JUDGMENT 1. Although a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act, has been filed for condoning the delay in filing this appeal an argument has been advanced that the stamp report that the limitation for filing this appeal expired on 14th January, 1979 is not correct and that actually the appeal was not time barred. In the petition for condonation of delay self it has been, asserted that as an application for certified copies of the judgment and decree had already been made on 18th September, 1978, the time from the date of that application to the date for order of reconstruction of the judgment should also be considered as time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree. In view of this argument I have entertained the .argument challenging the stamp report that the appeal is time barred. 2. It is not in dispute that the appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 31st August, 1978. According to the averments in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the petition for condonation of delay, the appellants filed an application for certified copies of the judgment and decree under appeal on 18th September, 1978, but the certified copies were not made available as the original judgment had been lost and no decree could be prepared because of the non-availability of the original judgment and that the court on 12th February 1979, directed the lost judgment to be reconstructed and after that was done, the decree was actually prepared and signed on 17th February, 1979, and prior to the signing of the decree, on 16th February 1979, itself an application for certified copies of the judgment and decree was made by the appellants. Except asserting that the first application for copies of the judgment and decree, made on 18th September, 1978, was allowed to be rejected for default, the aforesaid averments have not been controverted though a counter–affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. In the Counter affidavit filed it has been only stated that the statements made in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the petition are matters of record which need to be checked. In the Counter affidavit filed it has been only stated that the statements made in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the petition are matters of record which need to be checked. In these circumstances, I am not prepared not to Act, upon the averments contained in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the petition merely because in support thereof affidavit has been affirmed not by any of the appellants but only by a mere Pairvikar. It is the admitted position that the original copy of the judgment had been lost and was not available on the record. According to the counter affidavit, it was stolen away by one of the appellants, who was also a lawyer to the parties on 2nd September, 1978. It is also not in dispute that on 18th September, 1978, an application for certified copies of the judgment and decree has been made by the appellants. It must also be regarded as proved that the order for reconstruction of the judgment was passed and the judgment was reconstructed and the decree was singed only on 17th February, 1979. It is also not disputed that prior to the preparation of the decree, on 16th February. 1979, on application for copy had been filed. 3. Now, can it be said, as alleged in the counter affidavit, that the appellants allowed the application for certified copies of the judgment and decree made on 18th September, 1978 to be dismissed for default and that the dismissal, if any, Was due to any default or laches on their part? Apart from the al1egation that the original judgment had been stolen, on the facts of this case it is crystal clear that the application for copy was not dismissed for any laches or default on the part of the appellants. It was dismissed or rejected because the court office could not in the absence of the judgment and the decree, issue certified copies thereof. 4. On 18th September, 1978, the appellants had filed the application for certified copies of the judgment and decree. There was no default in prosecuting that application on their part. They renewed that application by filing a fresh application on 16th February, 1979 even prior to the signing of the decree. 4. On 18th September, 1978, the appellants had filed the application for certified copies of the judgment and decree. There was no default in prosecuting that application on their part. They renewed that application by filing a fresh application on 16th February, 1979 even prior to the signing of the decree. In these circumstances, it is manifest that the entire period from 18th September 1978, till 2nd April, 1979, when certified copies of the judgment and decree were ready for delivery, barring the delay of two days in supplying the requisite folios, was the time requisite for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree. And it cannot be doubted that if the entire period is regarded as, the time requisite, the appeal having been filed after summer vacation, is in time. This position is not controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. It was, however, strenuously argued on behalf of the respondents that the certified copies of the judgment and decree could not be supplied to the appellants because they had stolen the original judgment and the time during which copies could not be made available because of their own wrongful Act, could not be regarded as the time requisite for obtaining copies. I would assume that if copies could not be made available on account of the wrongful Act, of the appellants, the period during which such copies could not be made available may not be regarded as the time requisite but the onus lies on the person who alleges that copies could not be made available because of the wrongful Act, of the appellants to establish the same. In my opinion, it has not been so established. The only material brought on the record is that charge sheet has been submitted against one of the appellants and the court has taken cognizance of the case against him for theft of the original document. In a criminal case every persons accused of an offence, is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty. The mere fact that he has been summoned to stand trial cannot establish that one or the appellants has stolen the judgment. In these circumstances, this argument must fail. 6. In a criminal case every persons accused of an offence, is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty. The mere fact that he has been summoned to stand trial cannot establish that one or the appellants has stolen the judgment. In these circumstances, this argument must fail. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents also urged that in view of the exceptional circumstances, to save limitation, an appeal could be filed by the appellants even without a copy of the judgment and/or decree. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in Phoolchand & another vs. Gopal Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1470. Assuming that they could have filed an appeal without the certified copies of the judgment and decree, that circumstance has no bearing on the question for decision namely, what is the time requisite for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree which the appellants are entitled to exclude in computing the period of limitation. I, therefore, hold that the appeal is not time barred. 7. It is also stated in the petition that the appellants were advised that the appeal would be within time if it is filed on the re-opening day of the Court after the summer vacation, That advice cannot be said to be a completely irresponsible advice which no lawyer could have given and if, as it is, stated, the appellants acted on that advice, that would be sufficient ground for condonation of delay. However I have held that the appeal is not time barred. 8. This petition is, accordingly, disposed of. In the circumstances, however, I would make no order as to costs. Application disposed of.