JUDGMENT - Couto, J. -This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution gives rise to an interesting question of law, namely as to whether in cases of acquisition of land for Companies under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the inquiry postulated in Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition Companies Rules, 1963 is to be held and the report of the Collector is to be received by the appropriate Government prior to the issuance of the Notification under section 4 of the Act, and whether in the affirmative, the non-compliance with such requirement vitiates the respective proceedings. 2. The petitioner is the owner of two properties known as “Curia Vanguinim” situated at Taleigao, Dona Paula, formerly surveyed under the Old Cadastral Survey Nos. 803 and 804 and presently under Nos. 245/2 and 246/2 of the village of Taleigao. These properties are bounded on the northern and eastern sides by another property with the same designation 'Curia Vanguinim' belonging to one Andre Francisco de Souza Machado and others, on the southern side by the river Zuari and on the western side by a property also known as 'Curia Vanguinim' which belonged to one Dr. Alvaro Remigio Pinto and others and now belongs to M/s. Sociedade de Fomento Industrial Pvt. Ltd. by virtue of a Sale Deed made on 10-3-78. In the year 1977, the petitioner began to contemplate the development of his above referred to properties along with adjoining properties into a tourist complex and, therefore, alongwith the aforesaid Machado wrote a letter to the Director of Tourism and thereafter to the Chief Town Planner making them aware of the project prepared by M/s. Gherzi Eastern Ltd., Bombay and seeking their help for the acquisition of the adjoining lands for the execution of the said project. Correspondence was exchanged between the petitioner on one side and the Director of Tourism and the Chief Town Planner on the other and finally, by letter dated 26-10-78, the Chief Town Planner informed the petitioner that* his request to freeze 60 hectares of private land for his proposed hotel complex could not be considered by the Government. Correspondence was exchanged between the petitioner on one side and the Director of Tourism and the Chief Town Planner on the other and finally, by letter dated 26-10-78, the Chief Town Planner informed the petitioner that* his request to freeze 60 hectares of private land for his proposed hotel complex could not be considered by the Government. The petitioner was further advised to confine his project to the land owned by him and to take the necessary action at his end In the meanwhile, on 26th July, 1978, M/s. Sociedade de Fomento Industrial Pvt. Ltd. moved an application to the Sarpanch of Taleigao for construction licence in respect of their proposed hotel building in the property purchased by them from Dr. Alvaro Remigio Pinto. In September, 1978 petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption and injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji against the said Company and others in respect of the property purchased by M/s. Sociedade de Fomento industrial Pvt. Ltd. He sought a temporary injunction, but the learned Civil Judge, rejected the prayer. However, in the appeal to the Judicial Commissioner's Court, the said Company was restrained from constructing the proposed Hotel. The defend-ants in the said suit along with M/s. Gomantak Land Development Ltd. filed Writ Petitions in the Supreme Court which were admitted, but no interim relief was granted. On 7-8-78, M/s. Gomantak Land Development Ltd. took on lease from M/s. Sociedade de Fomento Industrial Pvt. Ltd. the land purchased from Dr. Alvaro Remagio Pinto and on 15th November, 1978 applied to the first respondent for the acquisition of the petitioner's land for their hotel project. Then, on 20th December, 1978, the aforesaid suit for pre-emption filed by the petitioner came to an end by a compromise. The petitioner continued to pursue his project by writing to the Sarpanch of Taleigao in that connec-tion. While the matters were so standing, the first respondent issued a Notification dated 28th October, 1980 under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, notifying that the properties of the petitioner above referred . The petitioner continued to pursue his project by writing to the Sarpanch of Taleigao in that connec-tion. While the matters were so standing, the first respondent issued a Notification dated 28th October, 1980 under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, notifying that the properties of the petitioner above referred . to were likely to be needed for the public purpose, namely for the purposes of Tourism Development project-Construction of Hotel at Curia Vanguinim, Taleigao by M/s. Gomantak Land Development Ltd. Then, a second Notification dated 25th January, 1982 was published under section 4 (l)of the same Act notifying that amongst others, the same petitioner's properties were likely to be needed for public purpose viz. Institutional Complex at Curca, Bambolim, Calapor, Taleigao and Doma Paula Plateau. Finally, a Notification dated 26th October, 1983 was published, notifying that the petitioner's properties mentioned in the Notification dated 28th October, 1980 were needed for the purpose notified therein. Again by a Notification dated 19th May, 1984, the first respondent amended the Notification dated 25th January, 1982 and modified the schedule of the said original Notifica-tion, deleting the petitioner's properties. 