JUDGMENT : B.N. Misra, J. - Though in this revision notice of admission and hearing bad been issued, with consent of counsel for both sides the matter was heard. 2. Amit. 3. This revision is directed against the order dated 7-11-1983 passed by the learned District Judge, Puri in Misc. Appeal No. 87 of 1983 restraining the petitioners from entering upon the suit-properties and causing disturbance in the possession of the opposite parties and in addition restraining the former from cutting the standing trees and damaging the boundaries of the suit-properties till the disposal of the suit by the trial court. By this order the learned District Judge set aside the order dated 30-7-1983 of the learned Munsif, Puri in Misc. Case No. 100 of 1983 wherein the injunction petition filed by the opposite parties against the petitioners had been dismissed. 4. The facts may be briefly noted. The opposite parties are the plaintiffs and the petitioners are the defendants in O. S. No. 273/82-1 pending in the file of the learned Munsif, Puri. The suit is one for permanent injunction. In the suit the opposite parties had filed a petition under Order 39, Rule 1, C. P. C. which was registered by the trial court as Misc. Case No. 263 of 1982. The opposite parties had prayed that the petitioners should be restrained from entering upon the suit land and interfering with their peaceful possession, cutting the trees and damaging the boundaries of the suit-lands till the final disposal of the suit. The petitioners had filed a rejoinder opposing the prayer for injunction. The learned Munsif who heard the matter restrained the petitioners from cutting and removing the trees standing on the suit-lands and damaging the boundaries thereof, but did not restrain the petitioners from entering upon the said lands. Thereafter, the petitioners filed Misc. Appeal No. 117 of 1982, but the opposite parties did not prefer any appeal against the aforesaid order of the learned Munsif. Vide his order dated 21-3-1983, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal with the following clarification:- "Accordingly it is hereby clarified that by the temporary injunction issued by the learned Munsif, Puri the defendants have not been restrained from going upon the suit-land and therefore, it follows that there is no impediment for them to raise crops and appropriate the usufructs. They have been restrained only from causing any damage, destruction or loss to the suit-property. With this clarification sought, for, the appeal is dismissed." Neither the petitioners nor the opposite parties challenged the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge which was allowed to stand as final. 5. Thereafter, the opposite parties filed a second petition under Order 39, Rule 1, C. P. C. with a prayer to restrain the petitioners from entering upon or interfering with their possession over the suit-lands. This petition was registered as Misc. Case No. 100 of 1983. The petitioners filed their objection. By order dated 30-7-1983, the learned Munsif dismissed the injunction petition on finding that there was no fresh cause of action and that the previous injunction application filed by the opposite parties on the same grounds had been duly considered and decided. The opposite parties challenged the aforesaid order of the learned Munsif in Misc. Appeal No. 87 of 1983. By his order dated 7-11-1983, the learned District Judge allowed the appeal and restrained the petitioners from entering upon the suit-lands or creating any disturbance in the possession of the opposite parties and further restrained the petitioners from cutting the standing trees or damaging the boundaries of the suit-lands. It is this order of the learned District Judge which is challenged in this revision. 6. Mr. A.K. Mahapatra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has urged that the learned District Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in passing the impugned order in as much as on the same facts his predecessor-in-office in Misc. Appeal No. 117 of 1982 had duly considered and rejected the same prayer. In support of this contention reliance is placed on a decision reported in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others AIR 1964 S.C 993 , wherein it was held : "It is needless to point out that interlocutory orders are of various kinds ; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which the orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of the court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now referred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to maintaining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocutory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation. The case of an application under O. IX, R. 7 would be an illustration of this type. If an application made under the provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can be no doubt that the property of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earlier stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate court. In that sense, the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to "set the clock back" does not attain finality. But what we are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same court is finally bound by that order at later stages, so as to preclude its being reconsidered. In that sense, the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to "set the clock back" does not attain finality. But what we are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same court is finally bound by that order at later stages, so as to preclude its being reconsidered. Even if the rule of res judicata does not apply, it would not follow that on every subsequent day on which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated and fresh orders sought on the basis of indentical facts. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. Thus if an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subsequent application for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred on the application of any rule of res judicata, but would be rejected for the same grounds on which the original application was refused. The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principle of res judicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issues, whereas in the other case, on proof of fresh facts, the court would be competent, may would be bound to take those into account and make an order coformably to the facts freshly brought before the court." On the basis of the principles discussed above, it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that in the absence of any new or fresh facts the impugned order should not have been passed against the petitioners by the learned District Judge. On behalf of the opposite parties it is urged that the impugned order does not call for interference as it is justified in the facts of this case. 7. On behalf of the opposite parties it is urged that the impugned order does not call for interference as it is justified in the facts of this case. 7. In this context it would be useful to refer to the provisions contained in Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C. which provides :- "Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order: Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interest of justice : Provided further that where an order for injunction has been passed after giving to a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or setting aside has been necessitated by a charge in the circumstances, or unless the court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party." Thus, according to the second Proviso, an order of injunction shall not be discharged, varied or set aside except where such a course is necessitated by change in the circumstances or unless the court is satisfied that the order had caused undue hardship to that party. Upon hearing counsel and, going through the records, I find that the opposite parties have not proved any change in the circumstances nor have they established undue hardship. On the very same facts it was not open to the learned District Judge to vary and change the order passed by his predecessor-in-office. 8. In the result, the revision is allowed. The impugned order of the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the learned Munsif restored. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed