Judgment A short but nonetheless very interesting point has arisen in the applications made under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court in all the above suits. The question is where in a suit the plaintiff claims reliefs other then recovery of debt or liquidated demand in money or any other claims as stated in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court, is an application under Chapter XIIIA maintainable in such a case ? In other words the scope and applicability of Chapter XIIIA is the subject matter of the applications made in the above suits. In all the above suits the plaintiffs have claimed reliefs other then debt or liquidated demand in money and have also made application under chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules for recovery of debt and interest. The defendants in all the above suits have questioned the maintainability of the said applications. Hence in this judgment I am concerned only with the scope of and applicability of chapter XIIIA and not with the merits of the individual application. 2. As the question that has arisen for consideration in this case is important and is bound to arise frequently in various cases I appointed Mr. A.C. Bhabhra, Bar-at-aw as amicus curiae to assist me in this case. Mr. Bhabhra in his usual fairness has assisted me in this case and made submissions on the point in issue in the above applications. 3. As the question that has arisen in the applications made in the above suits is same in all the applications this judgment is applicable to all the applications. 4. For consideration of the point involved in the applications it is necessary to set out very briefly the claims made by the plaintiffs in the above suits and the prayers made in the plaints of the above suits. 5. In Suit No. 48 of 1981 (Dena Bank v. Victory Engineering Works & Ors.) the plaintiff Bank has filed the suit against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as principal debtors and defendant no. 3 as guarantor for recovery of the plaintiff’s dues with interest under Cash Credit Hypothecation Account as also declaration of charge in respect of the goods hypothecated by the principal debtors to the Bank and the sale thereof. 1 and 2 as principal debtors and defendant no. 3 as guarantor for recovery of the plaintiff’s dues with interest under Cash Credit Hypothecation Account as also declaration of charge in respect of the goods hypothecated by the principal debtors to the Bank and the sale thereof. The prayers in the plaint of the said suit are as follows:- “(a) Decree for Rs.1,39,986.99p; (b) Interim interest and interest on Judgment at the agreed rate of 16.50% per annum. (c) Declaration that the plant, machinery and goods mentioned in paragraph 6 above and Annexure 'B' 'D' and 'E' hereto are charged with a first and paramount charge in favour of the plaintiff for payment of the plaintiff's claim in the suit; (d) Decree for sale of the said plant, machinery and goods mentioned in prayer (c) above with liberty to the plaintiff to appropriate the net sale proceeds thereof in pro tanto satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim in this suit; (e) Receiver; (f) Injunction; (g) Costs; (h) Further and other reliefs." 6. The Plaintiff has made an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules, High Court for a final judgment of Rs.1,39,986.39P and other reliefs against the defendants as will appear from the Master's Summons taken out by the plaintiff. 7. In Suit No. 47 of 1982 (Bank of India v. M.G. Wire Enterprise & Ors.) the plaintiff has filed the suit against the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as debtors and the defendant Nos. 4 and 5 as guarantors for recovery of its dues with interest payable under Demand Loan Account, Cash Credit Account No 1. Frozen Demand Loan Account and also for declaration of charge in respect of the hypothecated goods and the decree for sale thereof. 1, 2 and 3 as debtors and the defendant Nos. 4 and 5 as guarantors for recovery of its dues with interest payable under Demand Loan Account, Cash Credit Account No 1. Frozen Demand Loan Account and also for declaration of charge in respect of the hypothecated goods and the decree for sale thereof. The prayers or the plaintiff in the plaint of the above suit ale as follows:- ''(a) Decree for Rs.5,48,291.44P, against the defendants; (b) Further interest at the agreed rates of 7.15% over Reserve Bank of India rate minimum 16.15% per annum in the Demand Loan Accounts No. I and II and Frozen Loan Account and 7.50% over Reserve Bank of India rate minimum 16.50% per annum in the Cash Credit Hypothecation Accounts No. I and II and penal rate of interest at 2% over the applicable rates in the irregular portion from 1st January 1982 till the date of filing of suit; (c) Interim interest and interest on Judgment at the agreed rates at mentioned in prayer (b) (d) A declaration that the goods, stocks, assets, properties, plants and machineries books debts specified in annexures 'A' to 'H' hereof stand charged and/or the plaintiff has a charge thereon for the due repayment of all moneys due and owing from the defendants to the plaintiff in the said accounts; (e) A decree for sale of the said goods, assets, properties, stock, plants and machineries and realisation of book debts mentioned in annexure 'A' to 'H' hereof and payment of the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff in pro tanto satisfaction of the claims of the plaintiff after defraying therefrom the costs and expenses of the sale and realization; (f) Receiver; (g) Interlocutory injunction; (h) Attachment before Judgment; (i) Costs; (j) Further or other reliefs." The plaintiff made an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules, High Court for a final judgment of Rs.5,48,291.44P and interest against the defendants as will appear from the Master's Summons taken out on behalf of the plaintiff. 8. In Suit No. 363 of 1982 (United Industrial Bank Limited v. Shagarika Seafood Private Ltd. & ors.) the plaintiff has sued the defendant no. 1 as borrower and the defendant nos. 2 and 3 as guarantors for recovery of its dues under Packing Credit Account and advances made in Current Account. 8. In Suit No. 363 of 1982 (United Industrial Bank Limited v. Shagarika Seafood Private Ltd. & ors.) the plaintiff has sued the defendant no. 1 as borrower and the defendant nos. 2 and 3 as guarantors for recovery of its dues under Packing Credit Account and advances made in Current Account. The plaintiff has also prayed for enforcement of its securities covered by the Deed of Hypothecation executed by the debtor in favour of the plaintiff Bank The prayers made in the plaint are as follows:- (a) A Decree for Rs.30,78,026.76; (b) Interim interest and interest on Judgment; (c) A decree for sale of the hypothecated goods and assets of the defendant no. 1 and also realisation of the debts due to the defendant no. 1 as hypothecated and/or charged in favour of the plaintiff by annexure" A" and "B" to the plaint; (d) A decree for appropriation of the net sale proceeds and/or realisations of the said Securities in pro tanto satisfaction of the claims and dues herein of the plaintiff; (e) Attachment; (f) Receiver; (g) Injunction; (h) Costs; (i) Further and/or other reliefs." The plaintiff has made an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court for a final judgment for Rs.30,78,026.26 P and other reliefs against the defendants as will appear from the Master's Summons taken out on behalf of the plaintiff. 9. In Suit No. 504 of 1983 (Vijaya Bank v. Kay Tea Industries Private Limited) the plaintiff has sued the defendant no. 1 as debtor and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 as guarantors for recovery of its dues under Term Loan Account, Cash Credit Account and Supply Bills Purchase Account. The Plaintiff has also claimed for enforcement of the charge in respect of the goods, stocks, assets, properties, plants, machinery and book-debts covered by the hypothecation agreements executed by the debtor in favour of the Bank. The prayers in the plaint are all follows:- "(a) Decree for Rs.5,18,149.68 P (b) Interim interest and interest on Judgment at the agreed rates. The Plaintiff has also claimed for enforcement of the charge in respect of the goods, stocks, assets, properties, plants, machinery and book-debts covered by the hypothecation agreements executed by the debtor in favour of the Bank. The prayers in the plaint are all follows:- "(a) Decree for Rs.5,18,149.68 P (b) Interim interest and interest on Judgment at the agreed rates. (c) Declaration that the goods, stocks, assest, properties, plants, machinery and book dents mentioned in Annexure 'D', 'J', 'L', 'R' and 'V' here of stand charged and/or the plaintiff has a charge thereon for the due repayment of all moneys due and owing from the defendants to the plaintiff; (d) Decree for sale of the said goods, stocks, assets properties, plants, and machinery and for realisation of the book debts and payment of the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff in pro tanto satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff after defraying therefrom the cost and expenses of the same; (e) Receiver; (f) Injunction; (g) Attachment before judgment (h) Costs and (i) Further and other reliefs." The plaintiff has made an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court for a final Judgment of Rs.5,18,149.68 P. and other reliefs against the defendants as will appear from the Master’s Summons taken out on behalf of the plaintiff. 10. In Suit No. 686 of 1982 (United Commercial Bank v. Rajendra Commercial Company and Ors.) the plaintiff has sued the defendant as debtors for recovery of its dues on account of the advances made by the plaintiff to the defendants in packing Credit ans Account and Temporary Overdraft Account. The plaintiff has also claimed declaration of charge and sale of goods covered by the Deed of Hypothecation executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. The prayers in the plaint are as follows:- (a) Decree for Rs.2,74,948.10 paise as pleaded in paragraph 19 hereof; (b) Personal decree against the defendants Nos. The plaintiff has also claimed declaration of charge and sale of goods covered by the Deed of Hypothecation executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. The prayers in the plaint are as follows:- (a) Decree for Rs.2,74,948.10 paise as pleaded in paragraph 19 hereof; (b) Personal decree against the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for realisation of the plaintiff's claims and dues; (c) Interim interest and interest on judgment; (d) Receiver; (e) Injunction; (f) Attachment: (g) A decree for sale of the hypothecated properties as pleaded in paragraph 7 hereof of the plaint read with annexure 'G' with a direction upon the plaintiff for appropriation of the net sale proceeds thereof in pro tanto satisfaction of its claims and dues in this suit; (h) Casts; (i) Further and/or other reliefs." The plaintiff has made an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules, High Court for a summary judgment for recovery of Rs.2,74,945.10 P and other reliefs as will appear from the Master's Summons taken out in behalf of the plaintiff. 11. In Suit No. 709 of 1982 (Indian Overseas Bank v. Southern Cold Storage Private Limited and ors) the plaintiff has sued the defendant no. 1 as borrower and defendant nos. 2 to 6 as guarantors for the amount due on account of moneys advanced under four Packing Credit Accounts and Shipping Lien Agreement. The plaintiff has claimed also declaration of charge and sale of the goods and machinery covered by Deed of Hypothecation executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. The prayers in the plaint are as follows:- "(a) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 1; (b) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 2; (e) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 3; (d) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 4; (e) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 5; (f) Decree for Rs.9,79.792.11 against the defendant no. 1; (b) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 2; (e) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 3; (d) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 4; (e) Decree for Rs.9,79,792.11 against the defendant no. 5; (f) Decree for Rs.9,79.792.11 against the defendant no. 6; (g) Interim interest and interest on judgment at the agreed rate of 19.5 percent per annum; (h) Declaration that the said hypothecated goods and machinery mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 5 above and annexure 'A' hereto are charged with a first and paramount charge in favour of the plaintiff for due repayment of the plaintiff's claim in the suit; (i) Decree, for sale of the goods and machinery mentioned in prayer 'h' above with liberty to the plaintiff to appropriate the net sale proceeds thereof in pro tanto satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim in the suit; (j) Receiver; (k) Attachment; (l) Injunction; (m) Costs; (n) Further and other reliefs". In the suit the plaintiff has made an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court for a final judgment for Rs.9,79,792.11 P and other reliefs as will appear from the Master's Summons taken out on behalf of the plaintiff. 