Judgment Choudhary Sia Saran Sinha, J. 1. Plaintiffs are the appellants in this Second Appeal which is directed against a judgment of reversal. 2. Certain facts are undisputed and they are these. Defendant-2nd party was the 16 annas proprietor of tauzi No. 4398 described in Schedule-A to the plaint. This proprietary interest included 1.76 acres of bakast lands detailed in Schedule-B to the Plaint and five decimals of gairmazarua malik lands. Defendant second party executed two usufructuary mortgage deeds each on 7-7-1948, (Exhibits-2 and 2 Ka) for a consideration of Rs. 2000/ and 1600/-, respectively in favour of one Deocharan Sah. Deocharan Sah constituted a joint family with the plaintiffs and on his death, the plaintiffs inherited all his interest in the joint family property including the rehan interest created in his favour under the two sale deeds above mentioned. Defendants-1st party obtained an ex parte money decree against defendant-2nd party and put that decree in execution in Execution Case No. 1958 of 1954 making a prayer for sale of the bakast lands detailed in Schedule-B to the plaint. Deocharan and plaintiff No. 1 filed objection in that execution case on 15-1-1955. On their objection, the properties of Schedule-B to the plaint were ordered to be auction sold subject to the encumbrance of Rs. 3,500.00 created by the two mortgage deeds Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka, further encumbrance was also created in this property for certain amount with which we are not concerned. Defendants 1st party purchased the lands of Schedule-B to the plaint subject to these encumbrances. Without paying these encumbrances, defendants-1st party surreptitiously obtained delivery of possession over the lands of Schedule-B on 8-10-1956 and forcibly harvested the paddy crops standing on that land in the month of November and December, 1956 for which separate criminal cases were filed against them by the plaintiffs. Defendants-1st party were acquitted in those criminal cases and being emboldened by the same, they forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs from the Schedule-B lands on 15-11-1958. Defendants-1st party were acquitted in those criminal cases and being emboldened by the same, they forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs from the Schedule-B lands on 15-11-1958. Defendants-1st party not having given up possession over the land of Schedule-B to the plaint in spite of demand, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit for declaration that they are the mortgagees of the land of Schedule-B to the plaint, that the defendants have no right to dispossess them without paying the mortgage-money, that the defendants act of dispossessing the plaintiffs was illegal, that they were trespassers and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recovery of possession of the suit properties and a sum of Rs. 280/-, the price of the paddy stolen away. The plaintiffs further claimed permanent injunction against the defendants from doing anything which may be injurious to the right of the plaintiffs. 3. Defendants-1st party contested the suit alleging inter alia, that the two mortgage deeds Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka were farzi transactions, that Deosharan was not a registered money lender and that the properties sold on auction, abovementioned, were not sold subject to encumbrances. The allegation of the plaintiffs that the money decree obtained was collusive based on a hand note without consideration was disputed. They further alleged that the suit stood barred under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 , (hereinafter referred to as the Land Reforms Act). 4. The trial Court found that the bakast lands detailed in Schedule-B to the plaint having not vested in the State of Bihar, they were available to the plaintiffs, the mortgagees, for realisation of the mortgage dues and Section 4(d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act cannot stand as a bar to the maintainability of the suit. It also held that the instant suit being a suit for recovery of possession, it was not barred under the provisions of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as the Money Lenders Act). The properties of Schedule-B to the plaint having been sold subject to the encumbrances and the defendants not having paid the said encumbrances, the trial Court held the plaintiffs entitled to the reliefs claimed by them. It further found that the two mortgage deeds (Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka) were not farzi as alleged by the defendants. In the result, the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit. 5. It further found that the two mortgage deeds (Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka) were not farzi as alleged by the defendants. In the result, the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit. 5. Defendants 1st party carried the matter in appeal. The lower appellate Court found that the two rehan deeds (Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka) were genuine, valid and for consideration and the properties detailed in Schedule-B to the plaint had been mortgaged by defendant 2nd party to Deocharan Sah; that defendants-1st party dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land along with the paddy crops worth Rs. 280/-, that the present suit instituted by the plaintiffs was barred by Section 4(d) of the Land Reforms Act and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the reliefs claimed by them in view of the provisions of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act. The result was that the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. This has given rise to this Second Appeal before this Court. 