3. Petitioner challenges the legality and validity of the Notifications dated 28th October, 1980 and 26th October, 1983 issued under sections 4(1} and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, respectively, on several grounds, particularly that the said Notifications were issued in a mala fide and colourable exercise of the powers and further, in utter non-compliance with the provisions of the law regarding the acquisition of land for Companies. It was, in fact, argued by Mr. Dessai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the mala fide in issuing the impugned Notifications is patent, for the first respondent was fully aware that the petitioner was contemplating the development of the properties sought to be acquired along with the adjoining properties by building therein a Hotel complex. In fact, a project prepared by a reputed firm of Architects had been submitted to the Director of Tourism as well as to the Chief Town Planner and correspondance on the subject was going on when the impugned Notification under Section 4(1) was published. In fact, a project prepared by a reputed firm of Architects had been submitted to the Director of Tourism as well as to the Chief Town Planner and correspondance on the subject was going on when the impugned Notification under Section 4(1) was published. This, according to the learned counsel, clearly indicates not only mala fide, but also that the first and second respondents had acted in collusion to the prejudice of the petitioner, for the said Notification was issued on basis of a bare application made by M /s. Gomantak Land development Ltd. and without complying with the mandatory provisions of Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. 4. It is apparent from the material before us that the petitioner was, in fact, contemplating the development of his properties sought to be acquired by executing a tourist complex therein and in the adjoining pro- perties He has consulted a firm of Architects, namely M/s. Gherzi Eastern Ltd. and obtained their opinion on the project. He, therefore, had written a letter along with the owners of one of the adjoining properties to the Director of Tourism on 14th December, 1977 wherein he, inter alia, stated that he and the other two applicants were negotiating with the other co-owners to get them directly involved in the undertaking or alternatively agree to be compensated by selling their rights. He further stated that under the circumstances, the applicants ware requesting that their application be submitted to the concerned authorities with a view to securing their co- operation and sanction to the venture. Thereafter, a lot of correspondence ensued between him on one side and the Director of Tourism and Chief Town Planner on the other, for the petitioner was seeking their help for the purpose of persuading the owners of the adjoining properties to either sell the said properties to him, or to arbitrate in question, or to get the said properties acquired by the Government for his Hotel project. Finally, by his letter dated 16th February, 1978, the Director of Tourism advised the petitioner that he may restrict his proposed tourist activities such as construc- tion of the tourist cottages, swimming pool, etc., to the land existing around the paddy field. The said Director of Tourism also conveyed to the peti- tioner that the decision of the Government would be communicated to him in due time. The said Director of Tourism also conveyed to the peti- tioner that the decision of the Government would be communicated to him in due time. In his turn, the Chief Town Planner, in his letter dated 26th October, 1978 addressed to the petitioner, observed that there is no legal provision or any Government directive for freezing private lands belonging to one party for another private party, and advised the petitioner to confine his proposed project to only that part of the land which was owned by him at that time. He also informed the petitioner that in the event further land was acquired by him in the vicinity, the same land would be considered also alongwith the proposals. Finally, the Chief Town Planner advised the petitioner that he should take the necessary action as regards his project at his end. The petitioner did not take any action, and only on 24th November, 1979, addressed a letter to the Sarpanch of Taleigao submitting a master plan and requesting that the same be approved. In other words, the petitioner did not take any appropriate and positive steps to put in execution his plan for the tourist complex and despite the clear letters of the Director of Tourism and Chief Town Planner continued in the realm of unrealities pur-suing his dream to have his grandiose project of a tourist complex for about 100 cottages, central building, swimming pool, etc. On the other hand, M/s. Sociedade de Fomento Industrial Pvt. Ltd., after the purchase of the land from Dr. Alvaro Remigio Pinto, obtained a construction licence for a Hotel complex. Thereafter, on 7-8-78 they gave on lease the said land to M/s. Gonmantak Land Development Ltd. and the actual construction of the said Hotel complex commenced after the suit filed by the petitioner for pre-emption was compromised. Further, just before the compromise of the said suit, M/s. Gomantak Land Development Ltd. applied to the first res-pondent, praying that the petitioner's properties be acquired for their Hotel complex. The above facts may justify the inference that actually there was no mala fide on the part of the Government