Lahiri, J:- The petitioner questions the validity of the order dated 29.11.73 passed by the District Judge U.A.D., at Jorhat in Misc. Case No. 17 of 1973 arising out of Misc. Case (Land Acquisition) No. 33 of 1970 on the ground that learned Judge had no jurisdiction vested in him by law to alter and-modify the award made by his predecessor by invoking powers under section 151 and/or 152 of the Civil Procedure Code, for short-'the Code'. In the alternative, counsel contends that the learned Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law in refusing to grant 15% of additional com­pensation on the market value of the acquired land : in consi­deration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, which had been awarded by his predecessor in Misc. Case (Land Acquisi­tion) No. 33 of 1970 and banks heavily on P. C. Goswami vs. Collector of Darrang, AIR 1982 SC 1214 . 2. In exercise of powers conferred under section 6 of the Assam Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act, 1964, for short "the Assam Act", the Government of Assam acquired 19 bighas 15 lechas of land belonging to the petitioner. The Collector awarded compensation for the land and the houses and the standing trees. The petitioner being aggrieved by the Award of the Collector asked for a reference which came up for adju­dication before the District Judge, U A D at Jorhat, who on perusal of the claims and counter-claims of the claimant and the Collector, Sibsagar, framed the following issues :- 1) What is the proper value of the land acquired ? 2) Whether the assessment made by the Collector is inadequate ? 3) Whether the claimant is entitled to compensation, additional compensation and interest as claimed and if so, how much ? entitled to ? 4) Both parties have adduced evidence and some docu­ments have been executed. The case was numbered as Misc. case (Land Acquisition) No. 33/70. On appreciation of the evidence and upon hearing the parties learned Judge disposed of Issue No. 1 by enhancing the compensation to Rs. 3,000/-per katha from Rs. 2, 300/-per katha as awarded by the Collector. The claimant had raised no objection in respect of the compensation awarded by the Collector for the houses and the standing trees on the acqui­red land accordingly, the compensation awarded for the houses etc., was maintained by learned Judge. 3,000/-per katha from Rs. 2, 300/-per katha as awarded by the Collector. The claimant had raised no objection in respect of the compensation awarded by the Collector for the houses and the standing trees on the acqui­red land accordingly, the compensation awarded for the houses etc., was maintained by learned Judge. Learned Judge deter­mined the compensation of the land and houses as envisaged in section 11 of "the Assam Act" read with section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984, for short "the Acquisition Act". He held that the petitioner was entitled to interest @6% per annum as provided in section 28 of "the Acquisition Act”. Learned Judge further held that in addition to the market value of the land, the claimant was entitled to a sum of 15% on the market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Accordingly, he disposed of Issues 1,2 and 3. While disposing of Issue No. 4 learned Judge held that the clai­mant was entitled to compensation @ Rs. 3,000/- per katha and enhanced the compensation, awarded interest and "additional compensation @ 15% on the market value of the laud". Accor­dingly he made the award enhancing the compensation awarded by the Collector. The judgment and order was passed on 17.5.72 and the cost sheet or decree was prepared on 30.5.72. No appeal was preferred against the said Award made by learned Judge by any of the parties, as prescribed in section 54 of "the Acquisition Act", read with section 12(2) of "the Assam Act". On 17.3.73, long after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing an appeal or a review petition, the Collector filed an application purported to be under section 151 read with section 152 of "the Code" questioning the legality and validity of the part of the Award made by the District Judge in Misc. case (Land Acquisition) No. 33 of 1970 granting 15% additional compensation. On receipt thereof the successor-in-office of the learned District Judge entertained the same, heard the parties and concluded that grant of solatium @ 15% was a mistake committed by his predecessor, and, accordingly set aside the Award of additional compensation of 15% by his order dated 29.11.73 in Misc. case (Land Acquisition) No. 17 of 1973. On receipt thereof the successor-in-office of the learned District Judge entertained the same, heard the parties and concluded that grant of solatium @ 15% was a mistake committed by his predecessor, and, accordingly set aside the Award of additional compensation of 15% by his order dated 29.11.73 in Misc. case (Land Acquisition) No. 17 of 1973. The petitioner has questioned the jurisdiction of the court to alter, modify or amend the Award and/or the judgment played by the District Judge in Misc. Case (Land Acquisition) No. 33/70 in purported exercise of power under section 151 of "the Code". The petitioner has asked for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 29.11.73 in the Civil Rule and has ques­tioned the jurisdiction of the Court to render the impugned order in the connected Civil Revision. 