I. C. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this reference a question of far reaching importance as to the interpretation of a proviso to Section 29 of the Bombay Rents Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 arises for consideration. The question which is referred to this Bench is whether an appeal would lie against the determination of any question contem- plated under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in execution proceedings for enforcing decrees and orders under the Bombay Rents Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) and the Rules made thereunder. ( 2 ) THE relations of landlord and tenant are covered by the Transfer of Property Act 1890 Chapter 7 Sec- tions 105 to 117. But the provisions were found inadequate to meet the situation created by acute shortage of housing accommodation. Therefore Rent (War Restriction) Act 2 of 1918 was the first enactment brought into force for controlling the rent and housing accommodation. It came into force in the Bombay Presidency on April 10 1918 and remained in force upto December 31 1925 Thereafter on the expiry of Bombay Act 2 of 1918 upto 1939 the relations of landlord and tenant were governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In 1939 the Bombay Rent Restriction Act 16 of 1939 was enacted. It came into force on June 19 1939 and re- mained in force upto March 31 1948 After the advent of the World War II Bombay Rent Restriction Order 1942 was made in exercise of the powers conferred by Defence of India Rules 1939 Separate Order namely the Bom- bay Storage Accommodation Rent Restriction Order of 1942 and the Hotels and Lodging Houses Control Order 1942 were also framed. The provisions of these Orders with certain modifications were enacted by the Bombay Legislature in the Bombay Rents Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 7 of 1944 which came into force on 12th May 1944 and was made applicable on different dates in different areas. This Act did not apply to the business premises. The provisions of these Orders with certain modifications were enacted by the Bombay Legislature in the Bombay Rents Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 7 of 1944 which came into force on 12th May 1944 and was made applicable on different dates in different areas. This Act did not apply to the business premises. The Bombay Act 15 of 1939 and the Bombay Act 7 of 1944 both were repealed by Section 50 of the present Act which apparently recasts in some measure the provisions of the earlier Acts and provides for a large number of matters between the landlords and tenants. ( 3 ) THE Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 was enacted on 19th January 1948 and came into force on 14-2-1948. The purpose of the Act is indicated by its preamble to wit Whereas it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law relating to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises of rates of hotels and lodging houses and of evictions. Part-II of the Act applies to premises which are let for specific purposes by a landlord to his tenant. Sections 7 to 11 regulate the rents and permitted increase which a landlord may recover from his tenant; Sections 12 13 16 and 17 regulate the relations of landlord and tenant so far as evic- tion is concerned. Sections 23 and 24 relate to the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant with respect to the repair of premises and supply of essential services. Sections 26 and 27 relate to collection of rent. Section 28 is regarding the jurisdiction of the court and Section 29 provides for appeal. Part-III regulates the relations of Lodgers and lodging house-keepers with respect to eviction of lodgers and rates for lodging and other incidental servi- ces. This statute is within the express powers of the State Legislature. Section 29 of the Rent Act is the relevant Section for the purpose of the present case. Part-III regulates the relations of Lodgers and lodging house-keepers with respect to eviction of lodgers and rates for lodging and other incidental servi- ces. This statute is within the express powers of the State Legislature. Section 29 of the Rent Act is the relevant Section for the purpose of the present case. Section 29 as it stood prior to its amendment in 1953 reads as under:29 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law an appeal shall lie- (a) in Greater Bombay from a decree or order made by the court of Small Causes Bombay exercising ju- risdiction under Section 28 to a bench of two Judges of the said Court which shall not include the Judge who made such decree or order: (b) elsewhere from a decree or order made by a Judge of the Court of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887 or by the Court of the Civil Judge deemed to be the Court of Small Causes under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 28 or by a Civil Judge exercising such jurisdiction to the District Court. (1a) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be made within thirty days from the date of the decree or order as the case may be;provided that in computing the period of limitation prescribed by this sub-section the provisions contained in Sections 4 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 shall so far as may be apply. (2) No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-section (1 ). This section 29 was amended by the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Second Amendment) Act 1955 relevant portion of which (Clause 17) reads as under:in Section 29 of the said Act-to sub-section (1) the following proviso shall be added namely-PROVIDED that no such appeal shall lie from - (i) a decree or order made in any suit or proceeding in respect of which no appeal lies under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . (iv ). . . . . . . . . The whole controversy centers round the interpretation of the aforesaid proviso (1) to Section-29 (1) of the Rent Act. . . . . . . . . . . . (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . (iv ). . . . . . . . . The whole controversy centers round the interpretation of the aforesaid proviso (1) to Section-29 (1) of the Rent Act. ( 4 ) NOW in order to answer the question it is necessary to state a few relevant facts. A Civil Suit No. 51/75 was instituted in the Court of the Civil Judge (J. D.) Santrampur against the present petitioner No. 1 and deceased Jaswantlal Shankerlal Joshi for recovery of possession of the demised premises. Decree for possession was passed in favour of the landlord opponent herein. Execution Darkhast No. 31/79 was filed and the learned Civil Judge ordered to issue possession warrant under Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Against the said order the judgment debtor preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 4/80 in the District Court Panch- mahals at Godhra. The learned Joint District Judge who heard the appeal came to the conclusion that the appeal being against the order passed in execution proceedings under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable and dismissed the appeal. Against the said order the present Civil Revision Application No. 1332 of 1981 has been filed before this court. The Civil Revision Application carne up for hearing before a Division Bench of this court on 14-9-1982. Before the Division Bench the above mentioned question arose and the Division Bench referred the said question to the larger Bench. This is how this matter is before this Bench. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate Mr. S. K. Jhaveri for the petitioner submitted that in view of the fact that the right of appeal was granted under Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act and the proviso merely sought to carve out an excep- tion by providing that no appeal shall lie from a decree or order made in any suit or proceeding in respect of which no appeal lies under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 the court for the purpose of determining whether by virtue of the proviso the right of appeal is lost must confine itself to the position that obtained under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the date it was incorporated he. of 1953. of 1953. The definition of decree in Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as it stood in 1953 reads as follows:decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the court expressing it con- clusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or at of the matters in controversy in the suit and my be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of my question within Section 47 or Section 144 but shall not include (A) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or (B) at order of dismissal for default. Thereafter the decision of decree came to be amended by Amendment Act 1976 Now the definition of de- cree reads as under:decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it con- clusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within* (. . .) Section 144 but shall not include - (A) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or (B) any order of dismissal for default. (Reference to Section 47 omitted by Amendment Act 1976 mr. Jhaveri submitted that the subsequent amendment of 1976 in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 cannot take away the right which vested in the judgment debtor and an appeal would still be competent. He further sub- mitted that the proviso (I) to sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Rent Act has to be read as if it incorporated the provision regarding appeals from decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as existing when the said proviso to Section 29 of the Rent Act was engrafted in the Rent Act and not the subsequently amended provision of Code of Civil Procedure regarding appeals from decrees and orders as amended in 1976 or as may be amended from time to time. ( 6 ) NOW on the question whether reference to Code of Civil Procedure in the proviso (I) to Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act and the Rules made thereunder is by way of reference citation or incorporation into the Rent Act catena of authorities have been cited at the Bar but it will be profitable to refer to some of them which are relevant for deciding the question referred to us. 6. 1 The case of Collector of Customs Madras v. Nathalal Sampathu Chetty AIR 1962 SC 316 is cited before us. In that case the Officers of the Preventive Section of the Customs Department seized from one Nandgopal four blocks of gold weighing in all about 1 0 tolas. Inquiries were made as to the source from which Nandgopal ob- tained the gold. The Collector of Customs being prima facie of the view that the gold seized had been smuggled issued notice to the respondent to show cause why the said gold should not be confiscated and ultimately the Collec- tor of Customs had held that the onus which had been caused upon the respondent by Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act was not discharged and ordered confiscation of the said gold. Writ Petition was filed for quashing the said order which was allowed by the High Court of Madras. Another Writ Petition was also filed for the re- turn of the gold which was confiscated. Both these Writ petitions were heard together. The High Court held that Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act was void under Article 13 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that even if Section 178-A were valid the condition precedent for invoking the rule as to the burden of proof pres- cribed by the Section had not been complied with and ultimately held that the order of confiscation was invalid. Besides the High Court was of the view that Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act could not be invoked in adjudicating a contravention of a Notification under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which imposed restric- tions on the import of gold. Besides the High Court was of the view that Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act could not be invoked in adjudicating a contravention of a Notification under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which imposed restric- tions on the import of gold. Though on these conclusions the order of the Collector of Customs confiscating the gold was set aside the High Court held that the respondent was not entitled to an order for the return of the gold but only to a direction to the Collector to hear and determine the question about the gold seized being smuggled gold without reference to the rule as to onus of proof enacted by Section 178 Against this the Collector of Customs Madras went to Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court in that case held that there was no incorpora- tion of the Sea Customs Act 1978 in Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 A distinction has also been drawn betweeen a mere reference or citation of one statute into another and incorporation. In the for- mer case a modification repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred gets automatically attached to the referring statute but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no repercussion on the incorporating statute. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in that context as under:the effect therefore of Section 23-A is to treat the text of the notification by the Central Government under Section 8 (1) as if it had been issued under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act with the title and the recital of the source of power appropriate to it by the creation of a legal fiction. It would be obvious that in the context and on the language here employed if Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act were repealed there would no longer be any legal foundation for invoking the penal provisions of the Sea Customs Act to a contravention of a notification under Section 8 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. It would be obvious that in the context and on the language here employed if Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act were repealed there would no longer be any legal foundation for invoking the penal provisions of the Sea Customs Act to a contravention of a notification under Section 8 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. THE Supreme Court has further observed- a comparison of these formulae with the text of Section 23-A shows that the reference in it to Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act is merely for rendering notifications under the named provisions of the Foreign Exchange Re- gulations Act to operate as notifications under the Sea Customs Act and that it cannot have the effect of incor- porating the relevant provisions of the earlier Act into the Act of 1947 so as to attract the rule formulated by Brett L. J. in (1881) 8 QBD 63 already quoted. THE Supreme Court has next observed- it was for this among other reasons that the Judicial Committee held that rights of appeal created by amend- ments effected to the Land Acquisition Act subsequent to the enactment of the Local Act were not attracted to the incorporated provisions in the Local Act. We consider no analogy between the provisions held to be incorporated in Calcutta Improvement Trust Act 1911 dealt with by Privy Council and Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act now under discussion. We held therefore that when a notification issued under Section 8 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is deemed for all purposes to be a notification issued under Section 19 of the notification attracts to it each and every provision of the Sea Customs Act which is in force at the date of the notification (sic) (contravention ?)6. 2 In the case of New Central Jute Mills co. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise Allahabad and Others. AIR 1971 Supreme Court Page 454 three contentions were raised. The first was that Section 12 of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 was void as the powers delegated to the Central Government by the legislature were excessive and beyond permissible limits. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise Allahabad and Others. AIR 1971 Supreme Court Page 454 three contentions were raised. The first was that Section 12 of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 was void as the powers delegated to the Central Government by the legislature were excessive and beyond permissible limits. The second point was that the Sea Customs Act 1887 having been repealed it was not open to the Central Government under Section 12 of the Act to apply Section 106 (1) of the Customs Act 1962 to the Act and the notification dated May 4 1963 by which this was done was illegal and ultra vires. The third was that the search and seizure made by the respondents under the impugned authorisation dated August 11 1958 and the authorisation itself were not in accordance with the provisions of Section 105 of the Cus- toms Act 1962 On the first point it was held by the Supreme Court that that contention was purely of academic interest in the case. It was further held that no question was involved of delegation either of any essential legisla- tive functions or any change of legislative policy. On the second point it was held that the notification issued under Section 12 of the Act after the enactment of Customs Act 1962 the previous notification under the Sea Customs Act 1878 stood superseded and no question survived with regard to the validity of the notification issued in 1963 and amended in 1965. On the third point no merit was found in the contention and it was rejected. 6. 3 In the case of The State of Madhya Pradesh v. H. V. Narasimhan AIR 1973 Supreme Court Page 1835 the Supreme Court was considering the question whether the amendment of Section 21 of the Penal Code by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958 was also applicable for purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 which by Section 2 incorporates the definition of Public Servant as contained in Section 21 of the Penal Code. It was held that the two Acts were supplemental to each other and therefore the amendment Act was ap- plicable to amend the definition of Public Servant incorporated in the Prevention of Corruption Act. In paragraph 10 the Supreme Court observed as under:. . . . It was held that the two Acts were supplemental to each other and therefore the amendment Act was ap- plicable to amend the definition of Public Servant incorporated in the Prevention of Corruption Act. In paragraph 10 the Supreme Court observed as under:. . . . that it may not be possible to hold that the Act and the Penal Code were statutes in pari materia. It would appear that the Act is a completely self-contained statute with its own provisions and has created a specific of- fence of criminal misconduct which is quite different from the offence of bribery as defined in the Penal Code. Both these statutes have different objects and create offences with separate ingredients. No authority has been cited before us in support of the provision that the Act namely the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Penal Code are statutes in pari materia so as to form one system. In paragraph 12 the Supreme Court observed -. . . . We have already indicated that the object of the Act was to eradicate corruption from various levels either in Government services or in services under the Corporation or Government companies. Then Penal Code no doubt creates offences like those mentioned in Sections 161 and 165 of the Code but they were not found sufficient to scope with the present situation and the expanding needs of the nation. In these circumstances it was considered necessary to evolve a quick expeditious and effective machinery to destroy the evil of corruption existing in any form. If therefore the Penal Code with the same object enlarged the definition of Section 21 by adding the twelfth clause by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1968 and the Anti-corruption Laws (Amend- ment) Act 1964 there is no reason why the extended meaning to the provision of Section 2 of the Act as bor- rowed from Section 21 of the Penal Code be not given to that section. In paragraphs 13 and 14 authorities have been considered. In paragraph 16 it has been observed as under:on a consideration of these authorities therefore it seems that the following proposition emerges:where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an inte- gral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. In paragraph 16 it has been observed as under:on a consideration of these authorities therefore it seems that the following proposition emerges:where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an inte- gral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle however will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other. (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act if not imported into the subsequent Act also would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act either expressly or by necessary intendment applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act. 6. 4 In the case of Baiya v. Smt. Gopikabai and Another AIR 1978 Supreme Court Page 793 the expression personal law referred to in Section 151 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code (1954) was under consideration. In paragraph 26 it is observed as under: the questions posed above turn on an interpretation of the language of Section 151. There are no words in that section or elsewhere in the Code which limit the scope of the expression personal law to that prevailing on February 5 1955 On the contrary the words on his death used in Section 151 clearly show that the legislative intent was that personal law as amended upto the date on which the devolution of the tenure holders interest is to be determined shall be the rule of decision. In paragraph 27 it is observed that broadly speaking legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories: First where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption. Second where a sta- tute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject as a genus. In the case of the former the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. In the case of the former the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. This principle of construction of a reference statute has been neatly summed up by Sutherland thusa statute which refers to the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the refe- rence statute was enacted (Vide Suther lands Statutory Construction Third Edition Article 5208 Page 5208 ). Corpus Juris Secundum also enunciates the same principle in these terms. . . . . where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject and not to any specific statute or part thereof. . . the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied with all the changes made from time to time at least as far as the changes are consis- tent with the purpose of the adopting statute. In paragraph 28 it is observed that. Construed in accordance with the above principle the expression personal law referred to in Section 151 of the Code comprehends the Hindu Succession Act 1956 which will undoubtedly govern the inheritance to the estate of Smt. Sarji who died on November 6 1956 much after the coming into force of that Act. If we can say so with due deference the view taken on this point by the Bombay High Court in Smt. Indubais Case ( AIR 1966 Bom 64 ) and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kumari Ramlalis Case (AIR 1968 Madhya Pradesh 247) and in Nahar Hirasinghs Case (AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 141) is correct. 6. 5 In the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. The Union of India and Another AIR 1979 Supreme Court Page 798 the incorporation of Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 was under consideration. 6. 5 In the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. The Union of India and Another AIR 1979 Supreme Court Page 798 the incorporation of Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 was under consideration. In that case the question was that the grounds specified in the then existing Section 100 C. P. C. were incorporated in Section 55 and the substitution of the new Section 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as in- corporated. Section 55 is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court against the orders of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was substituted by a new section in 1976 which narrowed the grounds of appeal under that section. In construing Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the Supreme Court held that Section 100 of the Code as it exis- ted in 1969 was incorporated in Section 55 and the substitution of new Section 100 in the Code abridging the grounds of appeal had no effect on the appeal under Section 55. In paragraph 9 it is observed as under: we have no doubt that Section 55 is an instance of legislation by in-corporation and not legislation by refe- rence. Section 55 provides for an appeal to this Court on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100. It is obvious that the legislature did not want to confer an unlimited right of appeal but wanted to restrict it and turning to Section 100 it found that the grounds there set out were appropriate for restricting the right of appeal and hence it incorporated them in Section 55. The right of appeal was clearly intended to be limited to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100. Those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those spe- cific and known grounds that the legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. Those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those spe- cific and known grounds that the legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. The legislature could never have intended to limit the right of appeal to any ground or grounds which might from time to time find place in Section 100 without knowing what those grounds were. The grounds specified in Section 100 might be changed from time to time having regard to the legislative policy relating to second appeals and it is difficult to see any valid reason why the legislature should have thought it necessary that these changes should also be reflected in Section 55 which deals with the right of appeal in a totally different context. . . . . We must therefore reject the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents against the main- tainability of the present appeal. 