while issuing the impugned Notification under section 4(1) of the Act. Mr. Dessai, however, further urged that there are some other aspects of the case that clearly show that there was mala fide in issuing the aforesaid Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Mr. Dessai, however, further urged that there are some other aspects of the case that clearly show that there was mala fide in issuing the aforesaid Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. He contended that the fact that the said Notification was issued on the sole strength of the application dated 15th November, 1978 made by M/s. Gomantak Land Development Ltd. is conclusive evidence of the alleged mala fide and collusion, for the prevailing law was rnandatorily requiring an inquiry to be made before the publication of the said Notifica-tion in order to ascertain whether, prima facie the acquisition of the land sought by the Company was justified. He further argued, placing reliance on the rulings of the Supreme Court in (Abdul Hussain Tayabali etc. v. The State of Gujarat and others)1, and (The General Government Servants Co- operative Housing Society Ltd., Agra v. Wahab Uddin and others)2, that the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules are mandatory and as such, the inquiry has to beheld before the publication of a Notification under section 4(1) in cases of acquisition of land for Companies. He also urged that the failure to hold such an inquiry vitiates the Notification under Section 4 and the subsequent acquisition proceedings. 5. Joining issue, Mr. Usgaoncar. appearing for the second respondent, contended that there is nothing in Rule 4 to show that the inquiry envisaged therein is to be held prior to the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. He submitted that a careful reading of Sections 39 and 40 of the Act makes it clear that the inquiry to be held is before the issuance of the Notification under Section 6 and, therefore, if the inquiry postulated in Rule 4 is held after the publication of the Notification under Section 4, the same Notification is not vitiated, as well as vitiated are not the subsequent proceedings. Mr. Usgaoncar further invited our attention to the Land Acquisition (Gujarat Unification and Amendment) Act, 1965 under which Section 39 of the Act was amended by substituting the figure 6 occurring in Section 39 by the figure 4. He submitted that this amendment of the Land Acquisition Act of Gujarat shows that, unless a specific provision of law exists, the inquiry to be held under Rule 4 seems to be before the issuance of Rule 6 only. He submitted that this amendment of the Land Acquisition Act of Gujarat shows that, unless a specific provision of law exists, the inquiry to be held under Rule 4 seems to be before the issuance of Rule 6 only. He sub- mitted further that the said inquiry under Rule 4 could be held either before or after the Notification under Section 4, but the fact that it was not held before does not vitiate the proceedings. In any event, Mr. Usgaoncar further submitted that even if the inquiry under Rule 4 is to be held prior to the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the question to be considered is whether the proceedings will he vitiated if the requirements of the said Rule 4 are complied with after the publication of the said Notification. He urged that the inquiry held under Rule 4 is only to enable the appropriate Government to arrive at a tentative finding as to the necessity of initiating the proceedings. But after a Notification under Section 6 of the Act is issued the aforesaid tentative finding loses its force. In the circum- stances, he submitted that what is required is that before issuing the Notification under Section 6, all the requirements as postulated in Sections 39 and 40 as well as in Rule 4 should be complied with. In the present case, according to the learned counsel admittedly an inquiry covering the points mentioned in Rule 4 was held by the Collector after the issuance “of the impugned Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Thus, all the legal requirements had been complied with and in addition, it is to be borne in mind that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, since he had oppor- tunity to file his objections and actually availed himself of it. Also, in the circumstances no failure of justice was caused and, as such, there is no reason for interfering and to quash the impugned Notifications. Mr. Usgaoncar also argued that sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 speaks of Section 6 and not of Section 4 and this justifies the inference that the inquiry envisaged in the said Rule is to be held at any moment prior to the issuance of the Notification under Section 6 of the Act and not necessarily before the publication of a Notification under Section 4. 6. 6. Undisputably, the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the publication of the impugned Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act were for the purpose of acquiring land for a Company, namely for the second respondent. Now, in the Scheme of the Land Acqui- sition Act there are two types of acquisition of land, one being for public purpose and the other for the purpose of a Company. In the first case, the acquisition is made to satisfy a public interest and is an acquisition pro bono publico, that is, for the good of the community. In such a case, obviously, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that a particular land is needed to be acquired for a public purpose, then a Notification under Section 4(1) may follow. The situation is, however, different in the case of acquisition of land for a Company, since the land is to be acquired for a private entity, namely a public Company. Such acquisition of land amounts to take away the land from a private party and to be given to another private party, though a public Company. This being the position, the legislature felt it necessary that before initiating proceedings for acquisition of land for a Company, the appropriate Government had to satisfy itself that such acquisition is needed, for it indirectly satisfies also a public need or interest. Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 provides for the satisfaction of the appropriate Government with regard to certain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings. In sub-rule (1) it is specifically laid down that whenever a Company makes an application to the appropriate Government for the acquisition of any land, that Government shall direct the Collector to -submit a report to it on the matters mentioned therein. Now, since the acquisition proceedings are initiated by the publication of a Notification under Section 4(1), it would appear that the inquiry postulated in sub-rule(l) of Rule 4 is to be held before the publication of the said Notification. The wording of sub-section (1) implies that soon after the application is made the Collector should be directed to hold the inquiry referred to therein and to submit a report. The wording of sub-section (1) implies that soon after the application is made the Collector should be directed to hold the inquiry referred to therein and to submit a report. This means, soon after the application is received, the first step to be taken by the appropriate Government is to direct the Collector to hold an inquiry on the points mentioned in sub-rule (1) and thereafter, to submit his report to the Government. This being so, in our view, the inquiry required by Rule 4 should necessarily precede the issuance of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, specially when the said inquiry is meant to enable the appropriate Government to form an opinion as to whether or not the acquisition of land for a Company is justified. We are fortified in this view by the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of (Abdul Hussain Tayabali etc. v. The State of Gujarat and others) (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court while dealing with the contention that the inquiry under Rule 4 has to be held after the Notification under Section 4 is issued and not before and, therefore, the inquiry held in that case by the master was not valid, has observed as under : “We do not find anything in Rule 4 or in any other Rule to warrant such a proposition. The inquiry, the report to be made consequent upon such inquiry, obtaining the opinion of the Land Acquisition Committee, all these are intended to enable the Government to come to a tentative . conclusion that the lands in question are or are likely to be needed for a public purpose and to issue thereafter Section 4 notification.” (em-phasis supplied) Similarly, in the case of Wahab Uddin and others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after minutely analysing the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules, observed as under:- “The above consideration shows that Rule 4 is mandatory, its compli- ance is no idle formality, unless the directions enjoined by Rule 4 are complied with, the notification under Section 6 will be invalid. A con- sideration of Rule 4 also shows that its compliance precedes the notifica- tion under Section 4 as well as compliance of Section 6 of the Act,” (emphasis supplied). . A con- sideration of Rule 4 also shows that its compliance precedes the notifica- tion under Section 4 as well as compliance of Section 6 of the Act,” (emphasis supplied). . From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is thus clear that not only the compliance with the provisions of Rule 4 is mandatory but also that such compliance should precede the Notification under Section 4. In other words, the inquiry and the report mentioned in the said Rule are to take place before the issuance of the Notification under Section 4. 7. Mr. Usgaoncar has, however, contended that the provisions of Sections 39 and 40 of the Land Acquisition Act do not justify the finding that an inquiry before the publication of the Notification under Section 4 is required. Therefore, according to him, the inquiry postulated in Rule 4 can be held either before or after the said Notification. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel, since the provisions of Sections 29 and 30 come into operation only after the publication of the Notification under Section 4. 