3. Mr. P. Barthakur, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before us that the judgment and order passed by the District Judge in Misc. Case (Land Acquisition) No. 33/ 70 dated 17.5.72 was final and conclusive and it could not be revised, altered or modified by the successor-in-office of the le­arned Judge in purported exercise of powers under section 151 and/or 152 of "the Code", on the grounds that the judgment and order dated 17.5.72 was an appellate order, no appeal was preferred by the Collector, the period of limitation for preferring appeal or making an application for review under Or­der 47 Rule 1 of ''the Code" were long barred by limitation. As such, OP the fact situation of the case, learned Judge had no jurisdiction vested in him by law to seat in appeal and set aside the part of the judgment and decree in purported exer­cise of powers under section 151 read with section 152 of "the Code". Learned counsel submits that all the reliefs provided under "the Code" read with "the Acquisition Acts" were bar­red by limitation, as such learned Judge committed jurisdictional error in entertaining the application under section. 151/152 of "the Code”. When the statutory reliefs provided under the law were barred by limitation the court had no jurisdiction ve­sted in it by law to alter, modify or set aside the Award and/ or the judgment and decree of the District Judge rendered on 17.5.72. Learned counsel submits that the decisions rendered by the District Judge on Issue NJ. When the statutory reliefs provided under the law were barred by limitation the court had no jurisdiction ve­sted in it by law to alter, modify or set aside the Award and/ or the judgment and decree of the District Judge rendered on 17.5.72. Learned counsel submits that the decisions rendered by the District Judge on Issue NJ. 3 and 4 were partly set aside by his successor, which was nothing by exercise of appellate power not vested in him by law, and as such, the impugned order dated 29.11.73 is liable to be set aside and the judgment and order and decree in Misc Case (Land Acquisition) No. 33/70 be restored. The next contention of learned counsel is that the learned Judge committed jurisdictional error or errors apparent on the face of the records in refusing to grant solatium and/or 15% additional compensation on the market value of the land and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. It has been candidly admitted before us (I) that the judgment and order dated 17.5.72 was an appellable order, (2) that the period of limitation for preferring the appeal had long been barred by limitation before the Collector filed appli­cation under sections 151/152 of "the Code", (3) that by the impugned order, learned Judge partly set aside the decisions of his predecessor in respect of Issue Nos. 3 and 4 and that the question whether the petitioner was entitled to additional compensation was a positive, affirmative and direct issue being Issue No. 3 in Misc. Case (Land Acquisition) 33/70 and the said Issue was decided on the evidence, materials on record and upon hearing learned counsel for both the parties. There was a spe­cific issue framed and the same was decided on merits upon he­aring both the parties. If any of the parties was affected by the decision, it was to follow the mandates of the legislature and comply with the Rule of law. The remedies provided were clear and specific. The aggrieved party could and should have come before this court in appeal or could have preferred an application for revi­ew if the order. Neither of the reliefs was sought for. No explanation was offered before the learned Judge, who tried the subsequent case as to why the Collector could not ask for the available statutory reliefs provided by law. The aggrieved party could and should have come before this court in appeal or could have preferred an application for revi­ew if the order. Neither of the reliefs was sought for. No explanation was offered before the learned Judge, who tried the subsequent case as to why the Collector could not ask for the available statutory reliefs provided by law. It has been rightly contended that no party should be allowed to circumvent the mandate of the legi­slature and take resort to the inherent power of the Court. The right of appeal as well as the right to review were barred by limitation, the other party acquired a right and learned Ju­dge trying the subsequent case should have taken into conside­ration that the Collector had laches, suffered from negligence and did not avail of the statutory rights of appeal and/or re­view and that the claimants had already acquired a substantive right. In our opinion, under such situation the inherent power, which has to be exercised sparingly, should- not be exercised by the Court. The inherent power of the Court can be