JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - These three writ petitions are directed against the orders of dismissal passed against them by the Managing Director of the U. P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Bank.) They were all employees of the Bank and disciplinary proceedings were taken against them and thereafter the impugned orders were passed against them. The orders were passed with the prior concurrence of the U. P. Co-operative Institutional Services Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board). The said concurrence was obtained under Rule 89 of the U. P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rules framed by the Bank. 2. The contention of the petitioners is that no proper inquiry was held; that concurrence of the Board was obtained without considering the replies submitted by the petitioners to the show cause notice; and, that the final orders were also passed without considering the said replies. It has further been asserted that the Bank is an agency or instrumentality of the State and as such it is an 'authority within the meaning of Articles 12 and 226 of the Constitution. 3. The Bank has contested the petitions and has denied that it is an agency or instrumentality of the State. It has further asserted that proper inquiry was held in each case and that the show cause notice against the proposed penalty was not required under the rules and that the original notice given to the respective petitioners along with the charge sheets was enough. Accordingly, any reply submitted by the petitioners to the second show cause notice need not have been considered as the notice itself was redundant. It has further been contended that no writ petition lies in the matter as the Bank is not an `authority'. 4. As the points raised in all the three writ petitions are more or less identical the petitions were heard together with the consent of parties counsel and are accordingly being disposed of by a common judgment. 5. The first question that arises for consideration in these petitions is whether the Bank is an agency or instrumentality of the State. 4. As the points raised in all the three writ petitions are more or less identical the petitions were heard together with the consent of parties counsel and are accordingly being disposed of by a common judgment. 5. The first question that arises for consideration in these petitions is whether the Bank is an agency or instrumentality of the State. There was only a bald averment in para 1 of the writ petition No. 4284 of 1983 that the Bank is an instrumentality of the State being fully controlled by the State Government, it was not spelt out as to how and in what manner and in what respect the State Government exercises any control over the Bank. Thereafter during the course of hearing the petitions were amended and a new para was added to the effect that the Bank was an authority or instrumentality of the State as evident from the scheme of `the Act itself'. The title of the Act is not indicated in this amendment, but in arguments learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the provisions of the U. P. Co-operative Land Development Bank Act, 1964. This Act defines Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Land Development Bank as meaning "a co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force in Uttar Pradesh with its area of operation covering the whole of Uttar Pradesh and carrying on the business as a Land Development Bank and facilitating the operation of other land development banks, if any, included in its membership". That the opposite party Bank is such a co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force is not disputed. Thus it is beyond controversy that the Bank has not been created by or under any statute but is merely registered under a statute, and as such, it is not a statutory body. However this by itself is not decisive of the matter as it is now well settled that even a company or society registered under a statute may be treated as an instrumentality of the State if it satisfies certain other tests. These tests have been summarised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Prakash v. Union of India, (1981) 1 Serv LR 154 at p. 173: ( AIR 1981 SC 212 at p. 225) (para 38) as follows:- "................. ................. .............. 1. These tests have been summarised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Prakash v. Union of India, (1981) 1 Serv LR 154 at p. 173: ( AIR 1981 SC 212 at p. 225) (para 38) as follows:- "................. ................. .............. 1. One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. 2. Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. 3. It may also be a relevant factor .......... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. 4. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. 5. Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." 6. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Bank in each case, it has been stated that the share held by the State is only about 30 per cent. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by each petitioner there is a bare denial of the averment but it has not been attempted to be shown as to how much of the share capital is held by the State Government. We must, therefore, accept the averment of the respondent that the share held by the State Government is only thirty per cent. It is true that even on the basis of thirty per cent share-holding the State Government gets right of nomination on the Committee of Management of the Bank under Section 34 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. Such rights are often enjoyed by the Government or its instrumentalities (e.g., L. I. C., U. T. I., I. D. B. I.) in respect of various limited companies even in the private sector. It cannot, therefore, be said that the first ingredient laid down in Som Prakash supra is satisfied in the case. 7. The second ingredient is also not shown to be satisfied. Indeed, the control of the State Government is limited to the power of nomination under Section 34 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the first ingredient laid down in Som Prakash supra is satisfied in the case. 7. The second ingredient is also not shown to be satisfied. Indeed, the control of the State Government is limited to the power of nomination under Section 34 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. The State Government no doubt guarantees the debentures issued by the Bank, vide Section 8 of the U. P. Co-operative Land Development Banks Act and also constitutes a guarantee fund under Section 9 of that Act, and under Section 30 it makes rules to carry out the purpose of the Act, but these powers cannot by themselves be construed as conferring on the Government a deep and pervasive control on the Bank. 8. Ingredient No. 3 is no doubt attracted inasmuch as it is laid down in Section 3 of the U. P. Cooperative Land Development Bank Act that there shall not be more than one State Land Development Bank for the whole of Uttar Pradesh. Thus this Bank at the State level does enjoy a monopoly status which is State conferred. 9. As regards ingredient 4, the Bank does distribute loans to the agriculturists in pursuance of the State policy of facilitating the improvement and development of land of agriculturists. Sri R. N. Trivedi is however right in contending that similar functions are very often discharged even by the Banks in the private sector. Indeed, in a planned economy we have accepted the concept of mixed economy in which the private sector (including joint sector), the public and co-operative sectors have all their respective roles to play. They all are expected to contribute to the development of the country's economy. We cannot, therefore, hold that merely because loaning functions performed by the Banks are such as have the sanction of the State and have a place in the plans, the said functions are closely related to governmental functions. However, there are some regulatory functions, which will be presently noticed, which have also been entrusted to the State Land Development Bank or its Board of Directors (hereinafter referred to as the Board) and they no doubt are closely related to governmental functions. 10. Ingredient No. 5 is also not satisfied in the instant case because no department of the Government is transferred to the Bank. 10. Ingredient No. 5 is also not satisfied in the instant case because no department of the Government is transferred to the Bank. Indeed Section 28(2) of 1964 Act merely recognises the existence of the Bank only obliquely, inasmuch as it says that if on the date this Act comes into force any bank is functioning in the name of the U. P. State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank it shall within two months from such date change its name to the U. P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank. 11. Now, reverting to ingredient No. 4, under Section 29 of the 1964 Act, the Board has been given powers to make regulations providing inter alia, for inspection of the account books and proceedings of the primary land development banks in respect of their transactions and generally for any other matter in respect of which the Board considers that provision should be made for the purposes of the Act. Thus the Board has been given power of control over the different primary Land Development Banks functioning in various districts of the State. Section 13 (a) (b) also gives power to the Board of Directors of the Bank to issue directions to a mortgagor or to a Land Development Bank as the case may be. Section 18(2) gives the power to the Board of Directors of the Bank to direct the Managing Committee of a Land Development Bank to take action against a defaulter under Section 15, 16 or Section 17. Section 21 gives power to the Board of Directors of the Bank to appoint a receiver for the mortgaged property, either of its own motion or on application of a Land Development Bank. These are all powers which are in substance part of the sovereign powers of the State delegated to the State Land Development Bank or to its Board of Directors. As such, apart from the ingredient of monopoly status, the principle laid down in Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857 is also attracted to the U. P. State Land Development Bank. The test laid down in that case is indeed similar to ingredient No. 4 in Som Prakash ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) (supra). 12. The test laid down in that case is indeed similar to ingredient No. 4 in Som Prakash ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) (supra). 12. Sri R.N. Trivedi has invited our attention to a Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 Punj & Har 228. In that decision the Punjab State Land Development Bank was held not to be an instrumentality of the State. The provisions of the Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act read with the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act were examined by their lordships at some length. In para 12 of the report, their lordships quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia's case AIR 1981 SC 487 and set out six relevant tests gathered from the International Airport Authority's case. AIR 1979 SC 1628 . These six tests were the same as the five tests set out earlier from Som Prakash, supra with the additional test of financial assistance of the State being so much as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the body concerned. In para 17 of the report it was laid down that "it had to be conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no material worth the name