JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - "Gomati Nagar" has been widely advertised by the Lucknow Development Authority (LDA, for short) as the new township which the Authority is planning to bring up in the trans-Gomati area of the suburbs of Lucknow between the river and Faizabad Road. It is adjacent to the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL, for short) complex. On 2nd October, 1982, LDA issued a public notice inviting applications for registration of applications for plots and houses in this township. This was preceded by a State Government notification under S. 4, read with S. 17(1), (1-A) and (4), of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of certain land for purposes of laying out the portion of the "Ring Road" between Faizabad Road and Gomati Barrage for better communication between far-flung areas of the expanding city of Lucknow. This notification proposed acquisition of land of villages Ujariaon, Gazipur Saidulnisha, Bhikhampur and Jugauli (total about 55 acres), including 38 acres and odd of Ujariaon village alone. The Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika was already in possession of about 650 acres of land in this locality and it transferred the same to the LDA on 18th October. 1982. The scheme was to cover more than 1500 acres of land as announced. The registration of applications started on 1st November, 1982. About twenty thousand persons had already applied for registration by 10th May, 1983 (the date of the counter affidavit filed by LDA in Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983) by paying different sums of money ranging from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 20,000/- each to the LDA. 2. In the master plan notified by the State Government on 27-1-70 the area falling under the Gomati Nagar Scheme was earmarked partly for industrial purposes and partly as Green Belt. Existing land uses were, no doubt, protected. However no new housing activity was permissible in this area according to the master plan. The validity of this master plan has also been the subject of arguments before us. Some of the petitioners have relied on the master plan for contending that a new scheme could not be put into operation without prior amendment of the master plan. Others have contended that the so-called master plan was itself invalid and until a valid master plan was published, no scheme could be formulated. 3. Some of the petitioners have relied on the master plan for contending that a new scheme could not be put into operation without prior amendment of the master plan. Others have contended that the so-called master plan was itself invalid and until a valid master plan was published, no scheme could be formulated. 3. On December 6, 1982, LDA issued a public notice, vide annexure 4, stating that the LDA had prepared a draft of an amended master plan in respect of "planning District 'C"' (which was the "district" relating to the proposed Gomati Nagar Scheme) and the said amended draft plan was being published with a view to invite objections and suggestions from the general public. The amended draft plan could be inspected at any time in the Office of the LDA during the working hours. The objections were to be submitted within 14 days. (It may be mentioned here that all references to the annexures will hereinafter be made from the file of Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983, the leading case, unless otherwise specified in respect of any particular annexure). 4. Among others, the petitioners of: Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983 filed objections on 18-12-82, vide annexures 5 and 6, contending that they had already set up their industries with the sanction of the LDA, and under licence from the State Government, on part of land in question. Their factories were engaged in the manufacture of power distribution transformers and their spares. transmission line towers, microwave towers, sub-station structures etc. These were 'priority industries' as declared by the State Government and by the Government of India. An industrial estate of U.P. Small Industries Corporation also existed adjoining the petitioners' factories, and the site of that estate had not been included in the notification of proposed amendment of master plan, while the site of the petitioners' factories had been included. The petitioners were also given an oral hearing by a committee constituted by the LDA for hearing the objections. This hearing took place on 3rd January. 1983, vide annexures 7 and 8. According to the petitioners, the committee responded favourably to their objections, as recorded by the petitioners in their letters, annexures 9 and 10. The committee formulated its final recommendation of 14th January, 1983 and submitted the same to the State Government for its approval. 5. On 19th January, 1983. 1983, vide annexures 7 and 8. According to the petitioners, the committee responded favourably to their objections, as recorded by the petitioners in their letters, annexures 9 and 10. The committee formulated its final recommendation of 14th January, 1983 and submitted the same to the State Government for its approval. 5. On 19th January, 1983. the State Government issued a notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act read with sub-sections (1-A) and (4) of S. 17 of that Act as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh. This notification is annexure 11. The -notification stated that the land mentioned in the Schedule below it was needed for a public purpose, namely. Ujariaon Housing Scheme, Lucknow, by the LDA under a planned development scheme. It was further stated therein that the Government was of the opinion that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of S. 17 were applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said land, which was waste and arable land as well as land other than waste and arable land. was urgently required for the said scheme by the LDA and that in view of the pressing urgency it was as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an inquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act." Accordingly, the Governor directed under sub-section (4) of the S. 17 that the provisions of S. 5-A shall not apply. The Schedule specified the plots with their respective areas along with the details of villages, parganas and districts. The bulk of the land (829.75 acres) proposed to be acquired was situated in village Ujariaon but a few plots were situated in village Gazipur Saidulnisha (73.92 acres) and Vijaipur (66.11 acres) as well. It was because of the fact that most of the land sought to be acquired was situated in Ujariaon that the scheme was loosely described as 'Ujariaon Housing Scheme' though it had already been advertised in the press as the 'Gomati Nagar Scheme'. This was followed by a notification dated 28th January, 1983 containing a declaration under S. 6 of the Act read with S. 17(1)(1-A) of the Act to the effect that the land was required for the said public purpose. Accordingly, notices were issued by the Collector under S. 9 of the Act for taking possession over the land. This was followed by a notification dated 28th January, 1983 containing a declaration under S. 6 of the Act read with S. 17(1)(1-A) of the Act to the effect that the land was required for the said public purpose. Accordingly, notices were issued by the Collector under S. 9 of the Act for taking possession over the land. Although the committee set up by the LDA to consider objections to the amendment of the master plan had submitted its report on 14th January, 1983, the Government has still to take a final decision in the matter. Even at the very outset of the hearing of the petitions we were informed by learned counsel for the respondents, Sri Umesh Chandra. that the Government was considering the matter and may take a favourable decision in so far as objections of the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983 are concerned. 