8. Mr. Usgaoncar has further contended that, in any case, the above observations of the Supreme Court apply only for the formation of a tenta- tive opinion by the appropriate Government in respect of the acquisition of lands. The final decision is taken at the time of the issuance of the Notifica- tion under Section 6 and, therefore, the inquiry mentioned in Rule 4 can be held at any moment prior to the issuance of the Notification under Section 6. To support this view, he specially relied on sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 which provides that no declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government under Section 6 unless the same Government had consulted the committee and had considered the report submitted under the said Rule and the Report, if not submitted under Section 5 (a) of the Act, and the agreement under Section 41 of the Act has been executed by the Company. According to Mr. Usgaoncar this sub-rule shows only that what is required is that the said inquiry under Rule 4 has to be completed and considered before the issuance of the Notification under Section 6. We are, however, unable to accept the above contentions of Mr. Usgaoncar. According to Mr. Usgaoncar this sub-rule shows only that what is required is that the said inquiry under Rule 4 has to be completed and considered before the issuance of the Notification under Section 6. We are, however, unable to accept the above contentions of Mr. Usgaoncar. In fact, Rule 4 has two parts, the first dealing with the stage prior to the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 and the second, the stage after the issuance of the Notifica- tion under section 4, but prior to the issuance of a Notification under Section 6. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 comes into operation only after the' Notification under Section 4 is published and provides that no, declaration can be made by the appropriate Government under Section 6 unless the Government has consulted the Committee and has considered the Report submitted under Rule 4 as well as the Report under Section 5,(a) and the agreement under Section 41 of the Act has been executed. This sub-rule in no manner supports the contention of Mr. Usgaoncar and it may be pointed out tha| obviously for tentative formation of opinion for issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act, the inquiry contemplated in Rule 4, sub-rule (1) must precede the publication of the Notification under Section 4, as otherwise is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court above quoted, since the said inquiry is meant to enable the Government to form an opinion as to whether or not acquisition of land should be made for a Company. 9. Mr. Usgaoncar next contended that even if the aforesaid inquiry under Rule 4 has to precede the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, nevertheless the question to be considered is whether any failure of justice had been occasioned by not holding the inquiry before the issuance of the said Notification. He submitted that, at the most, the said inquiry under Rule 4 is meant only to enable the appropriate Government to form a tentative opinion. If after the Notification under Section 4, the appropriate Government holds an inquiry and forms a definite and final opinion that a particular land has to be acquired, it follows that the. omission in holding the inquiry under Rule 4 prior to the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 is of no consequence and does not vitiate the proceedings. If after the Notification under Section 4, the appropriate Government holds an inquiry and forms a definite and final opinion that a particular land has to be acquired, it follows that the. omission in holding the inquiry under Rule 4 prior to the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 is of no consequence and does not vitiate the proceedings. He placed reliance in support of this submission in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of (Babu Barky a Thakur v. State of Bombay and others)3, as well as in the case of Wahab Uddin and others (supra). We already stated that the inquiry under Rule 4 is to precede the Notification under Section 4. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Wahab Uddin has specifically laid down that the provisions of Rule 4 are mandatory and its compliance does not constitute an idle formality. Therefore, the question that arises is whether if the provisions of the said Rule 4 are not complied with, the Noti-fication issued under Section 4 and the subsequent proceedings are valid. Mr. Usgaoncar, placing reliance in Babu Burkya Thakur's case, has submitted that the purpose of the Notification under Section 4 is solely to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after the necessary survey whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. He further submitted that it is only under Section 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by the Government with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a company. Therefore, what was a mere proposal under Section 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. In the said case of Babu Barkya Thakur, the Supreme Court observed as under: “The purpose of the notification under Section 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under Section 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and area so as to be indentifible is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. What was a mere proposal under Section 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, it is not correct to say that any defect in the notification under Section 4 is fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a Company and the purpose has to be investigated under Section 5 A or Section 40 necessarily after the notification under Section 4 of the Act.” That was a case where a Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act had been issued and no reference had been made to the public purpose. It has been contended before the Supreme Court that the omission to refer to the public purpose was fatal to the Notification and to the proceedings. It was in that context that the Supreme Court made the aforesaid observations and held that the omission of reference to the public purpose was not fatal. The question of looking into the provisions of Rule 4 had not at all obviously arisen, because at the time of passing of the aforesaid ruling, the aforesaid Rule 4 was not in force, since the Rules came into force only in the year 1963. This being so, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court is not at all attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case and is of no help for the construction and interpretation of Rule 4. Besides, it may be pointed out that the non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 4 does not constitute a mere formal defect, but, on the contrary, is a defect that substantially affects the proceedings ana the Notification itself. 