6. This Second Appeal was admitted on 5-11-1976 but no substantial question of law was formulated. According to Sri Thakur Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants, the sole substantial question of law for determination in this Second Appeal is: Whether Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act and Sec. 4(d) of the Land Reforms Act would stand as a bar to claims of the plaintiffs being allowed in the instant suit? While the contention of Sri Thakur Prasad was that these provisions of law, abovementioned, cannot stand as a bar to the success of the plaintiffs, Sri Rash Behari Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents opposed this contention of Sri Thakur Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants. 7. It is not in dispute that the reliefs sought for the plaintiffs was based on the two usufructuary deeds (Exhibits-2 and 2 Ka) each executed on 7-7-1948. It is further not in dispute that the proprietary interest detailed in Schedule-A to the plaint, which was the subject matter of the usufructuary mortgage, vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act prior to the auction sale held on 2-8-1956 in Execution Case No. 1958 of 1954. By purchase at auction held on 2-8-1956, the defendants-1st party acquired right, title and interest of defendant-2nd party, namely, the mortgagor of Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka and thus stepped into the shoes of defendant-2nd party. By purchase at auction held on 2-8-1956, the defendants-1st party acquired right, title and interest of defendant-2nd party, namely, the mortgagor of Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka and thus stepped into the shoes of defendant-2nd party. The instant suit has been filed for various declarations, discussed above, against both the two sets of the defendants, namely, defendants-1st party and defendant-2nd party. Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act deals with the consequences of the vesting of an estate or tenure in the State and Sec. 4(d) thereof runs as follow: No suit shall lie in any Civil Court for the recovery of any money due from such proprietor or tenure holder, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage of, or is a charge on, such estate or tenure-and all suits and proceedings for the recovery of any such money which may be pending on the date of vesting shall be dropped. In the case of Shivshankar Prasad Sah V/s. Baikunth Nath Singh -- quoted elaborately in a decision of this Court Naima Khatoon and Ors. V/s. Sarju Prasad Singh and others -- it was, inter alia, held that "in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in the State are only those interests not coming within Sec. 6" under the circumstances, the only remedy open to the decree holders is that provided in chapter IV of the Act, i.e. a claim under Sec.14 before the Claims Officer for determining the amount of the debt legally and, justly payable to each creditor in respect of his claim." It was further held that "it is not open to the appellants to proceed with the execution. Their only remedy is to get compensation under the Act." Following this decision of the Supreme Court, it was held in Naima Khatoons case, referred to above, that the suit instituted in the circumstances, similar to the instant one, was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Sec. 4(d) of the Land Reforms Act. Thus, the lower appellate Court has rightly held that the provisions of Sec. 4(d) of the Land Reforms Act would stand as a bar to the maintainability of the present suit instituted by the plaintiffs. Thus, the lower appellate Court has rightly held that the provisions of Sec. 4(d) of the Land Reforms Act would stand as a bar to the maintainability of the present suit instituted by the plaintiffs. 8 If Sec. 4(d) of the Land Reforms Act would be a bar to the institution of the instant suit by the plaintiffs, the question of the plaintiffs being not entitled to the relief sought for by them in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Money Lenders Act would be, more or less, academic. However, since the learned Counsel for both the parties addressed to this Court on this point, I would like to make a few observations. The reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs was primarily based on the two rehan deeds (Exhibits 2 and 2 Ka). It is not in dispute that these two usufructuary mortgage deeds, besides proprietary interest, related to the bakast land detailed in Schedule-B to the plaint which were, undisputedly, agricultural lands. Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act, states, inter alia, that "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement, the principal amount and all dues in respect of an usufructuary mortgage relating to any agricultural land, whether executed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied and mortgage shall be deemed to have been wholly redeemed on expiry of a period of seven years from the date of execution of the mortgage bond in respect of such land and the mortgagor shall be entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged land in the manner prescribed under the rules. "The two mortgage deeds having been executed on 7-7-1948, the period of seven years would expire on 7-7-1955 i.e. earlier to the dispossession alleged by the plaintiffs, namely, 15-11-1956. "The two mortgage deeds having been executed on 7-7-1948, the period of seven years would expire on 7-7-1955 i.e. earlier to the dispossession alleged by the plaintiffs, namely, 15-11-1956. Sri Thakur Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants, however, contended that the mischief of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act will not be attracted in the instant case as the auction sale, held in the instant case on 2-8-1956, was subject to the encumbrances created by Exhibits 2 and 2Ka and there is nothing in Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act to show that any right created in the mortgagee by such an order of the Court would be affected by the provisions of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act. This contention of Sri Prasad does not appeal to me. 9. The overriding provisions of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act is to apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement. Firstly, the submission of Sri Rash Behari Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents was that the order of the court creating encumbrances might well be covered by the terms anything having the force of law." Secondly, if the overriding provisions of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act are to come into effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement, it is inconceivable to think that those provisions will not apply to an act of court which is to proceed in accordance with law. This being the position, the contention of Sri Thakur has no merit and it must fail. 10. Sri Prasad lastly contended, though faintly, that the defendants not having raised any such plea in the earlier litigation, they will be estopped from raising such a plea in the instant litigation. It would suffice to say that there can be no estoppel against a statute. 11. No other contention having been raised in this Second Appeal, it must be found that there is no merit in this Second Appeal, which must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are hereby confirmed; In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order for costs and the parties are directed to bear their own posts of this Second Appeal.