6. This group of 16 writ petitions challenges the notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17 on a number of grounds, which are not uniform or even mutually consistent. Sri Syed Mohammad Husain has argued for the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 1326 and 1969 of 1983. Sri Raja Ram Agarwal in Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983, Sri P. N. Mathur in Writ Petition No. 2799 of 1983, Sri R. N. Gupta in Writ Petitions Nos. 1352, 2018 of 1983 and Writ Petition No. 448 of 1984, Sri S. Mizra in Writ Petition No. 5855 of 1983, Sri H. S. Jain in Writ Petitions Nos. 1574 1575. 2160 and 1909 of 1983, Sri S. N. Shukla and Sri Uma Shanker in Writ Petitions Nos. 1639 and 1640 of 1983, Sri A. P. Singh in Writ Petition No. 3348 of 1983, and Sri A. K. Bhatnagar in Writ Petition No. 3468 of 1983. 7. There are some pleas taken by only one or two counsel and not by others. We may take up those pleas first. Thereafter the pleas which are common to all the petitioners will be taken. 8. Sri H. S. Jain has contended that LDA is a "company" within the meaning of the definition of the expression given in the Land Acquisition Act. and as such. no acquisition could be made for purposes of LDA without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. 8. Sri H. S. Jain has contended that LDA is a "company" within the meaning of the definition of the expression given in the Land Acquisition Act. and as such. no acquisition could be made for purposes of LDA without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. In the present case it was not disputed that the entire compensation was to be paid out of the funds of the LDA and not out of the funds of the State Government. It was also admitted that the procedure laid down in Part VII of the Act was not followed. It is true that the definition of company given in clause (e) of section 3 of the Act embraces a company incorporated by an Indian Law. It has, accordingly, been held in the State of Punjab v. Raja Ram, (1981) 2 SCC 66 : AIR 1981 SC 1694 , that even a statutory corporation such as the Food Corporation of India must be deemed to be a company within the meaning of the said Act. It does not, however, follow that every statutory corporation is company within the meaning of 'S. 3(e). A 'local authority' is also a statutory corporation, but it is not a 'company'. The fourth proviso to S. 6(1) of the Act itself brings out this distinction between a 'company' and a 'local authority'. It reads as follows : "Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority." 9. A local authority discharges Governmental functions unlike the Food Corporation of India which is mainly a commercial enterprise, though run in the public interest as an instrumentality of the State. The statutory functions of the LDA as laid down in the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. 1973 are clearly those of a local authority. It operates in a local area. Its funds are controlled by the State Government, vide S. 20 of the Act. Its accounts are audited by the Examiner Local Fund Accounts, vide S. 22 of the Act. 1973 are clearly those of a local authority. It operates in a local area. Its funds are controlled by the State Government, vide S. 20 of the Act. Its accounts are audited by the Examiner Local Fund Accounts, vide S. 22 of the Act. Thus the fund of the LDA maintained under S. 20 of the Act satisfies the ingredients of a 'local fund' as defined in the various Financial Rules of the State and Central Governments and also as .defined in the U.P. General Clauses Act as amended in 1975, and as such the LDA is local authority within the meaning of S. 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Reference may in this connection be made to Patel Premji Jiva v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 3 SCC 815 , in which it was held that acquisition of land for a market committee was acquisition for a local authority and as such the declaration under section 6 that the land was needed for a public purpose was valid. The same view has been expressed in Prithvi Nath Kapoor v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 All 349 , (Paras 7 to 21), in which it was held that the Allahabad Development Authority constituted under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 was a local authority. Reliance provision in S. 17 of the U.P. Urban was placed in that decision on the Supreme Court ruling in Union of Indian, R. C. Jain, AIR 1981 SC 951 . in which the Delhi Development Authority was held to be local authority. In Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285 : AIR 1974 SC 2077 , (Para 24), also it was held that acquisition for the DDA was acquisition not for a company. 10. That Article there is a specific Planning and Development Act laying down that the Government may acquire any land if it is of opinion that it is required for purposes of development or for any other purposes under this Act. After such acquisition, the Government may transfer the land to the development authority or any local authority for the purpose for which it has been acquired on payment by "the Authority" or the local authority of the compensation awarded under that Act and of the charges incurred by the Government in connection with the acquisition. After such acquisition, the Government may transfer the land to the development authority or any local authority for the purpose for which it has been acquired on payment by "the Authority" or the local authority of the compensation awarded under that Act and of the charges incurred by the Government in connection with the acquisition. It may be noted in this connection that the expression 'local authority' occurring in S. 17 of this Act has been used in a restricted sense of the municipal bodies, namely, the Municipal Board, Nagar Mahapalika, Zila Parishad etc. for the areas concerned, and that is why the expression "Authority" used with reference to a development authority has been distinguished from a local authority'. However, this verbal distinction, which has been made only as a legislative drafting device, in the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, has no effect on the meaning of the expression "local authority" occurring in the Land Acquisition Act which has to be culled out from the (Central) General Clauses Act. It follows thus that the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be attracted to the case of acquisition for purposes of a development authority. 