Judgment :- The appellant-petitioner in C.M.P.No.72/81 in A.S.No.151 of 1973 on the file of the Court if the learned Additional Judge, City Civil Court at Madras, is the respondent herein. The said C.M.P.No.72/81 was filed by the appellant in A.S.No.151 of 1978 under section 151, C.P.C. praying to amend the decree, dated 1st January, 1980 in A.S.No.151/78 by including the costs of trial Court as per the judgment and condoning the delay in filing the fee certificate in O.S.No.9379/74. 2. The affidavit of the partner of the appellant-firm in C.M.P.No.72 of 1981 is that the appellant became entitled to costs only on the award thereof by the lower appellate Court in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit with costs and therefore, the counsel filed his fee certificate after the appellate judgment was pronounced and that the decree has been drafted without including the costs in the trial court. It is alleged that the fee certificate has been filed within the time stipulated after the appellate judgment was pronounced and hence the costs of the trial Court as certified should be taxed and included in the decree and delay, if any, in filing the fee certificate, should be condoned. 3. The plaintiff opposes the application in his counter-affidavit, it is stated that no bill of costs and fee certificate had been filed in the trial court within the time granted after judgment of the trial court was pronounced and hence, the same should not be included in the decree and that the said costs cannot be now taxed and included when the fee certificate is filed in the lower appellate court. It was further contended before the lower court that the prayer for condonation of the delay must be made by a separate petition and thereafter only, any petition for amendment of the decree as drafted should be filed. 4. The following points were framed by the lower Court for determination in C.M.P.No.72/81: i. Has the bill of costs so far as it relates to costs incurred in the trial Court been filed in time? ii. If not, is the delay, to be condoned? iii. Does the decree as drafted require to be amended and if so, in what manner? The following points were framed by the lower Court for determination in C.M.P.No.72/81: i. Has the bill of costs so far as it relates to costs incurred in the trial Court been filed in time? ii. If not, is the delay, to be condoned? iii. Does the decree as drafted require to be amended and if so, in what manner? On point No.1, the lower court held that the appellant-petitioner had not filed his bill of costs so far as it relates to costs incurred in the trial Court within time. Under point No.2, the lower court held that there is no ground to condone the delay in the matter of filing the bill of costs so far as the trial court costs are concerned. Under point No.3, the lower court held that no amendment of the decree as drafted by the appellate court is necessary. The lower court dismissed the petition accordingly. Aggrieved by the above decision of the lower court, the court of the learned First Additional Judge, City Civil Court at Madras, the appellant-petitioner has come forward with this civil revision petition. 5. In the affidavit accompanying the petition it is inter alia stated by the partner of the appellant/petitioner that the appeal A.S.No.161/78 was allowed on 4th January, 1980, dismissing the plaintiffs suit with costs, that their advocate filed bill of costs and fee certificate in the above suit and also bill of costs in A.S.No.151/78. It is further stated in the affidavit that the lower court on 4th January, 1980 dismissed the plaintiff’s suit with costs and therefore, their advocate had filed fee certificate for the suit and as such, the appellant-petitioner is entitled to the costs of the trial court. It is further stated in the affidavit that the certified copy of the decree was received by the appellant-petitioner on 28th May, 1980 and that he immediately filed a memo on 16th July, 1980 in the office to correct the decree copy by including the costs of the trial Court. The Office had returned the said memo saying that the costs cannot be included in the appellate decree. It is further stated in the affidavit that the learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner filed the fee certificate within the time after the judgment was delivered in the above appeal and there is no delay in filing the same. 6. The Office had returned the said memo saying that the costs cannot be included in the appellate decree. It is further stated in the affidavit that the learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner filed the fee certificate within the time after the judgment was delivered in the above appeal and there is no delay in filing the same. 6. In the counter-affidavit filed in C.M.P.No.72/81 it is inter alia contended that there cannot be any amendment of the decree with regard to non-inclusion of costs unless and until the delay in filing the bill of costs in the trial court is first condoned. It is further contended that in the petition it is not stated as to how many days of delay has to be condoned by the lower court. No copy of the bill of costs is filed along with the present petition. It is contended by Mr.Himmatmal Mardia, the learned Counsel for the petitioner herein that though the bill of costs for the costs incurred in the trial court has to be filed before the trial court within seven days of the judgment of the trial court, it does not mean that the same cannot be filed before the appellate court in respect of the costs incurred in the trial court if the final decree has been passed by the appellate court awarding costs of the trial court, after the appellate courts judgment but within seven days of such appellate courts judgment. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the petitioner herein refers to the decision reported in JANAKI AMMAL v. NARAYANASWAMI IYER, (1917) 33 M.L.J.300 for the following proposition: "Where the High Court ordered by its decree each party to bear his own costs but that decree was reversed by the Privy Council which allowed to the appellant before it, his costs incurred in the High Court also, it was held that a fee certificate filed by the pleader for the appellant in the High Court in respect of fees received by him was not out of time because it was not filed within the seven days allowed by the rules." The decision in P.VENKATESWARLU v. MOTOR AND GENERAL TRADERS, (1975)1 S.C.C.770= (1976)1 S.C.J.393= (1976)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 35= (1975)3 S.C.R.958= A.I.R.1975 S.C.1409 is referred to by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner herein for the proposition that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by him on the date on which the appeal was heard. The decision in SANTOSH KUMAR v. BHAI MOOL SINGH, (1958)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 159= A.I.R.1958 S.C.321=( 1958)S.C.J.434= (1958) S.C.R.1211= (1958)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 159 is relied on by the learned counsel for the following proposition: "Now what we are examining here are laws of procedure. The spirit in which questions about procedure are to be approached and the manner in which rules relating to them are to be interpreted are laid down in SANGRAM v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL KOTAH, BHIREY LAL BAGA, (1955)2 M.L.J.(S.C) 13= (1955)S.C.J.431= (1955)2 S.C.R.1= A.I.R.1955 S.C.425. Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of section that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be sued to frustrate it. Too technical a construction of section that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be sued to frustrate it. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. Applied to the present case, these observations mean that though the court is given a discretion it must be exercised along judicial lines and that in turn means, in consonance with the principles of natural justice that form the foundation of our laws. Those principles, so far as they touch the present matter, are well known and have been laid down and followed in numerous cases." 7. Those principles, so far as they touch the present matter, are well known and have been laid down and followed in numerous cases." 7. Mr.R.S.Venkatachari, amicus curiae contends that the rule 96 of the Civil Rules of Practice deals with statement of costs and that as per the provisions of the said rule, each party shall, within seven days from the date of judgment or order or such further period as may be allowed by the court, bring into Court the certificate mentioned in the form contained in Appendix D, Forms Nos.1 and 2, and Appendix G, Form No.9, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and signed by him or his pleader, if any, of the costs and expenses incurred by him and may include therein the cost of preparation or process, the cost of production of any public record, of making and getting copies of pleading, application or affidavits which by the rules are required to be served on the opposite party, of such encumbrances and of obtaining the encumbrance certificates whenever such certificates are required to be produced and of nay adjournment or interlocutory application allowed to him and shall give credit for any costs allowed to his opponent and shall state the total amount claimed by him. The said statements shall be checked by the officer of the court, who shall note thereon the sums, if any, allowed and the total amount allowed by him and shall sign the same. If any party makes default in filing the said statement, the officer of the court shall prepare and sign a statement of the amounts of institution fee, if any and the pleader’s fee as fixed by the judge, allowable to the said party. Every party shall be entitled to inspect and take a copy of the statement. 8. In appeals, the costs or the certified copies of the judgment and the decree of the lower courts filed with the memorandum of appeal in compliance with the rules shall be included in the statement of costs. The statement referred to in paragraph (1) shall be signed by the judge and shall form part of the record of the case; and the total amount of costs allowed to the party to whom costs have been awarded shall be inserted in the decree of order before the same is signed by the Judge. 9. The statement referred to in paragraph (1) shall be signed by the judge and shall form part of the record of the case; and the total amount of costs allowed to the party to whom costs have been awarded shall be inserted in the decree of order before the same is signed by the Judge. 