12. Mr. B.K. Chatterjee appearing for Dena Bank and Indian Overseas Bank has submitted that the question that arises for determination in this case is where a plaintiff files a suit against a defendant joining and on the basis of several causes of action and also seeks to recover a debt or a liquidated demand besides other reliefs/claims, is he debarred from making an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court for a summary judgment for recovery of a debt or a liquidated demand in such application. In other words, according to him the moot point in this case is concerned with the scope, applicability and interpretation of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules. 13. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that in Rule 1(A) of Chapter XIIIA after the words 'in which the plaintiff seeks' the word 'only' has not been used. Therefore, the suit may include causes of action or reliefs other than debt or liquidated demand and interest as mentioned in the said Rule. 13. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that in Rule 1(A) of Chapter XIIIA after the words 'in which the plaintiff seeks' the word 'only' has not been used. Therefore, the suit may include causes of action or reliefs other than debt or liquidated demand and interest as mentioned in the said Rule. His submission is that in a suit where an application can be made under Chapter XIIIA asking for claims or causes as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) of Chapter XIIIA other claim or causes of action can be included. According to Mr. Chatterjee, the interpretation to the said Rule 1 as sought to be given on behalf of the respondents would really amount to inserting the said word 'only' as mentioned above which is not there in the Rule itself. It is further submitted that the Court will not read something in the said Rule which is just not there. 14. It is further submitted that an application under Chapter XIIIA can only be made in suits and not in any proceeding other than suit. In the suit there may be a claim for recovery of a debt or a liquidated demand as also claim for other reliefs, say for damages, but the claim for other reliefs would not disentitle the plaintiff to proceed under Chapter XIIIA to the extent his claim is for a debt or a liquidated demand. This interpretation of Rule 1 will get support from Rules 3, 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XIIIA where the key word used is 'claim'. It is further submitted that the Court has also been given power under Rule 8 to allow or disallow any part or portion of the claims, as it thinks fit. It is also submitted that Chapter XIIIA is intended to expedite grant of relief to the deserving plaintiff on adjudication of claim and defence on affidavit evidence so that lengthy trial is avoided. 15. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that in the suits filed by the Dena Bank and Indian Overseas Bank there are two branches of reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs seek to recover a debt or a liquidated demand. The plaintiffs have sought also to recover the said debt/liquidated demand by enforcement of their security. 15. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that in the suits filed by the Dena Bank and Indian Overseas Bank there are two branches of reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs seek to recover a debt or a liquidated demand. The plaintiffs have sought also to recover the said debt/liquidated demand by enforcement of their security. Only because the plaintiffs have sought to recover their debts through enforcement of their securities by claiming a declaration of charge and sale in respect thereof, they are not debarred from making an application under Chapter XIIIA for a summary Judgment. In each of the said suits the amount claimed by the plaintiff in prayer (a) of the plaint and the interest claimed in prayer (b) are both debt and/or liquidated demand. The agreement of hypothecation, promissory note and other documents executed by the defendants in the laid suits expressly provides for the rate of interest to be charged by the plaintiff banks from time to time. The amount claimed in prayer (a) of the plaint has been arrived at by computation of the amounts lent and advanced plus interest at the agreed rate. For showing what is a liquidated demand Mr. Chatterjee has referred to Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Original Side Rules of the High Court. The said Rule is as follows:- “Any suit in which the claim is only for a debt, or liquidated demand, is a liquidated claim, and may be admitted and marked as such. A mortgage suit may be marked as a liquidated claim. For the purposes of this rule 'debt' means a sum certain, or capable of being reduced to certainty by calculation, payable in respect of a direct and immediate liability by a debtor to a creditor; 'liquidated demand' means that the amount is a matter only of calculation to be made from fixed date, so that any two people making it correctly must arrive at the same result". 16. For the meaning of liquidated demand Mr. Chatterjee has referred Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition) at page 839 where it is stated as follows:- "Liquidated demand A demand the amount of which has been ascertained or settled by agreement of the parties, or otherwise Williamson v. City of Eastland Tex Civ. App. 16. For the meaning of liquidated demand Mr. Chatterjee has referred Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition) at page 839 where it is stated as follows:- "Liquidated demand A demand the amount of which has been ascertained or settled by agreement of the parties, or otherwise Williamson v. City of Eastland Tex Civ. App. 65, SW 2d 774, 775 Amount claimed is a "liquidated demand" if it is susceptible of being made certain in amount by mathematical calculations from factors which are or ought to be in possession or knowledge of party to be charged. Rifkin v Safeenovita, 131 Conn. 411, 40 A. 2d 188, 189." 17. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that in a suit where declaration of charge and sale of properties covered Deed of Hypothecation is claimed it is not necessary that two decrees viz., preliminary and final should be passed as in a mortgage suit. It is submitted that mortgage is a crystalised security of the creditor from the very date of creation of mortgage Hypothecation is not so. In a mortgage there is a very valuable right of the mortgagor known as "right of redemption". In a case of hypothecation or even in a case of pledge there is no such "right of redemption" of the hypothecator or of the pledgor. Further submissions of Mr. Chatterjee is that Ss. 176 to 178 of Contract Act applies in the case of a pledge Hypothecator does not seem to have even that right as provided in the laid sections. Mr. Chatterjee has referred to the decision reported in AIR 1933 Bombay 51 at pages 54, 55 (Official Assignee of Bombay v. Chimniram Motilal). It is submitted that in view of the said Bombay decision the case reported in AIR 1979 Calcutta 14 (Kalidas Pal v. Sripati M. Roychowdhury) has no application in this case Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted the decision of Co-Operative Hindusthan Bank Ltd v. Surendra Nath Dey & ors., reported in AIR 1923 Calcutta 524 is also of no assistance. According to Mr. Chatterjee the observation made in the case reported in AIR 1932 Calcutta 524 is merely obiter. 18. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that in a suit where a claim for declaration of charge and sale of goods covered by the Deed of Hypothecation is made, as in the instant case, this Hon'ble Court has been passing a final decree always. Chatterjee the observation made in the case reported in AIR 1932 Calcutta 524 is merely obiter. 18. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that in a suit where a claim for declaration of charge and sale of goods covered by the Deed of Hypothecation is made, as in the instant case, this Hon'ble Court has been passing a final decree always. He has referred to copy of such decree as settled drown up, completed and filed. 19. It is also the submission of Mr. Chatterjee that the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka, AIR 1926, Calcutta 713 has expressly recognised that in a suit wherein a claim seeking to recover liquidated demand has been made along with a claim for declaration of a charge the Court is competent to pass a final judgment in respect of the debt/liquidated demand postponing the adjudication of the claim for declaration of charge. He has further submitted that recently two learned Judges of this Hon'ble Court have expressly decided that the point of non-maintainability of a Chapter XIIIA application made in a suit filed by bank claiming, inter alia for enforcement of charge has no merit Reference has been made to the dictated order of Mrs. Monjula Bose, J. in Suit no. 277 of 1982 (Bank of Rajasthan v. S.K. Trading) and the decision of Mrs. Khastgir, J. in the case reported in AIR 1984 NOC 10 (Cal) (Grindlays Bank Limited v. Creswell Brewaries Limited & ors). 20. Mr. Sudipto Sarkar with Mr. P. Chowdhury appearing on behalf of Bank of India has submitted that a suit claiming money relief, a declaration of charge over movable property and a decree for sale is not a mortgage suit. The provisions of Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to such suits. The provisions of Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code and the forms of decrees specified therein, i.e., a preliminary and a final decree, apply only to suits relating to mortgage of immovalle property where the equity of redemption of the mortgagor require protection. The provisions of Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to such suits. The provisions of Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code and the forms of decrees specified therein, i.e., a preliminary and a final decree, apply only to suits relating to mortgage of immovalle property where the equity of redemption of the mortgagor require protection. Such statutory provisions and procedure are not applicable in the case of hypothecation of movable property Hypothecation of movable properly is merely a pawn within the meaning of S. 176 of the Indian Contract Act where it is open to the creditor to proceed only for money and retain in the pawn or to sell the pawn and give credit to the debtor and further the creditor can proceed against the security in execution of its money decree. Such remedy of the creditor is not open in a mortgage suit where the creditor cannot sell the property without coming to Court by reason of the provisions of Order 34 of Rule 14 of Civil Procedure Code even in execution of a money decree. With regard to the right of person where movable securities are given to the pawnee, reference may be made to case of Haridas Mundhra v. National & Grindlays Bank Limited, AIR 1963 Calcutta 132. 21. According to Mr. Sarkar, the observation made in the case of Cooperative Hindusthan Bank Ltd. v. Surendra Nath Dey, AIR 1932 Cal 524 at 533 which was relied upon by the respondents in support of the contention that Order 34 of C.P.C. applies to the case of mortgage of movables was made in connection with the question of costs and not otherwise. It naturally cannot be disputed that in a mortgage suit no application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules can be made Reference was made to the case of Kalidas Pal v. S.M. Roychowdhury, AIR 1979 Cal 14 where the Court observed as follows:- "A final judgment resulting in a final decree cannot be passed in a mortgage suit under Chapter 13A of the Rules and Chapter 13A can have no application to a mortgage suit. The plaintiff in a mortgage suit does not have any right to make any application for final judgment or decree under the provisions of Chapter 13A in a mortgage suit Unless the provisions of Chapter 13A apply the Court does not acquire any jurisdiction or power to entertain the application and to pass any decree and any decree which the Court may pass will clearly be without jurisdiction Merely because Rule 5 of Chapter 7 provides that a mortgage suit may be marked as a liquidated claim for the purpose of classification of suits, it does not follow that it becomes a suit to which the provisions of Chapter 13A are applicable." 