11. Sri S.N. Shukla and Sri Uma Shanker have contended that the master plan published by the State Government notification dated 27-1-70 was invalid. The State Government in its notification which is printed on page 90 of the book on the subject edited by Sri Uma Shanker himself purported to sanction the master plan under rule 6(6) of the Nagar Mahapalika Improvement Scheme and Master Plan Rules, 1965, in so far as the master plan related to the area comprised within the city of Lucknow, i.e, under the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika and under Direction No. 1(5)(f) of the Directions issued under S. 14 of the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958 in so far as it related to the regulated area under the latter Act. The contention of these learned counsel was that rule 6(6) was ultra vires the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. We find no substance in this contention. S. 383 of. the Adhiniyam gives power to the Nagar Mahapalika to prepare a master plan for the city. The contention of these learned counsel was that rule 6(6) was ultra vires the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. We find no substance in this contention. S. 383 of. the Adhiniyam gives power to the Nagar Mahapalika to prepare a master plan for the city. The rules have been framed by the Government under 5.384 (2)(d) of the Adhiniyam which provides that the Government may make rules in respect of all matters relating to the preparation and revision of master plan for the city. The rules were published with a notification dated 18-9-65. The only ground of attack on these rules, as urged in arguments, (though not taken in any writ petition) was that sub-rule (8) provided that the fact that the master plan had been sanctioned shall be notified in the Gazette and that such notification shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the master plan had been duly prepared and sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The rule-making power being widely worded, as noticed above, we do not find any invalidity either in sub-rule (6) or in sub-rule (8). Indeed, sub-rule (8) is immaterial for our purposes, as the fact that the master plan has been sanctioned by the State Government under sub-rule (6) is not at all disputed and even without invoking the "conclusive evidence" (sic) sub-rule (8) a presumption can be drawn under section 114 of the Evidence Act, which has not been rebutted, that the master plan was duly prepared and sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 12. Direction No. 1(5)(f), as it then stood, empowered the Government to sanction a master plan. The argument of learned counsel was that a power cannot be conferred by a definition clause. A specific provision has been made in regard to preparation of a master plan in Direction No. 10-A which has come into force only on 26-4-72 and it must be presumed, so the argument runs, that prior to introduction of Direction No. 10-A there was no power to prepare a master plan. We find no force in either of these submissions. There are innumerable instances of conferment of power through definition clauses. To take only a few illustrations, section 2(a)(xi) of the Essential Commodities Act confers power on the Central Government to declare any commodity as an essential commodity for purposes of the Act. We find no force in either of these submissions. There are innumerable instances of conferment of power through definition clauses. To take only a few illustrations, section 2(a)(xi) of the Essential Commodities Act confers power on the Central Government to declare any commodity as an essential commodity for purposes of the Act. Even in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 section .2(o) empowers the State Government to direct that any other officer may also be treated to be an officer incharge of the police station. Likewise, clause (s) of the same section empowers the State Government to declare any post or place as a police station. It is immaterial in what manner the legislative authority words the provision conferring a power on any other authority. What is material is that the power should actually be conferred. Direction 10-A may have been introduced subsequently and the definition given in Direction No. 1(S) may have been consequentially recast only with a view to greater drafting neatness. But mere recasting of the legislative language does not lead to any necessary inference that the power did not exist earlier. We thus find no merit in the plea that the master plan for Lucknow notified on 27-1-70 was, in any way, invalid on the grounds urged before us. 13. These very learned counsel also tried to urge during arguments that the master plan which was being circulated was a forged and incomplete document. No such plea could be pointed out as having been raised in any writ petition and as such we declined to entertain this plea in arguments. 14. Sri R. N. Gupta argued that the proposed acquisition could not be for a public purpose inasmuch as depriving the residents of the village Ujariaon of their land for housing the inhabitants of Lucknow city could not be a valid or legitimate public purpose. In other words, robbing Peter to pay Paul could not be a public purpose. In Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, (1966) 3 SCR 885 , at 907-909 : AIR 1966 SC 1788 at p. 1801, it was. however, held by their Lordships that : "Public purpose involves in it an element of general interest of the community and whatever furthers the general interest must be regarded as a public purpose." It can hardly be contended that development of a new township is not a public purpose. however, held by their Lordships that : "Public purpose involves in it an element of general interest of the community and whatever furthers the general interest must be regarded as a public purpose." It can hardly be contended that development of a new township is not a public purpose. In the process of such development a few people are bound to be uprooted and it is for the Government to consider how best the public purpose will be subserved by serving the larger public interest and with the least inconvenience to the least number of persons. Of course, the welfare of the residents of these 'villages'. or rather these suburban areas, is also a public purpose, but the Government is expected to reconcile the conflicting public purposes, and in the absence of mala fides or malice in law, this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Government on this point. 15. It was also argued by Sri R. N. Gupta that by incorporating all these villages within the development area. the Government would be indirectly abolishing the Gaon Sabhas concerned which it cannot do in view of the provisions of S. 3 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, and S. 117 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. We find no merit in this argument. If a village is absorbed in an urban area by extension of municipal limits, it may entail the consequential abolition of Gaon Sabhas, but we do not see how such extension would he illegal. A Gaon Sabha is constituted for a rural area. The character of a rural area may change to an urban area, and thereupon the need for Gaon Sabha also automatically disappears. There is nothing in the statutory provisions referred to by learned counsel to inhibit the power of the Government to acquire land for purposes of extension of urban development over suburban areas. 