public interest in terms of a service rule is absolute provided the authority concerned forms an option bona fide that it is necessary to pass such an order in public interest. If such decision is based on collateral grounds of if the decision is arbitrary it is liable to be interfered with by Courts”. 12. When an employee entered into the service, he has an expectation that he would remain in service till attaining the age of superannuation, as per rules. The superannuation condition of service. Security of tenure is sino qua non for efficiency of service. The employee must therefore be sure of his tenure unless he is proved to have either outlived the service for proved incapacity or inefficiency in discharge of the duties. The right to continue in service can be defeasible as per rules. The superannuation condition of service. Security of tenure is sino qua non for efficiency of service. The employee must therefore be sure of his tenure unless he is proved to have either outlived the service for proved incapacity or inefficiency in discharge of the duties. The right to continue in service can be defeasible as per rules. Compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor cast a stigma. On compulsory retirement he is entitled to all the benefits accrued to his service. But when a rule has been made empowering the employer to compulsorily retire an employee with a view to maintain efficiency of administration or discipline in the service, the said power should be exercised in terms thereof, to achieve the objective of the rule. In a given situation, there may be credible material before the employer or the disciplinary authority that the employee is of doubtful integrity or his continuing in the service is detrimental to the efficient service or in the public interest and it is expedient to take action to compulsorily retire the employee from service. The power to compulsorily retire may be invoked to achieve the legitimate purpose of public interest. The material at the disposal of the employer or the disciplinary authority is not sufficient to meet the standard of proof required at trial or enquiry. To meet such a situation, this power to compulsorily retire appears to have been invested. So it may be permissible for the employer to take recourse to compulsorily retire an employee. But the evidence osmaterial must be authentic and definite and when the action was assailed at law, the evidence or the material must be placed before the Court and must inspire confidence to the Court to accept. The concept of judicial review inheres in the Court to consider the record to find whether the action takenis bona fide and oblique consideration or bad faith or arbitrariness had crept in. The Court can go behind the form of the order and see the real effect. Under the garb of exercise of the power to compulsorily retire an employee, when the power is used as a cloak to disguise the above purposes, the Court has got undoubted power and jurisdiction to set at naught such an action as ostensible and colourable exercise of power. 13. Under the garb of exercise of the power to compulsorily retire an employee, when the power is used as a cloak to disguise the above purposes, the Court has got undoubted power and jurisdiction to set at naught such an action as ostensible and colourable exercise of power. 13. In the light of the above legal position, the question that arises for consideration is, whether the impugned action is a bona fide onetaken in the interests of efficiency of the service. Undoubtedly the respondents have power under second proviso to rule 20. But it is already seen that they had invoked the disciplinary power under rule 50 and pursued the proceedings upto midway. Short of passing the order, the entire gamut of procedure provided under rule 50 had been gone though. But for reasons best known, the respondents had retraced their stay and had taken recourse to the second proviso to rule 20 to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service. The material regarding the conduct of the petitioner was already available before them, before initiating disciplinary action under rule 50. One would except that for such a short circuit there would be some grave and grim circumstances emerged in the interregnum to take recourse to this action. It is not as if the respondents for the first time had become aware of the proclivity of committing corrupt practices by the petitioner. Under these circumstances, we would expect the respondents to place before the court some acceptable material necessitating to step passing of the orders on disciplinary proceedings initiated and to invoke the undoubted power under second proviso to rule 20. But no such material has been placed before the court. It the action of the respondents is allowed to prevail, it would not only amount to encourage exercise of arbitrary power for undisclosed ulterior or oblique purposes, but also defeat efficiency in service. In such a situation, it is not conducive to allow to short circuit the procedure of disciplinary action defeating statutory right of appeal. It must not be understood that the respondents understood that the respondents under no circumstances can take recourse to exercise such power. But the exercise there of must be an honest and bona fide exercise based on relevant, tangible and acceptable material. It must not be understood that the respondents understood that the respondents under no circumstances can take recourse to exercise such power. But the exercise there of must be an honest and bona fide exercise based on relevant, tangible and acceptable material. I have given my anxious consideration to the action and in the light of the facts and circumstances discussed above and the absence of any material placed before me, I am inclined to take the view that the exercise of power appears to be a colourable one to weed out petitioner from the service. 14. But the question is whether in exercising the discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution would this Court interfere with the order. As stated, the gravamen of the charge is the collection of bribes or receipt of illegal gratification from the temporary employees (watchmen, etc.). In his explanation the petitioner practically admitted the receipt of the amounts but he comes forward with an explanation that they lent money to him. A reading of the explanation would clearly indicate that the explanation is too tall a tale to believe. It passes beyond comprehension that a temporary watchman would lend Rs.1000 to an officer drawing more than Rs.2500 a month, as loan. Even with regard to one of the watchmen, viz., S.A.Sattar, he collected a sum of Rs.1000 at Rs.100 per month for April, May, June and July 1975 and at Rs.200. In the month of August at Rs.100 in the months of September and October, 1975. His explanation is highly artificial and too incredible to believe. If his explanation is excluded from consideration, the necessary and inevitable conclusion is that he collected illegal gratifications from his subordinates. When a person proclivated with the commission of corruption, approaches this court, the question is would this court extend its power to such a corrupt person. Though I find that the order was used as camouflage toput an end to the service of the petitioner, on the facts and circumstances of this case, I am not inclined to exercise the discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution, and in this ground. I am dismissing this writ petition, but in the circumstances, without costs. W.P. dismissed.