Judgment The petitioner is an employee in the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. By proceedings dated 24th December, 1974, the Chief Accountant, Revenue Operation Circle, Cuddapah was appointed as enquiry officer to hold an enquiry into the allegation against the petitioner that he was selling lottery tickets To the consumers with a view to raise the funds to the Employees Union without any written permission from the management The said officer conducted an enquiry and submitted his report. Thereafter, the Superintending Engineer, Operation, Cuddapah passed an order letting him off with a warning stating that if he indulges in such actions thereafter serious and suitable disciplinary action would be taken against him. That order has become final. Subsequently proceedings were initiated afresh on 17tb November, 1975, by the self-same officer appointing another enquiry officer in respect of the same charge of misconduct. The enquiry officer conducted an enquiry and submitted his report dated 27th July, 1976. Thereafter the disciplinary authority passed as order afresh by proceedings dated 21s.t August, 1976, imposing a penalty of censure. 2. The Chief Engineer, Electricity (General), reviewed the order of the Superintending Engineer dated 21st August, 1976, in his proceedings dated 15th July, 1977, in purported exercise of power under Regulation 7(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board Employees Discipline and Appeal Regulations (in short, “the Discipline and Appeal Regulations”) and held that the view taken by the Superintending Engineer is lenient and is not commensurate with the gravity of the charge hold proved against the petitioner. Accordingly he set aside the order of the Superintending Engineer. He issued a show cause notice to the petitioner giving him fifteen days time from the date of receipt thereof, to show cause why a punishment of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect should not be imposed on him. The petitioner submitted his explanation. Subsequently it was considered and the provisional conclusion was confirmed and one increment was stopped with cumulative effect. Against this order of the Chief Engineer, the petitioner presented a revision to the Board and the Board by proceedings dated 4th January, 1979, dismissed the revision. Challenging these proceedings, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. Subsequently it was considered and the provisional conclusion was confirmed and one increment was stopped with cumulative effect. Against this order of the Chief Engineer, the petitioner presented a revision to the Board and the Board by proceedings dated 4th January, 1979, dismissed the revision. Challenging these proceedings, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. In this writ petition, on behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that under the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, the Board is competent to conduct disciplinary enquiry for misconduct; but once proceedings have taken and concluded and were allowed to become final, it is not open to the disciplinary authority of a higher authority to reopen the enquiry Right of appeal has been provided and a right of review has also been given. A right of reconsideration of the orders also has been provided. But the question is whether the disciplinary authority has got jurisdiction to re-open an enquiry when it was concluded and was allowed to become final. In State of Assam and another v. J.N Roy Biswas State of Assam and another v. J.N Roy Biswas (1970) 2 S.C.R. 128: (1976) 1 S.C.C. 234 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2277, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, speaking through Krishna Ayyar, J. have held that no rule of double jeopardy bars initiation of fresh enquiry. But absence of power under rule inhibits a second enquiry by the disciplinary authority after the delinquent had once been absolved. It is also held: “No government servant can urge that if for some technical or other good ground, procedural or other, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law that a second enquiry cannot be launched. It can be; once a disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated, presumably on full exoneration, a changined government cannot re-start the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise, vested by rules in some authority. The basics of the rule of law cannot approached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the enquiry”. It is contended in the counter-affidavit that in the first enquiry only two persons were examined and others were not examined and therefore, the enquiry was re-opened. Obviously, the enquiry conducted in the first instance was not according to law. I am unable to subscribe to this view taken by the respondents. It is contended in the counter-affidavit that in the first enquiry only two persons were examined and others were not examined and therefore, the enquiry was re-opened. Obviously, the enquiry conducted in the first instance was not according to law. I am unable to subscribe to this view taken by the respondents. Once an enquiry has been held as per rules and has been concluded and when it is allowed to become final, unless there is a power to re-open that enquiry it is not open to the authorities to re-open the enquiry upon the same set of facts and for the same reasons. No doubt regulation 7(c) empowers the disciplinary authority or a higher authority to set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority and to review the order and to pass the orders by itself after following the procedure prescribed thereunder or if they want to impose a higher penalty, they can do so after giving an adequate opportunity of representation and hearing as per rules. But this is not the case here. The order passed after conducting the first enquiry was allowed to become final. Thereafter a second enquiry was initiated. The ostensible reason given in the counter is only a protext to re-start the enquiry de novo. That ground is not enough. If an enquiry is conducted and a punishment is inflicted, the employee, who suffers the punishment, may take it that the enquiry is concluded and it may not be re opened unless the power conferred under regulation 7 is exercised within a reasonable time by the competent authorities. But once the order was allowed to become final, unless there is an express power conferred under the regulations, it is not open to the authorities to initiate de novo enquiry upon the same facts to impose a higher penalty. Accordingly I hold that the action taken by the respondents is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. 4. The impugned orders are accordingly quashed and the writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs.250. Writ petition allowed.