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1984 DIGILAW 199 (GUJ)

BHARATKUMAR PREMJI CHAUHAN v. GURUKRUPA ALLUMINIUM CORPORATION

1984-07-30

A.S.QURESHI

body1984
A. S. QURESHI, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant herein was a workman working in the factory of respondent No. 1. While separating the Aluminium wire from the iron wires a wire hit his right eye and injured it very seriously. The appellant was given medical treatment but inspite of two operations having been carried out his injured eye could not be saved and he lost vision of that eye. The said accident occurred on 10 April 1980 The appellant gave notice to respondent No. 1; on 7th July 1980 claiming compensation to which the said respondent replied on 12th July 1980 asking the appellant to submit certain documents regarding expenses etc. The respondent failed to pay the amount of compensation to the appellant. Hence he filed Workmen Compensation Application No. 2181 on 11 claiming compensation of Rs. 9 800 together with interest and penalty as per law. ( 2 ) THE learned Commissioner for Workmens Compensation Junagadh awarded a sum of Rs. 7 806 by way of compensation but did not award either interest or penalty stating that as the amount of Rs. 7 538 P. was deposited in Court hence there was no order regarding penalty. ( 3 ) MR. D. M. Shah the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Commissioner was not justified in awarding Rs. 7 806 when the appellant was clearly entitled to the compensation of Rs. 9 800 as per Schedule to the Workmens Compensation Act 1923 (hereafter called the Act ). Mr. Shah has also urged that the learned Commissioner was not justified in holding that as the present respondent No. 2 had already deposited Rs. 7 538 P. towards compensation the question of awarding penalty did not arise. Mr. Shah has also urged that the appellant is entitled to interest on the amount of compensation as it was not paid within the statutory period of one month from the accident. ( 4 ) MR. M. D. Pandya the learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the amount of compensation awarded namely Rs. 7 806 was correct because in his submission the loss sustained by the appellant cannot be regarded as total loss of right eye. Mr. ( 4 ) MR. M. D. Pandya the learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the amount of compensation awarded namely Rs. 7 806 was correct because in his submission the loss sustained by the appellant cannot be regarded as total loss of right eye. Mr. Pandya urged that the medical evidence shows that the appellants Visual ability is the perception of light only which means that although the appellant has lost his vision he can still perceive light which according to him does not amount to total loss of the eye and therefore according to him the decision arrived at by the Commissioner that there was 30% loss is quite justified. Mr. Shah has urged that the total loss of sight in actual practice would amount to the total loss of eye and therefore the loss should be assessed at 40% and not at 30% as found by the learned Commissioner. The submission of Mr. Shah is rot correct and must be rejected. The total loss of eye is quite different from losing the vision. The fact that there is perception of light shows that there is no total loss of the eye although for all practical purposes the eye would not be useful for seeing anything. But in arriving at the total loss for the purpose of compensation 30 determined by the learned Commissioner is correct and is upheld. ( 5 ) THE second question raised by Mr. Shah is with regard to penalty which according to him should have been awarded by the learned Commissioner. Relying on Section 4-A sub-section (3) of the Act Mr. Shah points out that an employer who makes default in paying the compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due he is liable to pay the penalty unless there is justification for not paying the same. Mr. Shah has urged that although awarding penalty is discretionary the discretion must be exercised in favour of the workmen as soon as it is shown that the employer has failed to pay the compensation within the specified period of one month. Mr. Pandya has urged that in the facts and circumstances of this case the penalty is not attracted. Mr. Shah has urged that although awarding penalty is discretionary the discretion must be exercised in favour of the workmen as soon as it is shown that the employer has failed to pay the compensation within the specified period of one month. Mr. Pandya has urged that in the facts and circumstances of this case the penalty is not attracted. According to him although the accident had occurred on 10th April 1980 the notice was given by the appellant on 7th July 1980 which was promptly replied by the respondent No. 1 on 12th July 1980 whereby the appellant was asked to furnish certain documents. Mr. Pandya also urged that an ad hoc payment of about Rs. 1 0 was made though he is not able to specify the date on which such ad hoc payment was made. But there is no dispute that a substantial sum of Rs. 7 538 P. was deposited in Court on or before 11 September 1981 and thereafter the balance amount of Rs. 358-28 P. was deposited on 22nd December 1981 after the award. From these facts it is quite clear that the employer had not