which could establish tests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 as authoritatively laid and quoted above from Ajai Hasia's case." Now tests Nos. 3 and 5 of Ajai Hasia's case were the tests of monopoly status and of the functions being closely related to governmental functions. We have noted above that these two tests are satisfied in the case of the State Land Development Bank of U. P. In regard to these two tests the counsel for the petitioner before the Punjab and Haryana High Court had conceded that there was no material worth the name to attract the two tests. It was in view of this concession that the Full Bench did not give any serious consideration to the two tests although it did refer to some of the provisions pertaining to the functions of the Bank in paras 18 and 19 of the report. In para 18 of the report it was observed by the Full Bench that the power to make regulations for effective working was elementary. In para 18 of the report it was observed by the Full Bench that the power to make regulations for effective working was elementary. The power to make regulations for the body's own internal working is no doubt elementary, and may be enjoyed by even a private body, but the State Land Development Bank has power to make regulations providing for control over other bodies as well namely, the primary Land Development Banks in the State. In para 19 of the report, a reference was no doubt made to the Bank's control over the primary Land Development Bank by their Lordships. Their Lordships considered it "unnecessary to elaborate the matter, in view of the concession noticed above. Thus, the matter being decided ex-concesis the Full Bench decision cannot give us much assistance in so far as these two tests are concerned. At any event we cannot, with the utmost respect, subscribe to the proposition that the power conferred on a body to control other bodies in this manner may be enjoyed by a purely private body. Such statutory control over and power to issue binding directions to other independent persons, whether individuals, or bodies such persons not being agents or employees, is, in our opinion, clearly in the nature of a governmental function. 13. We are, therefore, of the opinion that State Land Development Bank of U. P. is an "authority", and an instrumentality of the State, and as such, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. 14. It is undisputed before us that the Bank is one of the co-operative societies covered by the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975, framed by the U. P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board with the approval of the Government under Section 122 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act Regulation 102 lays down that subject to the provisions of these regulations a co-operative society shall within three months from the date of the coming into force of these regulations frame service rules for its employees. The service rules shall be submitted to the Board for approval and shall be operative only after their approval. Accordingly the respondent Bank has framed the U. P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rules, 1976 with the approval of the U. P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board which was accorded on 22nd February, 1977. The service rules shall be submitted to the Board for approval and shall be operative only after their approval. Accordingly the respondent Bank has framed the U. P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rules, 1976 with the approval of the U. P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board which was accorded on 22nd February, 1977. These service rules have been filed as one of the annexures to the writ petition No. 4284 of 83. They are similar to the detailed provisions contained in the said regulations of 1975. Accordingly there is no dispute that the rules are valid. Considering the public character of the Bank together with the statutory provisions mentioned hereinabove, the said service rules cannot but be described as statutory in nature. R. 79(1) lays down various penalties that can be imposed on an employee of the Bank. Sub-rule (3) of this rule says that no penalty except censure shall be imposed unless a show cause notice has been given to the employee and he has either failed to reply within the specified time or his reply has been found to be unsatisfactory by the punishing authority. Sub-rule (4) says that the charge-sheeted employee shall not be awarded punishment under subclauses (e), (f) or (g) of sub-rule (1) without recourse to disciplinary proceedings. R. 81 lays down the procedure of disciplinary proceedings. Sub-rule (1) (a) lays down that the Inquiring Officer shall observe principles of natural justice. He shall serve the employee with a charge sheet with details of the evidence in support of the charge. The employee shall be required to submit his explanation and be given an opportunity to produce at his own cost or to cross-examine witnesses in his defence and shall also be given an opportunity of being heard in person. Rules 88 and 89 however provide that a major penalty will be imposed only with the prior concurrence of the Institutional Service Board, but no such concurrence would be required to imposing of a minor penalty. A minor penalty will however be appealable while a major penalty will apparently because of the previous concurrence of the Institutional Service Board, not be appealable. 15. In the instant cases before us, all the three employees were duly served with charge-sheets by the inquiring officer. They also did reply to those charge-sheets. A minor penalty will however be appealable while a major penalty will apparently because of the previous concurrence of the Institutional Service Board, not be appealable. 