JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the original defendant No. 2, who claims to be the sub-tenant of the suit premises, against the judgment and decree passed by the III Extra Assistant Judge Pune, dated 9th November, 1981. The controversy involved in this writ petition lies in a very narrow compass. Ganesh Appaji Kjire, the deceased father of the plaintiff, was in possession of the suit premises on a long lease of 99 years since 1945 under a registered Rent Note from Nilkanth Balwant Natu and his son Balwant Nilkanth Natu. After the death of Ganesh Khire, the plaintiff inherited the tenancy, rights qua the suit property. Shed 'A' was erected by the deceased father of the plaintiff. The father of the plaintiff had let out the open plot and shed 'A' to defendant No. 1 Chintaman Narayan Khole sometime in the year 1950 for carrying on the business of selling charcoal and firewood. Initially the contractual rent was Rs. 55/- per month. This rent was subsequently increased to Rs. 65/- and in addition defendant No. 1 was to pay to the plaintiff the education cess. When the suit was filed, the premises 'A' together with the shed were in possession of original defendants Nos. 3 and 4 Pandharinath and Dnyaneshwar and premises 'B' with the shed were in possession of defendant No. 2, the present petitioner. It appears that so far as the premises 'A' are concerned, defendant No. 1 transferred his interest in the business together with the goodwill etc. in favour of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 under a registered document styled as a sale-deed. However, we are not concerned in this writ petition with the said premises or the assignment in favour of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. So far as defendant No. 2, the present petitioner is concerned, it was the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 had created a sub-lease in favour of this defendant sometime in the year 1963. This sub-tenancy was created without his consent and, therefore, defendant No. 1 was liable to be evicted under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The plaintiff, therefore, served a notice on all the defendants and thereafter filed a suit for eviction 2. This sub-tenancy was created without his consent and, therefore, defendant No. 1 was liable to be evicted under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The plaintiff, therefore, served a notice on all the defendants and thereafter filed a suit for eviction 2. In the suit filed by the plaintiff, he had sought possession of the suit property in all on five grounds. Firstly, it was contended by the plaintiff that the induction of defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, in the premises 'B' by defendant No. 1, the head-tenant, was a transaction of unlawful sub-letting and, therefore, he was entitled to get possession of the suit premises under section 13(1)(e) of the Act. So far as the other grounds are concerned, they related to defendants Nos. 3 and 4. The plaintiff had also claimed possession of the property on the ground that the defendants had erected on the suit premises, without his consent in writing, certain permanent structures. Contention was also raised that defendant No. 1, the head-tenant was a defaulter in payment of rent and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to get possession of the property under section 12(3) of the Rent Act. It was also contended that he required the suit premises bona fide for the construction of a building for the occupation of his family. 3. The claim made by the plaintiff was resisted by all the defendants. Parties examined witnesses in support of their rival contentions. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court negatived the plaintiff's contentions on all counts, but held in favour of the plaintiff that the assignment of tenancy rights by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 was unlawful and on this ground alone the trial Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff so far as the premises 'A' were concerned. The trial Court also granted a money decree of Rs. 247.19 in favour of the plaintiff and against defendant No. 1. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree passed by the Court of Small Causes, Pune, all the parties filed appeals to the District Court. Since these appeals arose out of one and the same judgment, they were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment dated 9th November, 1981. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree passed by the Court of Small Causes, Pune, all the parties filed appeals to the District Court. Since these appeals arose out of one and the same judgment, they were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment dated 9th November, 1981. Before the Appeal Court, the claim for possession on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement was not pressed by the plaintiff. Before the Appeal Court it was contended by the plaintiff that the transaction between original defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, was that of leave and licence and not of sub-tenancy. It was also contended that when the tenancy of the head-tenant i.e. defendant No. 1 is terminated, calves must go with the cow and, therefore, defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, is not entitled to any protection under the Rent Act and the plaintiff is entitled to get possession of the premises in his possession. It appears that the Appeal Court dismissed the appeal filed by original defendants Nos. 3 and 4. The Appeal Court also recorded a finding that the defendant No. 2, the present petitioner was a lawful sub tenant of the suit premises, known as premises 'B' as he was inducted in the premises with the consent of the plaintiff. However relying upon the decision of this Court in (Bijibai Saldhana v. Rama Manohar Thannu Mishra)1, 70 Bom.L.R. 428, the Appeal Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to any protection under the Rent Act and, therefore, modifying the decree passed by the trial Court, the Appeal Court allowed the suit qua defendant No. 2 also. It is this part of the decree which is challenged in this writ petition by the original defendant No. 2, the lawful sub-tenant. 