JUDGMENT - GINWALA A.A., J.: - As said Krishna Iyer, J., in (Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915, legal challenges to the constitutionality of agrarian transformation die hard in our divided society. The present appeal and several other similar appeals and writ petitions pending in this Court, in which certain provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called as the Principle Act), as it stood amended upto the end of 1975, (called herein as Amended Ceiling Act), are challenge as violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution, bring home this observation. In order to understand the controversy raised now it will be convenient at this stage to take a quick survey of the legislative and judicial history of this piece of legislation. 2. The principal Act which came into force on 26-1-1962, imposed ceiling on agricultural holdings in this State and provided for acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling and for distribution of land so acquired. Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975 effected radical and drastic amendments in the principal Act by lowering the ceiling and by introducing the concept of artificial family unit for the purpose of determining the extent of ceiling area. Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 carried out some more amendments in the principal Act with which we are not concerned in these appeals. The principle Act and the Amending Acts have been included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by the Seventeenth, Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Constitution Amendment Acts, thus immunising, these Acts from challenges on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. 3. The constitutional validity of the Amended Ceiling Act was assailed in this Court in a bunch of 2660 writ petitions. By its judgment rendered in (Vithal Rao Udhaorao v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 99, a Division Bench of this Court repelled all the challenges. It held that the provisions of the said Acts were not open to challenge as violating Articles 14, 19 and 31 as they had been placed in the Ninth Schedule and because of the promulgation of emergency. 99, a Division Bench of this Court repelled all the challenges. It held that the provisions of the said Acts were not open to challenge as violating Articles 14, 19 and 31 as they had been placed in the Ninth Schedule and because of the promulgation of emergency. It rejected the challenge to the validity of Article 31-B by holding that far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 under which that article was inserted in the constitution, fortified that structure by subserving a fundamental constitutional purpose. The provisions contained in the Amended Ceiling Act pertaining to the concept of family unit were challenged before this Court in those petitions on the ground that they were beyond the purview of Article 31-A. The Division Bench rejected this contention also on the ground that those provisions formed a part of an integral scheme of agrarian reforms under which large agricultural holdings had to be reduced and the surplus land distributed amongst landless and other persons. 4. In the appeals preferred to the Supreme Court against this decision of this Court, the only question which was canvassed before that Court was as to whether the Amended Ceiling Act in so far as it created an artificial concept of family unit is in conflict with the second proviso to Clause (1) of Article 31-A and if so whether it is protected under Article 31-B. The Supreme Court by its judgment in Dattatraya Govind v. State of Maharahstra (supra) answered both these petitions against the appellants and rejected the appeals and special leave petitions pending before it. 5. At the time when the Supreme Court delivered the aforesaid judgment, the proclamation of emergency was in operation. On revocation of that proclamation, the appellants filed petitions before that Court for review of the said judgment on the ground that several contentions which were otherwise open to them for assailing the constitutional validity of the said Act could not be made because of the emergency and that they should be permitted to press those contentions since the emergency was lifted. Fresh writ petitions were also filed in the Court raising such contentions. The request for review was accepted and the matters came up again before the Supreme Court for consideration of other points involved in the appeals. 6. Fresh writ petitions were also filed in the Court raising such contentions. The request for review was accepted and the matters came up again before the Supreme Court for consideration of other points involved in the appeals. 6. The main thrust of challenge on behalf of the appellant in this second round before the Supreme Court was to dispute the constitutionality of Articles 31-A and 31-B as also of Article 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, since the respondent -State Government sought to protect the impugned provisions of the Amended Ceiling Act by resorting to the protective cloak afforded by these articles. By its order passed on 9th May, 1980, the Supreme Court dismissed all the writ petitions and review petitions relating to the validity of the Amended Ceiling Act, rejecting all the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner or appellants. It recorded its reasons in support of this order on 30th November, 1980, as reported in (Waman Rao v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271. Thus the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the said Act. 7. After the emergency was lifted, several writ petitions were filed in this Court as in the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the Amended Ceiling Act practically on the same grounds as urged in the writ petitions in the Supreme Court. After the decision of that Court in Waman Rao's case, the fate of these petitions was sealed. But legal ingenuity is unlimited. While the aforesaid writ petitions were pending in the Supreme Court and this Court, the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 omitted Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and re-enacted Clause (1) of Article 31 as Article 300-A, with effect from 20th June, 1979, thus taking it out from the Part on Fundamental Rights. This opened a fresh avenue for attacking the validity of the said Act. The writ petitions in this Court which were pending were amended to introduce this fresh challenge which we would presently elaborate. Even fresh air writ petitions came to be filed, like