Judgment :- The petitioner herein has prayed in this writ petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated October 10, 1975, of the Commissioner of Income tax, the second respondent herein, confirming the order dated December 20, 1973, of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income tax, the first respondent herein, so far as it directs the payment of interest under section 139(8) of the Income tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter refer red to as "the Act"), for the assessment year 1972-73. The petitioner is a firm carrying on business as Esso dealers in Thanjavur. The firm was assessed to income tax on a total income of Rs. 70, 300 by the Income tax Officer for the year 1972-73 as against the return of income filed by the assessee on May 26, 1973, admitting a total income of Rs. 60, 406. While making the assessment on a total income of Rs. 70, 300, the Income tax Officer charged a sum of Rs. 3, 416 towards interest treating the firm as an unregistered firm for the purpose of calculation of interest as per section 139(8). The petitioner made a request to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to waive the interest But that request was rejected. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a revision petition to the Commissioner of Income tax under section 264 of the Act contending that it was discriminatory to treat the registered firm as unregistered for the purpose of the levy of interest under section 139(8) inasmuch as the levy of interest is to compensate for the delay in completion of the assess ment and the consequent realisation of tax. Reliance was Placed in support of that contention on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in M Nagappa v. ITO. The Commissioner of Income tax by his order dated October 10, 1975, rejected the said contention. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has come forward before this court with this writ petition to quash the same on the ground that the charging of interest on the petitioner firm treating it as an unregistered firm is discriminatory when compared with other assessees who had filed returns belatedly, in the matter of calculation of inter est for the delayed filing of the return. According to the petitioner, the levy of inter est under section 139 is for the delayed filing of the return and the consequential delay in the realisation of tax. Therefore, the levy of interest is compensatory in nature and, therefore, its incidence on all assessees who had similarly delayed the filing of the returns and who are covered by the provision should be the same. Besides, the chargeability of interest is directly related to the amount that is recoverable from an assessee and hence could not be tagged on to the status in which the assessee is assessed to income tax. The classification of registered firms which have not filed returns within the specified time as a separate class for the purpose of payment of interest under section 139(8) does not bear any relationship to the object that is to be achieved by the relevant section and hence it is violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a single judge of the Karnataka High Court in M Nagappa v. ITO and Addl. CIT v. Mahadeshwara Lorry Service. In M Nagappa v. ITO, Venkataramiah J. (as he then was) held that the object of levy of interest being just reimbursement of what the Government would lose by delayed payment of tax resulting from the delayed filing of the return, provision in section 139(1) for the levy of inter est in the case of a registered firm on the tax which would have been payable if the firm had been assessed as an unregistered firm is outside the said object, that the levy is more in the nature of a penalty than mere compensation, that the classification of registered firms which have not filed the return within the specified time as a separate class for purposes of payment of interest under section 139(1) does not bear any relationship to the object to be achieved by that section. Section 139(1) as it stood prior to April 1, 1971, read with section 139(4), to the extent it required a registered firm to pay interest at a specified rate on the tax assessed as if it were an unregistered firm whenever the registered firm did not Me the return within the specified time, was violative of article 14 of the Constitution and was, therefore, void. A Division Bench of the same High Court in Addl CIT v. Mahadeshwara Lorry Service expressed its disagreement with the view taken by this court in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India, wherein section 139(8) in so far as it treats registered firm as unregistered for the purpose of levy of interest is valid and not violative of article 14. However, we find that the view taken by this court in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India on appeal has been accepted by the Gauhati High Court in Ganesh Das Sreeram v. ITO, by the Gujarat High Court in Chhotalal & Co. v. ITO, by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jiwamal Hospital v. ITO, by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Hindustan Steel Forgings v. CIT and by the Calcutta High Court in Mohanlal Soni v. Union of India. Mahen dra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India was a decision of a Division Bench of this court to which one of us was a party wherein an identical question as is now being raised by the petitioner has been specifically dealt with and this court has held that subjecting registered firms to the same treatment as unregistered firms in the matter of levy of interest cannot be said to be in any way arbitrary or a colourable exercise of legislative power and as such does not violate article 14 of the Constitution and the reasons given there in are as follows (head note) : "But for certain privileges given by the Income tax Act to a registered firm, it would be in the same position as an unregistered firm and hence it is open to the legislature to say that one or other of the privileges granted to a registered firm will not be available to such firms which have defaulted in submitting the return in time. It cannot be contended that the legislature which granted the privileges cannot take away any of the privileges given to registered firms at all events and when the legislature chooses to withdraw the privileges given to a registered firm, that cannot be attached as being discriminatory between registered firms and unregistered firms." * Though the Karnataka decisions referred to above dealt with the question as to whether the interest levied under section 139 is compensatory or penal in character and held that it is purely compensatory in nature, they have not chosen to deal with the above reasoning set out in the decision of this court in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India. The reasons given by this court in the said decision for holding section 139(8) as not violating article 14 have found acceptance from the other High Courts, such as, Gauhati High Court, Gujarat High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court, Punjab & Haryana High Court and Calcutta High Court. It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India requires reconsideration in view of the decision of the Karnataka High Court. Since the question raised in this case is squarely covered by the said decision of the Division Bench in Mahendra Kumar Iswar lal & Co. v. Union of India which decision has also found acceptance in the other High Courts and having regard to the reasoning given by the Division Bench in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India which has not been specifically dealt with by the Karnataka High Court in the said decisions, we are not in a position to accept the decisions of the Karnataka High Court as correct in preference to the view taken by the Division Bench of this court. Therefore, following the decision in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment just now pronounced. Therefore, following the decision in Mahendra Kumar Iswarlal & Co. v. Union of India, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment just now pronounced. But having regard to the fact that this court has taken a uniform view as to the constitutional validity of section 139(8) of the Income tax Act, 1961, and the said view of this court having been accepted by other High Courts except the Karnataka High Court and as already the decision of the Karnataka High Court which has taken a different view is the subject matter of an appeal before the Supreme Court, we do not feel that this is a fit case for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the oral application for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.