15. In the instant cases before us, all the three employees were duly served with charge-sheets by the inquiring officer. They also did reply to those charge-sheets. According to the petitioners no inquiry was conducted after receipt of the petitioners replies and no opportunity was given for cross-examining or adducing any witness. The inquiry reports made by the inquiring officer against them were also not supplied to the petitioners. A show cause notice against the proposed punishment of dismissal was sent to each of them by post. Thereafter it was published in the news-papers. The petitioners did reply to this notice within the time given in the notice as published in the press. However, the approval of the Institutional Service Board was obtained without consideration of that reply and without that reply being sent to the said Board for its consideration. As such the dismissal orders are alleged to be bad in law. 16. The factual averments in this regard have not been seriously challenged. Only a bald averment has been made in the short counter-affidavit filed in each case that the petitioner was given opportunity as required by the rules. Details of the inquiry held have not been mentioned. The original record was however produced before us by the learned counsel for the respondent. Even that record did not indicate that any formal inquiry was held. Only inquiry report was submitted after consideration of the reply received from each of the petitioners. Sri R.N. Trivedi learned counsel for the respondent has however contended that the second show cause notice was issued only by way of abundant caution and that it was not really required by the rules. It should therefore be ignored as redundant. Accordingly, it is contended, the Bank or the Institutional Board was not required to consider the reply submitted by the petitioners to the said show cause notice. 17. In this connection it has been pointed out that the provision in Rule 79 (3) about show cause notice referred to the show cause notice issued at the time of issuance of charge-sheet. 17. In this connection it has been pointed out that the provision in Rule 79 (3) about show cause notice referred to the show cause notice issued at the time of issuance of charge-sheet. We are inclined to agree with the contention of Sri Trivedi to the extent that the rules do not specifically contemplate any notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. The decisions of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court requiring a second show cause notice were based on the language of Section 240 (3) Government of India Act and of the original Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, which laid down that no major penalty could be imposed unless reasonable opportunity was afforded of showing cause against the action proposed. That language is not to be found in Rule 79 (3). Accordingly a second show cause notice at the stage of imposition of penalty was not required. 18. However, the fact remains that the original inquiry, itself was inadequate as a mere opportunity of submitting a reply to the charge-sheet was given. In these replies the charges were controverted. Moreover, time was given to the petitioners to show cause whether legally required or not; it was but proper that the Bank should have waited till the expiry of the time granted and if reply was received from the petitioners the same should have been considered by the Bank and should also have been forwarded to the Institutional Service Board before the same accorded its concurrence. This was all the more proper having regard to the fact that in the case of a major penalty the punishment could be ordered only with the prior concurrence of the Board and no provision for appeal thereafter existed in the rules. Each order of dismissal itself makes mention of the show cause notice and also of want of the response from the side of the petitioner to the said show cause notice. This was factually incorrect as the reply of each of the petitioners was submitted within time from the publication of the show cause notice. The conclusions of guilt stated in the dismissal orders are also not supported by reasons. Thus the dismissal order is a non-speaking order and inasmuch as it was not accompanied by the inquiry report it cannot be said to be a "speaking one even indirectly. The conclusions of guilt stated in the dismissal orders are also not supported by reasons. Thus the dismissal order is a non-speaking order and inasmuch as it was not accompanied by the inquiry report it cannot be said to be a "speaking one even indirectly. It was of course not necessary that a copy of the inquiry report should have been sent to the petitioners; but if the copy of inquiry report was not to be sent to them then the punishing authority in its own order should have either given reasons for coming to the conclusion of guilt or enclosed the report with which it expressed concurrence. We are of the opinion that the dismissal order is vitiated by non-compliance with the rules of natural justice and also by violation of the statutory rules referred to above, which were justiciable in view of our earlier conclusion that the respondent is an "authority" and therefore "State" and not an ordinary private co-operative society. 19. In the result the writ petitions are allowed and the orders of dismissal passed against the petitioners are hereby quashed. It shall, however, be open to the opposite parties, if they so choose, to proceed with the inquiry afresh from the stage after the receipt of the petitioners replies to the charge-sheets served on them. No order is made as to costs. 20. After the above judgment was pronounced Shri R. N. Trivedi, made an oral prayer for a certificate under Article 133 read with Article 134-A of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As such the certificate prayed for is refused.