exercised only in very exceptional cases, and, there is no iota of material to show that it was an exceptional case. In our opinion, in the absence of any reasonable and plausible cause for not pre­ferring the appeal, the Court should not have exercised power under section 151 of "the Code". Admittedly, it was not a case covered by section 152 of "the Code" because it was not a case of the correction of a clerical or arithmetical mistake. Indeed, inherent jurisdiction is an extra-ordinary juri­sdiction. It is true that inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code, but the powers are not to be exe­rcised when their exercise may be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in "the Code" or against the intention of the legislators. To put it in other words, the Court cannot make use of the extraordinary provisions of section 151 of "the Code" where the party had he remedy provided in the provisions of law and he neglected to avail the same. The power under se­ction 151 cannot be exercised as an appellate power and thereby whittle down the jurisdiction of the superior Court. The Court cannot assume appellate jurisdiction which is not- vested in the court by law. The power under se­ction 151 cannot be exercised as an appellate power and thereby whittle down the jurisdiction of the superior Court. The Court cannot assume appellate jurisdiction which is not- vested in the court by law. We are tempted to quote the relevant observat­ions of the Supreme Court in Nainsingh vs. Koonwarjee, AIR 1970 SC 997 , wherein inter alia, their Lordships observed as under :- "The High Court has misconceived the scope of its in­herent powers. Under the inherent power of Courts recog­nised by S. 151, C. P. C., a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. In iterant juristion of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked,, In other words the court cannot make use of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglected to avail himself of the same. Fu­rther the power under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power." (Emphasis added). 5. What we find, in the instant case is that learned Dis­trict Judge while exercising power under section 151 has in fact, exercised appellate power. Learned Judge was oblivious of the fact that the Collector had specific statutory remedies of appeal and/or review against the judgment and/or the decree and he had neglected to avail the same. A negligent party ordinarily does not deserve any relief under the extra-ordinary power un­der section 151 of "the Code". But the condition precedent for exercising power under section 151 of "the Code" is that the Court must either come to the conclusion that the order is necessary for the ends of justice or it must reach the concl­usion that the order was necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. However, in the instant case there is no finding as to the existence of the said conditions. 6. However, in the instant case there is no finding as to the existence of the said conditions. 6. In the result, we find that the learned Judge acted il­legally and without jurisdiction in overlooking the fact that the Collector could have appealed against the judgment and decree as provided in law and it did not avail remedies provided in law and/or did not ask for the reliefs and thereby neglected to avail the reliefs provided by law. Situated thus, the Court should not have exercised jurisdiction under section 151 of "the Code" when the Collector had his remedy provided and he had neglected to avail himself of the same. Secondly, learned Judge failed to consider that by lapse of time the petitioner had ac­quired a substantive right no sooner the period of limitation for preferring the appeal was over and the said right could not be taken away by the court in exercise of power under section 151 of "the Code". Thirdly, learned Judge completely overlooked the fact that the Collector could not have preferred an appeal without asking for condonation of delay, on sufficient cause being shown, but learned Judge granted the Collector the relief without condoning the delay and/or in the absence of any plau­sible and reasonable explanation for not preferring the appeal. Fourthly, there is no finding that the order was necessary for the ends of justice and/or necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Fifthly, learned Judge has exercised appellate power in modifying the judgment and decree passed by his predecessor. Lastly, learned Judge acted illegally and without jurisdiction in taking away the appellate relief available to the petitioner by making the impugned order under section 151 of "the Code". A party aggrieved by an award of the District Judge is entitled in law to prefer an appeal. By modifying the judgment and decree and setting aside the award in respect of the additional compensation, in exercise of power under section 151 of "the Code" learned Judge snatched away the right of appeal from the petitioner. A party aggrieved by an award of the District Judge is entitled in law to prefer an appeal. By modifying the judgment and decree and setting aside the award in respect of the additional compensation, in exercise of power under section 151 of "the Code" learned Judge snatched away the right of appeal from the petitioner. We are of the view that under such situations Learned Judge could not have exercised power under section 151 of "the Code" and the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction, however, we do not base our decision on this ground as we find that the second contention of the petitioner is clinching enough to set aside the impugned order. 