Judgment 1. ON 11. 8. 82 the matter was moved before one of the learned Judges of our court and His Lordship was pleased to issue a rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the orders complained of in the petition should not the set aside and further directing that the opposite party will not change the character of the disputed land in, which the petitioner was interested till the disposal of the rule. 2. MR, R. C. Deb' appearing for the petitioner refers to me paragraphs 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the petition in support of his case so far as the present application is concerned. In paragraph 9 it has been stated that the learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment, and decree dated 14th of may, 1980 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and ordered as fellows :- "the plaintiff to get a decree 'for has possession of the suit premises together with all buildings and structures standing thereon excepting the portion validly sublet to the different person by evicting the defendant there from". 3. THE petitioner's case is that petitioner's portion was validly sublet by the judgment debtor and therefore that portion occupied by it that is to say, Hindustan Petroleum could not be taken possession of by virtue of the said decree. 4. IN paragraph 11 it has been stated that the opposite party applied for the process of the court for taking possession of the disputed premises and that was a fraud upon the court and the gross abuse of the process of the court because the decree does not endow the opposite party the power to execute that portion occupied by the petitioner. Petitioner's case is that after getting illegal possession of the disputed premises the opposite party constructed and| or caused to be constructed a corrugated iron sheet wall around the disputed premises and also 3 ft. high brick built wall inside the corrugated iron sheet wall. Mr. Deb contended that portion which is Annexure 'b' to the petition (page 29) was validly sublet and the portion marked with green was in lawful possession of Hindusthan Petroleum but hukum Chand Raj Kumar had taken possession of the said portion which itself is a gross abuse of the process of the Court as the decree of eviction did specifically exclude that portion. Decree that was drawn up was specific on the point that recovery of possession could be had excepting the portion which was validly sublet to the different persons and Mr. Deb's client was one of the persons to whom it was validly sublet -Mr. Deb contended. 5. MR. Shyamaprasanna Roychoudhury took several preliminary objections which may be enumerated herein. (I). His first objection is that this application does not lie because the petitioner should have come under Order 21, Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and if he has any grievance he could have filed an appeal under Order 21, Rule 103 of the same code. (II). His second point is that application' under Section 115 and article 227 cannot be combined together. (III). His third point is that one must value the application as per the valuation of the suit. In the instant case the suit was valued at a sum of Rs.44,000/- and that valuation should have been given in the revisional application but instead it has been valued at Rs.5000/ -. Therefore, one learned Judge had no jurisdiction to issue rule or to hear the application. Mr. Roychoudhury referred to me Chapter II Rule l (i) and schedule referred to at page 7 of the Rules of the high Court, Appellate Side and contends that a single Judge could not hear any application the valuation of which was or should be more than Rs.5000/ -. Under the said schedule clause (3) one learned Judge would be competent, to hear application for revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code and against the orders of Munsifs and against the orders of other Judges upto the value of' Rs.5000/- and all rules granted on such application and as per clause (5)of the schedule also an application under Article 227 of the Constitution upto the value of Rs.5000/- and all rules granted on such application. The Division bench would be the appropriate Bench for hearing other such matters not coming under that purview or having the valuation more than what is stated above and the Division Bench would hear such applications may it be under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or may it be under Article 227 of the constitution of India. The Division bench would be the appropriate Bench for hearing other such matters not coming under that purview or having the valuation more than what is stated above and the Division Bench would hear such applications may it be under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or may it be under Article 227 of the constitution of India. He also referred to me the "note" at page 8 of the Appellate Side Rule which says that "every application for revisional shall state the value of the suit to which the application relates." 6. MR. Roychoudhury contended that it was the bounden duty of the petitioner to value the revisional application at a figure which was the valuation of the suit itself and if there is any transgression of that as provided under the rule the entire civil revisional application is liable to be rejected. In support of that Mr. Roychoudhury refers to three judgments reported in 34 CWN page 730 (Nishikanta Ghose v. Barada kanta Bose) where Justice Panckridge hold that a Judge of the Calcutta High' court sitting singly has no jurisdiction to deal under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure that an order made in a suit of the value of Rs.1000/- although the order itself may concern a sum within that figure and in that view of the matter he discharged the rule and his main reason to hold that was that according to the rule as referred to above every application for revision shall state the value as per the value of the suit to which the application relates. The