A. S. QURESHI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the appeal filed by the original defendants Nos. 1 to 4 against the decree passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court (10th Court) at Ahmedabad. The present respondent No. 1 had filed this suit for dissolution of the partnership and taking accounts. Both the sides have produced oral and documentary evidence at considerable length. The learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had established that there was a partnership. He decreed the suit granting the preliminary decree and the matter was referred to the Commissioner for taking accounts to settle the accounts of the dissolved firm. ( 2 ) MR. M. C. Bhatt the learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the trial court has misread and mis-construed the partnership deed Exhibit 56. According to Mr. Bhatt although the document is captioned as partnership deed in fact the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 is not that of partners. Mr. Bhatt has urged that this document Exhibit 56 is somewhat unusual type in this that the plaintiff is referred to as the party of the first part and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are collectively referred to as party of the second part. According to him in a genuine partnership deed each partner is regarded as a separate party and all of them are numbered at seriatum. Moreover the defendant No. 1 is really not a partner but it is itself a partnership firm whose partners are defendants Nos. 2 3 and 4. Mr. Bhatt has referred to the recitals in the said partnership deed wherein it is stated that the plaintiff is aged over 71 years he is not keeping good health he is unable to see properly he is very weak in body and that his sole means of livelihood for himself and his family is the business of Commission Agent in vegetable which he carries on a stall in the vegetable market at a place clled Bhagubhais Vanda which is managed by the Agricultural Produce Market Committee Ahmedabad the present respondent No. 3. For his submission Mr. Bhatt has heavily relied on the term No. 9 in the said partnership deed to show that the relationship between the parties concerned was not that of partners. For his submission Mr. Bhatt has heavily relied on the term No. 9 in the said partnership deed to show that the relationship between the parties concerned was not that of partners. In the said term No. 9 it is provided that the plaintiff will be entitled to 20% of the amount of gross commission as shown by the books of accounts on the sale effected by the partnership firm. Mr. Bhatt has submitted that this term clearly shows that the plaintiff was entitled to 20% of the gross receipts of the commission without any reference to the possibility of sharing any loss that may occur in the business of the firm. Mr. Bhatt has urged that the essence of a partnership is a joint venture where the partners come together to share profit and loss of the partnership business although Mr. Bhatt concedes that a partner may be entitled to profit only and may not share the loss with other partners. But according to him a fixed percentage of the gross receipts of the commission business clearly shows that the plaintiff wanted return of a fixed percentage of the total business as the compensation for the use and occupation of the stall of the plaintiff which was to be used by the partnership firm. Mr. Bhatt submits that this is not a real or genuine partnership deed but it is a camouflage sub-licence for obtaining compensation for the use and occupation of his stall by the plaintiff. ( 3 ) MR. M. B. Gandhi the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has urged that the relationship between the parties was that of partners and that the said document Exhibit 56 does create a genuine ownership between the parties concerned. Mr. Gandhi has urged that going through the entire partnership deed it comes out very clear that there is a genuine partnership. As regards term No. 9 he submits that there is nothing wrong in the plaintiff restricting his share to 20% of the gross receipts of commission earned by the firm. Mr. Gandhi points out that if the plaintiffs intention was to recover rent fee or compensation for the use and occupation of the aforesaid vegetable stall then the plaintiff would have insisted on a term where-by a fixed amount would be payable to the plaintiff. Mr. Gandhi points out that if the plaintiffs intention was to recover rent fee or compensation for the use and occupation of the aforesaid vegetable stall then the plaintiff would have insisted on a term where-by a fixed amount would be payable to the plaintiff. Instead the plaintiff agreeing to 20% of the gross amount of the commission may mean that he would get nothing if no commission is earned at all by the firm. According to Mr. Gandhi anybody who wants to sublet or give sub-licence would not agree to a term whereby he may get nothing if there is no commission earned by the firm. Mr. Gandhi further urged that it is true that no liability is cast on the plaintiff to share any loss. But according to him in a commission business no loss is contemplated. Hence absence of provision regarding the plaintiff sharing loss does not come in the way of the relationship being regarded as partnership. Mr. Gandhi also relies on the Exhibit 213 which is an extract from the register maintained by the Agricultural