4. Shri Abhyankar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended before me that once it is held that the petitioner is a lawful sub-tenant, then no decree could have been passed against him qua the premises in his possession under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. Decree is passed against the present petitioner-defendant No. 2 only under section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Decree is passed against the present petitioner-defendant No. 2 only under section 13(1)(e) of the Act. According to Shri Abhyankar, even if it is held or assumed that section 14 of the Rent Act has no application to the case of the petitioner, still the petitioner cannot be evicted under section 13(1)(e) of the Act since his sub-tenancy was a lawful one. Under section 5(11)(aa) of the Act, he becomes a tenant of the suit premises in his own right and, therefore, enjoys the protection under the Act. After the tenancy of the head-tenant is terminated, he becomes a direct tenant of the landlord. In support of these contentions, Shri Abhyankar has placed strong reliance upon the decisions of this Court in (Mangharam Chubarmal v. B.C. Patel)2, 73 Bom.L.R. 140 and (Birdichand Hiralal Bhandari v. Sadashiv Maruti Borhade)3, 73 Bom.L.R. 887. Relying upon these decisions, it is contended by Shri Abhyankar that once the plea of the plaintiff that he required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his own occupation was rejected, no decree could have been passed under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act against the lawful sub-tenant. It was also contended by Shri Abhyankar that the law laid down by the Single Judge of this Court in Bijibai's case is no more good law in view of the subsequent amendments to the Act as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in (Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaur)4, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1043. 5. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri Paranjape, the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, that a sub-tenant can claim no protection under the Act, except under sections 14, 15 and 15-A of the Rent Act. The case of the present petitioner is not covered by any of these sections. Admittedly the sub-tenancy was created in the year 1963 and, therefore, the petitioner who claims to be a sub-tenant cannot claim any protection under the Rent Act, and his case will be, governed by the general law. Under the general law, the plaintiff has to sink or swim with the main tenant and, therefore, since a decree is passed against the head-tenant or the main tenant, as a necessary consequence of it, decree must necessarily follow against the petitioner also. Under the general law, the plaintiff has to sink or swim with the main tenant and, therefore, since a decree is passed against the head-tenant or the main tenant, as a necessary consequence of it, decree must necessarily follow against the petitioner also. In support of this contention, Shri Paranjape has placed strong reliance upon the decision of Bal, J., in Bijibal's case as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in (Ludhichem Agencies v. Ahmed R.V. Peer Mohmed and another)5, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1998. Shri Paranjape has also challenged the finding recorded by the courts below that the petitioner was a lawful sub-tenant. According to him this finding in itself is perverse. All through defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were contending that they were the licensees qua the suit property. The licence was created in favour of the present petitioner by original defendant No. 1 the head-tenant in an unspecified property, which was also in joint possession of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 No demarcation was made by dates and bounds qua the premises 'A' and 'B'. Defendant No. 1 was entitled to pass and re-pass from the property, which is alleged to be in exclusive possession of the present petitioner-defendant No. 2. There was no partition between the two lands when the licence was created. Therefore, it is quite clear that defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, was not in exclusive possession of the suit premises, described as premises 'B'. Since the present petitioner was in possession of an unspecified and undemarcated portion of land, which was also in joint possession, the courts below committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the present petitioner was a lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises. 6. It was also contended by Shri Parajape that after the assignment of the business in favour of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 by the original defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 was served with a notice of assignment by the head-tenant and he was asked to pay rent to defendants Nos. 3 and 4. Therefore, defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, is deemed to have become a sub-tenant of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. This sub-tenancy was obviously created without the consent of the plaintiff. 