A. S. QURESHI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein has challenged the judgment and order dated 12th September, 1977 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal rejecting the revision application of the petitioner and confirming the judgment and order dated 5th April, 1976 passed by the Deputy Collector, Bulsar in Tenancy Appeal No. 32/76. ( 2 ) THE petitioner herein claims to be an agriculturist at a village called Nani Daman, outside the State of Gujarat. He purchased by a registered sale deed dated 2nd February, 1972 certain agricultural lands situated at village Baria in Pardi Taluka of Bulsar District. The same was certified on 28th October, 1973. However, the Mamlatdar, Pardi suo motu raised an inquiry under Section 84 (c) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (herein after referred to as the Act) as to whether the said sale was legally valid. The Mamlatdar held that the purchase was illegal and directed the petitioner to hand over the possession of the said land to the original vendor one Dahyabhai Jivabhai Patel. The petitioner filed Tenancy Appeal No. 32/76 before the Deputy Collector, Bulsar who confirmed the said order of the Mamlatdar. The petitioner further went to Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which upheld the decision of the Revenue authorities. ( 3 ) MR. S. N. Shelat, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the petitioner is entitled to purchase the suit land and that there is no bar under the provisions of the Tenancy Authorities have clearly misinterpreted the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Mr. Shelat has urged that the petitioner is an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Tenancy Act because, according to him, the petitioner cultivates the land personally though the land is situated outside the territorial limits of the State of Gujarat. Mr. Shelat has further urged that there is no bar of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act applicable to him because he is personally cultivating his land at Nani Daman and, therefore, he is covered by sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Tenancy Act. This contention of Mr. Mr. Shelat has further urged that there is no bar of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act applicable to him because he is personally cultivating his land at Nani Daman and, therefore, he is covered by sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Tenancy Act. This contention of Mr. Shelat is not tenable because it has been held by this Court in Devji Maghji Gangar and Others v. Lalmiya Mosammiya and Another, 18 GLR 515 that a person must come within the definition of agriculturist under the Tenancy Act before he can purchase the agricultural land within the State of Gujarat. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has gone into considerable details and having considered the earlier case of Tukaram Savalram v. Narayan Balkrishna, 54 Bom. L. R. 88 that in a benevolent legislation like the Tenancy Act the word land will have to be given a restricted meaning and hence it would mean and include the land which is situated within the territorial limits of the State. The policy behind such a restriction may be to see that the land remains within the cultivation of the persons who have been proximate to it rather than allow the same to be transferred to the strangers. So far as the law in question is concerned it is not open to this court to go behind the reasons or inquire into the policy of the legislature in enacting it so long as the legislation concerned is within the bounds of its legislative competence. In this case the word agriculturist is defined in the Tenancy Act and, therefore, any person who wishes to purchase agricultural land in the State of Gujarat has to come within the definition of "agriculturist" laid down in the Tenancy Act. If the purchaser does not come within the definition of agriculturist under the Tenancy Act, the bar of Section 63 will operate against this irrespective of the fact that he may be an agriculturist within the definition of the Legislation of some other State. ( 4 ) MR. If the purchaser does not come within the definition of agriculturist under the Tenancy Act, the bar of Section 63 will operate against this irrespective of the fact that he may be an agriculturist within the definition of the Legislation of some other State. ( 4 ) MR. Shelat has further argued that the result of the above interpretation of the provisions of the Tenancy Act would result into a situation where a citizen of India belonging to any other State would not be able to acquire agricultural land within the State of Gujarat which according to him, would create a difficult situation which can be avoided by putting a different interpretation on the provisions of the Tenancy Act. While Mr. Shelat is right that the result of the interpretation which this Court has put on the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act in the above-mentioned case and which is followed in the present case, would undoubtedly result into a situation that a citizen of India from outside Gujarat State will not be able to acquire agricultural land within the State of Gujarat, but such situation cannot be helped. It is within its own territory as it thinks fit. So far as this Court is concerned, we have to consider the provisions of the Tenancy Act as they stand. Putting any other interpretation on the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act would result into a situation where this Court may have to go into the Legislative provisions of the Tenancy Laws of other States. Moreover, it may also create other conflicts of law. Hence the interpretation put by this Court in the aforesaid judgment reported in 18 GLR 515 is respectfully followed in this case and it is held that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal had rightly decided that the present petitioner is not entitled to purchase the suit land and the same being void he must hand over the possession of the same to the original vendor. ( 5 ) AT this stage Mr. Shelat urges that he would like to carry this matter further and, therefore, the operation of this judgment and order of this Court be stayed for a period of eight weeks from today. Miss Valikarimwala on behalf of respondent No. 2 has urged that a stay for six weeks may be sufficient. ( 5 ) AT this stage Mr. Shelat urges that he would like to carry this matter further and, therefore, the operation of this judgment and order of this Court be stayed for a period of eight weeks from today. Miss Valikarimwala on behalf of respondent No. 2 has urged that a stay for six weeks may be sufficient. In the circumstance of the case, the operation of this order is stayed for a period of eight weeks from today. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Rule discharged. .