Produce Market Committee Ahmedabad wherein in column No. 1 the name of the plaintiff is shown as licencee. In column No. 4 the names of four partners i. e. the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 3 and 4 are shown as partners carrying on business. In the fifth column it is stated that the partnership deed is produced before the Committee. This according to Mr. Gandhi conclusively proves that the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were brought in as partners and their names were entered in the Register of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee as partners. Mr. Gandhi has also relied on Exhibits 250 and 251 and a number of other documents which show that the Market Committee had written letters to the plaintiff for not paying the price of the vegetables to the vegetable growers and the plaintiff and the plaintiff was dirceted to pay them as soon as possible. Similarly Mr. Gandhi has referred to various documents which are the correspondence between the Market Committee and the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff was participating in the business and hence according to Mr. Gandhi it cannot be said that there was no partnership between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 5. Similarly Mr. Gandhi has referred to various documents which are the correspondence between the Market Committee and the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff was participating in the business and hence according to Mr. Gandhi it cannot be said that there was no partnership between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 5. ( 4 ) THE basic requirements of law in a partnership are that there should be a joint venture between the partners with a view to share profits there of and to have the mutual agency between them. Thus the partners not only share the profit but also they can act as agent of one another and a partner can bind another partner in liability in the course of carrying on the partnership business. In the present case the sharing of profits namely commission earned by the firm is specifically settled between the parties as 20% for the plaintiff and the balance of 80% for the remaining 3 partners which is perfectly legal. So far as the mutual agency is concerned the partnership deed Exhibit 56 provides that the licence fees for the stall office rent etc. are to be paid by the party of the first part i. e. the plaintiff. The plaintiff is also called upon by the Market Committee to pay the unpaid amounts to the vegetable producers that is considerable liability of the plaintiff. On the other hand clause (b) in the partnership deed refers to the capital required in running the business payment of wages of workmen post expenses stationery and other miscellaneous expenses are to be arranged by the party of the second part which means defendants Nos. 2 3 and 4. From this Mr. Gandhi has urged that there has been division of liability between the parties and that this establishes the mutual agency between the parties as far as the commission business of the partnership firm is concerned. Looking to the contents of partnership deed Exhibit 56 and extract of register of the Market Committee Exhibit 213 Exhibit 57 58 59 246 to 247 248 249 250 and 251 it appears that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 is that of partners and not that of licensors and licencees. Looking to the contents of partnership deed Exhibit 56 and extract of register of the Market Committee Exhibit 213 Exhibit 57 58 59 246 to 247 248 249 250 and 251 it appears that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 is that of partners and not that of licensors and licencees. The parties had referred to this arrangement as partnership the name of the plaintiff has been used for the purpose of the aforesaid correspondence between the plaintiff and the Market Committee wherein the plaintiff has all the time been referred to as a partner and the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 have done several acts for and on behalf of the plaintiff as partners. Now the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 cannot go back on it and claim that there was no genuine partnership between the parties and that the description of partnership was merely for the sake of convenience. If the parties choose to describe their relationship in a particular manner and act according to that description it is not open to them to say that they did not mean what they have expressed and that their intention was something different from what is expressly stated. Appellants are estopped from denying partnership. Apart from this on the proper construction of Exhibit 56 the relationship contemplated under this document is that of partnership although the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are taken to be collectively party of the second part and that they have been described as the partners of another firm called Ashokkumar Natwarlal and Co. ( 5 ) ONCE it is held that there is in fact and in law a partnership the question of its dissolution arises. It is not in dispute that a notice of dissolution was given by the plaintiff on 2nd September 1967 to dissolve the partnership and taking accounts. Civil Suit No. 2290/67 was filed on 22nd December 1967 for dissolution and accounts. The said suit was unconditionally withdrawn but the business was carried on as usual by the erstwhile