JUDGMENT SEN, J.:—This appeal by special leave by the appellant Ram Murti is directed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court dated August 10, 1982# dismissing his second appeal under S. 39 and upholding the. Judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated August 23, 1977 affirming an appeal against the order of the Second Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dated March 8, 1976 and directing his eviction from the suit accommodation under S. 14 (1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. #Reported in (1982) 2 Rent CJ 635. 2. It is common ground that the parties stand in the relation of landlord and tenant. Respondent No. 1 Bhola Nath who is the landlord made an application dated December 18, 1968 claiming eviction of the appellant and respondent No. 2 Basant Lal who is his brother-in-law on the grounds mentioned in S. 14 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. It was alleged that although the appellant had taken the premises on rent from the Custodian of Evacuee Properties. @ Rs. 18/- per month, he vacated the premises after respondent No. 1 acquired the same and there was a new tenancy created in his favour on March 1, 1961 on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. On an application made by respondent No. 1, the Additional Rent Controller by his order dated February 14, 1969 passed under S. 15 (1) of the Act directed the appellant to deposit rent Rs.18/- per month w.e.f. December 1 1965 and to deposit the future rent at the same rate on the 15th day of each succeeding month. The second Additional Rent Controller by his order dated March 8, 1976 directed the eviction of the appellant on the ground specified under S. 14 (1) (a) on the finding that the appellant had committed a default in not complying with the order dated February 14, 1969 passed by his predecessor under S. 15 (1) and therefore it was not necessary to decide as to what was the agreed rate of rent. On the same day, the learned Additional Rent Controller dismissed an application filed by respondent No. 1 under S. 15 (7) of the Act on September 17, 1975 for striking out the defence of the appellant on the ground that he had committed defaults in complying with the order of his predecessor dated February 14, 1969 which had been affirmed in appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal by its order dated March 26, 1970. He came to this conclusion on perusal of the original challans filed by the appellant that all the rents up to April 1975 had been deposited on due dates, but there was delay in depositing the rents for four months, namely, for May, June, July and August 1975 oil due dates. The challans showed that the rents for the months of may and June 1975 had been deposited by him on August 14, 1975 while the rents for July and August, 1975 had been deposited on September 19, 1975. Despite the delay in making deposits of the rents for these months the learned Additional Rent Controller declined to make an order for striking out the defence under S. 15 (7) of the Act on the ground that although the appellant had committed defaults in complying with the order made under S. 15 (1), the defaults will have their legal consequences. Both the appellant and respondent No. 1 again preferred appeals before the Rent Control Tribunal but the appeals were dismissed on August 23, 1977. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control Tribunal affirming that of the learned Additional Rent Controller, the appellant preferred a second appeal before the High Court under S. 39 of the Act but the High Court declined to interfere with the order of eviction passed under S. 14 (1) (a). The High Court relying upon the decision of this Court in Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. (1978) 1 SCR 241 , held that the Rent Controller had no power to extend the time Prescribed by an order under Sec. 15 (1) which requires the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order and future rents by the 15th day of each succeeding month. 3. Ltd. (1978) 1 SCR 241 , held that the Rent Controller had no power to extend the time Prescribed by an order under Sec. 15 (1) which requires the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order and future rents by the 15th day of each succeeding month. 3. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on later decision of this Court in Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas (1980) 2 SCR 334 that inasmuch as the Rent Controller has a discretion under S. 15 (7) of the Act not to strike out the defence of a tenant for committing default in making payment or deposit of the rent as required by Sec. 15 (1), he has by necessary implication the power to condone the default in making payment or deposit of future rent falling due after the institution of the proceedings as required under S. 15 (1) and also to extend the time for such payment or deposit. 4. In his reply, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has made a twofold submission : (1) In Hem Chands case. ( AIR 1977 SC 1986 ) (supra), the Court held that when the tenant fails to make a deposit of the future rent in compliance with the order passed under S. 15 (1) against him, a right to obtain an order for recovery of possession under S. 14 (1) (a) accrues to the landlord and the Rent Controller has no power to condone the default of the tenant by extending the time for the payment. It is urged that the Court in Hem Chands case, supra, interpreted the provisions of Section 15 (1) in the context of S. 14 (1) (a) read with S. 14 (2) with which we are concerned and that the latter decision in Shyamcharans case, supra, which relates to the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 having a different scheme altogether has no application to the present case and (2) the tenant having committed consecutive defaults in making payment or deposit of the future rent as required under S. 15 (1), the proviso to S. 14 (2) is attracted. 