6. 6 In the case of Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority AIR 1982 SC 697 the facts were that the Special Area Development Authority for the Korba Special Area was constituted under Section 65 of the M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (23 of 1973 ). That Act was passed by M. P. Legislature. Section 69 of the said Act which prescribes the function of the Development Authority by clauses (v) and (vi) lays down that the Development Authority shall make provision for the municipal services and municipal management of the Special Area. Section 69 by clauses (c) and (d) of the said Act confers upon the Development Authority powers for the purpose of municipal administration and for the purpose of taxation. These two clauses of Section 69 and clauses (v) and (vi) of Section 68 were inserted in their present shape by Ord. Section 69 by clauses (c) and (d) of the said Act confers upon the Development Authority powers for the purpose of municipal administration and for the purpose of taxation. These two clauses of Section 69 and clauses (v) and (vi) of Section 68 were inserted in their present shape by Ord. 26 of 1975 which came into force on February 27 1976 The Ordinance was replaced by the M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam 1976 (6 of 1976 Since there was no Municipal Corporation or Municipal Council in the Korba Special Area prior to the constitution of the Development Authority the Government was required under sub-clause (b) of Section 69 to direct whether the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 or the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 shall apply to the Korba Special Area for the purposes of clauses (v) and (vi) of Section 68 and clauses (c) and (d) of Section 69. Such a direction was first issued by Notification dated January 28 1976 by which the Development Authority Korba was directed to exercise the powers and perform the functions of a Class I Municipality constituted under the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 This Notification became effective from 27-2-1976 from which date Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 was made effective. By another Notification dated 15-3-1977 the Development Authority Korba was directed under the aforesaid clauses of Sections 68 and 69 to exercise the powers and perform the functions under the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 By a Notice issued under Section 65 of the Act of 1973 and by another Notice issued under Section 164 (3) of the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 the Chief Executive Officer of respon- dent No. 1 - the Special Area Development Authority called upon the Company to pay property tax for the year 1976-77. Thereafter the Company was further called upon to pay property tax for the year 1977-78. The Com- pany disputed its liability to pay the aforesaid tax on the ground principally that no tax was leviable on its property since the Company was owned wholly by the Government of India and that respondent No. 1 was estopped from levying the property tax by reason of the agreement of 1976. Having failed to persuade the respondent No. 1 - Special Area Development Authority the Company filed a Writ Petition in M. P. High Court which was dismissed. Having failed to persuade the respondent No. 1 - Special Area Development Authority the Company filed a Writ Petition in M. P. High Court which was dismissed. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court of India. The first contention of the learned Attorney General was that respondent No. 1 could exercise only such powers to levy property tax as the Municipal Corporation or the Munici- pal Council had under the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 or the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 as these Acts stood on February 27 1976 when clause (d) was inserted in its present form in Section 69 of the Act of 1973. It was argued that the provisions conferring powers of taxation under the aforesaid two Acts must be taken to have been incorporated in Section 69 (d) of the Act of 1973 and any subsequent change in those provisions by amendment of the two Acts could not be availed of by respondent No. 1. The answer to this contention will depend mainly upon whether the provisions of the Municipalities Act and the Municipal Corporation Act were incorporat- ed into the Act of 1973 by its Section 69 (d ). The Supreme Court in that context in paragraphs 16 and 17 ob- served as under: applying these principles we are of the opinion that in the instant case subsequent amendments made to the Municipal Corporation Act and the Municipalities Act will also apply to the power of taxation provided for in Section 69 (d) of the Act of 1977. The Act of 1973 did not by Section 69 (d) incorporate in its true significa- tion any particular provision of the two earlier Acts. It provides that for the purpose of taxation the Special Area Development Authority shall have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has under the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 or the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 The case therefore is not one of incorporation but of mere reference to the powers conferred by the earlier Acts. As observed in Nathella Sampathy Chetty ( AIR 1962 SC 316 ) there is a distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making them part of another so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the later wholly untouched. Section 69 (d) of the Act of 1973 must accordingly be read to mean that respondent 1 shall have all the powers of taxation which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has for the time being that is to say at the time when respondent No. 1 seeks to exercise those powers. In paragraph 17 it is observed that the Act of 1973 does not provide for any independent power of taxation or any machinery of its own for exer- cising the power of taxation. It rests content by pointing its finger to the provisions contained in the two Munici- pal Acts. The three Acts are therefore supplemental from which it must follow that amendments made to the earlier Acts after the enactment of Section 69 (d) shall have to be read into that section. Without recourse to such a construction the power of taxation conferred by that section will become ineffectual. A reading of the reference to the two earlier Municipal Acts as a reference to those Acts as they stand at the time when the power of taxa- tion is sought to be exercised by respondent No. 1 will not possibly cause repugnancy between