7. Let us turn to the second contention. Indeed Article 141 of the Constitution has a special impact. It is an extra-ordi­nary provision, unique in character with special indigenous fla­vour. It is affirmative, positive and declaratory. It declares that laws made by the Supreme Court are binding on all Courts within the territories of India. No free wheeling is possible by any court where exists a binding decision of the Supreme Court. No adventurism is permissible in this constituency. In depicts unqualified respects towards the highest judiciary of the land, which in view of its knowledge, status, learning and wisdom has been powered by the founding fathers of the Constitution to make laws of the land binding on all courts. No judge, on any pretext or on any alleged reason or on any pretence, is al­lowed to side-track a binding decision of the Supreme Court. To do so would be to violate the mandates of the Constitution, the will of the people. A new construction on the binding law made by the Supreme Court in respect of a particular provision of an Act, or, legal engineering in respect thereto is a tabbo and would be to unlaw the law. No doubt can be expressed by any Court subordinate to the Supreme Court as to the correctness of a binding decision, on the grounds, inter alia, that (a) there is another view which was left out of considera­tion, or (b) there is another view which was never urged or considered by the Supreme Court, or (c) perhaps the law as interpreted is not in tune with the morse of the day or (d) change of events demand a change in outlook of law. Laws made by the Supreme Court are not merely matters of individual opinion, they are the products of judicial functioning having binding force. Their Lordships make law on the basis of obje­ctive tests and nothing is left to chances, at least there cannot be any scope for such presumption. Faith, devoting and respect in the apex court in India resulted in installing Article 141 in the Constitution. Article 141 is the heart and soul of the Constitut­ion. Why should pure light of truth b; broken up and colour­ed when the light has come from the Supreme Court. There is a line of decisions of the Supreme Court explaining the am­bit of Article 141 but we extract only one observation, from Fuzlunbi vs. Khadir Ali, AIR 1980 SC 1730 , wherein their Lo­rdships observed as follows : "We need hardly say that these devices are not permis­sible by the High Court when the decision of the Supre­me Court are cited before them not merely because of the jurisprudence of precedent hut, because of the impera­tives of Article 141". Their Lordship's further observed : "-----no judge in India, except a larger Bench of the Supreme Court without departure from judicial disci­pline can whittle down, wish away or be unbound by the ratio there of". 8. P.C. Goswami (Supra) is a binding and conclusive deci­sion of the supreme Court wherein their Lordships have held that under the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, the claimants are entitled to additional compensation or what is styled as solatium, @ 15% on the market value of the land. In P.C. Goswami (Supra) the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 was before their Lordships. The ques­tion that cropped up before their Lordships was whether the appellant was entitled to solatium or additional compensation under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 7 (2) of the said act, inter alia, read as under : "(2) When the compensation has been determined under sub-section (1) and sub-section (1A) the Collector shall make an award in accordance with the principles set out in section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and no amount referred to in sub-section (2) of section 23 of that Act shall be included in the award". (Emphasis added) It is thus seen that Section 7 (2) stated clearly that no amount referred to in section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act should be included in the award payable to the claimant. It may be stated here that section 11 (3) of the Assam Act of 1964 is the same, word for word, with section 7 (2) of the Assam Act of 1948, except for the figure and letter 1 (A) which stood substituted as (1). Appellant P. C. Goswami claimed that he was entitled to solatium, notwithstanding the provisions of sec­tion 7 (2) of the Assam Act of 1948. Their Lordships cogitated and applied the principles of law enunciated in State of Kerala vs. T. M. Peter, AIR 1980 SC 1438 . In Kerala, similar provi­sions of the state Act