JUDGMENT Kamleshwar Nath, J. 1. This is an appeal against the acquittal of the respondents Dina and others of offences, under section 500 IPC and 4 (3) of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Appellant Pokhai is Raidas (Chamar) by caste and is the Chaudhary of the community. The respondents also belong to the same community. The complainant-appellant used to carry on business in leather. 2. On 28-6-78 the appellant filed a complaint naming all the respondents with the allegation that the latter were unlawfully outcasting him from the community and had defamed him. It was stated that for quite some time the respondents were asking him to desist from carrying on his business of leather to which he was not agreeable, with the result that the respondents were threatening to ex-communicate him and not to participate or take meals at such ceremonial functions like marriage where he, the complainant, appeared, participated and took meals. In particular on 1-6-78 when the appellant went to attend the dinner of the marriage of the son of Nanda Chamar in village Malaha on a proper invitation, the accused-respondents declared that if the former participated in the function, they would not take meals. In consequence the plaintiff left the place and did :not participate in the function. The complainant then called a village Panchayat on 25-6-78 which took a decision that the complainant-appellant would be free to carry on his trade in leather and he would not be ex-communicated by any one. Inspite of this decision the respondents continued to denigrate him which has caused the great set back of his reputation, dignity and prestige. He, therefore, prayed for the prosecution of the respondents. The complainant-appellant examined himself as PW 1, Ram Jiawan (PW 2) Shri Ram (PW 3) and Kalloo (PW 4) to prove the facts of the case. The respondents examined DW 1 Badlu. 3. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that since the impugned acts of the accused were not the result of the caste-discrimination but only on account of the appellant's trade activities, no case under section 4(3) of the Act was made out. The respondents examined DW 1 Badlu. 3. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that since the impugned acts of the accused were not the result of the caste-discrimination but only on account of the appellant's trade activities, no case under section 4(3) of the Act was made out. The Magistrate found that the accused-respondents forbade the complainant-appellant to carry on trade in leather and on his failure to comply they had ex-communicated the appellant (Hukka Pani Band Kar Diya) and for the same reason the appellant had to come away from the house of Nanda where he had gone for meals. On this basis it was held that the ex-communication of the appellant by the accused, on account of trade activity, did not constitute the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. 4. At the time of hearing of this appeal no one appeared on behalf of the respondents. I have gone through the record with the aid of the learned counsel for the appellant who does not press for the prosecution of the respondents for the offence under Section 4 (3) of the Act. His contention is that on the own findings of the trial court, as also according to the evidence on the record, it was fully established that the respondents were openly excommunicating the appellant so much so that he had suffered in his reputation, respect and esteem which he had earned as a respectable member and. a Chaudhary of the community. It is urged that the appellant's reputation has been lowered in the estimation of others. There seems to be substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The complaint case as stated above briefly has not only been reiterated by Pokhai (PW 1) on oath but it has also been supported by the statements of Ram Jiwan (PW 2), PW 3 Shri Ram and PW 4 Kalloo. PW 2 Ram Jiawan stated that although the Panchayat called by the complainant had taken a decision that the complainant-appellant could carry on the business in leather, the accused-respondents nevertheless' told the members of the community that they would not take meals if the complainant was called on and participated in any social function. PW 2 Ram Jiawan stated that although the Panchayat called by the complainant had taken a decision that the complainant-appellant could carry on the business in leather, the accused-respondents nevertheless' told the members of the community that they would not take meals if the complainant was called on and participated in any social function. PW 3 Shri Ram stated that the accused did not accept the decision of the panchayat and went on to say that even if the members of the Biradari called the complainant then that person would also be ex-communicated (Hukka Pani Band Kar Diya Jayega). PW 4 Kalloo stated that at the marriage function of Nanda's son, the complianant and all the accused were present; that the accused stated that if the complainant took meals at the function, then they would not take meals, in consequence of which the complainant did not take meals at Nanda's place. 5. The evidence of PW 1 Badlu relates to the incident at Nanda's place. He says that he had attended the function but neither the complainant Pokhai nor the accused were present therein. fit is significant that he admitted the presence of Shri Ram (PW 3) in that function. As already mentioned, PW 3 Shri Ram has fully supported the case of complainant-appellant (PW J) Pokhai. It is impossible to believe, therefore, the statement of DW 1 Badlu that no incident as deposed to on behalf of the complainant had taken place on the occasion of marriage of Nanda's son. It is also noticeable that DW 1 Badlu stated that for about 4 years Pokhai neither invites the accused nor the accused go to his place but he did not know why there has been a secession of messing and meals , between them. A consideration of the statement of DW 1 Badlu as a whole shows that he is not a reliable witness and is concealing the truth. Indeed, he went on to say that he did not know whether any litigation about the land was going am between the appellant Pokhai and his uncle Gulab. 