22. Mr. Sarkar has further submitted that the fact that a suit involving a money claim and movable security is different is evident from AIR 1926 Cal 713 (Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka) in which in an application for final judgment under chapter 13A, the Division Bench passed a decree for a part of the money claim and relegated the claim against the securities to further hearing in the suit. 23. Mr. Sarkar has further submitted that the provisions of Chapter XIIIA Rule 1 read with the other Rules are concerned not with types of suits, but types of claim made in suits and Rule 3 empowers the plaintiff to make an application for final judgment in respect of any claim. This, according to Mr. Sarkar, is different from the law as it was in England previously, which permitted an application for final judgment to be made in the case of a specially endorsed writ which endorsement could only be possible in all actions where the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debtor liquidated demand in money, (Order III Rule 6). The special endorsement of a writ meant that the suit should be of a particular type. According to Mr. Sarkar, the word 'only' is significantly absent from Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA and ought not to be read into it. Further, the plaintiff in an affidavit supporting an application for final judgment under Order XIV Rule 1 in England had to say that in his belief the defendant had no defence to the action i.e. the whole suit unlike Chapter XIII of the Original Side Rules whereunder according to Rule 3 the plaintiff has to say only that the defendant has no defence "to the claim". It is submitted that inasmuch as the law in England at present is the same as in Original Side Rules the similar principles should be followed. The present law in England permits application for final judgment for all claims, for one of several claims and for part of the claim. Reference was made to Halsbury's Laws of England 4th edition, volume 37 Art. 411, P 305 and Atkin's Court Forms vol. 29 Forms 21, at p. 181 which shows that the form for summary judgment in the case of one of several claims. The decisions reported in 1892 (1) B 674 (Ryley v. Master) and P. 684 (Mlks v. Wood) which are based on the previous law in England clearly show the importance of the word 'only' in the corresponding English provision. In those cases, a claim for interest not being supported by contract or statute was held to be a claim for un-liquidated damages and hence the claim could not come within the expression "seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand". It is further submitted that several other English decisions show that in the case claim of interest based on statute or contract can claimed. According to Mr. Sarkar the aforesaid construction of the provisions of Chapter XIIIA viz., it is concerned not with types of suits but with types of claims in suit would be clear from the provisions of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure which makes the order applicable to 'classes of suits' and not 'claim'. The said order further speaks of a suit in which the plaintiff "seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money". If the provisions of Order 37 are contracted with the provisions of Chapter XIIIA there can be no doubt that the application under Chapter XIIIA for some of the claims in a suit is maintainable. The provisions of Order 37 are similar to the old English provisions. It is submitted that the construction suggested by the defendants would make the provisions of Chapter XIIIA and Order 37 identical which is not the case. 24. It is further submitted by Mr. Sarkar that in all Bank suits interest is contractual and those English decision referred to hereinbefore would have no application. It is submitted that the construction suggested by the defendants would make the provisions of Chapter XIIIA and Order 37 identical which is not the case. 24. It is further submitted by Mr. Sarkar that in all Bank suits interest is contractual and those English decision referred to hereinbefore would have no application. The decision reported in AIR 1926 Cal 713 (Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka) is a direct authority for the proposition that an application for final judgment merely for the money claim is maintainable even where there are other claims against the securities. Further, in a Bank suit, the cause of action of the Bank is for money lent and advanced and is a debt or liquidated demand. The securities are merely collateral securities given for due repayment of the debt. It would always be open to the Bank, in any case, to proceed only for money claim. 25. It is further submitted that the arguments now advanced in this case was made in an application under Chapter XIIIA in Suit no. 277 of 1982 (Bank of Rajasthan v. S.K. Trading) before Monjula Bose, J. and her lordship upheld this argument by a Dictated Order dated January 31, 1983. Further an application for final judgment in a Bunk suit, being Suit No. 340 of 1980 (Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Cresswell Breweries Ltd. & ors.) reported in AIR 1984 NOC 10 (Cal) was also allowed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Padma Khastgir by a judgment dated May 2, 1983 where an argument that the Bank suit is a suit for accounts was repelled and the decision reported in AIR 1939 Madras 255 was dealt with. It has been the consistent practice of this Hon'ble Court of several judges including the Division Bench to allow such application in Bank suits. It was submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances an application for final judgment is clearly maintainable in a Bank suit. 26. It has been further submitted by Mr. Sarkar that so for as the claim against the guarantor is concerned, the guarantor in a Bank transaction merely gives a guarantee for repayment of the money claimed, by way of additional security. The guarantor is not and cannot be concerned with the securities, nor the claim against the security is made against the guarantor. Sarkar that so for as the claim against the guarantor is concerned, the guarantor in a Bank transaction merely gives a guarantee for repayment of the money claimed, by way of additional security. The guarantor is not and cannot be concerned with the securities, nor the claim against the security is made against the guarantor. The claim against the guarantor is merely a money claim and clearly falls within the provisions of Chapter XIIIA. The guarantor must make payment on demand and the securities are of no concern to him Reference was made to Halsbury's Laws of England 4th edition volume 3 page 128 para 182 and the case of The Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Dr. Damodar Prasad, AIR 1969 SC 297 . 27. Further, according to Mr. Sarkar, Chapter XIIIA is a provision introduced for the benefit of plaintiffs and against defendants. It should be given the construction most beneficial to the plaintiffs to further the object of chapter XIIIA. Such a construction is a well settled principle of construction of statutes. The construction given by the plaintiffs is also in accordance with the Rule in Heydon's case, that is, the mischief sought to be prevented is that a defendant's delaying the realisation of just claim. In this connection Mr. Sarkar has also referred to the case of Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Babasaheb Rajaramji Dam Purikar, AIR 1984 SC 192 . 28. Mr. S.K. Adhya appearing for United Industrial Bank Limited has submitted that the right to make an application for final judgment has been given by Rule 3 of Chapter XIIIA. The words "any suit which is within the terms of Rule 1" and "any claim which is within the terms of Rule 1" occurring in Rule 3 deal with two distinct and separate matters. The first with the nature or character of the suit and the second with the nature or character of the claim made in the suit. The two clauses do not mean the same thing. If the same thing is meant by the aforesaid two clauses as contended on behalf of the defendants then the words "as regards any claim which is within the terms of Rule 1" would be redundant and superfluous. The two clauses do not mean the same thing. If the same thing is meant by the aforesaid two clauses as contended on behalf of the defendants then the words "as regards any claim which is within the terms of Rule 1" would be redundant and superfluous. It is further submitted that in the interpretation of statutes courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. This presumption will have to be made in the case of rule making authority also. He has relied on the case of J & K Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1170. According to Mr. Adhya, construction which would attribute redundancy to a legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons Reference was made to the case of Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Asstt. Com. Sales Tax, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 766. It is further submitted that every word in Rule 3 of Chapter XIIIA has a meaning and no word is redundant or surplus or repetition or inserted twice by way of abundant caution Mr. Adhya has further submitted that Rule 1(A) consists of two parts. The first, viz. "a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money' deals with the nature or character of the suit. The second part, i.e. clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 1A after the word arising' in Rule 1A, that is, a debt or claim arising on a contract or a debt based and/or founded upon any of the other causes deals with the nature or character of the claim. According to Mr. Adhya, the purported redundancy or surplusage or repetition in Rule 3 would disappear if Rule 1(A) is construed in the aforesaid manner. It is submitted that the rule of harmonious construction should be applied. It is the submission of Mr. Adhya that the word any before the word "claim" in Rule 3 indicates that there may be more than one claim in the suit. 29. Further submission of Mr. It is submitted that the rule of harmonious construction should be applied. It is the submission of Mr. Adhya that the word any before the word "claim" in Rule 3 indicates that there may be more than one claim in the suit. 29. Further submission of Mr. Adhya is that Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that "every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action" and "An obligation and a collateral security for its performance shall be deemed to constitute but one cause of action". According to him, the same cause of action may give rise to various claims and reliefs. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings Reference was made to the case of Sidramappa v. Rajashetty AIR 1970 SC 1059 . Therefore, according to Mr. Adhya, an application can be made under Chapter XIIIA by the plaintiff (i) in any suit which is for recovery of it debt, (in as regards any debt or claim which arises on or is founded or based upon a contract or any of the ether clauses (ii) to (iv) of Rule 1(A) of Chapter XIIIA. 30. Mr. Adhya has also submitted that the instant suit is for recovery of a debt arising on a contract Chapter VII Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules says that "debt" means a sum certain or capable of being reduced to certainty by calculation payable in respect of a direct and immediate liability by a debtor to a creditor. The word 'debt' has been construed to mean a sum due for which there is an existing obligation to pay in present Reliance was placed to the case of Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1265. In the instant application recovery of such sum is the subject matter of the application under Chapter XIIIA. 31. Mr. Adhya has further submitted that under Chapter 12 Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules, a suit which arises out of the ordinary transaction of a banker and debt arising out of such transaction is a commercial suit. In the instant application recovery of such sum is the subject matter of the application under Chapter XIIIA. 31. Mr. Adhya has further submitted that under Chapter 12 Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules, a suit which arises out of the ordinary transaction of a banker and debt arising out of such transaction is a commercial suit. The instant suit has been marked as Commercial Suit No. 363 of 1982 under Chapter 12 Rule 2. According to him, a suit by a pawnee against the pawnor is for recovery of a debt. Section 176 of the Contract Act deals with the rights of a pawnee and provides that in case of default by the pawnor the pawnee has (a) the right to sue upon the debt and to retain the goods as collateral security and (b) to sell the goods after reasonable notice of the intended sale to the pawnor Reference was made to the case of Lalan Prasad v. Ramat Ali, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1323 According to Mr. Adhya a pawn or pledge is the intermediate between a simple lien and a mortgage as stated by the Supreme Court. In a mortgage there must be a transfer of interest in the specific property as stipulated under S. 58 of the Transfer of the Property Act. There is no transfer of interest in the property in the case of pledge or hypothecation. Hence the provisions of Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code do not apply to pledge or hypothecation as there is no transfer of interest. 32. It is further submitted by Mr. Adhya that in the case of Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka, AIR 1926 Calcutta 713 final judgment was passed by a Division Bench on an application under Chapter XIIIA for the sum of Rs.13,000/- in a suit in which there was also a prayer for sale of the securities. It is well known that consent cannot confer jurisdiction. The Court while passing a decree for the admitted money claim on the application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules proceeded on the basis that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application as regards the money claim and that the same was maintainable. 