5. In order to deal with the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Sub-sec. 5. In order to deal with the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Act read with the proviso thereto, provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant, except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) to (1), set out in the proviso, subject to the conditions and qualifications mentioned in sub-secs. (2) to (11). Sub-sec. (2) qualifies the right given to the landlord to recover possession under S. 14 (1) (a), and it reads : "14 (2). No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by S. 15; Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months." When the tenant gets benefit of this protection is provided for by S. 15 which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows : "15 (1). In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the tenant including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate." Sub-section (2) of S. 15 deals with the situation where if, in any proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on any ground other than that referred to in sub-sec. (1). the tenant contests the claim for eviction, the landlord may, at any stage of the proceeding, make an application to the Controller for an order on the tenant to pay to the landlord the amount of rent legally recoverable from the tenant and the Controller may, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order in accordance with the provisions of the said sub-section. Sub-sec. (3) lays down that if, in any proceeding referred to in sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Controller shall, within fifteen days of the date of the first hearing of the proceeding, fix an interim rent in relation to the premises to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), as the case may be, until the standard rent in relation thereto is fixed . having regard to the provisions of the Act, and the amount of arrears, if any, calculated on the basis of the standard rent shall be paid or deposited by the tenant within one month of the date on which the standard rent is fixed or such further time as the Controller may allow in this behalf. Sub-sec. (4) provides that if, in any proceeding referred to in sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. Sub-sec. (4) provides that if, in any proceeding referred to in sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), there is any dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the Controller may direct the tenant to deposit with the Controller the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) or sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (3), as the case may be, and in such a case no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Controller decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same. Sub-sec. (5) provides that if the Controller is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub-section (4) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false or frivolous, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application. Sub-sec. (6) of S. 15 is relevant for our purposes, and it reads : "15 (6). If a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (3), no order shall be made for the recovery of possession on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the Controller may allow such costs as he may deem fit to the landlord." Sub-sec. (7) provides for striking out the defence of the tenant when he fails to make payment or deposit as required by sub-sec. (1) of S. 15. It runs as follows: "15 (7). If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this section, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application." 6. From a conspectus of these provisions, it would be seen that the various sub-sections of Ss. 14 and 15 form an integrated process seeking to strike a balance between the conflicting rights of the landlord to secure eviction of the tenant on any one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 and that of the tenant for protection against such eviction except under certain circumstances, The predominant object and purpose of the legislation, as a matter of social control, is to prevent eviction of tenants and to provide for control of rents etc. One must therefore give a meaningful interpretation to the various sub-sections of Ss. (1) of S. 14 and that of the tenant for protection against such eviction except under certain circumstances, The predominant object and purpose of the legislation, as a matter of social control, is to prevent eviction of tenants and to provide for control of rents etc. One must therefore give a meaningful interpretation to the various sub-sections of Ss. 14 and 15 in furtherance of the purpose and object of the legislation. 7. The right of the landlord to claim eviction of the tenant on the ground that he has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him under S. 14 (1) (a) is made subject to the provisions of S. 14 (2). The opening words of S. 14 (2) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1), clearly subordinate the landlords claim for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent to the statutory protection given to the tenant under S. 14 (2) against eviction on that ground on condition that he makes payment or deposit as required under S. 15. When a tenant can get the benefit of the protection under S. 14 (2) is provided for in S. 15 (1). Section 15 (1) of the Act is in two parts. The first part requires the tenant to pay or deposit within one month of the order of the Rent Controller passed under S. 15 (1) directing him to pay the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such payment or deposit is to be made. The second part is meant to secure payment of future rent by a defaulting tenant and casts a duty on such tenant to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the 15th day of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. The second part is meant to secure payment of future rent by a defaulting tenant and casts a duty on such tenant to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the 15th day