6. The evidence on the record as adduced on both sides thus fully establishes the facts set forth in the complaint. The view of the trial court was that despite these facts no offence of defamation had been committed. In my opinion this is not correct appreciation of law of defamation. 6. The evidence on the record as adduced on both sides thus fully establishes the facts set forth in the complaint. The view of the trial court was that despite these facts no offence of defamation had been committed. In my opinion this is not correct appreciation of law of defamation. Section 499 IPC says inter alia that whoever, by spoken words makes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases thereinafter excepted, to defame that person. It may be mentioned at this stage that it is the statement of Pokhai as also of PW 2 Ram Jiawan, that there had been enmity between the appellant and the accused respondents over leather business carried on by the former which the respondents wanted him to stop. That provides the background of the intention with which the respondents, if otherwise proved, must have acted in making imputations against the appellant. Explanation 4 of Section 499 IPC would show that a person's reputation is said to be harmed by an imputation if it lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person by itself or in respect of his calling or lowers the credits of that person. An imputation that a person would be ex-communicated if he carries on the business of leather and if he participates in social functions and takes meals is certainly one which lowers the moral character of that person not only by itself but also in respect of his profession, i.e., the business of leather. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the case of Mohan Lal v. Ram Charan, AIR 1928 Allahabad 213 to show that an imputation outcasting another person is defamatory. He has also referred to the case of Babu Lal v. Tundi Lal, 1932 CrLJ 835 where it has been held that the members of a caste cannot, as individuals, take the law into their own hands and declare a member to be outcasted and assert it to be so, unless there has been a regular meeting of the caste panchayat and a decision taken on the subject. In the present case there has been a caste panchayat and it has upheld the complaint of the complainant- appellant. 7. In the present case there has been a caste panchayat and it has upheld the complaint of the complainant- appellant. 7. Learned counsel has also relied upon the observation of Nagpur High Court in the case of Bhanwar Singh v. Sukh Ram Singh, 1940 CrLJ 585 which runs as follows :- "There is good authority for holding that to say a man is an outcast when he has not been outcasted is to defame him. Such conduct is to be distinguished from the permissible course of bringing up an allegation before a caste panchayat for a, decision whether the person complained" against should be outcasted or not. It is also permissible to refuse personally to have anything to do socially with a caste fellow of whose conduct one disapproves, but it is a different matter to dub him an outcast and induce other persons to boycott him before there has been a decision of the caste in which the person accused has been given a fair hearing. " There is clear evidence in this case that the respondents have defamed the complainant-appellant by outcasting him despite of the decision of the panchayat in favour of the appellant. The motive for the respondents to do so flows from trade rivalry. There is evidence that the reputation of the appellant has been lowered in the estimation of other members of the appellant's community. It will not be out of place to mention here that the dignity of the individual citizen of the State has been ranked high as a constitutional right. The preamble of the Constitution speaks of "Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual ". The fundamental duty under Article 51A clause (e) requirs every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic an regional or sectional diversities., The right of a citizen to live with dignity by also been recognized in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution. It is a pity but despite these high ideals of our Constitution, which are by no mean impracticable, the accused-respondents have chosen to denigrate the appellant simply because the latter persisted in carrying on a leather trade which they wanted to stop. Social ostracism in a village community carries grave consequences, and I think that the arms of the law would provide adequate protection to people placed in that predicament. Social ostracism in a village community carries grave consequences, and I think that the arms of the law would provide adequate protection to people placed in that predicament. The order of acquittal recorded by the Magistrate is contrary to law and must be set aside. 8. The appeal is allowed. The acquittal of respondents by the trial court is set aside. Each one of the respondents 1 to 11 is convicted for an offence under section 500 IPC and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. In the event of payment or realisation of fine, a. sum of Rs. 500/- shall be paid to the appellant by way of compensation. The CJM is directed to report compliance of this judgment within 6 weeks. Appeal allowed.