the two earlier Acts on one hand and the Act of 1973 on the other nor indeed will it cause any confusion in the practical appli- cation of the earlier Acts because the Act of 1973 does not contain any independent provision or machinery for exercising the power of taxation. The first contention of the Attorney General must therefore fail. The first contention of the Attorney General must therefore fail. The Supreme Court held that Section 69 (d) of the Madhya Pradesh Gram Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhi- niyam 1973 enacted that the Special Area Development Authority shall for the purpose of taxation have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or Council has as the case may be under the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 or the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 This was held to be not a case of incorporation but of mere reference and hence additional power of taxation conferred on the Municipal Corporations or Municipalities by amending the Cor- poration Act and the Municipalities Act became available to the Special Development Authority. ( 7 ) KEEPING in background for the moment the above-mentioned aspect of a statute or provisions of it - whe- ther it is incorporated into another Act or whether it is by way of mere reference or citation - we may now consider another aspect of the matter. The law is well settled that when the Constitution has entrusted the task of law-making to a legislature the duty of law-making must be performed by the legislature itself and the legislature cannot abdicate or efface itself. The legislature alone must perform the essential legislative function and the es- sential power of legislation cannot be renounced by it in favour of any other body. It may here be noted that under Article 196 before any enactment is made a Bill has to be originated in either House of the Legislature of a State which has a Legislative Council. Thereafter Bill is considered and discussed. After the Bill is passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State it is to be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he with holds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. After it is assented it becomes an Act. This procedure can-not be abdicated in favour of the Parliament or another legislative body or other authority. It is sufficient to attract the constitutional inhibition if there is surrender by the legislature of essential legislative authority even in respect of a particular subject-matter of legislation in favour of another person or authority which is not empowered by the Constitution to exercise this function. It is sufficient to attract the constitutional inhibition if there is surrender by the legislature of essential legislative authority even in respect of a particular subject-matter of legislation in favour of another person or authority which is not empowered by the Constitution to exercise this function. A legislature cannot be permitted to shift the onus of legislation. The reason is that this high prerogative of legislation has been entrusted to the wisdom judgment and patriotism of the legislature and not to those of other persons and the legislature will act ultra vires if it undertakes to renounce the trust in favour of another body in- stead of executing it. The legislature cannot shirk its duty by making a law that it shall not operate on its allotted field but somebody else will operate on its behalf. It is possible that a legislature refuses to perform its legislative function entrusted to it. However mere refusal may not amount to abdication in a given case but when it not only adopts such an act but also provides that the Act applicable to its territory shall be the Act amended in future by the other legislature from time to time there is nothing for it to predicate what the amended Act would be. Such a case would be clearly one of non-application of mind and one of refusal to discharge the function entrusted to it. It will be a case of abdication or effacement in favour of another legislature at least in regard to that particular matter. If it would be impermissible for a State Legislature to abdicate its functions and adopt without applying its mind any future parliamentary legislation then we should construe the present section in such a way as to render that provision constitutional. There-fore we have to examine the question as to what the State Legislature means when it refers to a parliamentary law in its enactment. Of course the State Legislature must have applied its mind to parliamentary legislation as it stood on the date when the State legislature adopted it. But at that time what form the parliamentary legislation may take in future it cannot know. If it simply adopts whatever law is made by the parliament from time to time without applying its mind it will amount to abdication of its function. But at that time what form the parliamentary legislation may take in future it cannot know. If it simply adopts whatever law is made by the parliament from time to time without applying its mind it will amount to abdication of its function. The legisla- ture can necessarily delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers of legislation to delegate of its choice for carrying out the policy laid down in the enactment and leave such delegates to work out the details within the frame-work of the policy to suit the varying aspects and needs of a complex situation. This would be all the more necessary in modern times when the legislature is called upon to enact laws to meet the challenge of complex socio-economic pro- blems. Therefore the legislature may within the policy laid down confer or delegate powers to adopt such policy or frame rules so as to implement the policy. Such delegation can be given. But if there is excessive delegation it may amount to abdication or self-effacement. In several authorities a distinction between abdication and delegation of powers or what excessive delegation of legislative power may amount to abdication of its essential legislative function by the legislature has been considered but there is a vital and fundamental distinction between the two concepts which must be noticed and constantly kept in mind. ( 8 ) THEREFORE now let us consider what is the position in the present case. In the instant case Section 29 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act as it originally stood prior to its amendment in 1953 provides that an appeal shall lie in the cases mentioned therein. At that relevant time there was no restriction and all decrees or orders passed under the Rent Act were made appealable. Thereafter