33. It is submitted that in the instant case loan was granted on the security of certain moveable properties which remained in the possession of the defendant. 33. It is submitted that in the instant case loan was granted on the security of certain moveable properties which remained in the possession of the defendant. The suit is for realisation of debt due and/or sum due to the plaintiff bank arising on the contract mentioned in the plaint Reference was made to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the plaint. According to Mr. Adhya, the reliefs, claimed in the instant suit are money decree and sale of the hypothecated properties. There is no claim or prayer for declaration. In the application under chapter XIIIA final judgment has been prayed for the money claim only. The nature and character of the suit is for recovery of a debt. The application has been made as regards the claim for payment or a debt arising on a contract. The application is therefore maintainable and this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to pass the final judgment. 34. Mr. B.K. Bachawat appearing for M.G. Enterprises and others has submitted that Chapter XIIIA applies only to suits where a plaintiff seeks to recover (a) Debt or (b) liquidated demand in money arising out of - (a) a Contract; (b) Enactment; (c) Guarantee where the claim is probably in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only or on a Trust Chapter XIIIA does not apply to all types of suit but only to suits which fall under the scope of Rule 1. 35. According to Mr. Bachawat Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA specifies (i) Nature of suits, i.e. to recover debt or liquidated demand in money; (ii) which must arise out of contract or guarantee. If in a suit declaration of charge or sale of charged assets and realisation of book debts or any similar reliefs are claimed then such suit is not a suit in which only the reliefs provided for in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA has been claimed. If such additional reliefs as mentioned above are claimed the character of the suit differs. The language of Chapter XIIIA is emphatic as will appear from the fact that there is double negative in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA Mr. If such additional reliefs as mentioned above are claimed the character of the suit differs. The language of Chapter XIIIA is emphatic as will appear from the fact that there is double negative in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA Mr. Bachawat has submitted that the word 'save' and "except" or 'unless' ale much stronger words than 'only' Court have considered similar question while considering the provisions of Rules of the Supreme Court Order 14, of the Rules of Supreme Court is similar to Chapter XIIIA of Original Side Rules of Calcutta High Court. It has been held that if any additional claim or relief is included the plaintiff would not be able to adopt summary procedure. In this connection he has referred to cases of Ryley v. Master, (1892) 1 Q.B. 674 and Wilks v. Wood, (1892) 1 QB 684. 36. Referring to the case of Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka AIR 1926 Calcutta 713 Mr. Bachawat has submitted that in that case the Division Bench set aside the sale of securities directed by the Trial Court and since the defendants admitted before the Trial Court and Appeal Court that a specific amount was payable by him a money decree was passed against the defendant but it was directed that such money decree would not be enforced till the decision on the other questions. According to Mr. Bachawat, it is to be noted that maintainability of the application under Chapter XIIIA was not before the Division Bench and although the question which is being considered by this Hon'ble Court in the instant application was not agitated before the Division Bench in the above case even then the Division Bench clearly held that sale of securities could not be ordered. 37. Referring to the case Kalidas Pal v. S.M. Roychowdhury, AIR 1979 Cal 14 Mr. Bachawat has submitted that that was a mortgage suit and the Calcutta High Court held that such a suit is outside the scope of provision of Chapter XIIIA; one of the reasons given by the Division Bench was that in a mortgage suit it was necessary to pass a preliminary decree and a final decree which was not applicable in a proceeding under Chapter XIIIA. 38. According to Mr. Bachawat in the case of Co-operative Hindusthan Bank v. Surendra Nath, AIR 1932 Cal. 38. According to Mr. Bachawat in the case of Co-operative Hindusthan Bank v. Surendra Nath, AIR 1932 Cal. 524 at 533 it was held that in case of mortgage or hypothecation of moveables provisions of Order 34 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply. It is submitted that in view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in a suit to enforce hypothecation or charge, which it is submitted is really a suit for enforcement of mortgage of moveables, there must be a preliminary decree and a final decree. Mr. Bachawat has further submitted that the decision in the case of Official Assignee of Bombay v. Chimniram Motilal reported in AIR 1933, Bombay 51 is contrary to the decision reported in the case of Co-operative Hindusthan Bank v. Surendra Nath, AIR 1932 Calcutta 524 and therefore the Bombay decision should not be followed by this Court. It is submitted that Court should proceed on the basis that provisions of Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code are applicable to mortgage and/or hypothecation of moveables. 39. It is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that the contention of the petitioner that if a suit is marked as liquidated claim according to Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Original Side Rules then it becomes a suit in which provisions of Chapter XIIIA are applicable cannot be accepted. Under Rule 5 of Chapter VII any suit in which claim is only for a debt or liquidated demand, is a liquidated claim, and may be admitted and marked as such. A mortgage suit may be marked as a liquidated claim. It is submitted that in the case of Kalidas Pal v. S.M. Roychowdhury, AIR 1979 Calcutta 14 at paragraphs 12 and 15 it was observed that a mortgage suit may be marked as a liquidated claim. Hence it cannot be said that anyone can apply in a mortgage suit under the provisions of Chapter XIIIA. Therefore, it cannot be said that because a suit is marked as liquidated claim under Rule 5 of Chapter VII application under Chapter XIIIA would lie. 40. According to Mr. Bachawat the contention of the petitioner that the suit is for recovery of debt only should not be accepted. In the plaint reliefs have been claimed for declaration of charge and for sale. 40. According to Mr. Bachawat the contention of the petitioner that the suit is for recovery of debt only should not be accepted. In the plaint reliefs have been claimed for declaration of charge and for sale. These reliefs are independent reliefs and suits could have been filed praying for those reliefs alone. It is submitted that for the above reason the contention of the petitioner that the declaration of charge and prayer for sale are merely mode or recovery of money due should not be accepted. Further, the suit is to be looked as a whole and cannot be bi-furcated. It is submitted that there cannot be any sale without a declaration of charge. 41. Further submission of Mr. Bachawat is that the contention of the petitioner that there is distinction between hypothecation of moveable property and mortgage is wholly academic in the facts and circumstances of this case. The ambit and scope of Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of this Court is in issue. Hence the case reported in AIR 1976 Delhi 115 (M/s. Gopal Singh Hira Singh v. Punjab National Bank) is not relevant in the facts and circumstances of this case. 42. It is further submitted that the provisions of order 34 of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the mortgage and/or hypothecation of moveables as has been held in the case of Hindusthan Bank v. Surendra Nath AIR 1932 Calcutta 524 at 533. Referring to the copy of the decree dated 3rd July 1981 in Suit No. 839 of 1978 (Dena Bank v. Messrs King's & ors.) relied upon by the petitioners to show that where moveables are charged for payment of the plaintiff's dues a final decree for declaration of charge and sale of charged goods can be passed. Mr. Bachawat has submitted that in the copy of the decree it does not appear that the question of charge which is the subject matter of the instant hearing was at all raised before the learned Judge in that case. Further, it does not appear under what circumstances a decree was passed. It, however, appear that the decree was passed upon hearing of oral evidence. The said decree does not show that no preliminary decree can be passed in such a suit. 43. Regarding the submission of the petitioners that Chapter XIIIA is concerned with claims, Mr. Further, it does not appear under what circumstances a decree was passed. It, however, appear that the decree was passed upon hearing of oral evidence. The said decree does not show that no preliminary decree can be passed in such a suit. 43. Regarding the submission of the petitioners that Chapter XIIIA is concerned with claims, Mr. Bachawat has submitted that such submission is nullified by the first sentence of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA which provides that the provisions of the said Chapter shall not be applicable save and except to suits of specified category. It is further submitted that the contentions of the petitioners that the Rules of the Supreme Court in England contain the expression 'only' which does not appear in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA and therefore there is difference between the two Rules, is without merit because Chapter XIIIA uses more specified, clear and mandatory, language by using double negative Further, the above submission of the petitioners is negatived by the cases reported in Law Reports (1892) QB 674 and 684 (Rvley v. Master and Wilks v. Wood). 44. Mr. Bachawat has submitted that the petitioners relied on Volume 37 of Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition, para 411 as well as volume 29 of Atkin's Court Forms, page 172 Form No. 21 in support of the contention that at present the Law in England after amendment of Rule XIV is now same as in Calcutta similar principles to be followed. Mr. Bachawat has submitted that reference to Halsbury's Laws of England and Atkin's Court Forms mentioned above is wholly inappropriate because recently there has been a change in Order XIV of the Rules of Supreme Court in England which made it applicable to various types of suits and the said passage in Halsbury's Laws of England and the said Form in Atkin refer to new Order XIV and not the old provisions which were in pari materia with Chapter XIIIA with which we are concerned in this case. 45. With reference to the petitioner's submission that a guarantor would guarantor a debt and is not concerned with security and a Banker need not proceed against security it is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that the question of guarantor's liability or his right against the security is not the subject matter of this application. 45. With reference to the petitioner's submission that a guarantor would guarantor a debt and is not concerned with security and a Banker need not proceed against security it is submitted by Mr. Bachawat that the question of guarantor's liability or his right against the security is not the subject matter of this application. The subject matter of this application is the ambit and scope of Chapter XIIIA as also the correct interpretation of the said Chapter. According to Mr. Bachawat, it is well established that the guarantor has interest in the property of the principal debtor and the security offered by the principal debtor since he can have recourse to the same in order to reimburse himself, after or even before payment. Reference was made to the case of Profulla Kumar Basu v. Gopee Ballabh Sen & anr., AIR 1946 Calcutta 159 and Ss. 140 and 141 of the Indian Contract Act. It is also submitted that the questions as to whether the liability of debtor and/or guarantor are coextensive or not and the guarantors liability is not deferred until the creditor exhausts his remedy against the principal debtor are wholly irrelevant while considering the scope of Chapter XIIIA of the High Court Rules Mr. Bachawat has Submitted that according to the petitioners the policy of law is that litigants should not be harassed and if the contention put forward on behalf of the defendant is accepted that would mean that two suits would be required to be filed. According to Mr. Bachawat contrary to the submission of the petitioner expedition could not be achieved since part of the suit would remain pending and that will have to be heard by the Court on trial on evidence and this is harrassing to the defendants. In fact there would be two trials one by affidavit and another on evidence. It is submitted that if the contention of the defendant is upheld it would not at all mean that two suits would have to be filed. The only consequence would be that the Bank would not be able to take recourse to Chapter XIIIA of the Rules of the Original Side of the High Court. 