Judgment :- 1. The defendant in a suit for maintenance is the appellant in the second appeal. There were three plaintiffs in the suit, 1st plaintiff being the wife, and the others the children, of the defendant. 2. The Munsiff found that the minor children were entitled to maintenance, and fixed it respectively at Rs. 50 and Rs. 25 per month. Maintenance, was however declined to the 1st plaintiff on the ground that she had not established that the husband had treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that the life with the defendant would be injurious to her. The wife's evidence in the case consisted of the testimony of six witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiff and eight documents, in addition to Exts. XI and XI(a) the certified copies of the extract of the general diary kept in the Quilon East Police Station, The incidents in the house on 18-11-1978 were such that the Police Control Room had to be alerted and the defendant had to be taken to custody by the Police. PW.2 spoke about the information received by the Police Control Room, of the husband being in the Police station to be released only next morning, after a warning. Ext. Al diary indicated a complaint about the defendant attempting to cause injuries to the 1st plaintiff. The information to the Police had been given by P.W. 5, a neighbour of the 1st plaintiff's house, and owner of a rice mill. Another neighbour who knew P.W.1 for a long time, P.W.6, gave evidence about the defendant's dissatisfaction in not having the dowry in the full measure be expected. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was a drunkard. 3. The trial court, made a critical comment about the omission to state specifically in the reply notice Ext.A8 that the defendant was a drunkard. According to it, Ext.A8 only referred to quarrels on one day and an attempt on the part of the defendant to cause injuries on the 1st plaintiff. The plaintiff had not examined any witnesses to show that the defendant was a drunkard. According to the Court, the evidence and circumstances did not justify the 1st plaintiff to entertain an apprehension about a possible harm to her life in living with her husband. 4. In appeal, the above finding was reversed. The plaintiff had not examined any witnesses to show that the defendant was a drunkard. According to the Court, the evidence and circumstances did not justify the 1st plaintiff to entertain an apprehension about a possible harm to her life in living with her husband. 4. In appeal, the above finding was reversed. The Appellate Court correctly noted the averments in the plaint about the plaintiff having been subjected to physical assault even while the couple were living together. The incidents of 18-11-1978 had to be appreciated in that background. The plaintiff has given evidence as P.W. 4. The regular battering which she suffered had been spoken to by her. A nocturnal assault was an almost regular and routine activity on the part of the husband, according to the wife. The Appellate Court observed and according to me correctly: "It is to be noted that she is the person to speak about the assaults she had received from her husband". That general statement, however, was without a caveat. The court continued: "But her version need not necessarily be accepted simply because she has said to. Her version must be corroborated in material particulars " The Appellate Court noted that the 1st plaintiff's father, who could have given useful evidence, had passed away on 21-6-1979. The evidence by the Head Constable of the Police Station who proved Exts. XI and XI (a) according to that court could not be ignored lightly. The detention of the defendant in the police station during the entire night, and his having been released only after his giving an undertaking of good behaviour, also established an unjustified conduct on the part of the husband, on 18-11-1978. The 1st plaintiff was pregnant at the time when she had been subjected to the cruel attack by the 1st defendant. These materials did furnish corroboration for believing the plaintiff, when she gave evidence as P. W. 4. In the above circumstances, the court below came to the conclusion that she was entitled maintenance, even while living separately. The quantum of maintenance was fixed at Rs. 75 per month. In so doing, the lower appellate court adverted to the fact of the defendant, was employed as a Village Officer and was possessed of immovable properties yielding income. 5. In the above circumstances, the court below came to the conclusion that she was entitled maintenance, even while living separately. The quantum of maintenance was fixed at Rs. 75 per month. In so doing, the lower appellate court adverted to the fact of the defendant, was employed as a Village Officer and was possessed of immovable properties yielding income. 5. Whether the conclusion of the lower appellate court is vitiated by any substantial error of law is the question which arises for consideration in the second appeal. 