the one from which we present appeal arises, assailing the validity of the said Act on this ground. Some of these writ petitions have been rejected by learned Single Judges of this Court giving rise to several letters patent appeals, which came before us for admission. Even fresh air writ petitions came to be filed, like the one from which we present appeal arises, assailing the validity of the said Act on this ground. Some of these writ petitions have been rejected by learned Single Judges of this Court giving rise to several letters patent appeals, which came before us for admission. We have rejected some of these appeals summarily in which the only ground of challenge was that certain provisions of the Amended Ceiling Act offended Article 300-A of the Constitution. Before doing that we had given full opportunity to all the Counsel concerned to put forth their submissions. We are recording our reasons here in the fond hope of setting at rest this legal challenge at least in so far as this Court is concerned. 8. The submission made by the Counsel for the appellants, based on Article 300-A, run as follows. Though under the 44th Amendment to the Constitution, right to property has been relegated to a legal right from fundamental right, the constitutional guarantee as regards property has not been lost but has been in a way put on a better footing. This article guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. This means that not only that the State cannot deprive any person of his property by an executive action, but that it can do so only by a valid legislation. For depriving a person of his property there must not only be a law supporting that action, but that law must be a validly enacted law. In so far as deprivation of property by acquisition is concerned the power to make laws in that behalf is found in Entry 42 of the Concurrent List read with Article 246. Even though Entry 42 specifies the head of legislation as “acquisition and requisitioning of property”, without specifying the conditions on which this can be done, two conditions which are implicit in the power of acquisition without consent of the owner as power of eminent domain namely the acquisition must be (a) only for public purpose and (b) on payment of just compensation, must be read in that entry. In other words, any law to come within the mischief of Article 300-A must provide that the acquisition shall be only for a public purpose and that just compensation shall be paid to the owner. In other words, any law to come within the mischief of Article 300-A must provide that the acquisition shall be only for a public purpose and that just compensation shall be paid to the owner. A fortiori any law which does not make provision for payment of just compensation for acquisition of property cannot be termed as a validly enacted law as the legislature cannot be deemed to be competent to enact such a law. According to the appellants though acquisition of land under the provisions of the Amended Ceiling Act could be said to be for a public purpose being for agrarian reform, the compensation payable for such acquisition under sections 23 and 26 thereof is quite illusory and not just and fair. Hence since that Act does not provide for payment of just and fair compensation for acquisition of land thereunder, it is not a valid law within the requirement of Article 300-A. This in sum and substance is the challenge founded on Article 300-A. 9. It can be seen that the main plank for the attack is that the compensation for the acquisition of the surplus land is illusory. Section 23 of the Amended Ceiling Act provides for the determination of compensation payable for surplus land. Reading this section with the first Schedule appended to the Act would show that the price per hectare of dry crop land has to be calculated as certain number of times the assessment per hectare. These numbers range between 150 to 250 depending on the Taluka and District in which the land is situated. It would therefore appear that the price payable is linked with assessment of the land i.e. land revenue. Now land revenue as is commonly known is related to the category or quality of land. The better the quality, the higher would be the price. Beyond making a bald statement that the compensation provided for under this section is illusory, no material has been put on record by the appellants in justification of this statement. In (Nand Lal v. State of Haryana)4, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2097, para 17, the Supreme Court repelled a similar challenge to the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, inter alia on the ground of want of material. The same position obtains in the present appeal. In (Nand Lal v. State of Haryana)4, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2097, para 17, the Supreme Court repelled a similar challenge to the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, inter alia on the ground of want of material. The same position obtains in the present appeal. Moreover, in that case the Supreme Court refused to uphold the contention that the price determined under the Haryana Act is illusory, having held as follows: “We find that the amount payable for such surplus land is to be calculated at the rates shown in the Table given below section 16(1) and it is clear that the rates are based on the actual quality of the soil and its yield and the same cannot be said to be illusory.” (See paragraph 17 of the report). This reasoning applies with equal force to the provisions contained in the Amended Ceiling Act in view of what has been stated above. Section 26 lays down that the amount of compensation may be payable at the option of the person receiving the compensation in transferable bonds carrying interest at 3 per cent per annum either repayable during a period of 20 years from the date of issue by equated annual instalment of principal and interest or redeemable at par at the end of the said period of 20 years. It is urged that having regard to the rate of interest and the deferred payment, the compensation becomes illusory. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that even under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in its application to this State, the interest payable on enhanced compensation is at the rate of 4 per cent per annum. Considering this interest at 3 per cent per annum cannot be said to be illusory. Moreover if the compensation is otherwise just and fair, it cannot become illusory if the payment is deferred with provision for interest. Thus the very foundation on which the edifice of challenge is sought to be built is lacking. On this ground alone, these submissions deserve to be rejected. 