3 and 4. Therefore, defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, is deemed to have become a sub-tenant of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. This sub-tenancy was obviously created without the consent of the plaintiff. According to him, this fresh tenancy was created in the year 1975 and that itself will provide a ground for eviction under section 13(1)(e) of the Act. In support of this contention, he had placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in (Dharamdas Mangilal Jain v. Mrs. Shrikwar and others)6, 1984(2) Bom.C.R. 84(S.C.) A.I.R. 1983 Bom. 114. It is not possible for me to accept this contention for more than one reason. To say the least, such a contention was not raised before the courts below. It was nobody's case that the petitioner-defendant No. 2 had become a sub-tenant of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. The mere fact that defendant No. 2 was asked to pay rent to defendants Nos. 3 and 4 will not make him their sub-tenant. Ultimately, the rent is payable for and on behalf of the head-tenant. In this context it cannot be forgotten that the petitioner had no control over the head-tenant so far as the premises 'A' were concerned. Further, it cannot also be forgotten that the suit itself was filed on 13-8-1975 and thereafter the alleged notice of assignment was served on the petitioner on 24-8-1975. Further, no questions were asked to defendant No. 2 when he was in the witness-box-in this behalf. It was nobody's case that any fresh sub-tenancy was created in favour of defendant No. 2 by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in the year 1975. As a matter of fact, after the filing of the suit, defendant No. 2 is depositing the rent in Court. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for me to entertain this contention raised by Shri Paranjape, for the first time during the course of the arguments. It cannot be forgotten that a question regarding lawful sub-tenant is not a pure question of law, but in any case is a mixed question of law and fact. Even otherwise, on the material placed on record, it is not possible for me to come to the conclusion that any fresh tenancy was created in the year 1975 so far as the present petitioner is concerned. 7. Even otherwise, on the material placed on record, it is not possible for me to come to the conclusion that any fresh tenancy was created in the year 1975 so far as the present petitioner is concerned. 7. So far as the contentions raised by Shri Paranjape on the merits of the controversy are concerned, I do not find any merit in the said contentions. After appreciating all the evidence on record, the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court came to the conclusion that with the consent of the plaintiff the premises were given to defendant No. 2 on rent. In this context the trial Court has placed strong reliance upon a document, Ex. 58, which was signed by the plaintiff. By this document the plaintiff had given his consent to have electric connection in the premises in the possession of defendant No. 2. It is an admitted position that in the year 1963 the rent of the premises was increased by ten rupees and this was done because the plaintiff had consented to the sub-tenancy in favour of defendant No. 2. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that defendant No. 2 was in exclusive possession of the suit property and, therefore, was a lawful sub-tenant. The Appeal Court after independently re-appreciating the whole evidence, also came to the same conclusion. The learned Judge of the Appeal Court found that premises 'B' were in exclusive possession of defendant No. 2 and he was using the said premises for parking and repairing his motor vehicles. The evidence further shows that defendant No. 1 had not retained with him any control over the premises 'B'. The learned Judge also came to the conclusion that the initial rent of Rs. 55/- was increased to Rs. 65/- per month because of the inductment of defendant No. 2 in the premises 'B'. Therefore, taking a cumulative view of the evidence brought on record, the learned Judge of the appeal Court also came to the conclusion that the sub-tenancy in favour of defendant No. 2 was created by defendant No. 1 lawfully with the consent of the plaintiff. Thus, after appreciating all the evidence on record, both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the petitioner is lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises 'B' from the year 1963. Thus, after appreciating all the evidence on record, both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the petitioner is lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises 'B' from the year 1963. This being a concurrent finding of fact based on the appreciation of the evidence on record, the same is not open to challenge in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even otherwise, with the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for both the sides, I have gone through the entire evidence on record and in my opinion, both the courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the sub-tenancy in favour of defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, was created by defendant No. 1, the head-tenant, with the consent of the plaintiff and, therefore, defendant No. 2 is the lawful sub-tenant qua premises 'B'. Therefore, I have no hesitation in confirming the said finding of fact. 8. Now, therefore, the only question which requires consideration