9. It is contended by Mr.R.S.Venkata-chari, the learned amicus curiae that the rule 96 is mandatory and that this rule requires that each party, whether they are successful or not must file the bill of costs within seven days from the date of judgment or decree along with the fee certificate. Time-limit has been prescribed and if default is committed in filing the fee certificate or bill of costs, the officer of court can proceed with the preparation of bill of costs and in the absence of the fee certificate filed by the counsel, it will not be included in the decree of the trial court. The question is if fee certificate is not filed before the trial court and therefore not included in the certified copy of the decree of the trial court filed along with the memorandum of appeal, can the appellate court allow the fee certificate which ought to have been filed before the trial court to be included in the statement of costs. It is clear that this will defeat the very purpose of rule 96(2) which states that the statement referred to in para (1) shall be signed by the Judge and shall form part of the record of the case. Therefore, even if the appellate court awards costs of both the courts, the costs of the trial court which can be included in the statement of costs, is only what is shown in the certified copy of the decree of the trial court. The fee certificate must be filed before the trial court and the decree of the trial court must be amended to include the fee paid to the counsel during the stage of trial of the suit and that can be done only by filing a petition to condone the delay in filing the fee certificate. It is further contended that this interpretation and approach to the provision of rule 96 of Civil Rules of Practice is beneficial to both the parties to the litigation and it is also in consonance with principles of natural justice. It is further contended that this interpretation and approach to the provision of rule 96 of Civil Rules of Practice is beneficial to both the parties to the litigation and it is also in consonance with principles of natural justice. It is further submitted by Mr. R.S.Venkatachari, learned amicus curiae that the party cannot take advantage of his own default and plead that whether he files the fee certificate or not in the trial court, the advocate’s fees should be included because the appeal is allowed with costs. It is further contended by Mr.R.S.Venkatachari that if the fee certificate relating to trial court is allowed to be filed straight in the appellate court, the other side would be denied an opportunity of questioning the quantum of the advocate-fee if it exceeds the schedule fees that can be allowed in law. 10. The suit had been decreed with costs in the trial court and the defendant had preferred an appeal. Admittedly, the defendant had not filed his bill of costs before the trial court within the time granted after the judgment was delivered by the trial court. In fact, he had not filed the same at all. Therefore, the decree as drafted by the trial court did not contain the costs incurred by the defendant as taxed by the court. On appeal, the lower appellate court had allowed the appeal with costs and set aside the trial court’s judgment and decree and had dismissed the suit with costs. Thereafter, it was contended on behalf of the defendant-revision petitioner herein before the lower court, as contended before this Court, that the had filed into court his bill of costs mentioning therein the costs incurred by the defendant in the appellate court as well as the costs incurred in the trial court. The office of the lower court had in preparing the appellate decree, provided for costs as taxed with reference to the costs incurred in the trial court. 11. As rightly contended by Mr.R.S.Venkatachari, rule 96 of the Civil Rules of Practice requires all parties to file within 7 days of the date of judgment, a certificate mentioned in rule 95 and also a statement in the form mentioned in the said rule giving details of costs incurred. 11. As rightly contended by Mr.R.S.Venkatachari, rule 96 of the Civil Rules of Practice requires all parties to file within 7 days of the date of judgment, a certificate mentioned in rule 95 and also a statement in the form mentioned in the said rule giving details of costs incurred. The rule further provides for taxing of institution fee, if any, and the pleader’s fee as fixed by the judgment in case of default in filing the said statement. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner herein by Mr.Himmatmal Mardia that it is only the successful party entitled to recover costs that need file the bill of costs within the time and not the other party who is not to receive the costs but only pay costs does not appear to be correct. Admittedly, in the instant case, the bill of costs relating to costs incurred by the defendant in the trial court had not been filed within the stipulated time after the judgment of the trial court. Therefore, the lower court is correct in having held that the revision petitioner herein had not filed his bill of costs so far as it relates to costs incurred in the trial court within the time. 12. It is relevant to note that when the bill of costs is not filed in a court within the specified time, it is only to that court, the party which committed default has to apply for condonation of delay in filing the bill of costs including the fee certificate and pray further for the inclusion of the same and get the decree of that court amended. Under these circumstances, there is no infirmity in the order under revision. Accordingly, the civil revision petition fails and stands dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The revision petitioner is given liberty to move the trial court for condonation of delay in filing the bill of costs including the fee certificate. 13. Before parting with this case, this Court records its appreciation towards the efficient assistance that had been given by Mr.R.S.Venkatachari as amicus curiae.