6. S.18(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was stressed to urge that a wife cannot claim maintenance and at the same time live separately unless the rigorous conditions contained therein are satisfied. Clause (b) was particularly referred to in that connection. The relevant provision which has to be considered in that context would read: "(2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance (b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harm full or injurious to live with her 11 husband 7. A right to have a decree for separate living with maintenance had been recognised even in early times, (see Matangini Dasi v. Jogandra Chunder Mullick, ILR (1892) 19 Cal 84, where maintenance was awarded to a Hindu widow to live separately when the evidence disclosed insecurity to personal safety due to the cruelty of the husband). The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 made statutory provisions in that behalf. Under that enactment, a Hindu wife was entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if the husband is guilty of such cruelty towards her as renders her unsafe on undesirable for her to live with him. The difference in the language of the provisions is to be noticed. Under the provisions of the present enactment, in order to claim maintenance while living separately, it will be sufficient if the wife entertains a reasonable apprehension in her mind about it being harmful or injurious to live with her husband. The provision is more liberal and more considerate to the wife. Under the provisions of the present enactment, in order to claim maintenance while living separately, it will be sufficient if the wife entertains a reasonable apprehension in her mind about it being harmful or injurious to live with her husband. The provision is more liberal and more considerate to the wife. Ordinary quarrels and strictness on the part of the husband would not amount to cruelty (See decision in Satyanarayanamurthi v. Jungamma, AIR 1952 AP 439). Situations where the conduct of the husband had been considered as amounting to cruelty are indicated in the decision reported in Kamala Bai v. L.R. Rathnavelu, AIR 1965 Madras 86 and Shyamsunder v. Shantamani Debi AIR 1962 Orissa 50. 8. When the evidence is assessed with reference to the above statutory provisions, a larger background behind the statute should also be borne in mind. Backwardness of the women in general, and social backwardness of the Indian women in particular, are to be duly reckoned with. One of the latest available studies, depicts the position of women the world over in the following words: "While women represent 50 percent of the world adult population and a third of official labour force, they perform nearly two-thirds of all working hours, receive a tenth of world income and own less than one percent of world property" (See An Analysis of the Situation of Children in India, UNICEF 1984 at page 79) That this would be true more or less to India too, is the view expressed by UNICEF in the above said publication. This only shows that the social disabilities of women continue even three decades after the ushering in of a Constitution which specifically provided for special provisions for protection of women. Andre Beteille observed in the article 'The Position of Women in Indian Society': "In practically all societies, whether patrilineal or matrilineal, women have, in fact, a lower status than men." (See Indian Women edited by Devaki Jain an page 64) No doubt, the women of Kerala have advanced considerably in very many walks of life. (A reflection of that awakening among women is perhaps seen in the striking statistics in relation to voter participation. While the percentage as regards women voter participation was 74.24 per cent in Kerala in the 1957 elections, it was only 13.21per cent in Orissa in the 1962 elections). (A reflection of that awakening among women is perhaps seen in the striking statistics in relation to voter participation. While the percentage as regards women voter participation was 74.24 per cent in Kerala in the 1957 elections, it was only 13.21per cent in Orissa in the 1962 elections). It is true that many women with considerable intellectual equipment and endowed with sophistication and refinement occupy key posts in many sectors. That, however, has not altered the 'society's structure and the status of women substantially. There is considerable force in the observations of Andra Beteille: "It is easy to be beguiled by lists of eminent women in the different walks of public life, but the basic, social and economic conditions under which woman live in the countryside have altered very little." (See page 69 of 'Indian Women' supra) 9. Awareness of the socially backward position of the women is therefore helpful in following the evidence in relation to delicate domestic issues. 10. Drunkenness of the husband, particularly of a chronic and excessive character, can lead to repeated acts of cruelty towards the wife. It is not to be expected that the wife should be a silent sufferer for ever, of such a cruel treatment. It is true that wife beating bad been prevalent from early times among all classes without distinction. The picture portrayed by Freda rick Rogers in his book 'Labour, Life and Literature - some memories of 60 years,' may be a familiar one irrespective of time or clime: "Wife-beating was never a monoply of the working-classes, and it has all but disappeared from every form of social life that I know. It is quite an ancient custom, dating probably from primitive times, and all classes have indulged in it. There is an entry in the church books of John Bunyan's chapel at Bedford which tells how a member of the congregation was