of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. It is obvious that a tenant who seeks protection against eviction on the ground mentioned in S. 14 (1) (a) must comply with the requirements of S. 15 (1), It must also be observed that S. 15 (1) of the Act does not contain the words "or such further time as the Controller may allow in that behalf" as they appear in S. 15 (3) and this necessarily gives rise to the vexed question whether the Rent Controller has any power to condone the default by the tenant in making payment or deposit as required by S. 15 (1) or to extend the time for such payment or deposit, 8. The narrow construction placed by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Hem Chand, AIR 1972 Delhi 275 on the powers of the Controller contained in S. 15 (7) in the context of S. 14 (2) does not appeal to reason. It is not inconceivable that the tenant might fail to comply with the requirements of S. 15 (1) by the date line due to circumstances beyond his control. For instance, it might not be possible for the tenant to attend the Court to make the deposit on the last day if it is suddenly declared a holiday or on account of a serious accident to himself or his employee or while going to the treasury he is waylaid, or is stricken with sudden illness, or held up on account of riots or civil commotion, or for that matter a clerk of his lawyer entrusted with the money, instead of punctually making the deposit commits breach of trust and disappears, or some other circumstances intervene which make it impossible for him for reasons beyond his control to physically make the deposit by the due date. There is no reason why the refusal of the Rent Controller to strike out the defence of the tenant under S. 15 (7) in such circumstances should not enure to the benefit of the tenant for purposes of S. 14 (2). 9. There is no reason why the refusal of the Rent Controller to strike out the defence of the tenant under S. 15 (7) in such circumstances should not enure to the benefit of the tenant for purposes of S. 14 (2). 9. In Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash (1980) 3 SCR 325 it was pointed out that the provision contained in S. 15 (7) was a penal provision and in terms by the use of the word "may" gave to the Controller a discretionary power in the matter of striking out the defence and that, in appropriate cases, the Controller may refuse to visit upon the tenant the penalty of eviction for failure to pay or deposit the future rent. In that case, the tenant paid the amount to the Advocate appearing for her but he betrayed her trust. In those circumstances, it was held that the Rent Controller could not have visited upon her the penal consequences of S. 15 (7) and should not have struck out the defence as this drastic power was meant for use only where a recalcitrant tenant was guilty of wilful or deliberate default in payment of future rent. It logically follows that if the Rent Controller has the power not to strike out the defence of the tenant under S. 15 (7) of the Act, he necessarily has by legal implication the power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of the future rents. 10. In Hem Chands case, AIR 1977 SC 1986 , supra, this Court partly reversed the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Hem Chand (AIR 1972 Delhi 275) holding that the default on the part of the tenant to comply with the requirements of S. 15 (1) vests an indefeasible right in the landlord and is not merely procedural right and therefore the Rent Controller was bound to pass order for eviction under S. 14 (1) (a) of the Act and the Rent Controller had no power to condone the default by the tenant in making payment or deposit of arrears of rent within one month of the date of the order of the Rent Controller or of future rent month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month. The underlying fallacy lay in the wrongful assumption by the Full Bench that S. 14 (2) was meant for the protection of the landlord. This Court while reversing the judgment of the Full Bench observed. "While we agree with the view of the Full Bench that the Controller has no power to condone the failure of the tenant to pay arrears of rent as required under S. 15 (1), we are satisfied that the Full Bench fell into an error in holding that the right to obtain an order for recovery of possession accrued to the landlord. As we have set out earlier, in the event of the tenant failing to comply with the order under S. 15 (1) the application will have to be heard giving an opportunity to the tenant if his defence is not struck out under S. 15 (7) and without hearing the tenant if his defence is struck out. The Full Bench is therefore in error in allowing the application of the landlord on the basis of the failure of the tenant to comply with an order under S. 15 (1)." In the concluding part of the judgment, there is an observation to the effect : "The Rent Control Act protects the tenant from such eviction and gives him an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent within two months from the date of notice of demand as provided in S. 14 (1) (a). Even if he fails to pay, a further opportunity is given to the tenant to pay or deposit the arrears within one month under S. 15 (1). Such payment or deposit in compliance with the order under S. 15 (1) takes away the right of the landlord to claim recovery of possession on the ground of default in payment of rent. The legislature has given statutory protection to the tenant by affording him an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order. This statutory provision cannot be modified as rights of parties depend on the compliance with an order under Section 15 (1). The legislature has given statutory protection to the tenant by affording him an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order. This statutory provision cannot be modified as rights of parties depend on the compliance with an order under Section 15 (1). In the circumstances, we agree with the Full Bench that the Rent Controller has no discretion to extend the time prescribed under S. 15 (1)." With respect, the observations in Hem Chands case ( AIR 1977 SC 1986 ) expressing the view that the Rent Controller has no power to extend the time prescribed in S. 15 (1) cannot be construed to mean that he is under a statutory obligation to pass an order for eviction of the tenant under S. 14 (1) (a) without anything more due to the failure on his part to comply with the requirements of S. 15 (1). The question would still remain as to the course to be adopted by the Rent Controller in such a situation in the context of S. 15 (7) which confers on the Rent Controller a discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant in the event of the contingency occurring, namely, failure on the part of the tenant to meet with the requirements of Section 15 (1). 