JUDGMENT A. N. Verma, J. - The petitioner was at the relevant time posted as a Rakshak at Railway Station Karchhana. He is aggrieved by a notice dated May 31, 1979 purporting to be under R. 47 (b) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) whereby the petitioner was called upon to show cause why he should not be removed from service. Subsequently, after the petitioner submitted his reply to the said notice, an order was passed by the Assistant Security Officer, Northern Railway, Kanpur Central, on July 2, 1979 removing the petitioner from service. Initially the petition was filed only against the notice dated May 31, 1979. Subsequently, by means of an amendment, the order dated July 2, 1979 has also been challenged. 2. In the notice dated May 31, 1979 it was stated that a confidential report had been received by the Assistant Security Officer from the Company Commander, Railway Protection Force/Mirzapur dated March 26, 1979 to the effect that petitioner had connived with certain criminals in the theft of some packages of truck tyres which took place on February 24/25, 1979 from the south side of a railway wagon which was stabled at Karchhana station. It was further stated in the notice that the Assistant Security Officer was satisfied that the petitioner was involved in that crime and that he proposed that the petitioner be removed from service. Accordingly, the petitioner was called upon to show-cause within ten days why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner thereupon filed a written reply stating that a full-fledged enquiry should be held against the alleged charge of petitioner's involvement in the aforesaid incident. The petitioner denied the charge of theft made against him and slated that the entire action was the result of ill-will and malice which the Sub-Inspectors B. L. Verma and S. S. Singh bore against him. In addition the petitioner also asked for a copy of the confidential report of the Company Commander on which the said notice was issued. 3. Upon a consideration of the reply of 'the petitioner the Assistant Security Officer passed the impugned order dated July 2, 1979 directing removal of the petitioner from service. 4. In addition the petitioner also asked for a copy of the confidential report of the Company Commander on which the said notice was issued. 3. Upon a consideration of the reply of 'the petitioner the Assistant Security Officer passed the impugned order dated July 2, 1979 directing removal of the petitioner from service. 4. The main contention of the petitioner's counsel was that his removal from service was manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction have been passed without following the mandatory procedure laid down in Rule 44 of the aforesaid Rule. It was urged that the order of the Assistant Security Officer dispensing with the aforesaid procedure under Rule 47(b) is, on the face of it, arbitrary and is based on considerations which were wholly irrelevant and improper for exercise of power under Rule 47. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are clearly of the opinion that the above contention is well founded. Under Rule 41 removal is a major penalty which can be imposed on a member of the service, namely Railway Protection Force. Rule 44 lays down the procedure for imposing major penalties which includes removal. It provides that the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charge on the basis of the allegation on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based are required to be communicated in writing to the member of the Force who may submit his explanation in defence and also state whether he desires to be heard in person. Under sub-rule (6) of Rule 44, the member of the Force is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses who are examined in support of the charges and to give evidence in person and to produce defence witnesses. 6. It is not disputed that the procedure laid down under Rule 44 was not followed in the present case. Rule 47 which is the main provision which was the subject of debate at the Bar reads thus :- "47. 6. It is not disputed that the procedure laid down under Rule 44 was not followed in the present case. Rule 47 which is the main provision which was the subject of debate at the Bar reads thus :- "47. Special procedure in certain cases :- Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 44, 45 and 46, where a penalty is imposed on a member of the Force (a) on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (b) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to he recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules, the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit." 7. With the counter affidavit the respondents have filed a copy of an order dated May 31, 1979, passed by the Assistant Security Officer which gives reasons why the Assistant Security Officer came to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to follows the procedure for imposing major penalties as prescribed under Rule 44 of the aforesaid Rules. The reasons disclosed in the aforesaid order are that Saraswati Dubey, another Rakshak, was the only eye-witness to the aforesaid incident of theft involving the petitioner and that he was stated that the petitioner has threatened him with dire consequences if Saraswati Dubey disclosed the aforesaid facts to the authorities, namely, involvement of the petitioner in the theft at Karchhana railway station. It is further stated in this order that Saraswati Dubey has made a request that his statement be kept confidential. In view of this statement of Saraswati Dubey and in view further of fact that he was the sole eye-witness it was likely that be might turn hostile if a regular departmental enquiry was stated against the petitioner, it has been decided to dispense with enquiry under Rule 44. 8. After stating the aforesaid facts the Assistant Security Officer observed that it was not reasonably : practicable to follow the procedure laid down under Rule 44. 9. Having considered the aforesaid reasons we are of the opinion that they do not provide a valid ground for dispensing with the enquiry under Rule 44. The term 'reasonably practicable' has been the subject of interpretation in the case of Maksudan Pathak v. Security Officer, Eastern Rly. 9. Having considered the aforesaid reasons we are of the opinion that they do not provide a valid ground for dispensing with the enquiry under Rule 44. The term 'reasonably practicable' has been the subject of interpretation in the case of Maksudan Pathak v. Security Officer, Eastern Rly. by a Full Bench of this Court reported in (1981) 7 All LR 317. After referring to a large number of authorities the Full Bench observed thus at p. 322. "We are, therefore, of the opinion that the words "reasonably practicable" would apply in a case where the authority cannot, in a reasonable manner, put into practice the clauses in relation to an enquiry, namely, because of certain facts and circumstances peculiar to each case, the authority cannot, in a reasonable manner, hold an enquiry. There may be a case where the charged person may have absconded, or a case where in spite of the best effort, the disciplinary authority may not have been able to serve the notice of the enquiry on the person charged or it may be a case where it is not possible for the person against whom the charge had been made to come and join, at the enquiry or there may be similar other valid reasons depending on facts and circumstances of each case." 10. At p. 323 against the Full Bench observed that the mere inability or inefficiency of the investigating authority to obtain evidence to prove the charge cannot be regarded as a valid reason for dispensing with the enquiry. 