partner. The present suit is for dissolution of partnership and for taking accounts. The question is whether the partnership continues after the same was dissolved by the aforesaid notice dated 2nd September 1967 Mr. Gandhi has urged that the original partnership created under Exhibit 56 has continued and the same is required to be dissolved now. The present suit is for dissolution of partnership and for taking accounts. The question is whether the partnership continues after the same was dissolved by the aforesaid notice dated 2nd September 1967 Mr. Gandhi has urged that the original partnership created under Exhibit 56 has continued and the same is required to be dissolved now. This contention of Mr. Gandhi cannot be accepted because once a partnership at will is dissolved by notice it comes to an end and the same cannot be continued or revived. If the erstwhile partners so desire they may create a new partnership but the dissolved partnership cannot be revived Mr. Gandhi then urged that because the erstwhile partners have continued the business even after dissolution a new partnership should be presumed to have come into existence on the same terms and conditions although there is no document creating such a new partnership This contention of Mr. Gandhi is also not tenable. Partnership is purely a contractual relationship. To create a partnership there must be an agreement to that effect. In the absence of such an agreement to create a partnership the partnership cannot be presumed. In law there is nothing like implied or presumed partnership. Therefore it is held that the partnership created by Exhibit 56 came to an end by the aforesaid notice of dissolution dated 2nd September 1967 Hence there is no question of granting the decree of dissolution now. There cannot be the dissolution of a firm which in law does not exist. ( 6 ) AS regards the accounts Mr. Bhatt has urged that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim accounts of the partnership firm prior to the date of the withdrawal of the suit No. 2290/67 as the same is barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1. As regards the accounts for the period subsequent to the withdrawal of the said suit Mr. Bhatt urged that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim accounts because according to him there is no partnership in existence during the material period and hence there was no accountability on the part of defendants Nos. 2 to 4. On the other hand Mr. Bhatt urged that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim accounts because according to him there is no partnership in existence during the material period and hence there was no accountability on the part of defendants Nos. 2 to 4. On the other hand Mr. Gandhi has urged that original partnership should be deemed to have continued upto the period when the final accounts were settled which covers the period from the withdrawal of the aforesaid suit upto the date on which the business of the firm came to an end. Mr. Gandhis submission is not correct in so far as it refers to the continuation of partnership after the withdraws 1 of the previous suit. As stated above the partnership having come to an end there is no question of its continuation or revival. Similarly there cannot be a presumed partnership just because the business of the erstwhile partnership was continued. However the accountability of the erstwhile partners would continue until the accounts are finally settled. In this case it is in evidence that the business was continued for quite sometime after the withdrawal of the aforesaid suit and the same came to an end on or about 24th December 1973 Hence the accountability of defendant Nos. 2 to 4 would continue till that date when the business of the erstwhile partnership came to an end. The respondent No. 1 has filed his cross objection in this appeal and claimed that he is entitled to the relief of the partnership accounts to be taken as contended by Mr. Gandhi not upto the date of the dissolution as decreed by the trial court but upto 24 December 1973 when the partnership business came to an end. The learned trial judge while decreeing the suit has held that the plaintiff is entitled to the acounts upto the date of dissolution which is not correct. The learned trial judge is also in error in holding that the partnership continued even after the dissolution because the business of the firm was continued as usual. That part of the learned trial judges decision will have to be set aside. The finding of the learned trial judge that the relationship between the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 to 4 was that of partners is upheld. That part of the learned trial judges decision will have to be set aside. The finding of the learned trial judge that the relationship between the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 to 4 was that of partners is upheld. The decision as regards taking accounts is modified to the extent that the accounts will be taken not upto the date of the dissolution of the firm but upto the date on which the business of the erstwhile partnership came to an end. The impugned decree is confirmed with the aforesaid modification. ( 7 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed Cross objections are allow ed. The trial courts decree is modified as referred to above. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed Cross objection allowed. .