Judgment Kamleshwar Nath, J. 1. THE plaintiff-respondent's suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant-appellants from realising income from Mela of Takia Mohabbat Shah or Tahebazari of Plot Nos. 413, 429, 432, 434, and 130 M of Village Patan, Tehsil Purwa, District Unnao, having been decreed by the learned Munsif South, Lucknow, and confirmed in appeal by the llnd Additional District Judge, Unnao, this second appeal has been filed to challenge the decree. 2. THE settled facts are that the aforesaid plots belonged to Gaon Sabha Patan and initially the Mela income as well as Tahebazari etc. throughout was realised and appropriated by the Gaon Sabha. By a resolution dated 16-11-1955 of the Gaon Sabha Patan a decision, as follows, was taken ;- "Whatever income accrues from the plots (mentioned above) or from Takia Mohabbad Shah or in any manner to the Gram Samaj, the same is donated in perpetuity to Mahatma Gandi Vidyalaya Patan. In future no such change would be effected as might reduce the income. " At the time when the resolution was passed, the Mahatma Gandhi Inter College, Patan, was only a Junior High School. The resolution of the Land Management Committee was promoted by a desire to enable the Junior High School to be upgraded to a High School and to earn recognition of the U. P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education. Subsequent to the passing of the resolution not only the Junior High School was upgraded to the standard of High School, but in due course was further upgraded to the Intermediate Grade and also received government aid. 3. SEVERAL years passed and the income of the said plots continued to be appropriated by the College. On 24-7-72 the Land Management Committee of the Gaon Sabha Patan purported to consider the necessity of taking back the property of the Gaon Sabha granted by resolution dated 16-11-1955. The relevant portion of the resolution is as follows :- "Today 24-7-1972 a meeting was held under the Presidentship of Deoki Nandan Chowdhary in which the resolutions mentioned below were passed unanimously. Quorum is complete. The relevant portion of the resolution is as follows :- "Today 24-7-1972 a meeting was held under the Presidentship of Deoki Nandan Chowdhary in which the resolutions mentioned below were passed unanimously. Quorum is complete. Resolution No. 1- Ranjit Chowdhary moved a resolution that in respect of such property of the Gram Samaj which has been recorded in the name of Mahatma Gandhi College, without the approval of Gram Samaj (Land Management Committee) or in the name of the other institutions or persons, information regarding the same be gathered and the proceedings be taken in order to get the property mutated again in the name of Gram Samaj of Patan. The Panchayat will bear the expenses of all legal proceedings in this connection ; a suit be filed, Dr. Sheo Nandan seconded the above resolution and the same was passed unanimously. " On 22-10-1972 the Land Management Committee resolved that " by resolution dated 16-11-55 the school had been allowed to realise the income of the Mela and the Takia for the purposes of securing recognition of the school, that whereas in addition to recognition the school has become self supporting in all respects, that presently a number of construction works of Gram Samaj are pending which have been stopped because of lack of funds due to the grant of land source and income to the school and, therefore, in order to carry out those functions, the Gram Samaj itself will appropriate the income and that in future the school will not appropriate the same. " 4. BY this resolution the original grant, under resolution no. 16-11-55, was revoked. The college, however, proceeded to auction the Mela contract for which they fixed 24-12-1972 as the date for auction. Consequently, on 23-12-1972, Gaon Sabha, plaintiff-respondent, filed the suit which has given rise to this second appeal with the case that in passing the earlier resolution dated 16-11-1955, the Gaon Sabha or the Land Management Committee acted without jurisdiction and that the Gaon Sabha (Land Management Committee) having revoked the licence on 22-10-1972, the defendant-appellants had no right to continue to realise the income of the plots or from the Mela. The defendant-appellants' case was that the grant, in consequence to the resolution dated 16-11-1955, was the basis on which the recognition of the institution as a High School and subsequently as Intermediate College was secured, that the right in favour of the College had been created permanently by the Gram Samaj, and consequently they were estopped from cancelling the licence. 5. LEARNED Munsif found that the resolution dated 16-11-1955 of the Land Management Committee was in contravention of the provisions of Rule 115-S (1) of UP ZA and LR Rules because the Gram Samaj was not entitled to grant a licence or lease for a period exceeding one year, without the specific permission of the State Government in the Revenue department and that further any lease or licence could only be made by means of a public auction in accordance with the prescribed procedure-. It was held, therefore, that the grant having been made without jurisdiction and in violation of the express provisions of law, it could not create any estoppel against plaintiff-respondent. The suit was, therefore, decreed. The lower appellate court agreed with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the defendant-appellants' appeal. 6. A new point was raised in this appeal by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants, (sic) that the suit itself was not maintainable because there was no resolution of the Land Management Committee to authorise the institution of such suit in accordance with para 128 of the Gram Samaj Manual. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellants referred to the decisions of our High Court in the Case of Gram Samaj Kairadih v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1969 AWR 500 followed subsequently in the cases of Sita Ram v. Deputy Director of Conslidation, 1982 ALJ 76 and Gaon Sabha through member v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1983 RD 75. In the absence of any law to the contrary, there can be no doubt that the resolution of the Land Management Committee, authorising the institution of the suit, is a condition precedent under Para 128 of Gram Samaj Manual which has been held not only to have a force of law, having been framed under the Rule-making powers of the State Government, but also a complete and mandatory provision on the point. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, contended that the defendant-appellants are not entitled to raise this point, for the first time in the High Court, because it relates to a question of fact, namely, a resolution of the Land Management Committee, to authorise the institution of the suit. 7. THE contention of learned counsel for the defendant-appellants is that it was the duty of plaintiff-respondent to make a specific averment in the plaint itself about this permission by the Land Management Committee, in the absence of which the suit could not be said to be properly constituted ; and if the plaintiff-respondent had come with the requisite statement in the plaint, the defendant-appellants would have replied in the written statement and the point would have come up for consideration at the earlier stage. It appears to me that the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants is correct. Order 7 rule 1 (e) CPC requires that the plaint shall contain the facts oonstituting the cause of action and when it arose. Order 7 rule 11 CPC prescribes that a plaint shall be rejected where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Since the Chairman of the Gaon Sabha was not competent to file a suit on behalf of Gaon Sabha, without the requisite resolution of the Land Management Committee, in accordance with Para 128 of the Gram Samaj Manual, the plaint was clearly barred by law ; and in that event the Chairman of the Gaon Sabha would have had no cause of action to file the suit. It was necessary, therefore, for the plaintiff-respondent to indicate in the plaint that the resolution dated 22-10-1972 of the Land Management Committee authorised the taking of the legal proceedings, including an institution of the suit, and if that was done the defendant-appellants would have been in a position to specifically answer it in their written statement. 8. It was necessary, therefore, for the plaintiff-respondent to indicate in the plaint that the resolution dated 22-10-1972 of the Land Management Committee authorised the taking of the legal proceedings, including an institution of the suit, and if that was done the defendant-appellants would have been in a position to specifically answer it in their written statement. 8. IT may, of course, be said that a mere rejection of the plaint for want of a cause of action or as barred by ariy law, would not have shut out the plaintiff-respondent for all times to file a suit ; Order 7 rule 13 CPC clearly says that the rejection of plaint, on the grounds set out in the preceding rules, shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. IT is true that the plaintiff-respondent, in that event, might have obtained an amendment of the plaint or might have filed a fresh suit, and in that sense the plaintiff-respondent may be said to have been prejudiced by the lapse of time which had taken place since the time of institution of the suit upto the time of hearing of the second appeal when this point was taken for the first time on behalf of the defendant-appellants. Even so, the question goes to the root of the case, namely, its very maintainability and, therefore, it should be legally permissible to examine the question even at this stage. By order dated 16-11-83 of this Court the plaintiff-respondent was directed to produce the original entry of the resolution authorising the Chairman of the Gaon Sabha to institute the suit alongwith an affidavit. In compliance thereof the plaintiff-respondent filed the certified copy of the proceedings dated 24-7-1972 of the Panchayat, along with the original register, in this Court on 8-12-1983 the certified copy has been brought on record. The relevant portion of the resolution has been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment. The material feature in this original entry in the Register of Panchayat is that the words "Dawa Dayar kiya jaye " (a suit be instituted) in the original record, contained in the register, was written in a different ink and pen from the remaining contents of the entry and that the last two words, namely, " Kiya jaye " were also found cramped due to shortage of space. These words have been enclosed and marked with X in red in the certified copy. Learned counsel for the parties concluded their arguments including the effect of the resolution dated 24-7-1972. It appears to me that reliance cannot be placed upon the words " Dawa Dayar Kiya Jaye " as they might be subsequent interpolation ; they do not appear in the natural sequence and written in the normal and natural course of the entry. Even otherwise, the resolution seems to be wide enough to authorise the Chairman of the Gaon Sabha to file the suit. The resolution took special note of the fact that certain property of the Gram Samaj had been entered in the name of the Vidyalaya (College) without the approval of the Land Management Committee of the Gram Samaj. The resolution provided that particulars be ascertained and " proceedings be taken in order to get the property mutated again in the name of the Gram Samaj ." The resolution, in my opinion, is not to be construed too literally or strictly; it must be given its widest amplitude because there can be no doubt that the intention of the Land Management Committee in making the resolution, was to retrieve all the property of the Gram Samaj as had been made over to the defendant-appellants (as also to other persons or institutions) and for that purpose to institute legal proceedings. That would include the institution of a suit. I am satisfied, therefore, that there was a permission of the Land Management Committee to the Chairman to file a suit which has given rise to this appeal. 