JUDGMENT 1. These two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution have been filed by two tenants Ramzani and Sitaram and are directed against separate orders of the Appellate Authority dated 10th August, 1982 passed under section 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Briefly the Act'). Since common question of fact and law are involved in these writ petitions they are being disposed of by one Judgment. 2. Om Prakash Sharma, respondent no 3, (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) in the two writ petitions, is owner of house no. 31/33, Sarrafa Bazar, Sadar, Meerut. This house consists of three rooms, two on the ground floor and one on the first floor. Ramzani, petitioner, was tenant of one room in the eastern portion of the ground floor and Sitaram, petitioner, was tenant of one room on the first floor. The third room in the western portion of the ground floor was in the tenancy of one Zainab Begum, but she had vacated it and the landlord had obtained an order of release of that room in his favour. 3. The landlord moved an application purporting to be under clause (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act, against Ramzani, for the eviction of the latter from the accommodation occupied by him as a tenant. The application was moved on 2831979. The landlord pleaded in the application that he was employed in the Defence Department and was due to retire within a year or so. His family consisted of self, wife and two major sons of marriageable age. He was posted at Faizabad but had no family quarter and, therefore, his family was staying in a single room in house no. 24, Banker's Street, Meerut Cantt. In contemplation of his retirement he had purchased house no. 31/33 on 2.9. 1975 for a sum of Rs. 10,000. He had apprised the tenant of his need to have a house for the residence of his family and had also given the required six months' notice to the tenant on 1291978. The single room accommodation in house no. 24 was wholly insufficient for him and his family. His need to have the accommodation occupied by the tenant was most genuine, and bona fide. Even on au comparative basis his need was pressing. The tenant had a small family. The single room accommodation in house no. 24 was wholly insufficient for him and his family. His need to have the accommodation occupied by the tenant was most genuine, and bona fide. Even on au comparative basis his need was pressing. The tenant had a small family. He added that in view of his social status being a Government servant and the fact that his sons were grownup and graduates, he needed suitable accommodation for himself and the family. The landlord added that house no. 31/33 was in a dangerous and dilapidated condition. The Cantonment Board had issued a notice for demolition of the house on 2361978. He had submitted a building plan to the Cantonment Board for according of sanction for reconstruction of the house. An estimate of expenditure was also being obtained and he would be in a position to carry out demolition and reconstruction from the amount of gratuity and GP. Fund which he would receive on retirement. He also added that he did not own or possess any other premises and gave an undertaking that upon release he would not let out the house to any one. 4. The landlord moved an application under clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 21 of the Act against Sitaram in November, 1978. In that application as well same allegations were made which were made in the application moved against Ramzani and which have been set out in the preceding paragraph. 5. Both the tenants contested the respective applications. 6. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord against Sitaram by its order dated 5.6.1979. The Authority rejectedfile case of the landlord for release of accommodation on the ground contained in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act, as in its opinion the landlord had not succeeded in establishing the various requirements of law. The Prescribed Authority, however, held that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide and pressing. It, therefore, allowed the application of the landlord on the ground of need contained in clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act, Sitaram, tenant, felt aggrieved and filed miscellaneous appeal no. 349 of 1979, in the court of the District Judge, Meerut. 7. The Prescribed Authority rejected the landlord's application against Ramzani, tenant, by its order dated 15th January, 1980. 349 of 1979, in the court of the District Judge, Meerut. 7. The Prescribed Authority rejected the landlord's application against Ramzani, tenant, by its order dated 15th January, 1980. The Authority observed that the landlord had failed to establish the requirements of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act. Coming to the question of the need, the authority observed that two rooms in house no. 31/33 had already been released in favour of the landlord and, therefore, the need of the landlord for the room occupied by Ramzani could not be held to be genuine and bona fide. On the question of comparative hardship to the parties also, the Authority held in favour of Ramzani. The landlord felt aggrieved and filed miscellaneous appeal no. 10 of 1980, in the court of the District Judge, Meerut. 8. Both these miscellaneous appeals were disposed of by the learned First Additional District Judge, Meerut by two separate Judgments of 10th August, 1982. 9. The learned Additional District Judge disagreed with the finding of the Prescribed Authority that house no. 31/33 was not in a dilapidated condition and did not require demolition and reconstruction. He recorded a finding that the said house was in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction. He, however, held that three out of the four requirements contemplated under rule 17 of the rules framed under the Act, were, not fulfilled by the landlord and, therefore, he was not entitled to get the accommodation released on the ground contained in clause (b) of subSection (1) of Section 21 of the Act. Dealing with the question of release of accommodation in possession of the two tenants on the ground of need contained in clause (a) of subsection (1) ejection 21 of the Act, the learned Additional District Judge held that two rooms (one of which was in occupation of Smt. Zainab and the other which was in occupation of Sitaram) released in favour of the landlord, were not sufficient to meet the needs of his family members. The plan of the house indicated that there were no facilities attached to the room on the western side and the passage for the room on the first floor lay through the accommodation in possession of Ramzani. The plan of the house indicated that there were no facilities attached to the room on the western side and the passage for the room on the first floor lay through the accommodation in possession of Ramzani. The landlord wanted to reconstruct the house before occupying it and had already taken steps in that direction, and unless the entire house was made available to him, he would not be in a position to demolish and reconstruct it. It was again emphasised that two rooms were not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the family of the landlord. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, recorded a finding that the landlord bona fide required the entire disputed accommodation. On the question of comparative hardship of the parties also he held that the landlord would suffer greater hardship, both physically as well as mentally, in case both the rooms were not released in his favour. He added that there was no evidence to show that no accommodation was at all available to the tenants at any rent. The mere fact that the tenants would have to pay higher rent for some other accommodation could not, by itself, be taken as a valid hardship to them. Regarding rule 16 (1) (a) the learned Judge observed that it had no 'application to the facts of the present cases. Although two judgments were delivered, the discussion of the aforesaid points in both of them was almost identical. In the result, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal of Sitaram and allowed the appeal of the landlord against Ramzani. 10. Feeling dissatisfied, the two tenants have filed these writ petitions.. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 12. The concurrent findings of the courts below that the landlord is not entitled to release of the accommodation in occupation of the two tenants on the ground that the house is in a dilapidated condition and is required for demolition and reconstruction, contained in section 21 (i) (b) of the Act, have not been challenged in these writ petitions, on behalf of the landlord.... 13. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the need of the landlord to have the accommodation of both the tenants for the use of his family is bona fide, genuine and pressing, is well founded and based on cogent material. 13. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the need of the landlord to have the accommodation of both the tenants for the use of his family is bona fide, genuine and pressing, is well founded and based on cogent material. No infirmity which may justify interference with this finding of fact has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 14. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Additional District Judge had made out a third case for the landlord to base the order of release in respect of both the accommodations. The landlord had based his applications for release on the ground of his bona fide need, and in the alternative, on the ground that the house was in a dilapidated condition and needed reconstruction after demolition. The new case which was made out by the learned Additional District Judge was that the landlord required the house bona fide after demolition and new construction for occupation by himself and members of his family. This case was not pleaded in the two applications for release and, therefore, this case could not be made out for the landlord. 15. I have given anxious consideration to these submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The contents of the two release applications were almost identical. In these applications the size of the family of the landlord was given out and it was said that they were staying in a single room in house no. 24, Banker's Street, Meerut Cantt., and the accommodation was entirely insufficient for the needs of the family. The need of the landlord was most genuine, bonafide and pressing even on comparative basis. The families of the tenants were short. In two paragraphs it was said that the house was in a dangerous and dilapidated condition and a notice for its demolition had been received from the Cantonment Board. He (landlord) was taking steps for sanction of a building plan and preparation of estimate of expenditure. He would meet the expenses of demolition and reconstruction out of the gratuity and G.P. Fund which he would receive on retirement, in about a year's time, and was also, immediately, in a position to carry out the construction work. In the applications the landlord gave an undertaking that on release he would not let out the accommodation to any one else. In the applications the landlord gave an undertaking that on release he would not let out the accommodation to any one else. In these applications it was not said Specifically that the building is bona fide required after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by him self or any 'member of his family, but from the averments made in the applications it is clear that the intention of the landlord was to demolish the present dilapidated house and reconstruct it for occupation by himself and his family members, and prayer for release of the accommodation was made with this end in view. The pith and substance of the applications and not merely their outer form is to be seen to find as to what were the precise grounds for seeking release. In my view, the grievance of the petitioners that the landlord had not pleaded that lie needed the house for his occupation after demolition and reconstruction, and the learned Additional District Judge had made out an entirely new case for him, is not well founded, and the same is repelled. Here it may be pointed out that the learned counsel for the petitioners has not alleged any prejudice to the tenant petitioners in their defence, on account of absence of the specific plea that the building was bona fide required after its demolition and reconstruction, for occupation of the landlord and his family members. 16. Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act read thus:. 21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust. (b) That the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction. (b) That the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction. Clause (a.) covers cases where the landlord requires the building in its existing form, for his occupation, and also where he requires the building after demolition and reconstruction, for his occupation. In both these cases the main ground for release is personal need of landlord or the members of his family. It has not been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the landlord could not have made an application for release under clause (a) on the ground that the house is bonafide required after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family.' It may be emphasised that this ground for release is wholly distinct and different from the ground contained in clause (b). In order to succeed on the ground contained in clause (b) the landlord has to fulfil the requirements laid down in rule 17 of the rules framed under the Act, but fulfillment of such requirements is not necessary for grant of release under clause (a) for personal occupation after demolition and reconstruction. Where a release is allowed under clause (b), section 24 of the Act empowers the tenant to claim a portion of the newly constructed building on rent which has to be computed according to the given formula. But no such right has been conferred on the tenant in case of release under clause (a). The reason for this distinction is obvious. 