JUDGMENT N. N. Sharma, J. 1. THIS revision is directed against an order dated 20-11-1981 passed by Sri I. P. Mital, Sessions Judge, Tehri Garhwal, at Camp Uttar Kashi by which he allowed Criminal Revision No. :21 of 1981 preferred by State against the order of discharge dated 6-6-1981 recorded by Sri Rati Ram, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal, under that order learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had discharged the accused (revisionist) under section 245 (2) CrPC. 2. IT appears that a complaint was filed by Food Inspector Uttar Kashi against Gopeshwar Prasad and M/s. Shriyana Prasad Dayanidhi Jain wholesales of Uttar Kashi alleging that accused no. 1 was selling mustard oil at hir shop on 21-11-1979 at about 4 p. m. when the Food Inspector purchased the mustard oil. After compliance of necessary formalities, he sent the sample for analysis ; Public Analyst opined that the sample was adulterated. It appears that at the time of sampling the purchase was done by the Food Inspector from sealed tin ; a voucher was also produced by the vendor showing that he did purchase the mustard oil in sealed tins from accused no. 2 ; vouchers corroborated this assertion of the vendor and so Food Inspector also impleaded accused-revisionist on the application of vendor. The case was fixed for evidence before framing the charge on 3-5-80 in the court of competent Magistrate, but it was transferred to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for disposal. 3. MEANWHILE an application was filed by accused no. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused persons alleging that the prosecution was not sustainable in view of non-compliance of Rule 22-A of the P.F.A. Rules which was mandatory according to the decision of this court in Criminal Revision Wo. 46 of 1974 Jyoti Swaroop v. State, reported in 1978 All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal 342. State opposed the prayer on the ground that no evidence of the prosecution has yet been recorded and so there was no question of discharge of the accused at that stage. However learned Magistrate ignored this contention and recorded the impugned order and discharged the accussed under section 245 (2) CrPC. State opposed the prayer on the ground that no evidence of the prosecution has yet been recorded and so there was no question of discharge of the accused at that stage. However learned Magistrate ignored this contention and recorded the impugned order and discharged the accussed under section 245 (2) CrPC. Learned Sessions Judge disagreed with this view and allowed the revision and set aside the order of discharge and remanded the case to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Uttar Kashi for disposal in accordance with law by the impugned order. 4. AGGRIEVED by this decision the instant revision was filed. Heard learned counsel for both the parties at great length. 5. SRI Keshav Sahai, learned counsel for the applicants took me through the relevant provision of Sections 244 and 245 CrPC which read as under:- " Sec. 244. Evidence for prosecution.-(E) When in any warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. (2) The Magistrate may, on the application of the prosecution, issue a summons to any of its witnesses directing him to attend or to produce any document or other thing. " Sec. 245 ;-When accused shall be discharged.-(1) If upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction tike Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless. " 6. HIS contention was that there was nothing in sub-section (2) of Section 245 CrPC to fetter the discretion of the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any stage of the case if he found, for reasons to be recorded that the charge was groundless. Learned Session Judge erred in holding that the discharge was premature. " 6. HIS contention was that there was nothing in sub-section (2) of Section 245 CrPC to fetter the discretion of the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any stage of the case if he found, for reasons to be recorded that the charge was groundless. Learned Session Judge erred in holding that the discharge was premature. In this connection learned counsel for the revisionist pointed out that there was no reason to import in sub-section (2) of Section 245 CrPC, .the words " If upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, the Magistrate considered for reasons to be recorded .........". Sub-clause (2) of section 245 CrPC could be read in isolation also as it was complete in itself. It was not subject to section 244 or Section 245 (1) CrPC. 7. HIS further contention was that an interpretation of this section should be made in favour of the accused if two interpretations were possible. 8. IN this connection he relied upon a decision Cricket Association of Bengal v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 1925 where it was observed at page 1925 " Where the High Court after giving a clear finding that on the allegations in the complaint the case initiated before the Magistrate as a warrant case is misconceived, directs the Magistrate to investigate whether the accused has not committed a different offence triable as a summons case the Magistrate has jurisdiction under section 248 to permit the withdrawl of the complaint and acquit the accused as the case ceases to be a warrant case and becomes one to which summons case procedure applies. " It appears that in that case respondent no. 2 filed a complaint on January 3, 1967 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,, Calcutta in respect of an incident which occurred on 1-1-67 in Second Cricket Test Match between India and West Indies at the Eden Gardens. (2) " The circumstances leading up to the order of the High Court may be indicated. The second respondent filed a complaint on January 3, 1967 before the court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate Calcutta in respect of the incident which took place on the second day (January 1, 1967) of the Second Cricket Test Match between India and West Indies at the Eden Gardens. The second respondent filed a complaint on January 3, 1967 before the court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate Calcutta in respect of the incident which took place on the second day (January 1, 1967) of the Second Cricket Test Match between India and West Indies at the Eden Gardens. The Test Match was to be played under the control, management and supervision of the Cricket Association of Bengal which had sold tickets of various denominations for the game. There were tickets sold for all the days of the Match and there were arrangements made for the sale of daily tickets. The game started as scheduled on December 31, 1966. The play was interrupted by a number of spectators scaling over the fencing erected around the play ground and entering the cricket field. However, nothing untoward happened on that day. (3) According to the prosecution, the first appellant started selling tickets announcing that arrangements had been made for the accommodation of about 60,000 spectators, while as a matter of fact nearly a lakh of spectators were admitted into the enclosure. The sitting arrangement was most inconvenient and highly unsatisfactory. The arrangements made by the first appellant for accommodating the persons inside the enclosure were so grossly inadequate that it tended to endanger the personal safety of the spectators. On the day in question, the complainant, who was a holder of a season ticket for Rs. 45/- went to attend the game and found all the stands jampacked. Notwithstanding this the people with tickets were being pushed into different enclosures with the result that the spectators within the enclosures started jumping over the fence and occupied the space between the lines of the field and the fencing. The police unable to control the rush and confusion caused by the behaviour of the crowd, suddenly started a lathi charge followed by the bursting of tear gas shells, which resulted in causing injuries to various persons. This infuriated the crowd, which retaliated by act of arson. The arrangements for going out of the enclosures were also grossly inadequate with the result that some of the spectators who wanted to clear out quickly in panic sustained injuries. The match had to be abandoned for the day. This infuriated the crowd, which retaliated by act of arson. The arrangements for going out of the enclosures were also grossly inadequate with the result that some of the spectators who wanted to clear out quickly in panic sustained injuries. The match had to be abandoned for the day. On these facts the complainant alleged that the first appellant had acted most rashly and negligently in overselling the tickets and admitting a large number of people than could be conveniently accommodated inside the ground and thereby endangered human lives and the personal safety of thousands of spectators. It was further alleged that as a matter of fact the rash and negligent act of the first appellant also resulted in hurt being caused to a number of persons, who had come to witness the Match. Apart from the Cricket Association of Bengal, which was the first accused, he made 33 persons accused in his complaint petition.........." (4) On January 3, 1967, the Chief Presidency Magistrate examined the complainant and heard his counsel. As the Chief Presidency Magistrate was prima facie satisfied there was a case, he issued summons to the persons shown as accused under sections 337 and 338 tread with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code, fixing February 13, 1967 for appearance. The complainant had also made a prayer for issue of search warrants and for seizure of the account books and other relevant papers in the custody of the first accused- appellant and search warrants were issued on January 6, 1967...................... (8) On June 8, 1967, the Chief Presidency Magistrate dismissed the complaint as against accused nos.16, 17, 18, 19., 23, 27, 30 and 34 under section 204 (3) CrPC on the ground that the complainant has not deposited the necessary charges for issue of summons. It was noted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate that the complainant though called w,as absent. Dealing with the application dated May 31, 1967 filed by the complainant for permission to withdraw the complaint, the Chief Presidency [Magistrate has stated that he can not accord permission to withdraw the complaint as the proceedings under section 338 IPC are warrant procedure proceedings. It was noted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate that the complainant though called w,as absent. Dealing with the application dated May 31, 1967 filed by the complainant for permission to withdraw the complaint, the Chief Presidency [Magistrate has stated that he can not accord permission to withdraw the complaint as the proceedings under section 338 IPC are warrant procedure proceedings. But the Chief Presidency Magistrate has further stated that no useful purpose will be served by proceeding further with the complaint as the complainant was not present and was also not serious to proceed with the complaint as is evident from his conduct in committing several defaults. For these reasons the Chief Presidency Magistrate passed an order discharging all the other remaining accused under section 253 (2) CrPC. " 9. IN this connection the observations relied upon by the learned Advocate for revisionist reported at page 1929 were as under : " 253 (2). Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless. This sub-section gives ample jurisdiction to the Magistrate to discharge an accused in the circumstances mentioned therein and the order of discharge can be passed at any previous stage of the case. Sub-section (1) under those circumstances will not operate as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate under sub-section (2). " 10. THUS it is obvious that in that case complainant himself was reluctant to proceed with the complaint and had already applied for its withdrawal. In the instant case the Food Inspector was not even examined and the statement of any accused had not been recorded. It was premature on the part of learned Magistrate to have observed that the prosecution was defective as there has been violation of mandatory rule 22 (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The said authorities relied upon by Magistrate are clearly distinguishable. In Abdul Nabi v. Gulam Murtaza Khan, AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 93 the facts were as below ; " The necessary