15A. Sri R. N. Gupta further argued that the aforesaid master plan in any case came to an end under S. 59 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. 15A. Sri R. N. Gupta further argued that the aforesaid master plan in any case came to an end under S. 59 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. S. 59 provides that in respect of development area the corresponding provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act shall stand suspended and the provisions of Sections 6 and 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act shall apply in relation to such suspension as if the suspension amounted to repeal of the said enactments. It has further been laid down in this section that any "directions" under the Regulation of Building Operations Act shall continue to the extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the new Act. In view of this saving provision. we do not see how the master plan. which was issued under the "directions" could be said to have come to an end under S. 59. 16. We may now come to the main arguments which have been advanced by Sri Raja Ram Agarwal and which have been adopted by most other learned counsel for the petitioners except to the extent already indicated. 17. Sri Agarwal has contended that the LDA could only act within the four corners of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. Under that Act it could act only in accordance with duly framed plans. The existing master plan did not permit the use of this area for residential and other purposes connected with the setting up of a new township. As such it was not permissible for the Government to say that the land was required for planned development. Under that Act it could act only in accordance with duly framed plans. The existing master plan did not permit the use of this area for residential and other purposes connected with the setting up of a new township. As such it was not permissible for the Government to say that the land was required for planned development. The Explanation to section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act inserted by the U.P. Legislature by U.P. Act 8 of 1974, however, lays down that in respect of any.land in a regulated area (within the meaning of U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act) a notification under this sub-section may be issued in anticipation of the preparation and finalisation of a Scheme for the planned development of the area in which the land is situated Although the provisions of the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act stand suspended under S. 59(1) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act in respect of a development area, the expression"regulated area" should in the light of the principles underlying S. 8 of the General Clauses area within the meaning of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, It was laid down in National Sewing Thread Co. v. James Chadwick, AIR 1953 SC 357 , Union of India v. Mohammad Usman, AIR 12965 All 269, and Misra Nand Kaushik v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 All 204 , that the principles underlying the General Clauses Act may be invoked even where the provisions of any section of that Act do not in terms apply. Sri Agarwal, however, contended that although a notification under section 4(1) could, no doubt, be issued in anticipation of finalisation of a plan. the same would be only for the purposes of action under sub -section (2) of that section. He. however, contended that action for the proposed plan could not be treated as 'planned development for purposes of S. 1711-A). The necessity of taking possession could only arise after finalisation of the plan and not earlier. We find. however, that the words "planned development" used in this Explanation are the same as used in S. 17(1-A) by the State Legislature and it would be difficult to hold that what is planned development within the meaning of this Explanation is not to be treated as planned development within the meaning of section 17(1-A). Moreover, in Aflatoon (supra). We find. however, that the words "planned development" used in this Explanation are the same as used in S. 17(1-A) by the State Legislature and it would be difficult to hold that what is planned development within the meaning of this Explanation is not to be treated as planned development within the meaning of section 17(1-A). Moreover, in Aflatoon (supra). (para 23 of SCC) even where no such explanation was in force, a similar argument was repelled by their Lordships who held as follows : "It is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no inhibition. in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under "the Act before the Master Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi, AIR 1963 SC 1077 ). In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible the area in which the land is situated. in an area other than a development area Although the provisions of the U.P. with the approval or sanction of the local (Regulation of Building Operations) Act authority did not preclude the Central stand suspended under S. 59(l) of the U.P. Government from acquiring the land for Urban Planning and Development Act in planned development under the Act. respect of a development area, the Section 12 is concerned only with the expression "regulated area" should in the planned development. It has nothing to do light of the principles underlying S. 8 of with the acquisition of property, the U.P. General Clauses Act, be read as acquisition generally precedes development. including a development area within the For planned development in an area other meaning of the U.P. Urban Planning and than a development area, it is only Development Act. It was laid down in necessary to obtain the sanction or National Sewing Thread Co. v. James approval of the local authority as provided Chadwick, AIR 1953 SC 357 , Union of in Section 12(3)." 18. It has been pointed out b Sri Umesh Chandra. It was laid down in necessary to obtain the sanction or National Sewing Thread Co. v. James approval of the local authority as provided Chadwick, AIR 1953 SC 357 , Union of in Section 12(3)." 18. It has been pointed out b Sri Umesh Chandra. learned counsel for LDA, underlying the General Clauses Act may in this context that in certain eventualities be invoked even where the provisions of the Vice-Chairman of LDA or the State Government could, vide S. 14(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, permit development of any land even if the same was not in conformity with the master plan. 18A. In view of the decision in Aflatoon's case, AIR 1974 SC 2077 (supra), the acquisition proceedings could be undertaken and the land could be acquired even in anticipation of Government's sanction to the proposed amendment to the master plan of 1970. It was urged in passing that there was no zonal development plan as contemplated by the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act. The master plan had been prepared under the earlier enactments and was to continue in force until it was revised under the new Act. The master plan itself divides the area covered thereby into various zones. The question of the master plan being not valid for want of zonal development plans does not, therefore, arise. It is only when a new plan is to be framed under the new Act that the procedure laid down in that Act, vide Sections 8 and 11, is to be followed. 