9. IT may be mentioned that learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent has urged that in case of urgency the Chairman of the Land Management Committee is authorised by Para 128 of the Gram Samaj Manual to institute a suit without prior resolution of the Land Management Committee provided that it was subsequently ratified by the Land Management Committee in its next meeting. The contention of learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent is that if the defendant-appellants had raised the plea in the written statement the plaintiff-respondent would have secured subsequent ratification of the resolution by the Land Management Committee. The contention of learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent is that if the defendant-appellants had raised the plea in the written statement the plaintiff-respondent would have secured subsequent ratification of the resolution by the Land Management Committee. There is no substance in this contention, because whether or not the defendant-appellants raised the plea in the written statement, it was obligatory for the Chairman of the Land Management Committee to obtain ratification of its acts of institution of the suit in the very next meeting of the Land Management Committee, which, admittedly, was not done. However, that would not affect the maintainability of the suit because for reasons mentioned, the resolution dated 24-7-1972 contained the requisite authority for institution of the suit. 10. LEARNED counsel for the appellants then urged that the suit should be barred by the principle of promissory estoppel, because acting upon the resolution dated 16-11-1955 the defendant-appellants obtained the upgradation of the Junior High School into High School and thereafter into Intermediate Grade and, therefore, the plaintiff-respondent should not be permitted to go back upon the representation. LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff-respondent contends that the grant of the right to collect income from the land and Mela Takia Mohabbat Shah, under the resolution dated 16-11-1955, was in total violation of the provisions of Rule 115 S of UP ZA and LR Rules and, therefore, the plaintiff-respondent was not at all bound by the representation. It is not disputed that according to Rule 115 S (1) of the Rules no lease or licence, in respect of any property vesting in the Gaon Sabha, could be made for a period exceeding one year except with the specific permission of the government in the revenue department. The Rule also provided that no lease or licence be made in favour of any person except by public auction held in accordance with the procedure prescribed. It is clear enough that according to resolution dated 16-11-1955 the grant was in perpetuity. It is admitted that no specific permission of the government in the revenue department had been obtained, nor the right was made over to the defendant-appellants by any public auction. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the grant was in violation of the statutory powers of the Gram Samaj in whom the right had vested under section 117 (1) (5) of the UP ZA and LR Act. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the grant was in violation of the statutory powers of the Gram Samaj in whom the right had vested under section 117 (1) (5) of the UP ZA and LR Act. It is also the concurrent finding of fact, recorded by both the courts below, that there was no evidence on record to show that the recognition of the appellant-institution would be withdrawn in case it is not permitted to continue to have Mela income from the disputed property or that the College would have to be closed down on the stoppage of the Mela income. The lower appellate court observed that the defendant-appellants are receiving grant from the State Government and bear a considerable expenditure whereas the Mela income is a paltry sum and that it has not been denied that the Gaon Sabha needed the income of Mela for its development activities. The lower appellate court held that the College stands on its own legs and that there was no proof of any fraud or manifest injustice to the defendant-appellants in withdrawing the grant by the resolution revoking it. The question is whether on these findings of fact, it can be validly stated that the plaintiff-respondent's claim is barred by the principle of promissory estoppel. 11. RELIANCE has been placed by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants on the case of Uma Shanker Misra v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. Allahabad, AIR 1974 Allahabad 290 wherein the petitioner was declared as passed in the High School Examination Result, as published in the newspapers. He also appeared at and passed the Intermediate Examination and further B. A. Part I Examination. It was thereafter that the Board of High School and Intermediate Examination levied a charge against the petitioner that he had failed in the High School Examination and had got himself admitted to the Intermediate Course by suppression of material facts and was required to show cause why his Intermediate Examination should not be cancelled and action taken against him for taking undue admission to the Intermediate Course. It was held that the Board and the College acted in a manner amounting to a recognition of his having been duly admitted to the Intermediate Course of study, and that being so when the Board has remained inactive for a considerable time, the transaction, although originally impeachable, had become unimpeachable and the petitioner could legitimately invoke the bar of equitable estoppel. That case has absolutely no parallel with the present case. It is clear enough that the petitioner having secured a certain qualification under good faith (having been declared successful in the published result), on account of the inactivity of the Board, could not be deprived of that qualification ; perhaps the clock could not be put back. In the present case, the grant by the resolution dated 16-11-1955 was clearly in violation of the statutory provisions of law and no such situation had come into existence as could not have been revoked lawfully. The grant was a licence and the very stipulation that it was irrevocable, could not make it so because it was not statutorily possible for the Gaon Sabha to make a grant in perpetuity in view of the applicable law and rules. 