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1984 DIGILAW 187 (KER)

GEETHAKUMARI v. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

1984-07-11

K.BASKARAN, M.P.MENON

body1984
Judgment :- 1. These writ appeals were heard and are being disposed of by this common judgment in as much as the question of jaw raised in all the writ appeals is the same. 2. For the sake of convenience, we would refer to the facts of the case as stated in O.P. No. 5315 of 1984, from which writ appeal No. 283 of 1984 has been filed. 3. It is averred in the writ petition that the petitioner had been working as a teacher in Kolakkad Aided U.P. School, Kolakkad in Kozhikode District. She had passed SSLC. which is the qualifying examination for teachers' training course. She had also undergone teacher's training in the State of Karnataka, and ultimately a certificate known as Teacher's Certificate Higher (T.C.H.) has been issued to her. When matters stood like this, by Ext. P6 proceedings of the 1st respondent. Director of Public Instruction, dated 8-6-1984 the petitioner has been placed under suspension pending disciplinary action. It is to challenge the proceedings of the first respondent, the writ petition has been filed. 4. Shri P. K. Appa Nair, the counsel for the appellants, submitted that Ext. P6 order has been passed by the first respondent without jurisdiction, or at any rate, he has acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him. Ext. P6 purports to have been issued by the first respondent in exercise of the power vested in him under sub-section (2) of S.12A of the Kerala Education Act (the Act) read with R.67 (2) (a) of the Kerala Education Rules (the Rules). The submission made by Sri. Appa Nair is that S.12A of the Act contemplates disciplinary action against the teacher to be taken by the Manager; and it is only in case the Manager fails to act in compliance with the intimation of the circumstances requiring him to take such disciplinary action received from the Government or the authorised officer, that the latter could take action, and therefore, the order of suspension passed by the Ist respondent, Director, is without jurisdiction and as such liable to be quashed. For the sake of convenience, we would extract the provisions of S.12A of the Act: 12A. For the sake of convenience, we would extract the provisions of S.12A of the Act: 12A. Disciplinary powers of Government over teachers of aided schools: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in S.11 or S.12 and subject to such rules as may be prescribed, the Government or such officer, not below the rank of an Educational Officer, as may be, authorised by the Government in this behalf, shall have power to take disciplinary proceedings against a teacher of an aided school and to impose upon him all or any of the penalties specified in the Rules made under this Act." 5. It may at once be noticed that the first respondent has made it very clear in Ext P6 proceedings that the order of suspension passed by him, was in exercise of the power vested in him under sub-section (2) of S.12A of the Act. What that sub-section lays down is that either the Government or the officer authorised in that behalf, as the case may be, may suspend a teacher of an aided school when any disciplinary proceedings is proposed to be taken against him under sub-section (1) or when such disciplinary proceedings are pending. All that is required to attract the provisions of subsection (2) of S.12A is that disciplinary proceedings must be proposed to be taken against the teacher. It would be wrong to construe that the proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of S.12A of the Act qualifies or controls sub-section (2) of S.12A of the Act. In terms, the proviso refers only to disciplinary proceedings under sub-section (1) of that section, without making any reference to suspension, when disciplinary proceedings were proposed to be taken or during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. There is no warrant for the view that the intimation should precede the order of suspension. In our opinion, the Government or the authorised officer, as the case may be, would be within its or his rights to pass an order of suspension, as soon as it was decided by it or him to intimate the manager regarding the circumstances requiring disciplinary action. In our opinion, the Government or the authorised officer, as the case may be, would be within its or his rights to pass an order of suspension, as soon as it was decided by it or him to intimate the manager regarding the circumstances requiring disciplinary action. This being the true legal implication, we do not find any substance in the argument of Sri Appa Nair that it is only where, after due intimation to the manager by the Government or the authorised officer regarding the circumstances requiring disciplinary action against the teacher is given and there is failure on the part of the Manager to take action in the light of the intimation, that the Government or the authorised officer would have the power to suspend a teacher. The fallacy lies in the failure to note the distinction between the power to initiate disciplinary action on the one hand, and the power to suspend the teacher, pending disciplinary proceedings, on the other. There is nothing in the wording of sub-section (2) of S 12A which expressly or by necessary implication lays down that failure to comply with the requirements of the intimation in regard to the taking of disciplinary action by the manager, is a condition precedent to the exercise of power by the Government or the authorised officer under that sub-section. In our view, as aforesaid, the proviso (a) to S.12A of the Act does not control or qualify that sub-section (2) of that section, and it is attracted to every case in which disciplinary proceedings against a teacher of an aided school is proposed to be taken under subsection (1) of that section. For this view, we express, we find support from the Division Bench ruling of this Court in P P. Sreedharan v. Assistant Educational Officer, Pappinissery (1974 KLT. 53) 6. Sri Appa Nair then contended that there was no evidence in Ext. P6 that the Government or the 2nd respondent had a proposal to take action against the appellant-petitioner and others similarly placed, and therefore, the suspension should not have been ordered. We do not agree with this line of reasoning. The very order under challenge states: "it is proposed to take disciplinary action against the above teacher. P6 that the Government or the 2nd respondent had a proposal to take action against the appellant-petitioner and others similarly placed, and therefore, the suspension should not have been ordered. We do not agree with this line of reasoning. The very order under challenge states: "it is proposed to take disciplinary action against the above teacher. Pending disciplinary action, in exercise of the powers vested in me under S.12-A of the K. E Act, 1958, read with R.97(2) of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959, the above teacher is placed under suspension" It must be presumed that when the Ist respondent-Director issued Ext. P6 order, he was aware of the procedure to be followed in connection with disciplinary action to be taken and we would not be justified in drawing any inference that the 1st respondent did not follow the procedure in issuing Ext. P6 order. As Govindan Nair, C. J., in P.P. Sreedharan v. Asst. Educational Officer, Pappinissery (1974 KLT. 53) has in his inimitable words observed, the proposal would be there from the time it has been decided to intimate the Manager regarding the circumstances requiring disciplinary action. There is no fixed time within which intimation has to be given to the Management; nor is there any prescribed form in which the intimation has to be given. There is absolutely no reason why we should think that when the 1st respondent-Director stated in Ext. P6 order that there was a proposal to take action against the appellant-petitioner he would not follow or had not followed the procedure prescribed in that behalf either under S. I2A of the Act or under R.75 or 75A of Chapter XIV-A of the Rules. 8. Various other decisions reported in Kumara Mannadiar v. District Educational Officer (1976 KLT. 639), Krishnan v. District Educational Officer (1976 KLT. 799), Manager S.N.V. High School v. State of Kerala (1982 KLT 229) and K.P. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (1974 KLT 714 (FB )) have been cited by the counsel for the appellant-petitioners. We do not think any of these decisions would advance the cause of the appellants. In this view, the appeals have only to be dismissed; and we do so. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to the counsel for the appellants on usual terms if applied for in that behalf. Dismissed.