19. Sri Agarwal has tried to distinguish Aflatoon's case on the ground that the expression "planned development" occurring in section 17(1-A) in our case did not occur in the statute in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We have already pointed out that the expression "planned development" occurring in this sub-section is the same as in the Explanation of S. 4(1) and as such must he construed as comprising development either in accordance with a sanctioned master plan or in anticipation of a sanctioned or modified master plan. 20. It was also contended before us that the procedure followed for amendment of the master plan was not correct inasmuch as the notice dated 6-12 -82 was not published by the State Government as required by S. 13(3). 20. It was also contended before us that the procedure followed for amendment of the master plan was not correct inasmuch as the notice dated 6-12 -82 was not published by the State Government as required by S. 13(3). The notice itself, however, shows that although it purports to have been published by LDA, it had been published after previous approval of the State Government for the proposals for amendment. The LDA has only received the objections and suggestions and thereafter formulated its recommendations which have been forwarded to the State Government which is to take a final decision. Thus, the procedural flaw pointed out does not, in any manner, affect the substance and as such cannot be said to be fatal. 21. Sri Agarwal also contended that the Gazette in which the notification under S. 4 was published was available to the petitioners only on 19-2-83 and that it should, therefore. be presumed that it was not actually published on the date on which it purported to be published. He has referred in this connection to the averments in.paras 24, 25 and 41 of the writ petition and para 6 of the rejoinder affidavit. We find, however, that the averments in these paragraphs are vague inasmuch as they do not disclose where the petitioners made efforts to obtain copy of the Gazette and where and how they ultimately succeeded in obtaining a copy of that Gazette. The presumption of due publication cannot be displaced by such vague averments. 22. We now come to the main argument advanced in the case by Sri Agarwal which is to the effect that the invocation of the urgency clause under S. 17 was bad in law. It has been contended that though the satisfaction of the State, Government is to be subjective. yet such satisfaction must be based on objective materials and that it could be challenged on the basis of non-application of mind. He has contended that the matter of acquisition could not he so urgent as to preclude even a summary inquiry as is contemplated by section 5-A and in support of this he has placed reliance on Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 : AIR 1977 SC 183 . He has contended that the matter of acquisition could not he so urgent as to preclude even a summary inquiry as is contemplated by section 5-A and in support of this he has placed reliance on Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 : AIR 1977 SC 183 . He has contended that once the validity of the satisfaction and existence of objective material in support of the satisfaction are challenged, the burden lay on the State Government to prove that it did have such material to act upon. In the instant case, he has contended that the State Government has acted hastily under pressure from the LDA and its haste was evident from the fact that the notifications were issued even before the Government was able to decide the objections to the proposed amendment of the master plan. The Government had also not applied its mind to the factors raised in the petitioners' objections to the proposed amendments to the master plan, namely, that the petitioners industry was a priority industry and that even exemption has been granted by the State Government itself to this industry under S. 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. He has further contended that as much as 1600 acres of land earmarked for sullage farm has also been transferred by the Nagar Mahapalika for the Gomati Nagar Scheme, vide resolution dated 14-5-82 of LDA. No alternative arrangement for setting up of a sullage farm has been made by the LDA or Nagar Mahapalika. Learned counsel has also relied on the decision of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 , (para 16), (a case of actual malice or mala fides). Dr. Nanak Chandra Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 105, Smt. Manohari Devi Balwal v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 163, Ajadul Bux v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 All 435 and A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P., 1983 All LJ 1016. 23. Dr. Nanak Chandra Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 105, Smt. Manohari Devi Balwal v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 163, Ajadul Bux v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 All 435 and A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P., 1983 All LJ 1016. 23. In Narayan Govind Gavate's case (supra) relied on by the learned counsel, para 24 of the report, their Lordships held that "the High Court had correctly stated the grounds on which even a subjective opinion as to the existence of the need to take action under S. 17(4) of the Act can be challenged on certain limited grounds." The Bombay High Court judgment on this point was extracted in para 11 of the report in which it was stated that the satisfaction of the Government could be challenged only on three grounds: "Firstly, on the ground of mala fides secondly, on the ground that the authority which formed that opinion or which arrived at such satisfaction did not apply its mind to the material on which it formed the opinion or arrived at the satisfaction, and thirdly, that the material on which it formed its opinion or reached- the satisfaction was so insufficient that no man could reasonably reach that conclusion." It was added that "So far as the third point is concerned, no court of. law can. as in an appeal, consider that, on the material placed before the authority, the authority was justified in reaching its conclusion. The court can interfere only in such cases where there was no material at all or the material was so insufficient that no man could have reasonably reached that conclusion." 24. We have, therefore, to consider the challenge on the basis of these propositions. The plea of mala fides has been vaguely asserted in some of the writ petitions, and it was not seriously argued and, at any event, we find no substance in the same. We have, therefore, to consider the second and third points enumerated above. 25. It was, no doubt, at the instance and persuasion of the LDA that the Government formed the opinion that the matter was so urgent that an inquiry under section 5-A would be unnecessarily dilatory. We have, therefore, to take into account the counter-affidavits filed by the State Government as well as the LDA on this point. 