facts are that the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner under sections 420 and 406, IPC alleging certain facts. The said authorities relied upon by Magistrate are clearly distinguishable. In Abdul Nabi v. Gulam Murtaza Khan, AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 93 the facts were as below ; " The necessary facts are that the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner under sections 420 and 406, IPC alleging certain facts. The learned Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed, recorded the statement of the complainant under section 200 CrPC, took cognizance of the case under section 420 IPC only, and issued summons to the accused. (3) On appearance of the accused, he raised an objection, that the facts as disclosed in the complaint do not make out any offence, and that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case. The learned Magistrate upheld the contention of the accused and dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused. (4) The complainant, dissatisfied with that judgment took the matter in revision to the Sessions Judge Hyderabad. The learned Judge allowed the revision petition and directed enquiry into the complaint. His opinion was that the learned Magistrate was not justified in dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused without recording any evidence in the case. It is this view of the learned Sessions Judge that is now challenged in this revision petition. " It was observed at page 93 :- (7) " Chapter XVI relates to the complaints filed before the Magistrate. Under section 200 CrPC a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, has at once to examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath, and has to reduce the substance of the examination to writing which is required to be signed by the complainant and the witnesses. If the Magistrate, before whom the complaint in writing is made is not competent to take cognizance under section 201, he has to return it for presentation to the proper court. It is section 203, which is relevant for our purposes. According to that section, the Magistrate before whom a complaint is made, may dismiss the complaint after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under section 202; if (sic) in his judgment there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall briefly record his reasons for, so doing. It is under section 204 that if the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he can issue the summons in view of the nature of the case. It is thus clear that the first stage in a complaint filed by a private person for its dismissal is under section 203. Once that stage is passed, then the second is only under section 253 (2) CrPC. There is no stage in between at which the Magistrate, who has taken cognizance of the case, can dismiss the complaint. It is true that the language of section 253 (2) is somewhat wide but its connotation has to be understood by reading sections 252 and 253 together. It will be seen that under section 252 CrPC it is made incumbent upon the Magistrate to proceed after the accused appeared before him to hear the complaint (if any) and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. In Section 253 CrPC reference is to section 252, that is to say to hear the complaint (if any) and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Sub-section (2) of Section 253, however empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case, if for reasons to be recorded, he considers the charge to be groundless. What then is the meaning of the phrase at any previous stage of the case obviously, has to be understood in the light it is made. Sub-section (1) in which reference to section 252 is made. Sub-section (1) expressely refers to the duty of the Magistrate to take all the evidence referred to in Section 252, and it is in juxta-position of this duty that, section 252, empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case. It can only mean that after the stage of section 203 is passed, but some evidence is recorded under section 252 and before all the evidence referred to in section 252 is recorded the Magistrate can discharge the accused. " 11. I respectfully agree with these observations which have not been overruled even by any obiter dicta of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority. " 11. I respectfully agree with these observations which have not been overruled even by any obiter dicta of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority. Language of sections 252 and 253 of the old Code is identical with new sections 244 and 245 of present Code. 12. IN the instant case, it is obvious that the proceedings were initiated on a complaint by the Food INspector and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under section 190 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is significant to note that a case initiated on a complaint of the Food INspector does not need any inquiry as contemplated by sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Statement of Food INspector or any other witness is not to be recorded as a condition precedent to the summoning of the accused and in that respect such complaint is distinguishable from the complaint of a private complainant. The accused were summoned straight-way. It was warrant case. The complaint had not been withdrawn by the Food INspector nor the statement of Food INspector or any other prosecution witness or of the accused had been recorded, when this order of discharge was drawn under section 245 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such short-cut was impermissible and simply an abuse of the exercise of discretion conferred by section 245 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Had such discretion vested in the Magistrate, he could have arbitrarily rejected the complaint just-after taking cognizance or could have proceeded with the case as there was no previous stage in this case after the taking of the cognizance of the offence. So the order of learned Magistrate was rightly set aside by the impugned order and this revision is dismissed as devoid of force. Stay order dated 15-12-81 is vacated. The record of the case shall be sent.: to the court below for quick disposal. Revision dismissed.