46. With reference to the petitioner's submission based on the case of Babaji Kondaji Garad & Ors. The only consequence would be that the Bank would not be able to take recourse to Chapter XIIIA of the Rules of the Original Side of the High Court. 46. With reference to the petitioner's submission based on the case of Babaji Kondaji Garad & Ors. v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 192 that beneficial construction has to be given and the object and intent have to be taken into account, it has been submitted by Mr. Bachawat that if the contention of the Bank is accepted the same would defeat the object and intent of the Rules and would place an intolerable burden on the defendants. Further, according to Mr. Bachawat, the policy of law is that every litigant must be directed to follow the procedure laid down in law. 47. Regarding the dictated order dated 31st January 1983 in Suit no. 277 of 1982 (Bank of Rajasthan v. S.K. Trading) it has been submitted that no reason at all has been given in the said order nor it appears that the matter was considered in detail by the learned Judge. Hence the said order of Mrs. Monjula Bose, J. cannot be treated as a precedent by this Hon'ble Court. 48. Referring to the submission made on behalf of the petitioner United Industrial Bank that provision under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code a plaintiff is bound to join all the reliefs in one suit and therefore, a plaintiff can select one claim out of its many claims and apply for final judgment under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules and further the provisions of Chapter XIIIA would become useless or nugatory unless the contentions on the part of the Bank are accepted, Mr. Bachawat has submitted that such submissions on behalf of the Bank are wholly erroneous. According to Mr. Bachawat the provisions of Chapter XIIIA would apply only to a limited class of suits. The petitioner's submission assumes that provisions of Chapter XIIIA are applicable to all types of suit in which different types of relifes have been prayed but whether that is so or not is under consideration in the application. According to Mr. Bachawat the provisions of Chapter XIIIA would apply only to a limited class of suits. The petitioner's submission assumes that provisions of Chapter XIIIA are applicable to all types of suit in which different types of relifes have been prayed but whether that is so or not is under consideration in the application. It is further submitted that in any event, Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code in Procedure Code in fact would protect a plaintiff who went to take recourse to Chapter XIIIA because such a plaintiff who would like to take advantage of the provisions of Chapter XIIIA can file to suits and apply under provisions of Chapter XIIIA in such a suit as would fall within the scope of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIA. According to Mr. Bachawat the cases reported in Sidramappa v. Rajashetty & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1059 : Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 1265 and Lallan Prasad v. Rahmat Ali & anr. 1967 SC 1322 are not relevant with regard to the question that has arisen for consideration in the instant case. 49. Mr. Bachawat has further submitted that the question as to whether a plaintiff is entitled to apply under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court will have to be determined with reference to the nature and character of the suit at the time of its institution and even if the plaintiff gives up other claims at a latter stage he would not be entitled to apply under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court. 50. Mr. T.K. Biswas appearing on behalf of the defendants in Suit no. 504 of 1983 (Vijaya Bank v. Kay Tea Industries Private Limited) has submitted that the instant application of the plaintiff Bank under Chapter XIIIA is misconceived as the plaintiff Bank's suit is not one within the terms of Rule 1 of the said Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court which is a summary procedure in suits to recover debts or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant. It is submitted that Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA is intended to cover the cases of a simple contract debt, that is to say where the plaintiff claims a liquidated sum of money; for example, for goods sold and delivered, or money lent and advanced on promissory notes etc. If the contract stipulates that interest is payable at a certain rate agreed between the parties that interest must be claimed separately as a liquidated sum and in such a suit the plaintiff cannot claim interim interest or interest on judgment under any provisions of Sale of Goods Act as damages or interest under the Interest Act or an interest which Court by exercise of its discretionary power can award in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code or any other statutory law or on equitable consideration. According to Mr. Biswas the Judge in chamber, has only the power to pronounce, judgment in favour of the plaintiff under Rule 6 of Chapter XIIIA if the Judge is satisfied that the defendant has failed to satisfy him that there is an issue which ought to be tried in the suit. If the defendant satisfies the Judge that he has a good defence or discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend them no final judgment should be passed and leave to defend the suit shall be given to the defendant. The judgment in an application under Chapter XIIIA would be only for the liquidated sum of money claimed and the Rule does not empower the Court to award anything else apart from costs as mentioned in Rule 11. It is further submitted that the plaintiff Bank's debt is a secured debt in the first police, and it is not a simple contract debt, and unless the Bank abandons or gives up the security the plaintiff Bank is not entitled to invoke the provisions of Chapter XIIIA. According to Mr. Biswas the principles which are applicable in the case of winding up of companies for their inability to pay debts apply in the instant case: a secured creditor like a Bank is outside the winding up proceedings. The principle that unless the Bank gives up, abandons or releases any security and claims the debt as an ordinary unsecured creditor is also applicable to an application made under Chapter XIIIA. 51. Further, according to Mr. The principle that unless the Bank gives up, abandons or releases any security and claims the debt as an ordinary unsecured creditor is also applicable to an application made under Chapter XIIIA. 51. Further, according to Mr. Biswas, the object of Rule 1 is that if it is a simple contract debt or a liquidated demand for money than the decree on the basis of the final judgment will be executed as simple money decree forthwith. But in case of a Bank who is a secured creditor the Bank like a mortgage has first to proceed against its securities to satisfy the decretal dues, and thereafter can only apply for personal decree against the debtor or mortgagor in case of a mortgage. The provisions of the summary proceeding, therefore, are not contemplated in case of suits filed by the secured creditor the Bank like Mortgagee, for recovery of secured debts and not is simple contract debt. 52. It is also submitted by Mr. Biswas that it is clear also from a comparison of the reliefs claimed in the Summons and in the suit that dispose of this application will not dispose of the suit and that is not the object of Chapter XIIIA. Chapter XIIIA contemplates a summary procedure in disposal of suit, like Order 37 in Code of Civil Procedure. Hence a secured creditor like Bank cannot in law maintain an application under Chapter XIIIA for final judgment for a sum of money and the Judge in Chambers has no jurisdiction under Chapter XIIIA to pass any order under the said Chapter in respect of suits instituted by a secured creditor on a secured debt which again is not a liquidated sum of money. 53. Mr. A.C. Bhabra appearing as amicus curiae has made his submission in the application made under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court in Suit No. 48 of 1980 (Dena Bank v. Victory Engineering Works & Ors.) His submission is in respect of the issue regarding ambit, scope and interpretation of Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court. He has dealt only with the question of demurrer as distinguished from the merit of the application Although Mr. He has dealt only with the question of demurrer as distinguished from the merit of the application Although Mr. Bhabra has made his submissions in the application made in Suit No. 48 of 1980 (Dena Bank v. Victory Engineering Works & ors) still his submission will be applicable in the other cases inasmuch as a common point as stated above has arisen in the application made under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court in the other cases also. 54. According to Mr. Bhabra one of the conditions on which an application for summary judgment lies is that the suit must be one which is within the terms of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA. He has also referred to Rule 3 of Chapter XIIIA. 55. Mr. Bhabra has referred to the case of Wilks v. Wood, (1892) 1 QB 684 at page 687 wherein. It is observed that where the plaintiff seeks to put in force a summary remedy which is, without doubt, very valuable, hut of which the application is required to be strictly watched Mr. Bhabra has submitted that the general rule for, obtaining a judgment in a suit is after allowing the defendant to file a Written Statement, after hearing the suit and thereafter delivering a judgment. He refers to Order 8 Rule 1, Order 18 and Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Mr. Bhabra, Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA lays down an exception to this general rule. In particular he has refer red to the words "the provisions of this Chapter shall not apply save to suits" of certain classes. The classes of suit, are enumerated in Rule 1. It has been submitted that Chapter XIIIA applies only to suits of the nature as specified in Rule 1(A) and (B). The classes of suits comprised in (A) are suits upon debts or for recovery of determination amount of money. 56. Mr. Bhabra has further submitted that the contract of debt is defined by Sir William Blackstone to be that whereby a chose in action, or right to certain sum of money, is mutually acquired and lost. The classes of suits comprised in (A) are suits upon debts or for recovery of determination amount of money. 56. Mr. Bhabra has further submitted that the contract of debt is defined by Sir William Blackstone to be that whereby a chose in action, or right to certain sum of money, is mutually acquired and lost. He remarks that it may arise from any of the other contracts, as, in case of sale, if the price be not paid in ready money, the vendor becomes indebted for it, amount to the vendor, and the vendor has the property in his price, as a chose in action, by means of this contract of debt Any contract, in short, whereby a determinate some of money becomes due to any person, and is not paid but remains in action merely, is a contract of debt. Reference was made to Compendium of Mercantile Law 1923 Edn pase 753. 57. With reference to the question what is an action for debt Mr. Bhabra has relied on the following passage in Personal Action at Common Law by Ralph Rutton, (1929 edition) at pages 47 and 48. "The action of debt was the action for the recovery of a sum certain or a liquidated demand not sounding in damages, and it lay for the recovery of such a sum first on records, such as judgments or recognisances, secondly, no specialties, as bonds or covenants to pay money in leases and mortgages, thirdly upon simple contracts, and lastly it was founded in maleficio, and lay, for example, against a sheriff suffering the escape of a prisoner taken on a case (the writ under which Mr. Pickwick was arrested and imprisoned in the Fleet Street at the suit of Mrs. Bardell, or, rather, Messers Didson & Fogg) and upon statutes at the suit of a party aggrieved by same breach of their provisions, or a common informer". 58. Mr. Bhabra has submitted that the form of a plaint in suit or action on debt is given in Bullen & Leaks Forms and Precedents, 12th Edn. From No. 170 at pages 375, 376. 59. Mr. Bhabra has submitted that summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA is an exception to the general rule laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. It is submitted that an exception should be strictly construed. From No. 170 at pages 375, 376. 