25. It was, no doubt, at the instance and persuasion of the LDA that the Government formed the opinion that the matter was so urgent that an inquiry under section 5-A would be unnecessarily dilatory. We have, therefore, to take into account the counter-affidavits filed by the State Government as well as the LDA on this point. Learned Standing Counsel for the Government also placed before us the relevant record which indicates that before issue of notification invoking S. 14 the matter was referred to the Legislative Department and they raised certain queries about the urgency clause whereupon further material was asked for from the LDA, and the LDA furnished further material and ultimately the State Government was satisfied. The LDA in its affidavit has pointed out that in view of the acute housing shortage in the capital town of Uttar Pradesh and the likelihood of the housing problem becoming more acute on account of rise in population as well as influx of more and more persons to the town of Lucknow know for seeking employment and other business avocations it was necessary to develop this big residential township in a planned manner for which an area of 1600 acres was required to be acquired. The scheme was to cost about 75 crores including development and housing programme. . The LDA had already obtained over 650 acres of land from the Nagar Mahapalika and on that basis had started inviting applications and obtaining registration deposits. The LDA planned to develop houses for economically weaker sections of the society as well. The work had been started in full swing and tenders of the value of more than one crore had already been accepted by the time the counter-affidavit dated 10-5-83 was filed. Further tenders of the value of rupees three crores for construction of houses had been received and the work was going to start and the same would include about five thousand houses for economically weaker section of society. In all. over ten thousand houses were to be constructed within a period of one year. As much as 70% of the land under the scheme had been earmarked for the economically weaker section. In all. over ten thousand houses were to be constructed within a period of one year. As much as 70% of the land under the scheme had been earmarked for the economically weaker section. As against this, the population of the village Ujariaon was only about six thousand and that of Gazipur Saidulanisha was about two hundred and it was expected that on account of acquisition of land about five hundred families doing cultivation would be affected. In village Vijaipur only about thirty families would be affected. Almost 90% of people living in these villages were engaged in jobs other than agricultural and mostly depended for their livelihood upon the city of Lucknow. They would be allotted land on preferential basis under the scheme. About 50% of the acquired area was to be left open as roads, parks and Green Belts and 50% was to be utilised in making plots and buildings. After Bangalore city, Lucknow was fastest growing town in terms of the rate of increase of population. The population had already touched the level of 13.14 lacs and was likely to increase by not less than five lacs by the next census of 1991. Lucknow being the capital of the most populous State of the Country. had to be properly developed, Due to lack of proper planning there had been considerable encroachment and pressure on road traffic. With the development of Gomati Nagar, there would be dispersion of jobs and traffic from the inner area of the city of Lucknow. It is planned to connect Faizabad Road with Kanpur Road through a Ring Road in the first phase. Ultimately, the Ring Road will cover the entire city on all sides. On an average, 8000 to 10.000 new jobs are created in a year in Lucknow in the service sector alone, namely, banks, Government offices, Governmental undertaking, Companies, Corporations, Co-operative Societies etc. and.this means that on an average the population increases by forty thousand to fifty thousand persons every year. It was in the context of these facts. according to LDA, that they had impressed on the Government the urgency of the matter. 26. and.this means that on an average the population increases by forty thousand to fifty thousand persons every year. It was in the context of these facts. according to LDA, that they had impressed on the Government the urgency of the matter. 26. On the other hand, it has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that there are already several schemes of the LDA and of the U.P. Housing and Development Board which have been going on and it was, therefore, not very urgent to proceed with this new scheme. This argument is, in our opinion, wholly unrealistic. Considering the magnitude of the problem of urban planning, housing and development, the mere fact that a few schemes are already in operation cannot lull us into a sense of complacency. There is a constant flow of population from the villages to the cities and from smaller cities to the metropolitan cities. The argument of Sri Agarwal that the urgency clause could be invoked in respect of housing scheme only when there is a sudden influx of population such as in the wake of country's partition is difficult to accept. To accept the same would imply that the urgency clause can hardly ever be invoked in a case of "planned development". That would negate and frustrate the intention of the Legislature which specifically provided for "planned development" as a ground for invoking the urgency clause. 27. Sri Agrawal has placed the greatest reliance on the observations in para 42 (SCC) of Narayan's case, (supra). wherein their Lordships observed as follows : "All schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas must be urgent in the context of the country's need for increased production and more residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature of such schemes of development does not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries under Section 5A of the Act." 27A. These observations have to be read in the context of the facts of that case. The greatest distinguishing feature is that the statute which was considered by. their Lordships in that case did not, it seems, empower the Government,- as our sub-section (1-A) of section 17 does, -to invoke the urgency clause in cases of planned development. These observations have to be read in the context of the facts of that case. The greatest distinguishing feature is that the statute which was considered by. their Lordships in that case did not, it seems, empower the Government,- as our sub-section (1-A) of section 17 does, -to invoke the urgency clause in cases of planned development. Secondly, a perusal of paras 3 to 9 of the report shows that the Government in that case did not even attempt to place before the court any material in support of the alleged urgency. They merely took their stand on the plea of non-justifiability of the satisfaction of the Government. Such a plea could obviously not stand in view of the principles of challenge ability mentioned earlier. In para 42 it was further noted by their Lordships that "The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act" and that it was "certainly a case in which the recital was at least defective" and that "the burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under