in this writ petition is to find out as to whether a lawful sub-tenant, whose sub-tenancy is created in the year 1963, is entitled to any protection under the Act or he will have to sink or swim with the head-tenant. It is no doubt trust that a view has been taken by a Single Judge of this Court in Bijibai's case (70 Bom.L.R. 428) that such a sub-tenant cannot get any protection under the Act since his case is not covered by section 14 or section 15 of the Act. This is what Bal, J., observed in Bijibai's case :--- "It would be unreasonable to suppose that the legislature intended the above results or wanted to discriminate in the manner between sub-letting, transfer or assignment made prior to the commencement of the Ordinance (and legalised by it) and lawful sub-letting, transfer or assignment made subsequent thereto. The only reasonable conclusion would, therefore, be that though the Legislature did not prohibit sub-letting, transfer or assignment after the Ordinance if made in pursuance of an express contract, it did not intend to extend the protection of the Rent Act to sub-tenants, transferees or assignees claiming under such transactions but left them to be governed by the general law. The only reasonable conclusion would, therefore, be that though the Legislature did not prohibit sub-letting, transfer or assignment after the Ordinance if made in pursuance of an express contract, it did not intend to extend the protection of the Rent Act to sub-tenants, transferees or assignees claiming under such transactions but left them to be governed by the general law. The interpretation of Clause (b) of sub-section (11) of section 5 of the Rent Act must be consistent with the above considerations and it must, therefore, be held, rejecting the argument of Mr. Walawalkar, that the expression "who has derived title before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959 "occuring in the said clause qualifies the expression "any person" and not "his predecessor". It follows that neither of the petitioners had acquired the status of the statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Again, the protection afforded by the Rent Act is available to a tenant against his own landlord. In the case of a sub-tenant his landlord is the head tenant till the interest of the latter in the premises in question is determined. The protection available to the sub-tenant till then would, therefore, be against eviction by the head-tenant. So long as the interest of the head-tenant subsists the original lessor is not his landlord and there can be no occasion for the latter to seek to evict him This is clear from the definition of the landlord given in section 5(3) which reads : "5. So long as the interest of the head-tenant subsists the original lessor is not his landlord and there can be no occasion for the latter to seek to evict him This is clear from the definition of the landlord given in section 5(3) which reads : "5. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context.--- (3) 'landlord' means any person who is for the time being, receiving or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant; and includes any person not being a tenant who from time to time drives title under a landlord; and further includes in respect of his sub-tenant a tenant who has sub-let any premises.' The original lessor would become the landlord of the sub-tenant and the protection would be available to him against the lessor only if the sub-tenant steps into the shoes of the head-tenant on the determination of his interest in the premises; but for this to happen, section 14 prescribes a condition viz. that the premises must have been sub-let before the commencement of the Ordinance. This condition is admittedly not satisfied in the case of either of the two petitioners. None of them was, therefore, entitled to protection under the Rent Act against eviction by the respondent when he dispossessed them on August 1, 1964." 9. However, in my opinion, much water has flown after the said decision. When Bijibai's case was decided, section 5(11) read as under :--- "5(11). None of them was, therefore, entitled to protection under the Rent Act against eviction by the respondent when he dispossessed them on August 1, 1964." 9. However, in my opinion, much water has flown after the said decision. When Bijibai's case was decided, section 5(11) read as under :--- "5(11). 'tenant' means any person whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes (a) such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Housing Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959; (aa) any person to whom interest in premises had been transferred under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 15; (b) any person remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession, with or without the assent of the landlord, of the premises leased to such person or his predecessor who has derived titled before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959; (c) any member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court." Thereafter the said definition came to be amended. The amended definition as it stands today reads as under :--- "5. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context.---(11) 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes--- (a) such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959; (aa) any person to whom interest in premises has been assigned or transferred as permitted, or deemed to be permitted, under section 15; (b) any person remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession with or without the assent of the landlord, of the premises leased to such person or his predecessor who has derived titled before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959; (bb) such licencees as are deemed to be tenants for the purposes of this Act by section 15-A; (c) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ..." From the bare reading of the amended and the unamended definition, it is quite clear that sub-Clause (aa) as unamended only covered the persons to whom interest in premises had been transferred under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 15. The words and the expression "under the proviso to sub-section (1) of the section 15" were omitted by the sub-sequent amendment and the present definition covers a person to whom interest in premises had been assigned or transferred as permitted, or deemed to be permitted under section 15; which means section 15 as a whole. It was contended by Shri Paranjape that even after the amendment, Clause (aa) will only cover persons to whom interest in the premises had been transferred under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act, since the expression used in he amended provision is "permitted or deemed to be permitted under section 15". The expression "permit" has been used in the proviso to section 15 only and to in the substantive part of the section and, therefore, even after the amendment, the area and the filed covered by the said definition is the same. According to him, this a further clear from sub section (a) of the 5(11). According to Shri Paranjape, if such an interpretation is not put on the said definition clause, sub-section (a) will become redundant, as both the sub-section will cover the same area and field. It is not possible for me to accept this contention. Whenever an enactment is amended by the legislature, it is done with a specific intention. If the legislature intended to cover the same area and filed even after the amendment, then amendment to section 5(11)(aa) was wholly unnecessary. It is not an exercise in futility. By the amendment the legislature wanted to cover the whole of section 15 of the Act and to give the status of a tenant to the person to whom interest in premises has been transferred or assigned, as permitted or deemed to be permitted under section 15 of the Act. It is not an exercise in futility. By the amendment the legislature wanted to cover the whole of section 15 of the Act and to give the status of a tenant to the person to whom interest in premises has been transferred or assigned, as permitted or deemed to be permitted under section 15 of the Act. Section 15 reads as under :--- "15(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, but subject to any contract to the contrary, it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of this Act for any tenant to sub-let the whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein and after the date of commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act, 1973, for any tenant to give on licence the whole or part of such premises : Provided that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases or the giving on licence any premises or class of premises and to such extent as may be specified in the notification. (2) The prohibition against the sub-letting of the whole or any part of the premises which have been let to any tenant, and against the assignment or transfer in any other manner of the interest of the tenant therein, contained in sub-section (1), shall, subject to the provisions of this sub-section, be deemed to have had no effect before the commencement of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, in any area in which the Act was in operation before such commencement; and accordingly, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or in the judgment, decree or order of a Court, any such sub-lease, assignment or transfer or any such purported sub-lease, assignment or transfer in favour of any person who has entered into possession, despite the prohibition in sub-section (1), as purported sub-lessee, assignee or transferee and has continued in possession at the commencement of the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to be valid and effectual for all purposes, and any tenant who has sub-let any premises or part thereof, assigned or transferred any interest therein, shall not be liable to eviction under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13. The provisions aforesaid of this sub-section shall not affect in any manner the operation of sub-section (1) after the commencement of the Ordinance aforementioned." Under section 15(1) it has been laid down that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a tenant is not authorised to sub-let or transfer his right or interest in the premises. But the expression used viz. "but subject to any contract to the contrary" is pertinent, which means that by a contract to the contrary, a tenant could sub-let the premises. If such a sub-letting is authorised or consented to by the landlord, then such a sub-tenancy will be lawful. This is what has been found in the present case by both the courts below. Therefore, on the finding recorded by the courts below, which is now confirmed in this writ petition, it will have to be held that the petitioner is a lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises i.e. qua premises 'B'. Once this finding is recorded then obviously the landlord cannot seek possession of the suit property under section 13(1)(e) of the Act from a lawful sub-tenant. Once this finding is recorded then obviously the landlord cannot seek possession of the suit property under section 13(1)(e) of the Act from a