12. LEARNED counsel for the defendant-appellants then referred to the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, AIR 1971 SC 1021 . The lower appellate court has very correctly distinguished this decision by pointing out that the decision itself excludes the operation of the principle of promissory estoppel in a case where the statute governing the person, making the representation, provides otherwise than the representation made. The decision came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981; I SC Cases 11 where in paragraph 38 it was held that the decision could not be read as holding that the rule of estoppel would be applicable against the government in exercise of its legislative and statutoty powers. In Para 40 the Court set forth the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and one of the elements set forth was that the doctrine is not available when an officer of the government acts outside the scope of its authority because in that case the Doctrine of Ultra Vires would come into operation and the government could not be held bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers. It was held that it was only when the officer acts within the scope of his authority under a scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a representation and a person acting on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous position that the court is entitled to require the officer to act according to scheme, agreement or representation, and that if the public authority goes behind that obligation arbitrarily or at whim, compliance by him can be enforced. It was also pointed out that the officer of the government could also be justified in changing the terms of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations including matters which have a bearing on the general interest of the State. Clearly, in the present case the Land Management Committee had acted beyond its authority in passing the resolution dated 16-11-1955. At the same time, it is clear that in revoking the grant by the resolution dated 22-10-1972, the Land Management Committee was pomoted to provide for the requisite funds for its developmental activities which would certainly be a matter of general interest to the residents of the village ; the resolution had mentioned that the developmental activities of the village were held up for lack of funds including the amount of income from the disputed land appropriated by the defendant-appellants. Referring to the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P., (1972) 2 SCC 409 the Supreme Court observed in Paras 42 and 45 of the decision M/s. Jit Ram v. Shiv Kumar, (Supra) that a person dealing with an agent of the government must he held to have noticed all the limitations of his authority. It may, therefore, be presumed that the defendant-appellants would have known that the Land Management Committee was not legally competent to make the grant in terms of the resolution dated 16-11-1955 in view of the limitations imposed by the law on the authority of Gaon Sabha. 13. ON a careful consideration of all the matters, I am satisfied that the defendant-appellants are not entitled to the benefit of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. 13. ON a careful consideration of all the matters, I am satisfied that the defendant-appellants are not entitled to the benefit of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. Reference may be made to the latest decision in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (1983) 3 SCC 379 where the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was invoked against the State Financial Corporation which had agreed to advance a loan for the construction of the hotel by M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., but when the latter had spent large amounts on its project, the Corporation refused to advance the loan. The Supreme Court observed that the agreement to advance the loan was entered into in performance of the statutory duty cast upon the Corporation under the State Financial Corporation Act 1955 under which the Corporation was created and set up. It was observed that if the loan was not forthcoming, the petitioner may not have undertaken the huge project and, therefore, the Principle of Promissory Estoppel would come into play. The point of particular appreciation is that the agreement for the performance of which the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was invoked was a result of the statutory duty of the Corporation. In the present case, there was no statutory duty of the Land Management Committee or Gaon Sabha to make a perpetual grant of the income of the property to the defendant-appellants by the resolution dated 16-11-1955. It was a licence on the face of it gratis which could be revocable apart from its being beyond the scope or authority conferred by law. 14. NO other point has been raised in this appeal which deserves to fail. The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their costs of this appeal. The income or amounts accumulated by the Tehsildar or the concerned authority, during the pendency of the appeal, under the interim orders of this Court, will be made over by the Tehsildar or the concerned authority to the plaintiff-respondent within two months.