59. Mr. Bhabra has submitted that summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA is an exception to the general rule laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. It is submitted that an exception should be strictly construed. It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the scope of the exception is not to be enlarged. Further, in order to bring a case within the exception strict compliance with its terms is necessary. In support of the above submission Mr. Bhabra has referred to the case of Gaya Prasad v. Kalak Nath, AIR 1929 Oudh 389 at page 392, where in it is observed that it is a well recognised principle of interpretation that an exception does not affect the general rule and it must be confined within its own limit and strictly to the subject matter entrusted within it. Mr. Bhabra has also relied on the cases of E.I. Railway, Calcutta v. Jothram Chandrabhan AIR 1928 Lahore 162. Madho Singh v. Jamed Skinner AIR 1942 Lahore 243 and also Sriram Verma v. The State, AIR 1956 All 466 . 60. According to Mr. Bhabra the instant suit is not an action only on the debt simplicitor, but it is also based upon the agreement of hypothecation and is for a declaration of charge and decree for sale. It is submitted that the application should be made for a judgment on the claim within the terms of the Rule. It is not enough that the suit may be within the terms of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA but the plaintiff's application for judgment also be in respect of such a claim as is within the terms of Rule 1 so that although the suit may be within the terms of Rule 1, the plaintiff may not make an application for a claim which may not be within the terms of Rule 1. Further, the second condition under Chapter XIIIA, viz., the recovery is only of the debt and that the application should be for a judgment upon a claim comprised in Rule 1, does not enlarge the scope of the suits within the terms of Rule 1 so as to include suits for debts and other kinds of suits, such as damages. 61. Mr. 61. Mr. Bhabra has further submitted that Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XIIIA go to show that the defence of the defendant may go to whole or to a part only of the plaintiff's claim and if the defence applies to a part of the plaintiff's claim; the Court may either pass a judgment on the part of the claim or give leave to defend the whole of the plaintiff's claim in either case the claim in suit must be a debt or liquidated demand under Rule 1(A) of Chapter XIIIA Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 go to show that the whole or residue of the claim must be a debt or liquidated demand and not any other claim. 62. It is also submitted that when summary procedure is laid down, the suits must be of a specific class, is also clear from the provisions of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1976 which, like suits under Chapter XIIIA, permit a summary suit only on debts, liquidated demands etc. 63. It is the submission of Mr. Bhabra that language of Rule 1 or Rule 3 of Chapter XIIIA is not that in any suit where a claim for debt is made along with claims for damages or other claims then one can make an application under Chapter XIIIA. 64. According to Mr. Bhabra Chapter XIIIA is only contemplating one written statement by the defendant either as to the part or the whole of the plaintiffs claim, and does not contemplate two written statements to be filed in a suit, one in respect of the whole or part of the claim and the other in respect of other claim, such as damages. If Chapter XIIIA were to apply to a suit where there is a claim for recovery of debt as well as a claim for recovery of damages then in so far as it applies to it claim for damages, the defendant would be as of a right entitled to file a written statement disputing the claim for damages, but as regards the claim for debt, if leave is granted to him to defend then he will be entitled to file another written statement dealing with the claim for debt in the suit; in that event there would be two written statements by one and same defendant in the suit. This is not warranted by either Chapter XIIIA or by general law. An illustration of such a suit may be a buyer's suit for recovery of price paid in advance (which would be a debt) and for recovery of damages for non-delivery of goods under S. 57 of the Sale of Goods Act. The seller will file one written statement dealing with both claims in suit. The seller is not required to file two written statements-one regarding the claim for price and other regarding damages. If Chapter XIIIA is construed to apply to such a buyer's suit for refund of advance and recovery of damages then the seller would be entitled to file without any leave a written statement against the claim of recovery of damages and if the plaintiff applies for judgment on debt then, if leave is granted to him to defend the action either as to whole or part of the claim then another written statement will have to be tiled by defendant with regard to the whole or part of the plaintiff's claim for debt. If Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA is construed as comprising suits for debt and damages then there would be two written statements by the seller in one suit which is not permissible in law. It is further submitted that if other claims are also to be included in a suit to which Chapter XIIIA applies, then a Mortgage suit should also be one within the terms of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA. But that has been negatived by the Division Bench in the Case of Kalidas Pal v. S.M. Roychowdhury AIR 1979 Calcutta 14. With regard to the petitioners' contention that the application has to be made as regards the claim within the term of Rule 1 shows that there an may be other claims in the suit should not he accepted, became it would be contrary to the first condition, viz., that the suit must be within the terms of Rule 1. With regard to the petitioners' contention that the application has to be made as regards the claim within the term of Rule 1 shows that there an may be other claims in the suit should not he accepted, became it would be contrary to the first condition, viz., that the suit must be within the terms of Rule 1. The harmonious construction would be that the suits should be confined to debts so also the application should be for recovery of the claim of debt Petitioners further submission that recovery of debt includes enforcement of security should also not he accepted, because declarations are only granted if the Court is satisfied by evidence Reference was made to the case of Wallersteiner v. Moir, (1974) 3 AIR 217 at 251. 65. According to Mr. Bhabra the judgment of Khastgir. J in the case of Grindlavs Bank Ltd. v. Creswell Brewaries Ltd. AIR 1984 NOC 10 Cal is distinguishable because in that case the suit was filed only for recovery of debt after obtaining leave under Order 2 Rule 2 in respect of security According to Mr. Bhabra, the dictated order of Mrs. Moniula Bose, J. dated 31st January, 1973 passed in Suit No. 277 of 1982 (Bank of Rajasthan v. S.K. Trading Corporation) does not help the petitioners because that order only rejected a submission that Order 34 of Civil Procedure Code should be made applicable. The said order dated 31st January 1973 does not give any reason regarding the issue which has arisen in the instant case in allowing the application under Chapter XIIIA. 66. According to Mr. Bhabra, the case of Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka AIR 1926 Calcutta 713 is distinguishable, because there the trial Court passed a decree on condition and the appeal court held that unconditional leave should have been granted. But on the admission passed a decree for a certain amount. The question of demurrer to the application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court was not raised or decided in that case. 67. But on the admission passed a decree for a certain amount. The question of demurrer to the application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the High Court was not raised or decided in that case. 67. As stated earlier the point that arises for consideration in these applications is whether summary procedure under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court is applicable to suit wherein claims or causes of action apart from those mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) of Chapter XIIIA have been made or joined. The contention of the respondents is that in order to avail of the procedure for summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA no other claims or causes of action excepting the claims specified in Rule 1(A) and (B) of Chapter XIIIA can be joined in the suit. According to the petitioners, if in a suit claims or causes of action other than those mentioned in Rule 1 are made or joined with clues of action and claims mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) the plaintiff will still be entitled to apply for a summary judgment under Rule 3 of Chapter XIIIA only in respect of the claims coming under Rule 1(A) and (B) of the said chapter. As the above point involves consideration of the Rules contained in Chapter XIIIA a reference to the relevant Rules may be made. 68. The heading of Chapter XIIIA is "Summary Procedure In Suits To Recover Debt or Liquidated Demands Or For Immovable Property" Rules 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XIIIA are as follows: "1. As the above point involves consideration of the Rules contained in Chapter XIIIA a reference to the relevant Rules may be made. 68. The heading of Chapter XIIIA is "Summary Procedure In Suits To Recover Debt or Liquidated Demands Or For Immovable Property" Rules 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XIIIA are as follows: "1. The provisions of this Chapter shall not be applicable save to suits (A) in which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest arising – (i) on a contract express or implied; or (ii) on an enactment where the slim sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; (iii) on a guarantee where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or a liquidated demand only; (iv) on a trust; or (B) For the recovery of immovable property with or without a claim for rent or mesne profits by a landlord against a tenant whose term had expired or has been duly determined by notice to quit or has become liable to forfeiture for non-payment of rent or against persons claiming under such tenant. 3. Where the defendant in any suit which is within the terms of Rule 1 has entered appearance the plaintiff may, as regards any claim which is within the terms of Rule 1, on affidavit made by himself or by any other person who can swear if positively to the facts verifying the came of action and the amount claimed if any, and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the claim, apply to the Judge for final judgment for the amount claimed together with interest, if any, or for the recovery of the land (with or without rent or mesne profits) as the case may be and costs; Provided that as against any defendant who has filed a Written Statement such application shall not be permissible unless the summons is taken out as in Rule 4 mentioned within ten days after receipt of notice of the entering of appearance under Chapter VIII, Rule 18. 4. 4. The application by the plaintiff for judgment under Rule 3 shall be made by summons returnable not less than seven clear days after service accompanied by a copy of the plaint and affidavit. 5(a) The defendant may show cause against such application by affidavit. (b) The affidavit shall state whether the defence alleged goes to the whole or to part only and (if so) to what part of the plaintiff's claim and shall deal specifically with all matters of fact. (c) The Judge may, if he thinks fit, order the defendant or in the case of a Corporation any Officer thereof to attend and be examined upon oath or to produce any lease, deed book or document or copy of or extract therefrom. 6. Upon such application the Judge may, unless the defendant by affidavit or otherwise as the Judge may direct shall satisfy him he has a good defence to the claim on its merits or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, make an order refusing leave to defend and forthwith pronounce judgment in favour of the plaintiff. 7. If it appears to the Judge that any defendant has a good defence to or ought to be permitted to defend the claim and that any other defendant has not such defence and ought not to be permitted to defend, the former may be permitted to defend and the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment against the latter, and may issue execution upon a decree to be drawn up pursuant to such judgment without prejudice to his right to proceed with his claim against the former." 69. The heading of Chapter XIIIA describes the nature of the suit where summary procedure is available. 70. Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA describes the nature of the cases where an application for summary judgment can be made. Rule 1 provides that the provisions of the Chapter shall not be applicable save to suits containing causes of action or claims of the nature as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B). The double negatives contained in the Rule according to the respondents restrict its application to the nature of the suit and the claims to be made therein. Rule 1 provides that the provisions of the Chapter shall not be applicable save to suits containing causes of action or claims of the nature as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B). The double negatives contained in the Rule according to the respondents restrict its application to the nature of the suit and the claims to be made therein. The petitioners contention is that because Rule 1(A) does not contain the word 'only' after the words "in which the plaintiff seeks to recover" the suit may contain claims other than those specified in Rule 1(A) and (B). It appears that there is some force in such contention. Rule 1 describe the nature of the suit wherein and also specifies the claim in respect whereof an application for summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA can be made Therefore, Rule 1 limits the nature of the suit as also claims where procedure of Chapter XIIIA would apply. In other words the expression in Rule 1 shall not be applicable save to suits restricts the nature of the suit and claim wherein summary procedure is available. Therefore, the nature of the suit wherein and the claims in respect whereof summary procedure is available are mentioned in Rule 1. The controversy is if claims other than those as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) are made in the suit will that change the nature of the suit so as to take it out of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA and, therefore, application for summary judgment cannot be made. 71. As stated earlier Rule 1 restricts the nature of the suits as also claims where an application for final judgment can be made Rule 1, in my view, ex facie does not contain any bar for joining claims other than those mentioned therein. It limits the claim in respect whereof application under Chapter XIIIA can be made. It, however, does not say that claims other than those mentioned in the Rule cannot be joined in the suit. For determination of this question a reference may usefully be made to other Rules of Chapter XIIIA and the effect of Rule 1 read and construed in the light and context of other rules may be examined. When other causes of action or claims not coming under Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA are added in the suit of the nature mentioned in Rule 1 does. When other causes of action or claims not coming under Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA are added in the suit of the nature mentioned in Rule 1 does. It change the nature of the suit? In my opinion regarding the claims mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (3) the nature of the suit remains the same and so far as other claims are concerned another nature of the suit is only added to it. The suit retains its existing nature but due to addition of other claims another nature of suit is added. The existing nature of the suit remains but with it are added causes of action or claims of different nature depending on the nature of added claims. 72. If Chapter XIIIA Said that it would not apply save to suits containing only the claims as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) then in that event no other claim, excepting these mentioned in Rules 1(A) and (B) can be made in the suit. 73. Application for summary judgment is made under Rule 3. The portion of Rule 3 relevant for the question under consideration is:- "Where the defendant in any suit which is within the terms of Rule 1 has entered appearance the plaintiff may, as regard, any claim which is within the terms of Rule 1....." Rule 3 contains two conditions for making an application for a summary judgment. Application under summary procedure is to be made in a suit which is under Rule 1 and only as regards claims which are within the term of Rule 1. If the nature of the suit as indicated under Rule 1 would contain only claims as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) and no other causes of action or claim could be included in the suit then what was the necessity for mentioning in Rule 3 "as regards any claim which is within the terms of Rule 1." This part of Rule 3 in that case would be redundant or superfluous. A construction which would attribute redundancy to a Legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons See Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur, AIR 1964 SC 765. A construction which would attribute redundancy to a Legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons See Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur, AIR 1964 SC 765. If the claim, in the suits wherein the application for summary judgment can be made is restricted to claims as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) only and no other claim can be made in that suit then there was no necessity for the legislature to provide in Rule 3 the portion mentioned above the intention of the legislature cannot be that any portion of a statute would he redundant or superfluous. In interpreting a statute effect shall he given to all its parts unless it makes any part of the statute ambiguous or unworkable. Further, in interpreting a statute redundancy should be avoided. In construing Rules 1 and 3 it should be noted that the language used by the Legislature should be looked into because no canon of construction can be said to be more firmly established than this that the Legislature uses appropriate language to manifest its intention See Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 192 . 74. It should also be noted that Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 contain word 'claim' and not 'action' or 'suit'. This show that in an application for summary judgment what is absolutely necessary is the claim specified in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA. If Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA is read in the context of other Rules and in particular Rule 3, then it appears that application for summary judgment can be made in suits of the nature mentioned in Rule 1, i.e. containing claims as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) out that suit may contain other claims or causes of action not coming within Rule 1. This is clear from the language of Rule 3. 75. In order to ascertain the true ambit and scope of Rule 1 the same should be read along with the other Rules of Chapter XIIIA and in particular Rule 3. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) it is observed at page 47 as follows:- "It was resolved in the Case of Lincola College that the good expositor of an Act of Parliament should "make construction on all the parts together and not of one part only by itself". In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) it is observed at page 47 as follows:- "It was resolved in the Case of Lincola College that the good expositor of an Act of Parliament should "make construction on all the parts together and not of one part only by itself". Every clause of a statute is to "be censtrued with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute." 76. At page 58 of the above book it is observed that "Individual words ate not considered in isolation but may have their meaning determined by other words in the section in which they occur". 77. At page 59 of the above book it is further observed the- "The meaning of a section may be controlled by other individual sections of the same Act." 78. In Craies on Statute Law (7th Edition) at page 98 it is observed that “The office of a good expositor or of an Act of Parliament, "said Coke in the Lincoln College Case, "is to make construction on all parts together, and not of one part only by itself-Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlogerit." And again he says: "It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the makers ........................ and this exposition is ex visceribus actus". 79. If Rule 1 is construed in the context of other Rules of Chapter XIIIA and in particular Rule 3, it appears that an application for final judgment can be made in respect of claims mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) but it does not say that such suit shall contain only claims mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B). This is quite clear from the language of Rule 3. 80. Reading the Rule 1 in the context of other Rules in Chapter XIIIA and in particular Rule 3, it appears to me that an application for a final judgment can be made in the suit of the nature mentioned in Rule 1 and in respect of the claims as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) of Chapter XIIIA. 80. Reading the Rule 1 in the context of other Rules in Chapter XIIIA and in particular Rule 3, it appears to me that an application for a final judgment can be made in the suit of the nature mentioned in Rule 1 and in respect of the claims as mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) of Chapter XIIIA. Such suit may include other claims or causes of action but that will not debar the plaintiff from adopting summary procedure if the conditions laid down in Rule 1 are satisfied. 81. Only because a suit is marked as 'Liquidated Claim' under Chapter VII Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules that does not mean that application under Chapter XIIIA can be made in that suit Mortgage suit can be marked as 'Liquidated Claim' but Chapter XIIIA does not apply to a mortgage suit as has been held in Kalidas Pal v. Sripati M. Roaychowdhury, AIR 1979 Calcutta 14. 82. Mr. Bachawat and Mr. Bhabra relied upon two English decisions viz., Ryley v. Master, (1892) 1 QB 674 and Wilks v. Wood, (1892) 1 QB 684 in support of the contention that the provisions for final judgment by application of Chapter XIIIA should be strictly construed. The above cases are under the Order XIV of the Rules of Supreme Court in England before the amendment which dealt with the procedure for obtaining summary judgment in some cases. 83. In Ryley v. Master, (1892) 1 QB 674 a writ of summons was endorsed under Order III, r. 6 with a claim for a sum of money and for interest thereon at five percent, per annum from the date of the writ till payment or judgment; and it did not appear that the interest was claimed by statute or under any contract between the parties. It was held that the plaintiff was not "seeking to recover the debt or liquidated demand in money" within the meaning of Order III, r. 6; and, therefore, that the writ was not "specialty endorsed" so as to enable him to obtain final judgment in an action under Order XIV, r. 1. It was held that the plaintiff was not "seeking to recover the debt or liquidated demand in money" within the meaning of Order III, r. 6; and, therefore, that the writ was not "specialty endorsed" so as to enable him to obtain final judgment in an action under Order XIV, r. 1. It was further held that the claim of interest must be treated as part of what purported to be a specially endorsement, and, therefore the writ was not "specially endorsed" under Order III, r. 6, so as to entitle the plaintiff to have final judgment under Order XIV, r.1. 84. In Wilks v. Wood, (1892) 1 QB 684 it was observed that where a plaintiff claims by his writ interest not arising under a statute or by contract express or implied he does not "seek only to recover a debt or liquidated demand" within Order III, r. 6, and the writ is consequently not a specially endorsed writ on which an order for judgment can be made under Order XIV, r. 1. 85. The above two English cases are distinguishable. There Order III r. 6 under which writ was specialty endorsed contained the expression "seeking only to recover debt or liquidated demand for money." The language used in Order III r. 6 is more restricted than the language of Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA which provides that. "The provisions of this Chapter shall not be applicable save to suits. (A) in which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money............" As stated earlier for application of summary procedure the suit will be of the nature mentioned in Rule 1 and the claims made therein will be as specified in Rule 1(A) and (B) The question is if claims other than those mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B) are joined in the suit then whether application for summary judgment can still be made in such a suit in respect of claims mentioned in Rule 1(A) and (B). In Rule 1 unlike Order III r. 6 of the Rules of Supreme Court the Legislature has not used the expression 'only'. In that view of the matter and in view of language used in Rule making of application for final judgment under Chapter XIIIA is limited to cases coming under Rule 1. In Rule 1 unlike Order III r. 6 of the Rules of Supreme Court the Legislature has not used the expression 'only'. In that view of the matter and in view of language used in Rule making of application for final judgment under Chapter XIIIA is limited to cases coming under Rule 1. But the language used in Rule 1 does not say that such suit will contain only claim, of the nature mentioned in Rule 1. If claims other than those mentioned in Rule 1 is added in the suit that will not take the suit out of Rule 1. This construction of Rule 1 is also supported by Rule 3. The language used in Rule 1 and Rule 3 in my view, shows that the suits wherein application for summary judgment can be made may contain Claims other than those mentioned in Rule 1 but procedure for summary Judgment will be applicable only in respect of claims specified in Rule 1(A) and (B). As this aspect of the matter has already been dealt with earlier in detail it is not necessary to repeat the same. 86. Further, Order II Rule 3(1) provides that "save as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly…...." This right of the plaintiff to unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant cannot be taken away except by an express provisions in a statute. Chapter XIIIA dues not take away this right of the plaintiff. 