11. We must mention that the scheme of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is almost similar with regard to the claim of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for arrears of rent has been served on him under S. 12 (1) (a) of that Act, except for the difference that under that Act the landlord has to bring a suit for eviction before a Civil Court under Section 12 (1) (a) instead of an application before the Rent Controller under Section 14 (1) (a) as in the Delhi Act. Further, the difference is that the Civil Court is expressly given the power under S. 13 (1) in the event of a failure on the part of the tenant to pay the arrears of rent within two months from the date of the notice of demand under S. 12 (1) (a), to extend the time for deposit of payment of the arrears due on the date of the institution of the suit. Except for this difference, the scheme of the two enactments is almost the same. The relevant provision of S. 12 (3) conferring protection on the tenant against eviction on the ground mentioned in S. 12 (1) (a) if he makes payment or deposit as required by S. 13 (1), is identical with the protection given under S. 14 (2) of the Act. Likewise S. 13 (6) which creates a statutory bar against the passing of a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in S. 12 (1) (a) if a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by Section 13 (1), and S. 13 (7) which invests the Court with a discretion in the matter of striking out the defence of the tenant if there is failure to pay or deposit the rents under S. 13 (1), are identically the same as those of Ss. 15 (6) and 15 (7) of the Act: 12. Under the terms of S. 13 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, a tenant in default on a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any ground referred to in S. 12 is required to deposit the arrears of rent within one month of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may allow and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. In a series of decisions, the Madhya Pradesh High Court uniformly took the view that though the Court had power to extend the time for deposit or payment of the arrears due till the institution of the suit, it had no power to extend the time for deposit or payment of future rent. In a series of decisions, the Madhya Pradesh High Court uniformly took the view that though the Court had power to extend the time for deposit or payment of the arrears due till the institution of the suit, it had no power to extend the time for deposit or payment of future rent. The High Court was of the view that even if a tenant in default had complied with the first requirement i.e. made deposit or payment of the arrears within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court might on an application have allowed in that behalf, it was still obligatory upon such tenant to comply with the second requirement i.e. to continue to make such deposit or payment, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month, if he wanted to claim the protection under S. 12 (3). In the event of any default on his part to comply with the second requirement, the Court had no power to grant further time for making such deposit or payment in respect of which he was in default. 13. In Shyamcharans case, ( AIR 1980 SC 587 ) (supra), this Court reversed the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the question as to whether the Court had the power to grant further time under S. 13 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act for payment or deposit of future rent. It was held that if the Court has discretion under S. 13 (7) not to strike out the defence of a tenant committing default in payment or deposit as required under S. 13 (1), the Court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment. It was observed that another construction may lead, in some cases, to a perversion of the object of the Act namely, the adequate protection of the tenant. Section 12 (3) entitles a tenant to claim protection against eviction on the ground specified in S. 12 (1) (a) if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by S. 13. On the construction of S. 13 that the Court has the power to extend the time for payment or deposit, it must follow that payment or deposit within the extended time will entitle the tenant to claim the protection of S. 12 (3). On the construction of S. 13 that the Court has the power to extend the time for payment or deposit, it must follow that payment or deposit within the extended time will entitle the tenant to claim the protection of S. 12 (3). In other words, it would imply that failure to comply with the second requirement of S. 13 (1) would (not) entitle the landlord straightway to a decree for eviction under S. 12 (1) (a). 