17. White considering the comparative hardships of the parties, the learned Additional District Judge observed that if the accommodations were not released in favour of the landlord, he would suffer greater hardship, both physically as well as mentally. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners: hat the mental agony to the landlord could not be taken into account by the learned Additional District Judge, because it was not specifically pleaded by the landlord in the two release applications. It is true that in the two applications it was not said specifically that the landlord would, inter alia, suffer mental agony as well if the accommodations were not released in his favour. In the application it was said that the landlord would suffer greater hardship if the accommodations were not released in his favour. It is true that in the two applications it was not said specifically that the landlord would, inter alia, suffer mental agony as well if the accommodations were not released in his favour. In the application it was said that the landlord would suffer greater hardship if the accommodations were not released in his favour. In my view this was sufficient and it was not necessary to detail the various kinds of hardship in the applications. The detail of hardship were given by the landlord in the evidence which he placed before the Prescribed Authority. The tenants had full opportunity to meet this particular averment of the landlord. The learned Additional District Judge was right in taking this aspect into consideration while deciding the question of comparative hardship to the parties. He was right in not ignoring this particular kind of hardship on the technical ground that it was not specifically pleaded in the release application. 18. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Additional District Judge committed a grave error of law in not considering the question of comparative hardship of the parties from the standpoint of clause (e) of subrule (I) of rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. Since the question of comparative hardship to the parties was not considered in the light of clause (e), the finding on this point was vitiated and deserved to be set aside. The learned Additional District Judge had ignored this important provision by saying that it had no application to the instant case. In reply, the learned counsel for the landlordrespondent has urged that clause (e) had no application to the instant case and further, that the question of comparative hardship from the standpoint of nonavailability of other accommodation to the tenants was very much considered, though in connection with a different plea of the tenants. The learned Judge had clearly observed that there was no evidence to show that no accommodation was at all available at any rent. Clause (e) of subrule (1) of Rule 16 reads thus: 16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement [Sections 21 (1) (a) and 34 (8)](l) In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such tactors as the following (a)....................(b)......................(c).....................(d)..................... Application for release on the ground of personal requirement [Sections 21 (1) (a) and 34 (8)](l) In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such tactors as the following (a)....................(b)......................(c).....................(d)..................... (e) Where there are a number of tenants separately occupying a block of tenements and the landlord desires their eviction on ground of his personal need the Prescribed Authority shall consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants. Clause (e) is applicable where 'a number of tenants' are to be evicted to satisfy the genuine need of the landlord and his family. Then the hardship to be caused to all such tenants on account of eviction is to be weighed and considered against the hardship to the landlord. This is to achieve a certain social justice, namely, that a number of persons should not be thrown out to satisfy the need of one person without first going into the question whether there is any likelihood of availability of alternative accommodation to them. The question is whether the two tenants (the present petitioners) who are to be evicted in he instant cases, are to be regarded as 'a number of tenants' for purposes of clause (e). In my view, the expression 'a number of tenants' should not be given such a wide meaning as to include only two tenants as in this case. Although clause (e) does not lay down any minimum number of tenants to answer the description 'a number of tenants', the nature of the provision and the object to achieve which it has been made, indicate that the number of tenants should be sufficient and, in any case, more than two. My view, therefore, is that clause (e) has no application to the case of the present petitioners. Here it may also be pointed out that the learned Additional District Judge clearly held that there was no evidence on the record to show that no accommodation was at all available at any rent. The stand of the two tenants was only this much that the rents were very high in Meerut, but they did not give any idea of the rent at which a room may be available to them in some locality of Meerut. 19. The stand of the two tenants was only this much that the rents were very high in Meerut, but they did not give any idea of the rent at which a room may be available to them in some locality of Meerut. 19. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge that comparative hardship to the landlord would be greater, is based on good material and it does not suffer from any legal infirmity and does not deserve to be upset. 20. The orders of eviction of the two petitioners passed by the learned Additional District Judge do not suffer from any error of law and do not call for any interference. There is no merit in these writ petitions, 21. In the result, both the petitions fail and are dismissed. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs of these petitions. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioners has prayed that some reasonable time may be allowed to the tenantpetitioners to vacate the premises in question. I, therefore, allow four months' time from today to the petitioners to vacate the premises and handover possessions the landlord immediately on the expiry of this period. (Petitions dismissed)