JUDGMENT : Chaudhary Sia Saran Sinha, J. – In an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, said to be the employee of Respondent no. 1, has prayed for quashing Annexure 1, an ORDER :passed by the Anchal Adhikari, Nawanagar, Bhojpur, dated 16.7.1981/30.7.1981 in Minimum Wages Case No.2 of 1980-81 as also for quashing Annexure 1 an ORDER :dated 21.3.1983, passed by the Additional Collector, Bhojpur in Revenue Misce. Appeal No. 15 of 1981-82. 2. On the report of the Labour Inspector, a case under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was registered on 6.7.1980 which related to non-payment of wages as pr scribed under the Act and the Rules for the period from 20.10.1977 to 21.4.1978. The Impugned ORDER :as contained in Annexure 1 indicates that notice was served on the petitioner and that the delay in filing the claim was condoned. The claim was decreed. When the petitioner came to know about the same, he preferred an appear ‘but in vain, he’ having lost it as would be evident from Annexure 2. Now, the petitioner has come up to this Court in this writ application. 3. The impugned ORDER :s were attacked on two grounds, namely, want of service of notice on the petitioner about the case and the illegal condonation of delay. 4. The unambiguous statement of the petitioner, made in the writ application about there being no service of notice on him in the case, in the absence of any counter affidavit filed on behalf of any of the Respondents, remains uncontroverted. The records of the case in question were called for. A perusal of the records makes the position all the more worse. 5. Rule 29 of the Bihar Minimum Wages Rules, 1951, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) lay down, inter alia, that if an application under sub-section (2) of section 20 or section 21 is entertained, the Authority shall serve upon the employer by registered post or special messenger a notice in form IX to appear before him on a specified date with all relevant documents and witnesses, if any, and shall inform the applicant of the date so specified. Form IX appended to the Rules prescribes for a notice to the employer to answer the claim on the date fixed. Form IX appended to the Rules prescribes for a notice to the employer to answer the claim on the date fixed. Lastly, it states that in default of his appearance on the date mentioned in the Form, the application will be heard and determined in his absence. Obviously, such a notice must be sent to the employer ahead of the date fixed. Two notices were found on the records of the case. One is dated 1.10.1980 and the other is dated 31.12.1980. The dates of hearing mentioned in each of the two notices are different. They are, however, penned through and ultimately the date mentioned is 5.2.1981 in each of the two notices. Submission of Sri A.B. Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the ORDER :sheet disclosed that the hearing of the case commenced much earlier to 5.2.1981, the date shown as a date of hearing in the notice. As the rule prescribes the notice must state that in case of default of the petitioner, the matter will be taken up ex parte in his absence. The intimation purported to have been given under the two notices referred to above is not to that effect. Rather it is that if he does not appear, legal action will be taken against him. 5. While in one of the notices, there is no service report at all, the other contains a report but without any date, either of any serving peon or the alleged attesting witnesses. The said service report does not also indicate whether the person was made aware of the contents of the notice or it was hung up in a portion of his residential house. In these facts and circumstances of this case, the irresistible conclusion is that the assertion of the petitioner that the notice of this case was not served on him stands established. 6. The decision of the case by the Anchal adhikari without any notice to the petitioner will render the ORDER :passed by him as contained in Annexure-1 illegal and void. If this be the fate of Annexure-1, the ORDER :passed in the appeal, as contained in Annexure-2, will meet the same fate. 7. In view of the findings recorded above, it is not necessary to decide the question of limitation when I propose to remand the case. I would, however, like to make a few observations in this respect. 8. If this be the fate of Annexure-1, the ORDER :passed in the appeal, as contained in Annexure-2, will meet the same fate. 7. In view of the findings recorded above, it is not necessary to decide the question of limitation when I propose to remand the case. I would, however, like to make a few observations in this respect. 8. The report filed by the Labour Inspector is Annexure-3. At the end of the report, there is an endorsement which runs as follows : – “daba patra dayar kame mein vilamb ka karan jaanch, majdoori dilane ka prayas evem prashashkiya swikriti prapt kame ke karan hua hai atah avedak dabapatra dayar mein hue vilamb ki awadhi ko condone kame ka prarthi hai.” The bald assertion made by the Labour Inspector for the delay in filing the claim has been dealt with in, more or less, a perfunctory way, as will appear from the following part of the ORDER :, as contained in Annexure-1, of the Anchal adhikari : – “….Shram nirikshak ne daba patra dayar karne me hue vilamb ki kafiat ko condone kame ke liye prarthan kiya hai. Vilamb ki awadhi ke liye aawasyak karan bataya hai hiske aadhar par daba patra dayar kame me hue vilamb ko condone kar liya gaya hai......” 9. Proviso to section 20 of the Act lays down a period of limitation for six months within which an application for the minimum wages is to be made. It runs as follows : – “Provided that any application shall be presented within six month from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable.” As; undisputedly, the wages was payable daily, the report of the Labour Inspector for setting the law in motion on 6.7.1980 in respect of claim from the period from 20.10.1977 to 21.4.1978 was much beyond time. The proviso to section 20 of the Act lays down : – “Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” The language or the second proviso indicates that decision about the condonation of delay should be taken at the stage of admission of the case itself. It further envisages that the delay should be condoned only when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. In view of the bar of limitation created in the first proviso, the satisfaction contemplated in the second proviso must be a judicial satisfaction and not an arbitrary one. Any other interpretation would have the effect of nullifying the bar of limitation created in the first proviso. The language of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is similar to the language used in the second proviso. It is well settled that while considering the question of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court insists on explanation of every day's delay. This approach has not been adopted while condoning the delay. In view of my findings above and keeping in view the ends of justice, a remand of the case appears to be necessary. 10. In the result the application is allowed. Annexures-1 and 2 are quashed and the matter is sent back to the Anchal adhikari concerned on remand for fresh decision in accordance with law after giving due notice to the petitioner and allowing him an opportunity to adduce such evidence as may be relevant and on hearing both the sides. The Anchal adhikari will also consider the prayer for condonation of the delay keeping in view the observations made above. He shall then dispose of the matter in accordance with law. There shall be no ORDER :s for costs of this application. Let the records be sent down immediately. Application allowed.