10. Mr. Usgaoncar further submitted that, in the case of Wahab Uddin, the Supreme Court had upheld the finding of the High Court only because there had been failure of justice in that particular case. In fact, the observations made by the Supreme Court go to show that though the ipquiry under Rule 4 has to precede the Notification under section 4 of the Act, if no failure of justice is caused by not holding such inquiry, the proceedings will not be vitiated. In fact, the observations made by the Supreme Court go to show that though the ipquiry under Rule 4 has to precede the Notification under section 4 of the Act, if no failure of justice is caused by not holding such inquiry, the proceedings will not be vitiated. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court, after observing that a consideration of Rule 4 shows that its compliance procedes the Notification under section 4 and after observing that Rule 4 is mandatory and its compliance is no idle formality, further held that in the case before it :- “The inquiry report submitted by the Collector does not show that he applied his mind to the provisions of Rule 4 as stated above, or to the objections of the first respondent. In fact there was no report under Rule “4. The report that was submitted was one under section 5A of the Act. We have examined this aspect of the matter to see that although the enquiry was belated and not in accordance with law, there has been no failure of justice. In our opinion there has been failure of justice. Agreeing with the finding of the High Court, although for different reasons, we hold that the notification under* section 6 is invalid for non-compliance of Rule 4 of the Rules.” In the said case, there was no report under Rule 4 and the Supreme Court held the Notification under Rule 6 invalid, specifically, for non-compliance of Rule 4. The observations about the failure of justice are subsidiary and apparently made in the light of the contentions of the appellants before the Supreme Court. In fact, it is clear from para 7 of the Report that the appellants had urged that the first respondent had in fact filed objections which were inquired into and that he was given an opport-unity of being heard and that the High Court therefore had not been right an holding that there had been a breach of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court observed that the real question was not whether there has been any violation of any principle of natural justice, but whether Rule 4 of the Rules had been complied with by the collector. The Supreme Court observed that the real question was not whether there has been any violation of any principle of natural justice, but whether Rule 4 of the Rules had been complied with by the collector. It was dealing with this contention that the Supreme Court construed the Rule 4 as aforesaid that it was in this context that it was held that the Notification under section 6 was invalid for non-compliance of Rule 4. The High Court has however held that the Notification under section 6 was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice, thereby causing a failure of justice. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court found that, in fact, there had been a failure of justice in that case and therefore up-held the said finding of the High Court. That was a ground additional to that of failure to comply with Rule 4, for holding the Notification under section 6 invalid. As we already said that provision of law was not complied with and this in our view, by itself had caused a failure of justice. We are fortified in this view by the observa-tions made by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh Hight Court in the case of (K. Yadaih and others v. Govt. of A.P.I Secretary, Housing Municipal Admn. and others).4 wherein it has been held that acquisition of private lands for public purposes by the use of compulsion of law should not be permitted by courts except in strict compliance with the procedure laid down by the Land Acquisition Act, the same being an ad nominem legislation. We therefore find that the impugned Notification under Section 4 (1) is vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory Rule 4 of the Rules and consequently, the acquisition proceeding initiated by the said Notification are vitiated. 11. Thus, the petition succeeds on the ground of non-compliance of Rule 4 alone. Therefore, although the impugned Notifications are being challenged in the petition on several other grounds, we do not find it necessary to deal with them. 12. In the result, this petition succeeds and consequently the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. 13. Mr. Usgaoncar prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused. Rule made absolute. ----