10. It would appear that in the ultimate analysis the arguments advanced by the Counsel impinge on the competency of the State Legislature to make the law namely the Amended Ceiling Act, without making provision for just and fair compensation for acquisition of surplus land. On this ground alone, these submissions deserve to be rejected. 10. It would appear that in the ultimate analysis the arguments advanced by the Counsel impinge on the competency of the State Legislature to make the law namely the Amended Ceiling Act, without making provision for just and fair compensation for acquisition of surplus land. What in effect they submit is that after deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and insertion of Article 300-A no legislature is competent to enact a law for acquisition of private property in which provision has not been made for payment of just and fair compensation. According to them such a law though may have been validly made prior to the said amendment of the Constitution, it cannot be implemented after this amendment became effective on 20-6-1979, as it ceased to be valid because of the amendment. The appellants submit that the validity of the law has to be tested with relation to the date on which it is sought to be implemented and not in relation to the date on which it is made. 11. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra and Wamanrao v. Union of India (cited supra), the State legislature was competent to enact the Amended Ceiling Act at the time it was passed. The question is whether the said Act which had been validly and competently enacted can now be struck down for want of legislative competence consequent to the change in constitutional provision brought about by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, assuming but without deciding that such a change affects the legislative competence with regard to laws relating to acquisition and requisitioning of private property. This question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (Ginwala, J.) was a party, in (Manoel Francisco v. Collector of Daman)5, 1984 Mh.L.J. 144 where the validity of the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of Villages) Regulation, 1962 was under challenge on identical grounds. The Division Bench relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Mahendra Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh)6, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, of a Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Raheman v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, and of the Allahabad High Court in (U.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. S.T.A. Tribunal)7, A.I.R. 1976 All. The Division Bench relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Mahendra Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh)6, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019, of a Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Raheman v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, and of the Allahabad High Court in (U.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. S.T.A. Tribunal)7, A.I.R. 1976 All. 154, held that the Constitutional validity of an Act has to be tested on the basis of the constitution as it was on the date when the Act was passed subject to any retrospective amendment of the Constitution and that the constitutional validity of the Regulation could not be challenged on the alleged incompetency of the Legislature due to changes brought about by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, particularly when the constitutional amendment which was being relied upon was not retrospective. This ratio applies with equal force to the facts of the present case. Mr. S.R. Deshpande, appearing for the appellant to one of the appeals, however, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh)8, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121, for the proposition that a provision of law which was not unconstitutional at the time when it was made can be successfully challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality. That case is distinguishable on facts. What really has been held by the Supreme Court in that case is that a law which may be unobjectionable as a transitional or temporary measure at an initial stage can still become discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution if it is persisted in over a long period without any justification (See paragraph 16 of the report). That case is not an authority for the proposition that a law which has been validly and competently made by the legislature, becomes invalid because of the legislature being deprived of that competency by constitutional amendment which is not retrospective. In view of what has been held by the Division Bench in Manoel's case, we have no hesitation in discarding the abovesaid contention of the Counsel for the appellants. 12. Mr. S.N. Kherdekar, learned Counsel for the appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No. 12 of 1983, assailed section 4 of the Amended Ceiling Act as violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution. 12. Mr. S.N. Kherdekar, learned Counsel for the appellant in Letters Patent Appeal No. 12 of 1983, assailed section 4 of the Amended Ceiling Act as violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution. He also submitted that this section is invalid as it offends Article 14 since it discriminates between properties of major and minor persons. According to him, this provision also offends section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. We do not find any substance in any of these contentions. Since the Amended Ceiling Act is included in the Ninth Schedule it is immune from challenge under Article 14 by virtue of the protection afforded under Article 31-B. There is no conflict between section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and section 4 of the Amended Ceiling Act, since they operate in different fields. Moreover, section 8 deals with voluntary transfers and not transfers by operation of law as under the Ceiling Act. It is difficult to conceive how section 4 offends Article 300-A of the Constitution. Even if it does, the validity of this section cannot be challenged on the basis of that article in view of what we have said above with regard to the effect of constitutional amendment on the provisions of the Amended Ceiling Act. 13. For all these reasons, therefore, we had summarily rejected the Letters Patent Appeals stated above. Appeal dismissed. -----