paid the amount due within one month of the date when it fell due as required by sub-section (3) of Section 4-A. The question here is as to when does the amount of compensation become due and payable. Mr. Shah has relied on he decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Another AIR 1976 SC 222 wherein the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that under the provisions of the Act the employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arises out of and in the course of employment. Therefore the submission of Mr. Shah must be accepted that the amount of compensation having become due on the date on which the accident was caused the amount should have been paid within the statutory limit of one month failing which the employer is liable to pay penalty in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay in payment. In this case there is nothing on record which could justify the delay in payment. This is a case of no fault liability and therefore there is no legal defence available to the respondents. In this case there is nothing on record which could justify the delay in payment. This is a case of no fault liability and therefore there is no legal defence available to the respondents. The very fact that the accident has occurred out of and in the course of employment and therefore the employer is bound to pay compensation without demur within the period of one month. Therefore the learned Commissioner was not justified in refusing to award penalty on the ground that the amount was deposited even though long after it became legally due and payable. ( 6 ) MR. Shah has very fairly stated that although the law permits the penalty to the maximum extent of 50% of the compensation in the present case the appellant would be satisfied if he is awarded 25% of the compensation amount as and by way of penalty for non-payment of compensation within the stipulated period of one month. Hence the appeal will have to be allowed on this claim and the appellant is held to be entitled to penalty at the rate of 25% of the amount of compensation of Rs. 7056/- awarded for injury excluding the amount awarded for the expenses. ( 7 ) THE last question raised by Mr. Shah is with regard to interest payable to the appellant for the delayed payment of compensation. Mr. Shah has urged that the accident having occurred on 10th April 1980 the respondents should have paid the compensation on or before 9th May 1980 whereas in fact a substantial amount was paid on or about 11 September 1981 i. e. one year and 5 months after the accident. Hence according to him the appellant is entitled to interest for this delayed payment at the rate of 6 percent per annum as laid down in sub-section (3) of Section 4-A of the Act. Mr. Pandya has urged that in compensation cases the interest if awarded is usually from the date of application and not from the date of accident. For this submission Mr. Pandya has relied upon the analogy of the claims in motor accident cases. This submission of Mr. Pandya is not correct. Although Mr. Pandya has not been able to point out any decision where this principle is laid down but he relies on the facts that in several cases interest has been awarded from the date of the application. Pandya has relied upon the analogy of the claims in motor accident cases. This submission of Mr. Pandya is not correct. Although Mr. Pandya has not been able to point out any decision where this principle is laid down but he relies on the facts that in several cases interest has been awarded from the date of the application. This contention of Mr. Pandya is not correct in-as much as the liability to pay compensation under the Act stands on entirely different footing from the liability in motor accident claim cases and other compensation cases. The liability under the Act is no fault liability and the amount of compensation to be awarded is precisely laid down in the table. Therefore the provision in sub-section (3) of Section 4-A of the Act has specifically put down one month limit within which the amount of compensation has to be paid. Hence the employer has no alternative but to pay the amount within a month. The date when the amount of compensation becomes due and payable as held by the Supreme Court (supra) is the date on which the accident occurred. There-fore there is an absolute liability of the employer to pay the amount of compensation within the statutory period of one month. Non-payment would necessarily result in not only the employer being liable for penalty but also interest from the date on which the amount has become due and payable which means the date of the accident or at the latest one month thereafter. The rate of interest has been fixed statutorily to be 6 percent at simple interest. Hence the appeal is allowed on this count also and it is held that the respondents are liable to pay to the appellant simple interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from one month after the accident till the different dates on which different amounts have been paid. The respondents shall pay the amount to the appellant on these two counts namely penalty and interest within a period of three months from today. In the result the appeal partly succeeds. The impugned award is to be modified as stated above. Order accordingly. Appeal partly allowed. .