had denied payment of solatium where-for their Lordships had to strike down the provision in order to achieve the virtue of equality and to eliminate, the vice of inequality in the impugned Act. Their Lordships applied the principles of Peter (Supra) in P. C. Goswami (Supra) and directed the State Government to pay solatium payable under section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Before reac­hing the decision their Lordships considered the provisions of section 7 (2) of "the Assam Act" and also noticed that the provisions had expressly denied payment of solatium, compared the same with the Kerala Act and applied the rule of Peter (Supra) but instead of striking down the provision in order to achieve equality, as those were a bunch of Civil Appeals, direc­ted the State Government to pay solatium under Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We find that their Lordships applied the principles of Peter (Supra) in P. C. Goswami, scanned the provisions of the Assam Act and directed the State of Assam to pay solatium @ 15% on the market value of the land. We extract the relavant finding from P. C. Gyswami (Supra): "There is, however, one contention advanced by Mr. Nandy which, in our opinion, deserves to be accepted. He contends that in the matter of payment of solatium, no discrimination can be made between actuations under the Assam Act and those made under the Land Acquisi­tion Act. We extract the relavant finding from P. C. Gyswami (Supra): "There is, however, one contention advanced by Mr. Nandy which, in our opinion, deserves to be accepted. He contends that in the matter of payment of solatium, no discrimination can be made between actuations under the Assam Act and those made under the Land Acquisi­tion Act. Section 4 (3) of the Assam Act itself says that if a land is acquired under that Act, the State Govern­ment shall be empowered to apply to such land any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In a judgment (1) The State of Kerala vs. Peter given by this court very recently, to which Mr. Nandy has drawn our attention, it was held that there is no justification for discriminating between an acquisition under one Act and an acquisition under another Act in so far as payment of solatium is concerned. This should be more so in respect of an acquisition to which the State Government is empowered to extend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Nunit Lal has not been able to controvert this posi­tion in view of the judgment to which we have refe­rred above. We accordingly direct that the State Govern­ment shall pay to the appellant solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the compensation awarded to him by the High Court. (Emphasis added) 9. It follows, therefore, (1) that denial of payment of solatium in the Assam Act was considered to be unjustified, discriminatory between the Central Act and State Act, (2) that the said Act was considered to be covered by Article 31, (3) that the Kerala Act and the Assam Act were held to be Land Acquisition Acts simplicitor not falling within the ambit of Article 31. Therefore, there is an adjudged decision of the Sup­reme Court furnishing an example or an authority for an iden­tical or similar case which has arisen in the instant case. As such, P. C. Goswami (Supra) is a precedent which we must follow. The principles of law enunciated presented to the Supreme Court, was duly determined after due consideration, and declared to serve as a rule for further guidance not only in that case but to be applied to analogous cases. 10. As such, P. C. Goswami (Supra) is a precedent which we must follow. The principles of law enunciated presented to the Supreme Court, was duly determined after due consideration, and declared to serve as a rule for further guidance not only in that case but to be applied to analogous cases. 10. Under these circumstances we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion, on the authority of P. C. Goswami (Supra), that we are bound to hold that the provision of section 7 (2) of the Act of 1948 and/or section 11 (3) of 1964 Act denying solatium was invalid or in other words solatium must be paid under the impugned Acts. We are of the firm opinion that solatium is payable under the Assam Act of 1964 on the autho­rity of the Supreme Court. Learned Judge has held that sola­tium is not payable in view of the provisions contained in section 11 (3) of the Act of 1964. However, it goes counter to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in P. C. Goswami. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in P. C. Goswami we hold that the claimants are entitled to solatium i.e. additional compensation on the market value of the acqui­red land. 11. In the result we set aside the impugned order dated 29.11.73 and restore the judgment, order and decree dated 17.5.72 and 30.5.72 respectively. In the result, the petitions are allowed. However, we make not order as to cost but direct the respon­dents to make the payment, as awarded, within 3 months in view of the fact that the parties are litigating since 1970.