reason for such finding as given in the concluding portion of judgment that the learned Judge in dealing with such matter not only should know the amount of stake in respect of the particular order that is sought to be revised but also he must have information as to the value of the subject matter of the suit in which that order was made. In the other judgment reported in 34 CWN page 876 (Mohitosh Dutt v. Rai Satis Chandra chaudhuri) Justice Cuming held that a single judge of the Calcutta high Court had no power to issue a rule in respect of a matter which arises out of a suit valued over Rs.1000/- (at that time valuation was not Rs.5000/-as it is now) although the matter to which the application related might itself be within that figure and Justice cuming held in conclusion that "the correct course, I think, in the present case would be to discharge the present rule as incompetent, having been granted by a court which had no power to grant it leaving it upon the petitioner if he is so advised to move the proper court". In the other judgment reported in-83 CWN page 648 (Golam Bari. v. Havendra Nath) Justice P. B. Chakravartti (as His Lordship then was) held "under the distribution of business in the Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side) a judge sitting singly has no jurisdiction to issue a rule against an order of a Judge relating to a matter of which the value exceeds Rs.2000/- and as it was in that case the value of which was more than Rs.2000/- was heard by a Single judge it was held that the consequence of: a rule being issued by a Judge sitting singly which was beyond his jurisdiction under the distribution of the business in this court was considered in two cases referred to above and in both of them it was held that the rule should be discharged, and His Lordship too observed "in view of the settled practice of this court the only order which I can make is to discharge the rule". On the basis of that Judgment Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee who took over the argument from Mr. Roychoudhury called upon me to discharge the present rule too. Mr. Deb however on this point referred to me a case reported in 75 CWN page 397 (H. Agarwalla v. N. Agarwalla where Division Bench of our Court held that under such circumstances the rule cannot be discharged altogether. In paragraph 4 of the said judgment the Division bench observed "even assuming that in some cases, the application in question on being returned to the learned Advocate may not be re-filed and. In paragraph 4 of the said judgment the Division bench observed "even assuming that in some cases, the application in question on being returned to the learned Advocate may not be re-filed and. go out of the records of this court, the application in cases like the present may well be sent or brought from the single bench concerned to the appropriate bench, namely, the Division Bench through the office of the court under appropriate, orders." I also in this case following the said judgment direct the office to place the matter before the Appropriate Bench. I also in the present, case find that the revisional application was not valued nor was the application under Article 227 valued in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II (I) (i)read with clauses (3) and (5) and note: thereof of the appellate side rules. Patently the said rules have not been complied with in this case. So I cannot and have no jurisdiction to hear this revisional application. 7. AN argument was advanced by Mr. Deb that even if the application for revision under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code should state the value of the ' suit to which the application related that would not debar the petitioner to value the application under Article 227 of the Constitution in the manner he had done according to the valuation which is the subject matted of the application subject matter being only the part of the subject matter of the suit itself. This sort of break-up of the valuation (splitting it up and valuing it on the basis of the subject matter of the application only on pro rate basis) in my opinion is not contemplated and hence in my view cannot be allowed, as sought to be done in this case. . 8. FURTHER more I am. unable to accept that contention because the question of valuing an application under Chapter ii Rule l (i) Clause 5 of the Appellate side Rules which deals with Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be isolated in respect of its valuation specially when the application is a combined one, as it is in. this case. Framers of, the rule never meant there should be a different valuation in respect of an application for revision or an application under Article 227 of the Constitution if the application related to the suit itself. this case. Framers of, the rule never meant there should be a different valuation in respect of an application for revision or an application under Article 227 of the Constitution if the application related to the suit itself. If that is allowed to be done it would create not only an anomalous position but would create an absurd position and it is the general principle that in matter of construction of a rule a uniform principle is to be followed whenever it is possible. In my view a valuation under Article 227 of 'the Constitution must follow the valuation of the suit itself as per the note in the said schedule specially when the application is a combined one as in this case. It may further be noted that under the Appellate Side Rules an application under article 227 of the Constitution is also instituted, as civil revision. I accordingly direct this mater may be placed before the appropriate bench for necessary orders. 9. HOWEVER I make it clear that I do not deal with other preliminary objections as the one dealt with by me hereof is accepted to disentitle me to hear the matter and refer it to the appropriate Division Bench. Application referred to appropriate bench.