lawful sub-tenant. It appears that Bal, J., in Bijibai's case put a narrow construction of the provisions of the Rent Act in view of the unamended provision. In my opinion, once the definition of a 'tenant' is amended, which now includes a person to whom interest in the premises is transferred or assigned as permitted under section 15 then it must change the whole colour of the controversy. Therefore, in view of the subsequent amendment to the Rent Act, the law laid down by Bal, J., in Bijibai's case is no more good law. 10. However, it was contended by Shri Paranjape that the law laid down by Bal, J., in Bijibai's case is approved by the Supreme Court in Ludhichem Agencies v. Ahmed R.V. Peer Mohamed and another, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1998. In this context, Shri Paranjape has placed strong reliance upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in para 10 of the said judgment, which read thus :--- "Mr. D.V. Patel, appearing for the petitioner in Special Leave Petition No. 5632 of 1981, points out that the petitioner had been in occupation of the entire flat as a sub-tenant since 1943 and that in 1960 he had merely restricted his occupation to the portion presently occupied by him. It must be taken, he contends, that he was a lawful sub-tenant since 1943, and therefore, by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act he must be regarded as a tenant of the landlord on the determination of Saraswatibai's tenancy. The contention has no force. The courts below have found that the occupation of the petitioner in the premises presently in his possession must be treated as dating back to 1962 and not earlier. That being so, the benefit of sub-section (1) of section 14 cannot be available to the petitioner. The contention has no force. The courts below have found that the occupation of the petitioner in the premises presently in his possession must be treated as dating back to 1962 and not earlier. That being so, the benefit of sub-section (1) of section 14 cannot be available to the petitioner. The benefit can be claimed by a sub-tenant to whom the premises have been can be claimed by a sub-tenant to whom the premises have been lawfully sub-let before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, inasmuch as the sub-tenancy of the petitioner in the premises has been found to commence from 1962, we must hold that this petitioner also has no right to continue in possession. This special leave petition mush also be rejected." It is not possible for me to accept this contention of Shri Paranjape. It appears from the judgment of the Supreme Court that in Ludhichem Agencies's case the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of an unlawful sub-tenancy created in the year 1960. That was not the case of a lawful sub-tenancy. Since the Supreme Court found that the unlawful sub-tenancy was created in 1960, it came to the conclusion that the alleged sub-tenant could not claim the benefit of section 14(1) of the Act. In this case it is not the contention of Shri Abhyankar that the petitioner's case is covered by section 14 of the Act. According to Shri Abhyankar, apart from section 14 the lawful sub-tenant is entitled to the protection of the Rent Act, since on that count the tenancy of the tenant cannot be terminated under section 13(1)(e) of the Act. I find much substance in this contention of Shri Abhyankar. It is by now well-settled that a provision of the Act which is intended to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction must be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible into the protection afforded to the tenant. If the language of a provision is susceptible of two interpretations then that should be preferred which enlarges the protection of the tenant rather than that which restricts it. See (Mohd. Shafi v. Addl. Dist and Sessions Judge, Allahabad)7, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 836. A somewhat similar provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in (K.K. Krishnan v. M.K. Vijaya Raghavn)8, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1756. See (Mohd. Shafi v. Addl. Dist and Sessions Judge, Allahabad)7, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 836. A somewhat similar provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in (K.K. Krishnan v. M.K. Vijaya Raghavn)8, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1756. This is what the Supreme Court observed in para 6 of its judgment : "............Quite obviously, the legislature thought that the tenant whose tenancy was well secured and protected by the rights conferred by the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act should alone be entitled to such security and protection and that the tenant should not be allowed to profit by the protection given to him by sub-letting the premises and extending the protection to others besides himself, unless the landlord by his act agreed to such a course. Where the landlord had himself agreed that the tenant could sub-let, the quest on would not arise. Therefore, section 11(4)(i) provides that sub-letting shall be a ground for eviction but not if it was by agreement of the landlord". Similar view is expressed by the Supreme Court in (Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaur)9, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1943. While dealing with a similar provision of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, this is what the Supreme Court has observed in para 26 of the judgment :--- "The right of possession that the sub-tenants enjoy on the basis of lawful induction as sub-tenants is assured to the