14. As to the absence of an express provision for extension of time for deposit or payment of future rent, it was said : "Obviously, express provision for extension of time for deposit or payment of rent falling due after the filing of the suit was not made in S. 13 (1) as the consequence of non-payment was proposed to be dealt with by a separate sub-section, namely S. 13 (6). Express provision had to be make for extension of time for deposit or payment of rent that had accrued prior to the filing of the suit, since that would ordinarily be at a very early stage of the suit when a written statement might not be filed and there would, therefore, be no question of striking out the defence and so, there would be no question of S. 13 (6) covering the situation." In Shyamcharans case, the Court did not find any justification for adopting a narrow construction of S. 12 (3) and S. 13 (7) read in the context of S. .13 (1) and relied upon a decision of this Court in B. C. Kame v. Nemi Chand Jain, AIR 1970 SC 981 where on an application made by the tenant, time for deposit or payment was extended. It was pointed out that in that case there was default both in payment of the arrears of rent that had accrued before the filing of the suit and in payment or deposit of the monthly rent that fell due after the filing of the suit. 15. We must confess that the two decisions in Hem Chand and Shyamcharan, ( AIR 1980 SC 587 ) supra, are irreconcilable. 16. It would be incongruous to hold that even if the defence of the tenant is not to be struck out under S. 15 (7), the tenant must still be visited with the punishment of being deprived of the protection under S. 14 (2). 16. It would be incongruous to hold that even if the defence of the tenant is not to be struck out under S. 15 (7), the tenant must still be visited with the punishment of being deprived of the protection under S. 14 (2). In Hem Chands case ( AIR 1977 SC 1986 ) the Court went to the extent of laying down that even if the defence of the tenant is struck out under S. 15 (7), the Rent Controller could not straightway make an order for eviction in favour of the landlord under S. 14 (1) (a). The Court held that the High Court was wrong in its assumption that failure to comply with the requirements of S. 15 (1) vests in the landlord an indefeasible right, to secure an order for the eviction of the tenant under S. 14 (1) (a). The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court taking that view and remanded the matters to the Rent Controller observing that there was still an issue to be tried. If that be so, the question at once arises "What is the issue to be tried?". If the landlord has still to make out a case before the Rent Controller that he was entitled to an order for eviction of the tenant under S. 14 (1) (a), surely the tenant has the right to participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the landlord. It must logically follow as a necessary corollary that if the defence is not to be struck out under S. 15 (7) it means that the tenant has still the defences open to him under the Act. In the premises, the conclusion is irresistible that he has the right to claim protection. under S. 14 (2). What is of essence of S. 14 (2) and of S. 15 (6) is whether there has been a substantial compliance with the order passed under S. 15 (1). The words "as required by S. 15 (1)" in these provisions must be construed in a reasonable manner. If the Rent Controller has the discretion under S. 15 (7) not to strike out the defence of the tenant, he necessarily has the power to extend the time for payment of future rent under S. 15 (1) where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or deposit was due to circumstances beyond his control. If the Rent Controller has the discretion under S. 15 (7) not to strike out the defence of the tenant, he necessarily has the power to extend the time for payment of future rent under S. 15 (1) where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or deposit was due to circumstances beyond his control. The previous decision in Hem Chands case interpreting S. 15 (7) and S. 14 (2) in the context of S. 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, although not expressly overruled, cannot stand with the subsequent decision in Shyamcharans case interpreting the analogous provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as it is of a larger Bench. 17. The further contention advanced by learned counsel for the respondents that in a case of consecutive defaults the proviso to S. 14 (2) is attracted, cannot be accepted for obvious reasons. On a plain construction, it provides that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under S. 14 (2) if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent for that premises for three consecutive months. On a plain construction, the proviso is attracted only in a case where the tenant has been saved from eviction in an earlier proceeding for eviction before the Rent Controller under S. 14 (1) (a) of the Act i. e. the tenant must have enjoyed the benefit of S. 14 (2) in a previously instituted proceeding. 18. In the premises, we cannot but reverse the view expressed by the High Court that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the default on the part of the tenant in making payment or deposit of future rent or to extend time for such payment or deposit. We are constrained to set aside its judgment and order as well as the order of the Rent Control Tribunal and that of the Rent Controller which proceed to order the eviction of the appellant under S. 14 (1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 upon that basis and the matter must be remitted back to the Rent Controller for a decision afresh. The Rent Controller shall now consider the question of exercising his discretion to condone the delay in making the payment or deposit for the rents which fell due for the months of May, June, July and August, 1975 in accordance with law. He shall further consider whether the appellant has to be evicted in terms of S. 14 (1) (a) keeping in view the provisions contained in S. 14 (2) and S. 15 (6) of the Act. He shall also determine as to whether the rent of the demised premises was Rs. 18 per month, or Rs. 80, as alleged. 19. The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the Rent Control Tribunal and that of the Rent Controller are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Rent Controller for a decision afresh with advertence to the observations made above. Appeal allowed. For Citation: AIR 1984 SC 1392