11. In the case of Maksudan Pathak (supra) the reasons disclosed by the disciplinary authority for dispensing with the procedure under Rule 44 were that the local Railway Protection Force Staff was in collusion with the members of the Force against whom disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and consequently in the opinion of the disciplinary authority it was not reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry under Rule 44. The Full Bench rejected those grounds as relevant or valid for exercise of powers under Rule 47. According to the Full Bench the practicability referred to under Rule 47 mast be with reference to the following of the procedure laid down under Rule 44. 12. The Full Bench rejected those grounds as relevant or valid for exercise of powers under Rule 47. According to the Full Bench the practicability referred to under Rule 47 mast be with reference to the following of the procedure laid down under Rule 44. 12. In our opinion the term reasonable practicable has nothing what so- ever to do with the prospects of success of the enquiry for the department should an enquiry be held as contemplated under Rule 44. "Practicability" is not to be confused with the expediency or the chances of success of the enquiry contemplated against the delinquent member of the Force. 13. Applying the dictum of the Full Bench to the facts of the present case it is apparent that the circumstance that the only eye-witness to the alleged incident is not willing to come forward and give testimony against the petitioner was not relevant and proper for dispensing with the enquiry under Rule 44, as it nothing to do with the holding of the enquiry. 14. Rule 44 embodies a sound principle of natural justice providing for a full and fair opportunity to the employee against whom it is proposed to award a major penalty which includes dismissal or removal from service. Rule 47 (b) has, therefore, to be construed strictly as it enables the disciplinary authority to give a complete go-bye to the aforesaid principles of natural justice embodied in Rule 44 and straightway, on the material collected ex parte and behind the back of the delinquent member, to remove or dismiss him. In view of what has been stated above we are clearly of the view that Rule 47 (b) was illegally applied in the case of the petitioner. The grounds disclosed by the Assistant Security Officer were not germane to the considerations on account of which enquiry under Rule 44 could be dispensed with. 15. It has not been asserted in the counter-affidavit that there was any practical difficulty in following the procedure under Rule 44. The only ground disclosed in the counter-affidavit is that which has been mentioned in the aforesaid order dated May 31, 1979 and which we have rejected as being totally irrelevant to the application of Rule 44. 16. 15. It has not been asserted in the counter-affidavit that there was any practical difficulty in following the procedure under Rule 44. The only ground disclosed in the counter-affidavit is that which has been mentioned in the aforesaid order dated May 31, 1979 and which we have rejected as being totally irrelevant to the application of Rule 44. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Arjun v. Union of India reported in (1983) 9 All LR 60. We have examined this case and find that the same is of no assistance. It has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the Bench considered the reasons disclosed by the authorities for dispensing with the enquiry and came to the conclusion the the ground for defencing with the enquiry were relevant and proper in this view of the matter the Bench came to the conclusion that the impugned order dispensing with the enquiry was not liable to be interfered with. The position in the present case, as noticed above, is entirely different. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the reasons disclosed by the authorities for dispensing with the enquiry are not justiciable. This point stands concluded by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Maksudan Pathak (supra) where it was clearly held that it is opens to the Court to see whether the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry are relevant and valid. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the Assistant remove the petitioner from service as the petitioner had been appointed as a Rakashak by the Chief Security Officer, Northern Railway. We do not agree with this submission. 19. Rule 43 read with Schedule II to the said Rules specifies the disciplinary authorities in the case of various categories of the members of the Force. In the case of Rakshaks the Assistant Security Officer/ Assistant Commandant Adjutant have been named as the officers competent to take disciplinary action including removal. The Assistant Security Officer was hence fully empowered to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. 20. In the case of Rakshaks the Assistant Security Officer/ Assistant Commandant Adjutant have been named as the officers competent to take disciplinary action including removal. The Assistant Security Officer was hence fully empowered to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. 20. In view of what has been stated above, the impugned order dated July 2, 1979, passed by the Assistant Security Officer/CNB Allahabad removing the petitioner from service as well as the order dated May 31, 1979, passed by the same Officer dispensing with the enquiry under R 44 are manifestly unsustainable under law and without jurisdiction. The notice dated May 31, 1979 is also for the same reason liable to be quashed. It will, however, be open to the authorities to take fresh action against the petitioner on the same charge by following the procedure laid down in Rule 44. 21. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned May 31, 1979, the order dated May 31, 1979, dispensing with the enquiry under Rule 44 as well as the final order dated July 2, 1979, passed by the Assistant Security Officer/CNB at Allahabad are quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.