section 5A of the Act and that the mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question." The matter was thus decided only on the basis of burden of proof. The observations extracted above cannot be read as if they were the words of a statute, but have to be read only as forming part of the train of reasoning while formulating the principles of law laid down in the case. It would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature to construe the said dicta of their Lordships to mean that even though the Legislature says that S. 17 can be invoked if the Government thinks it necessary for purposes of planned development, yet it cannot be invoked for purposes merely of planned development. There is no doubt, an observation in para 39 of Narayan, (supra), that the urgency clause could be invoked in the case of operation of natural physical forces beyond human control, but as was pointed out in Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 , (paras 8 to 10). There is no doubt, an observation in para 39 of Narayan, (supra), that the urgency clause could be invoked in the case of operation of natural physical forces beyond human control, but as was pointed out in Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 , (paras 8 to 10). this observation was only illustrative and not exhaustive of the situations in which the urgency clause could be invoked. 28. The cases of our own High Court relied on by learned counsel were also based on the respective facts of each case. Sri Umesh Chandra. learned counsel for the LDA, has on the other hand relied on the cases in Rajbali v. State, AIR 1983 All 78 , Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 (supra), Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 , Patna Improvement Trust v. Lakshmi Devi, AIR 1963 SC 1077 , and Aflatoon's case, AIR 1974 SC 2077 (supra), and also Ishwarial Girdharilal Joshi v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870 . A recent decision in Anand Kishore v. State of U.P., 1984 All LJ 58, also upholds the invocation of the urgency clause and distinguishes the decision in Dr. Nanak Chandra Chaturvedi (1979 All CJ 105) and Smt. Manohari Devi Balwal, (1979 All CJ 163) (supra). It is unnecessary to discuss all the cases separately. Each decision is related to its individual facts, and the principles are well settled as laid down in Narayan, (supra), from which the relevant extract has already been given above: 29. In the instant case, so far as the public notice inviting objections and suggestions in respect of proposed amendment to the master plan was concerned, only ten objections were received. It does not, however. imply that even under S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act only a few objections would have been received as has been contended by Sri Agarwal. In Aflatoon's case it is mentioned that after the notification under S. 4 was issued on 13-11-59 in respect of thirty-four thousand acres of land, as many as six thousand objections were filed up-till 1961. After these objections were decided, the declaration under S. 6 was published on 18-3-66. This illustrates the likely time-lag between a notification under S. 4 and declaration under S. 6 if an inquiry under section 5A is held in respect of a big scheme. After these objections were decided, the declaration under S. 6 was published on 18-3-66. This illustrates the likely time-lag between a notification under S. 4 and declaration under S. 6 if an inquiry under section 5A is held in respect of a big scheme. So far as the Gomati Nagar Scheme is concerned, at least a few hundred objections could have been expected to be filed and they could well have taken. on an optimistic estimate, at least a year to dispose of if an inquiry under section 5-A, howsoever summary in nature. were to be held. It is it notorious fact that even summary inquiries take a very long time. particularly when a large number of objectors are involved. Even service of notices on individuals in respect of dates of hearing takes a long time to complete. Thereafter, succession are procedural hurdles are often encountered. In such a big scheme a delay of even one year would have meant a tremendous escalation of cost in view of the constant increase in prices in these days of galloping inflation. The expected escalation would ultimately have been passed oil to the consumers, namely, the prospective allottees, in other words, the general public including economically 'weaker sections and not merely the middle income group and higher income group as contended- by the petitioners. It cannot in these circumstances be said that the Government when if invoked S. 17, was satisfied on non -existent material or on so insufficient a material that no man could reasonably reach that conclusion. Nor can it be said that the Government did not apply its mind to that material. Narayan's case was one in which no material was at-all placed before the court and is thus clearly distinguishable. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the challenge to the invocation of S. 17(1)(1-A) read with S. 1714) must fail. 30. Lastly, the petitioners contend that their plots had been arbitrarily included in the notification for acquisition whale the plots of others similarly situated had been excluded. Sri Agarwal has placed the facts relating to the industries set up by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983. Sri P.N. Mathur had placed the facts relating to the industry of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2799 of 1983. Sri Agarwal has placed the facts relating to the industries set up by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1983. Sri P.N. Mathur had placed the facts relating to the industry of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2799 of 1983. Sri Mohammad Husain has contended that some of the plots of his clients which are sought to be acquired were graveyards recorded in the revenue papers. However, as held in Mohd. Ali Khan v. Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika, AIR 1978 All 280 , graveyards and cremation grounds and even places of worship are not legally immune from compulsory acquisition, though the State, out of respect for the sentiments of the people concerned, may voluntarily refrain from exercising its powers in such cases except in compelling circumstances. In such cases the question of locus standi of the petitioners may also arise. vide Mohd. Naqi Khan v. State of U.P., 1965 All LJ 609. Some other petitioners have contended that their plots contained houses from before. It has also been contended that while some industries and houses in adjacent areas had been allowed to remain untouched, the industries and houses belonging to the respective petitioners are proposed to be demolished in consequence of acquisition for the scheme. This is said to be arbitrary and discriminatory. Without accepting the factual assertions made on behalf of the petitioners, the opposite-parties have expressed their willingness to examine individual cases on their own merits. Learned Counsel for the opposite-parties have assured us that after examining the cases they would fairly exclude the land of any of the petitioners which deserved to be excluded in order to remove any legitimate complaint of