reprimanded at a church meeting for beating his wife when she did not deserve it. In the street where I lived as boy and young man we were in an atmosphere of wife-beating, and yet it was a street that prided itself on its respectability. In the street where I lived as boy and young man we were in an atmosphere of wife-beating, and yet it was a street that prided itself on its respectability. At a house next door to me a man flung his wife out of a ground floor window, and one man I knew, in a good position in life, intellectual and educated, who was kind to me as a boy, was in the habit of giving his wife periodical thrashings. Her female neighbours used to say she richly deserved them and she certainly was a confirmed dipsomaniac. People seldom interfered between a man and his wife; it was a dangerous thing to do, as the contending paries usually joined forces and turned on the person who interfered with, "And pray, what business is it of yours?" 11. Repetitive acts of battering by an alcoholic would justify a wife entertaining a reasonable apprehension of harm or injury in living with the husband. 12. Ordinarily, no wife, particularly one with children born in wedlock, would rush to a public authority, much less to a Police Station, with a complaint against her husband. Though in a different context, the peculiar characteristic of Indian Womanhood had been emphasised by the Supreme Court in the decision in Barwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1983 SC 753). That such a complaint was made in relation to unhappy incidents in her house, necessitating intervention of the police is a significant fact. Almost like the situation in Shantamani Debt's case (AIR 1962 Orissa 50 supra) where the wife was rescued from the torture of the husband by an order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate and with police help. The Orissa High Court was of the view that the incident "by itself is sufficient to indicate a circumstance which is really extraordinary " In the absence of any convincing evidence about the existence of an oblique motive on the part of the wife, it would be reasonable to presume in such circumstances, that the husband was the aggressor, and that the wife had felt the attack beyond reasonable endurance, when she sought police aid. 13. Again the requirement of a reasonable apprehension of the complaining wife is not of such a rigour as is virtually beyond the power of a party to prove. Quite often, the bitterness of life is suffered in silence by the weaker spouse. 13. Again the requirement of a reasonable apprehension of the complaining wife is not of such a rigour as is virtually beyond the power of a party to prove. Quite often, the bitterness of life is suffered in silence by the weaker spouse. Social conditions are such that even after repeated agonising situations, the woman puts up a facade that everything is normal in her home. She even builds up an appearance of a happy home, even while carrying sorrow's crown of sorrow. It is only when even the last straw is broken, she parts company with the husband and leaves, the matrimonial home. The court while enquiring into the requirement of S.18(2) (b) should therefore insist only on such proof as would show that the apprehension entertained by the complaining spouse is not illusory or imaginary, and that the proved events, objectively viewed, are such as to cause apprehension about a harm or injury in living with the husband. It is not reasonable to expect that neighbours would be available, and be ready and willing, to give useful evidence about such sensitive domestic incidents. Where, as in the present case, a pregnant wife gives evidence about her husband being a drunkard, and about the repeated sufferings she had had at his hands almost regularly, and when there is corroboration of the ill-treatment by her husband the requirement of S.18(2) (b) is satisfied. 14. The Lower Appellate Court, properly appreciated the evidence in the case and applied the correct legal principles, in evaluating the contentions based on S.18(2) (b) of the Act. There is therefore no scope, for interference in the second appeal. 15. A new plea, namely, that the marriage had been dissolved by a decree dated 26-8-1981, and as such the liability of the Appellant to pay maintenance got extinguished was raised in second appeal. This plea had not been taken before the Lower Appellate Court. It is significant that the judgment of the court below was rendered on 15-1-1983 almost two years after the alleged decree of dissolution of marriage. The judgment of the Sub Court, Quilon in E.H.A. O.P.No.110 of 1980 which was sought to be admitted in evidence, prima facie, makes strange reading. I have rejected the petition to accept that document in evidence in the second appeal. It is not therefore necessary to comment more about that judgment. The judgment of the Sub Court, Quilon in E.H.A. O.P.No.110 of 1980 which was sought to be admitted in evidence, prima facie, makes strange reading. I have rejected the petition to accept that document in evidence in the second appeal. It is not therefore necessary to comment more about that judgment. It is also not known whether the judgment has been challenged in further proceedings. No justifiable ground had been shown to merit consideration of this new plea in second appeal. The second appeal is dismissed.