by amendment in 1953 the proviso was added and restriction was imposed to sub-section (1) to Section 29 of the Act to the effect that there shall not be any appeal from a decree or order made in any statute or proceedings in respect of which no appeal lies under the Civil Procedure Code 1908 Therefore for the first time a restriction was brought in by way of the said proviso (I ). At that rele- vant time the definition of decree as provided in Code of Civil Procedure 1908 read as under:decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it con- clusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 47 or Section 144 but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or (b) any order of dismissal for fault. Therefore at that relevant time per the definition of decree or order as provided in Code of Civil Procedure an appeal was competent from any order under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the incorporation of the relevant provisions of Code of Civil Procedure was to that effect. What that incorporation of the provi- sions of Code of Civil Procedure into proviso (I) of Section 29 (1) of the Act could be was to be ascertained and for that purpose we called upon the learned Advocate for the petitioner to put it in writing as to how and what the incorporation in the proviso at that relevant time should be. The learned Advocate had submitted in writing as under: provided that no such appeal shall lie from- (i) A decree passed by the Court with consent of parties. (ii) where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from such decree he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. (iii) no appeal shall lie from the order other than the following orders: (a) an order under Section 35-A of the Code; Provided that no appeal shall lie save on the ground that no order nor an order for the payment of a less amount ought to have been made; (b) an order under Section 95 of the Code. (iii) no appeal shall lie from the order other than the following orders: (a) an order under Section 35-A of the Code; Provided that no appeal shall lie save on the ground that no order nor an order for the payment of a less amount ought to have been made; (b) an order under Section 95 of the Code. (c) an order under any of the provisions of the Code imposing a fine directing the arrest or detention in the Civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (d) any order made under rules in the first schedule of the Code from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Order XLIII Rule 1. (iv) (a) Save as otherwise expressly provided no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction but where a decree is appealed from any error defect or irregularity in any order affecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal; (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (a) where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its cor- rectness. Now by the Amendment Act of 1976 in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure definition of decree was modified and that amendment would bring an additional restriction in the proviso of non-appealability provi- ded in proviso (I) to Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act. By the amendment of 1976 of the Code of Civil Procedure the definition of decree reads as under:decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it conclu- sively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144 but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. ( 9 ) NOW in 1953 when the proviso (I) was introduced to Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act appeal was competent against the determination of any question made under Section 47 and it was appealable as if it were a decree and the orders passed under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code in Execution proceedings were appealable. But after the amendment in 1976 reference to Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is omitted by the Amendment Act 1976 The question in the present case is therefore whether the mention of Code of Civil Procedure was by way of a reference or citation or incorporation. It is submitted that this would be legislation by incorporation. ( 10 ) AT this juncture we may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry AIR 1967 SC 1480 . In that case the question which arose for determination was whether the Pondi- cherry General Sales Tax Act (10 of 1965) was a valid piece of legislation. The legislative assembly of Pondicherry passed this Act in exercise of the legislative power conferred upon it under the Union Territories Act (20 of 1963) and it became law on receiving the assent of the President on 25 May 1965 Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Pondicherry Act provided that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint and pursuant to this provision the Pondicherry Government issued a notification dated March 1 1966 bringing the said Act into force 1st April 1966. Section 2 (1) of the Pondicherry Act provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1959 as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of the Pondicherry Act shall extend to and be in force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry subject to certain modifica- tions and adoptions and Section 2 subsection (2) of the Pondicherry Act enacted that the Madras General Sales Tax Rules 1959 or any other rules made or issued under the Madras Act and in force in the State of Madras imme- diately before the coming into force of the Pondicherry Act shall apply to the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Now in the meantime the Madras legislature had amended the Madras Act and consequently it was the Madras Act as amended upto 1st April 1966 The Pondicherry Act came into force on 25th May 1966 It was therefore contended on behalf of the petitioners before the Supreme Court that the Pondicherry Legislature had wholly abdicated its legislative function and effaced itself by adopting whatever might be the general sales tax law of the Madras State in force at a future date when the Pondicherry Act came into force and the Pondicherry Act was therefore null and void. This contention found favour with the majority of Judges of the Supreme Court and the majority Judges speaking through J. M. Shelat J. gave the following reasons for accepting this contention:the question then is whether in extending the Madras Act in the manner and to the extent it did under Sec- tion 2 (1) of the Principal Act the Pondicherry Legislature abdicated its legislative power in favour of the Mad- ras Legislature. It is manifest that the Assembly refused to perform its legislative function entrusted under the Act constituting it. It may be that a mere refusal may not amount to abdication if the legislature instead of going through the full formality of legislation applies its mind to an existing statute enacted by another legislature for another ju- risdiction adopts such an Act and enacts to extend it to the territory under its jurisdiction. In doing so it may perhaps be said that it has laid down a policy to extend such an Act and directs the executive to apply and im- plement such an Act. In doing so it may perhaps be said that it has laid down a policy to extend such an Act and directs the executive to apply and im- plement such an Act. But when it not only adopts such an Act but also provides that the Act applicable to its teri- tory shall be the Act amended in future by the other Legislature there is nothing for it to predicate what the amen- ded Act would be. Such a case would be clearly one of non-application of mind and one of refusal to discharge the function entrusted to it by the instrument constituting it. It is difficult to see how such a case is not one of abdication or effacement in favour of another legislature at least in regard to that particular matter. IN our view this decision is directly applicable to the facts of the present case and reliance can be placed on it for the purpose of solving the controversy in the present case. Relying on this case in the present case if we read that proviso (I) to Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act to mean as amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure from time to time by the Parliament it would be a clear case of abdication or effacement of its legislative function. There relevant proviso to Section 29 (1) of the said the Legislature even till to-day has not been amended. Till the State legis- lature i. e. Legislative Assembly of Gujarat does not make the necessary amendment in the Rent Act and if it allows the amended provisions of Code of Civil Procedure to be read into proviso (I) to Section 29 (1) without considering it by shirking its duty it would amount to its non-application of mind and abdication of its function because the State legislature of Gujarat has nowhere considered the amendment of 1976 of the Code of Civil Procedure without performing its essential legislative functions. In the present case what is to be done is that one has to read the proviso (I) to Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act to mean or it stood on the date of amendment in 1953 by way of incorporation and it should not be read as providing inclusion of the future amendments which may be made by the Parliament in the Code of Civil Procedure from time to time. In fact in order to give full effect and to make the said proviso meaningful the said proviso (I) to Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act will have to be read in this manner only. No cannon of construction permits the Court to read the Section in such a manner ai to render it to some extent otiose. If this interpretation is not put to this proviso it will have to be held void and not of any effect in view of the Supreme Court judgment in B. Sharma Raos case (supra ). Therefore the present case would be legislation by incorporation. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate for the respondent has cited a case of Rallis India Ltd. v. R. B. Joshi Sales Lax Officer City Division II reported in XXXI Sales Tax Cases page 261. In the afore-said case the question was relating to the constitutional validity of Sales Tax Act 1956 and in that petition the orders of assessment reassessment collection and enforcement of payment of tax or penalty under the Central Act were challenged. The main question before the Court was for consideration as to whether the Parliament has abdicated its legislative function in favour of another legislature in enacting Sections 6 8 and 9. There the Court held that Section 6 cannot be affected by the vice of abdication. So far as section 8 is concerned the Court held that it is difficult to appreciate how in the circumstances the Parliament could be said to have abdicated or effaced itself in enacting the provisions of the Central Act. In Section 9 machinery for assessment reassessment penalty etc. under the Central Act is provided. At the end the Court came to the conclusion that it is not necessary to consider and decide the question whether Section 9 (2) suffers from the vice of abdication of legislative power in so far as it has adopted the future as well as existing provisions of the general sales tax law of the appropriate State regarding levy of penalty imposition of tax liability on tansferee of or successor to a business and recovery of tax from third parties. In the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of Podicherry A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1480 and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that that decision has no application to the facts of the case and no reliance can be placed on behalf of the petitioner. Ultimately the Supreme Court came to the con- clusion that in the facts of the case all contentions urged before it were rejected and the petition was dismissed. In our opinion the facts of the aforesaid case are different and therefore this decision has no application to the facts of the present case and no reliance can be placed on behalf of the respondent. On the contrary in our view the case of B. Shama Rao (supra) is applicable to the instant case and we have placed reliance on it to come to the conclusion that if we read the reference of Code of Civil Procedure in proviso (I) of Section 29 (1) of the Rent Act as amended from time to time by the Parliament it would be a clear case of abdication or effacement of the legislative function. Under the cir- cumstance we answer the question referred to us as under: ( 12 ) THE Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mentioned in the Rent Act and the Rules made thereunder would be that Code as it stood in 1953 when it came to be incorporated in the Rent Act and not as amended in 1976. An appeal would therefore lie against the determination of any question under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Proce- dure in execution proceedings under the Bombay Rent Act and the Rules made thereunder on the principle of incor- poration. We accordingly answer the question referred to us. Parties to bear their own costs. This Revision Application will now go back to the Division Bench of this Court for hearing and final disposal in the light of the answer given by us. Reference answered accordingly. .