discrimination. In view of this assurance, we do not propose to embark on examination of the detailed complaints of discrimination sought to be advanced by various petitioners. There is no case of deliberately hostile discrimination, though the possibility of inadvertent discrimination may not be ruled out. The assurance given by learned counsel for the opposite-parties relieves us of the burden to look into the individual cases from this aspect. Although the inquiry under S. 5-A has been held to be validly dispensed with, the opposite-parties are nevertheless willing to examine individual cases from the point of view of relief of any complaint of discrimination only. For this purpose they are prepared to consider any material that may he placed by the respective petitioners. Although the inquiry under S. 5-A has been held to be validly dispensed with, the opposite-parties are nevertheless willing to examine individual cases from the point of view of relief of any complaint of discrimination only. For this purpose they are prepared to consider any material that may he placed by the respective petitioners. We will expect the authorities to act according to this assurance and we, accordingly. refrain from entering into this ground of challenge at this stage. 31. Normally, it is for the Government to devise the procedure for examining such complaints. However. having regard to the large number of petitioners and the nature of their complaints, we are of the opinion that it would be proper that the material that may be placed by the petitioners may be got examined through a senior officer with a judicial background. The work involves sifting of evidence and application of correct legal principles to the facts ascertained, and that is a task that may appropriately be discharged by a judge. We would suggest the State Government may appoint a retired judge a special officer. The retired judge may be of the rank at least of District Judge. However, although we are suggesting the appointment of judge to make a preliminary examination of the material, we should make it clear that the inquiry that would be so entrusted to the judge would be purely a fact-finding administrative inquiry for the information of the mind of the Government and not a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry. The judge will not be required to hear any oral evidence though hearing of oral arguments, to the extent convenient. may be feasible. The officer may be given all facilities of transport, clerk, stenographer etc. so that he may be able to make local inspections and to complete his work quickly. No individual notices need be sent to the petitioners. Indeed, the cases of the land owners other than the petitioners need not even be examined because the other land owners may be assumed to have acquiesced in the acquisition proceedings. So far as the present petitioners are concerned, they have no objection to any amendment of the impugned notifications whereby their land may be deleted from acquisition. The petitioners need not be sent individual notices and a public notice through local newspapers should be deemed enough. So far as the present petitioners are concerned, they have no objection to any amendment of the impugned notifications whereby their land may be deleted from acquisition. The petitioners need not be sent individual notices and a public notice through local newspapers should be deemed enough. The petitioners may keep their material with sworn affidavits ready to be filed with such officer or with the Government or at such other office as may be appointed in that behalf immediately on publication of such notice. The inquiry should not be allowed to be dragged on. A lump sum remuneration may he provided for payment to the officer. Considering the rank of the officer. his report should not be subjected to the usual bureaucratic examination at the Secretariat level but final orders should he passed thereon by the Secretary to the Government or the Minister, whosoever may he competent under Rules of Business, without any examination at a lower level. We have thought fit to make these detailed observations in the interest of fairness to 1984 ALL.L.J. "0 XI (11 the petitioners as well as to the Government and the LDA. The officer may also he given the assistance of revenue staff for purposes of survey etc. so that he may complete the work in a month or so. 32. During the course of the arguments we were told that the collector had made an offer of about 18 paise per sq. ft. as provisional compensation to the owners. We were also informed that in respect of acquisition of land for HAL which is adjacent to the Gomati Nagar area. this court had enhanced the compensation to Rs. 3/- per sq. ft. and that the same had been upheld by the Honble Supremo. Court as well. Although the question off compensation was not directly before us in these writ petitions, we expressed. during the course of hearing, our view that as public authorities the Government and the LDA were expected to act in a fair manner and to give to the land owners a reasonable offer of compensation instead of compelling them all to litigate over compensation. during the course of hearing, our view that as public authorities the Government and the LDA were expected to act in a fair manner and to give to the land owners a reasonable offer of compensation instead of compelling them all to litigate over compensation. We are not in a position to say, in the absence of any material in the instant case, what are the distinguishing features (from the point of view of valuation) between the land under acquisition here and the land which had been earlier acquired for HAL but even on a rough and conservative estimate it was patent that an offer of mere 18 paise per sq. ft. as compensation was ludicrously on the low side, and that even as provisional compensation an offer of at least Rs. per sq. ft. should be made. We had expressed this expectation during arguments and the learned counsel for LDA fairly stated that the expectation of this court would be duly honoured. It should, however. be added that if on a consideration of all the facts, the collector and the LDA are convinced that even a higher figure is Clearly called for, they should not hesitate in making an offer of a higher figure so that the land owners, most of whom may be from among the weaker sections of the people. may not have to go to court on this point unnecessarily. Even after making a reasonable offer, the parties may sit down across the table and finalise an agreed compensation rate so that even the need of a reference under S. 18 may he eliminated. However, the preliminary offer itself should, we expect he announced within a month from today and payments be made to the land owners who have chosen or who hereafter choose not to contest the acquisition itself. 33. Subject to the aforesaid directions. all the writ petitions are dismissed, but no order is made as to costs. 34. Immediately after the above judgment was pronounced, Shri H. S. Jain and Shri M. A. Khan on behalf of some of the petitioners of the aforesaid petitions, made an oral prayer under Article 133 read with Article 134-A of the Constitution, for a certificate. We are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As such the certificate prayed for is refused.