sub-tenants as a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act. As a tenant inspite of the determination of his tenancy continues with the right to remain in possession as a statutory tenant and enjoys the protection against eviction by virtue of the provisions contained in statute, a sub-tenant who is lawfully inducted, is also recognised by the statute to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act and he must necessarily enjoy the protection against eviction afforded to a tenant by the Act. A lawful sub-letting on the basis of the provisions of the Act does not become unlawful merely because the contractual tenancy of the tenant comes to an end. A tenant incurs the liability to evicted, if the tenant after the commencement of the Act sub-lets without the written consent of the landlord; and the tenant who has lawfully sub-let with the written consent of the landlord must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction on that ground. A tenant incurs the liability to evicted, if the tenant after the commencement of the Act sub-lets without the written consent of the landlord; and the tenant who has lawfully sub-let with the written consent of the landlord must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction on that ground. Sub-letting lawfully done with the written consent of the landlord does not become unlawful merely on the ground that the contractual tenancy has come to an end. Sub-letting to constitute a valid ground for eviction must be without the consent in writing of the landlord at the time when the tenant sub-lets any portion to the sub-tenant." In my opinion, these observations aptly apply to the present case also. Once it is held that the tenancy of the head-tenant could not have been terminated under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act as the sub-tenancy created in favour of the petitioner-defendant No. 2 was lawful one, then, in my opinion, what the landlord cannot achieve or get directly cannot be permitted to be achieved indirectly. 11. Original defendant No. 1, the head-tenant, has not challenged the decree passed against him and, therefore, the same has become final. However, it cannot be forgotten that the in document of defendant No. 2 as a sub-tenant was with the consent of the landlord. In law, he is the lawful sub-tenant of the landlord. He is also covered by the definition of 'tenant' and therefore, after the termination of the tenancy of the head-tenant on the grounds personal to him and unconnected with the lawful sub-tenant or not germane for the termination of the sub-tenancy, the lawful sub-tenant will get the status of a tenant qua the landlord. Otherwise creation of lawful sub-tenancy with the consent of the landlord will have no meaning. If such an interpretation is not put upon the provisions of the Rent Act enacted to protect the tenants from unreasonable eviction the landlords can evict the lawful sub-tenants by resorting to collusive actions or by getting ex parte decrees against the head-tenants. Therefore, it is also not possible for me to accept the contention of Shri Paranjape that section 14 is the sole repository of rights of lawful sub-tenants. As a matter of fact, section 14 was enacted to give protection even to unlawful sub-tenants or licensees. If the unlawful sub-tenants are given protection by the said provision. Therefore, it is also not possible for me to accept the contention of Shri Paranjape that section 14 is the sole repository of rights of lawful sub-tenants. As a matter of fact, section 14 was enacted to give protection even to unlawful sub-tenants or licensees. If the unlawful sub-tenants are given protection by the said provision. It is difficult to imagine that the legislature intended not to give any protections under the Rent Act to lawful sub-tenant. 12. In the present case, termination of the tenancy qua the premises in possession of the petitioner was sought only under section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Admittedly, on the finding recorded by both the courts below, no decree could have been passed in favour of the plaintiff under the said sub-section qua the premises in possession of the petitioner-original sub-tenant. Only because a decree is passed against the head-tenant since he has unlawfully assigned his right in favour of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 qua the premises 'A', as a necessary consequence a decree qua premises 'B', which are in lawful possession of the petitioner as the lawful sub-tenant, cannot follow. Otherwise, the very purpose of enacting section 15(1) and section 5(11)(aa) will be frustrated. Therefore, in my opinion, the appeal Court obviously committed an error in passing a decree of eviction even against the present petitioner original defendant No. 2 regarding whose premises no decree could have been passed in favour of the plaintiff under section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act. 13. In the view which I have taken, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the other decisions cited before me by Shri Abhyankar since the said decisions cover a wider area than the one with which I am concerned in this writ petition. In the result, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed, so far as the premises in possession of the petitioner original defendant No. 2 which are described as premises 'B' are concerned. Hence the Rule is made absolute. The decree passed by the Appeal Court against defendant No. 2, the present petitioner, qua premises 'B' is set aside and that the trial Court is restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. -----