Judgment :- 1. We do not think that there is any scope for interference in this appeal. The 3rd respondent in the Original Petition (who is the 2nd respondent in the writ appeal) was the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board, whose tenure of office in terms of S.10 (1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, expired on 30-11-1983. Thereafter, he wrote a letter of resignation dated December 10, 1983 informing the Governor that he was tendering his resignation of the Membership of the Board under sub-section (2) of S.10 of the Act; and that resignation was to take effect from 16-12-1983; unless his successor was appointed before that date. In the letter, he also pointed out that his term of office had already expired on 30-11-1983, but he was continuing to hold the office of the President only by virtue of the provisions contained in subsection (3) of S.10 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of S.10 of the Act provides: "(3) A member of the Board shall on the expiration of his term of office continue in office until the vacancy caused by the expiration of his term of office is filled up." This sub-section, it may be noted, in terms docs not refer to resignation. Sub-section (2) of S.10 lays down: "(2) A member of the Board may, by writing under his hand, addressed to the Raj Pramukh, resign his membership." There is nothing to show that sub-section (2) to S.10 is controlled by subsection (3; of that section. If the intention of the Legislature was that subsection (3) of S.10 would operate not only in the case of the expiration of the term, but also in the case of vacancy arising on account of resignation, there is no reason why it should not have been so stated, expressly or by necessary implication, in that sub-section. For us, it is fairly clear that operation of sub-section (3) of S.10 is restricted to cases where the term of office expires by the efflux of time as fixed under the relevant provisions of the Act, and it has no relevance to vacancy arising out of resignation It would be too much to read into the sub-section that even a Member who is not willing to be a Member could be compelled to continue in office. The express desire of the 3rd respondent, manifested in his letter of resignation dated 10-12-1983, is that he would cease to be a Member of the Board, effective from 16-12-1983. But for this letter of resignation fixing the date on which it was to come into effect, it might have been possible to say that the 3rd respondent continued to be a Member and to hold the office of the President even after 30-11-1983, on which date he would have ceased to be a member in terms of sub-section (1) of S.10 of the Act. 2. It could not also be contended that by the letter dated 21-12-1983 sent by the Commissioner and Secretary to the Department, a new appointment has been effected as once he ceased to be a Member of the Board he could not be appointed to be a Member without following the procedure prescribed for the constitution of the Board. The appellants have no case that it is following the procedure prescribed for the nomination of the Member of the Board that the letter dated 21-12-1983 was sent by the 2nd appellant. 3. The Advocate-General, who moved the appeal for admission, submitted that in the absence of acceptance of resignation by the Governor, of the letter of resignation sent by the 3rd respondent, the resignation of the 3rd respondent did not come into effect. In support of his contention, he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra f AIR. 1978 SC. 694). That was a case in which a High Court Judge, Satish Chandra by name, sent in his resignation intimating the President that his resignation would take effect from a particular date, before which date he withdrew the resignation. Repelling the contention that the resignation had taken effect the moment the letter of resignation was sent by the judge, the Supreme Court held that the judge had the option to withdraw the resignation before the effective date mentioned in the letter. The Supreme Court observed in Para.51 as follows: "It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional bar, a'prospective' resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it comes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. The Supreme Court observed in Para.51 as follows: "It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional bar, a'prospective' resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it comes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or the office tenure of the resignor. The general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries In the case of a judge of a High Court, who is a constitutional functionary and under proviso (a) to Art.217 (1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own volition, chooses to quit office. If in terms of the writing under bis hand addressed to the President, he resigns in praesenti the resignation terminates his office-tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date, the act of resigning office is not complete because it does not terminate bis tenure before such date and the judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective withdraw it, because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal." 4. This is not the case here. The effective date stated in the letter of resignation was 16-12-1983 and thereafter for the continuance of the Membership even the Supreme Court decision cited above and relied on by the Advocate-General is no authority. Moreover, there is no indication in sub-section (2) of S.10 that it is only on the acceptance of the resignation that the letter of resignation will be given effect to. 5. It is noted that the appeal is only by the State and the Secretary to Government, Revenue (F) Department, not by the 3rd respondent, whom the learned judge has declared to have ceased to be a member of the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we find no ground for admitting this writ appeal. Dismissed.