87. For construing Rules 1 and 3 of Chapter XIIIA reference was made by the parties to Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure after its 1976 amendment. Chapter XIIIA dues not take away this right of the plaintiff. 87. For construing Rules 1 and 3 of Chapter XIIIA reference was made by the parties to Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure after its 1976 amendment. After the said amendment Order XXXVII Rule 2(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: "(8) Subject to the provision, of sub-rule (1), the Order applies to the following classes of suits namely: (a) * * * * * (b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising,- (i) on a written contract; or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed cum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or (iii) on a guarantee where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only". (underlining is mine) 88. It should be noted that language of Order XXXVII Rule 2(b) is more or less similar to the language of Order III Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. It should be noted that Rule 2(b) of Order XXXII of Civil Procedure Code will apply only to the claims mentioned therein. That is the effect of the word 'only' used in the said Rule Chapter XIIIA Rule 1, inter alia, provides that: "The provision of this Chapter shall not be applicable save to suits (A) in which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money......." It means that unless the suit contains claims as mentioned in Rule 1 Chapter XIIIA will not be applicable. The language is not that the suits should contain only claims of the nature mentioned in Rule 1. The language of Rule 1 only says that the provisions of Chapter XIIIA shall not be applicable save to suits containing claims as mentioned in the said Rule Unless the suit contains claims as specified in Rule 1 Chapter XIIIA will not be applicable. The language of Rule 1 only says that the provisions of Chapter XIIIA shall not be applicable save to suits containing claims as mentioned in the said Rule Unless the suit contains claims as specified in Rule 1 Chapter XIIIA will not be applicable. Hence Chapter XIIIA shall be applicable to suits containing claims as mentioned in Rule 1 and in respect of those claims application for summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA can be made Rule 1 does not say that for application of Chapter XIIIA no other claims excepting those mentioned in Rule 1 can be joined in the suit. The requirement of Rule 1 is that the suit shall contain claims of the nature specified therein. If claims other than those are included in the suit, that, in my view, would not prevent the plaintiff to make application for summary judgment in respect of the claims specified in Rule 1. Considerable light is thrown by the language of Rule 3 of Chapter XIIIA on this aspect of this case Reading Rules 1 and 3 together it appears to me, as already stated hereinbefore, that even if a suit contains claim not coming under Rule 1 along with claims coming under the said Rule the plaintiff will be entitled to make an application for a summary judgment only in respect of the claims coining under Rule 1. The language of Rule 1 read with Rule 3 does not, in my view, convey the sense that the application for summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA can be made where the suit will contain only claims as mentioned in Rule 1. 89. It was next argued on behalf of the respondents that if claims other than those mentioned in Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA are made in the suit the suit will stand bifurcated and there will be two trials, one on affidavit, i.e. in respect of claims coming under Rule 1 and the other on evidence in respect of claims not coming under Rule 1. This contention of the respondents does not appeal to me. This contention of the respondents does not appeal to me. Even if it is assumed that for making application for a summary judgment the suit will contain only claims specified in Rule 1 still there may be two trials in case where part of the plaintiff's claim is allowed and in respect of other part leave to defend is granted to the defendant or in case where there is more than one defendant claims against one is allowed but leave is granted to the other defendants to defend the suit. See Rules 7 and 8 Chapter XIIIA. Therefore, I am unable to accept the above contention of the respondents. 90. It was also submitted by Mr. Bhabra that Chapter XIIIA contemplates filing of only one written statement. If in a suit where claims other than those mentioned in Rule 1 are allowed to be joined then there will be two written statements, one in respect of claims not coming under by Rule 1 and regarding such claims the defendant can file written statement as of right and regarding the claims coming under Rule 1 the defendant would be entitlied to file written statement only if he obtains leave to defend. Hence there would be two written statements in the suit which is not permissible in law. It appears to me that there is not much force in this submission. In a suit containing claims coming under Rule 1 and those not coming under Rule 1 the defendant can file one written statement dealing with both the claims before the plaintiff applies for summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA. If application for final judgment is made after filing of the written statement then if an application for final judgment is made the defendant will not be allowed to defend the claims specified in Rule 1 unless leave to defend is obtained by him. Hence in such a case there is no question of filing two written statements where however application for summary judgment is made before tiling of the written statement by the defendant then ho cannot file a written statement in respect of claims coming under Rule 1 without obtaining leave to defend the suit. Hence in such a case there is no question of filing two written statements where however application for summary judgment is made before tiling of the written statement by the defendant then ho cannot file a written statement in respect of claims coming under Rule 1 without obtaining leave to defend the suit. But as regards claims not coming under Rule 1 the defendant may file his written statement before the disposal of the application of final judgment in respect of such claims or he may wait until the application for summary judgment is disposed of. There is no bar for filing a written statement by the defendant only with regard to the claims not covered by Rule 1 before disposal of the application for final judgment. If the defendant files a written statement dealing with such claims then in the event of ins obtaining leave to defend the suit regarding claims coming under Rule 1 he may file an additional written statement confined to the claim, coming under Rule 1. Hence there is no bar in filing one written statement dealing with the claims not coming under Rule 1 and an additional written statement, if leave to defend is obtained by the defendant, in respect of claims coming under Rule 1. 91. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that if claims other than those specified in Rule 1 is allowed to be included in a suit to which Chapter XIIIA applies, then a mortgage suit should be one within the terms of Rule 1. But this has been negatived by in case of Kalidas v. Sripati M. Roychowdhury, AIR 1979 Calcutta 14. So far as mortgage suit is concerned the mortgagee has right to enforce his claims against the security. Hence a mortgage suit does not come within Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA. Where the mortgage is entitled to sue for mortgage money only as stated in S. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act then the question will arise whether Chapter XIIIA will apply or not. If the claim of the plaintiff comes under Rule 1 then he will be entitled to apply for a final Judgment under Rule 3. The claim in a mortgage suit does come under Rule 1 and hence the question of application of Chapter XIIIA in such a suit a does not arise. 92. If the claim of the plaintiff comes under Rule 1 then he will be entitled to apply for a final Judgment under Rule 3. The claim in a mortgage suit does come under Rule 1 and hence the question of application of Chapter XIIIA in such a suit a does not arise. 92. Reliance was placed by the pesitioners in the case of Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka, AIR 1926 Calcutta 713. In this case the plaintiff claimed certain sum alleged to be due upon adjustment of account together with interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum as also sale of certain shares and jewelleries held by him as security. After filing the plaint, the plaintiff took out summons under Chapter XIIIA for a trial judgment. The Trial Court ordered the defendant to give security of Rs.22,753-10-3 by a certain date; in default the suit to stand decreed for the said amount with costs. The securities were directed to be sold by the Registrar and the sale records to be applied in satisfaction of the decree. The defendant preferred an appeal against the said order. The defendant admitted that Rs.13,000/- was payable by him. According to Appeal Court, Trial Judge should have given unconditional leave to the defendant to defend the suit and the order of the learned Judge regarding sale of the properties was entirely without jurisdiction under Chapter XIIIA. As the defendant admitted Rs.13,000/-, a decree was passed for the said amount. In this case as the defendant admitted the plaintiff's claim at Rs.13,000/- appeal court passed a judgment for the said sum but that the judgment was not to be executed pending final determination of the other matters in the suit. It should be noted that in this case the appeal court passed a Judgment for the amount admitted by the defendant but the question regarding scope and maintainability of Chapter XIIIA with which I am concerned in the instant case was not considered or decided. 93. In the case of Grindlays Bank Limited v. Crewell Breweries Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1984 NOC 10 (Cal), the plaintiff made an application under Chapter XIIIA for recovery of the balance due in account wherein moneys were lent and advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant with interest. A final judgment was passed in the said application made under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules. 94. AIR 1984 NOC 10 (Cal), the plaintiff made an application under Chapter XIIIA for recovery of the balance due in account wherein moneys were lent and advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant with interest. A final judgment was passed in the said application made under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules. 94. Applications for final judgment under Chapter XIIIA have been made in the above suits wherein the plaintiffs' claims in the plaint are recovery of debt and interest on the basis of agreement. These claims in my view, come under Rule 1. THE plaintiffs have also claimed a declaration of charge in respect of movable properties hypothecated or pledged by the defendant as security and for sale there of and payment of sale proceeds to the plaintiff in pro tanto satisfaction of their respective claims. These claims, however, do not come within Rule 1 of Chapter XIIIA. 95. For all the reasons mentioned hereinbefore the applications for final judgment in respect of money due on account of debt and interest are maintainable. 96. In this case I have only considered the question of scope and maintainability of the application made under Chapter XIIIA. I have not considered the respective merits of the said applications. Further, in my opinion it is not necessary to express any view as to whether Order 34 of the Civil Procedure Code will apply to the case of hypothecation or pledge or charge of the movable properties or not. Hence I am not expressing any view regarding the same. 97. For all the reasons stated above I hold that the applications under Chapter XIIIA made in the above suits are maintainable. Cost of the application will abide by the result of the same when disposed of on merit. 98. Before I conclude I would like to express my approciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. A.C. Bhabra as amicus curiae in this case. Application maintainable