H. V. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution by Subhash Singh (petitioner in Writ Petition No, 11798 of 1983) and Naresh Kumar (petitioner in (Writ petition No. 11799 of 1983) are respectively directed against orders dated 17th of August, 1983 and 25th of August, 1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, authorising their detention under Section 3 of the National Security Act. (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE reasons communicated to the two petitioners ill writing indicate that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that it was necessary to detain them with a view to prevent them from acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, was based on following facts: (1) That on 29th of April, 1983 at about II in the night when Vijaipal Singh and Chet Ram, after attending the function near Naw Bharat Paper Mills, arrived near the culvert close to double quarters in Modi Nagar, they found the two petitioners accompanied by four others standing there. The two petitioners and their companions started abusing Vijaipal Singh and Chet Ram and assaulted them with kattas (country made pistols), lathi and hockey sticks saying. Deal these sales first, the leaders shall be taken care of subsequently. On an alarm being raised by Vijaipal, number of persons reached the spot and on seeing them, the petitioners and their companions weilded their lathies and hockey sticks causing injuries to one Chet Ram as well. A written First Information Report regarding the said incident was made by Vijaipal at police station Mcdi Nagar whereupon Crime Case No. 220/80, under section 323/147/149 I. P. C. was registered and was pending investigation. Afore-mentioned activity of the two petitioners had created an atmosphere of terror in the area of Modi Nagar. (2) That on 18th of May, 1983 at about 9. 45 P. M. when Man Singh and his brother Ram Sajiwan were, after performing their duties at the Cloth Mill, returning to their quarters, the two petitioners along with their companions armed with lathies, reached the Sokhar Road in Modi Nagar and saying that Ram Sajiwan claims to be the stooge (Chamcha) of Dhan Prakash, he should, therefore, be killedtt, started, with a view to kill him, assaulting him with lathies and hockey sticks. In the process, they caused grievous injuries to Ram Sajiwan. In the process, they caused grievous injuries to Ram Sajiwan. Accordingly Crime Case No. 222 of 1983, under section 147/307 LP. C. was registered against them at police station Modi Nagar on 18th of May, 1983. The said case was pending investigation. (3) On 9th of July, 1983 at about 10. 15 A. M. the two petitioners along with their companions committed the murder of Phegu Ram, son of Dukh Bhajan, Secretary of Kapra Mill, Hind Mazdoor Sangh, near the gate of Modi Cloth Mills and Gaylord Hotel by assaulting him with lathies, knieves and hockey sticks. After so assaulting Phegu Ram, they ran away towards Satish Park. In that connection Crime Case No. 324 of i983, Tunder section 147/302 I. P. C. had been registered against them at police station Modi Nagar. On the same day and as a result of afore-mentioned activity of theirs, tension amongst the members of Hind Mazdoor Sangh and an atmosphere of lawlessness prevailed in the entire locality. Members of Hind Mazdoor Sangh thereafter announced that they would take revenge by taking blood for blood and adopted a violent attitude. Consequently they committed the murders of Ashok, Ram Kishan and Goroj, who were members of the petitioner Union C. I. T. U. , and at another place committed the murders of Jagpal and Sahabuddin, two members of C. I. T. U. Thus the petitioners objectionable activities resulted in arson, looting and creating a feeling of terror and panic in the locality. Aforementioned cases were also pending investigation. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners questioned the validity of their detention on the ground that out of the three grounds on which the orders for petitionerst detention were based, two of them, namely, the first two were such which merely had an impact on the question of law and order and had no bearing on the question of maintenance of public order. Relying upon a long string of decisions of the Supreme Court, he urged that inasmuch as the orders authorising petitioners detention were based amongst others on irrelevant grounds as well, those orders stood vitiated and the two petitioners are entitled to be released from custody forthwith. Relying upon a long string of decisions of the Supreme Court, he urged that inasmuch as the orders authorising petitioners detention were based amongst others on irrelevant grounds as well, those orders stood vitiated and the two petitioners are entitled to be released from custody forthwith. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners also emphasised that according to various decisions of the Supreme Court, the general rule is that in cases where the order of detention is based on a number of grounds, each such ground must be such which results into a prejudicial activity of the nature specified in section 3 of the Act and even if one- of such grounds is found to be Such which has no such effect, the entire order of detention would stand vitiated. According to him the exceptions to the aforementioned general rule, where t he grounds on which the order of detention is based can be read in conjunction with each other, are: (i) Where the particular ground is a general description of which the particulars are contained in other grounds. (ii) Where reading of the ground as a whole clarifies some vagueness and gives specific meaning to an ambiguous or vague allegation in any particular ground, (iii) Where the ground is so intimately connected to other ground as to warrant reading together to complete picture, (iv) Where the grounds which merely mention the antecedents of the detenu and which in fact are not grounds for detention, and (v) Where a particular ground is merely by way of introductory paragraph or preamble, and urged that the instant case does not fall in any of the exceptions pointed out above and as such care should be taken not to be swayed away by the cumulative effect of the three incidents mentioned in the grounds for detention communicated to petitioners. ( 4 ) IN order to test the validity of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners we think it would be convenient to understand the true scope and ambit of the provisions contained in sections 3 (2) and 8 (J) of the Act. ( 4 ) IN order to test the validity of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners we think it would be convenient to understand the true scope and ambit of the provisions contained in sections 3 (2) and 8 (J) of the Act. Section 3 (2) of the Act runs thus: The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. ( 5 ) UNDER this section the detaining authority is enabled to make the order directing that a person be detained only in case it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to prevent such person from- (1) acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, (2) acting in any. manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order and (3) acting in any manner prejudicial to supplies and services essential to the community. ( 6 ) IT clearly implies that an order of detention has to be founded and to depend upon the satisfaction of detaining authority that the pet on sought to be detained is likely to indulge in an objectionable activity of the nature falling under all of the three categories mentioned above. In other words for purposes of this section, such satisfaction of the detaining authority with regard to the necessity to detain a person with a view to prevent him from indulging in the objection able activities of the nature mentioned in Section 3 (2) constitutes the grounds on which the order for detention of such person is to be based. In other words for purposes of this section, such satisfaction of the detaining authority with regard to the necessity to detain a person with a view to prevent him from indulging in the objection able activities of the nature mentioned in Section 3 (2) constitutes the grounds on which the order for detention of such person is to be based. Section 8 (1) of the Act runs thus: ( 7 ) WHEN a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. ( 8 ) THIS section achieves the objective underlying Article 22 (5) of the Constitution by obliging the detaining authority to take following two actions promptly. : - (i) to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order for his detention is based, and (ii) to afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order. ( 9 ) THE moment the detaining authority informs the detenu of its satisfaction regarding the necessity to detain him with a view to prevent him from indulging in any of the prejudicial activities of the nature prescribed in section 3 (2) of the Act, it communicates to the detenu the grounds for his detention. ( 10 ) SO far as the second obligation, namely, the detaing authority must afford the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make a representation is concerned, it necessarily implies that the reasons or the facts on which the detaining authority gets satisfied that it is necessary to detain a person with a view to prevent him from indulging in any of the pre-judicial activities, described in section 3 (2) of the Act is based, have necessary to be communicated to the detenu, for unless this is done, the detenu will not get an effective opportunity to make a representation against the order directing his detention. It often happens that the detaining authority, while communicating to the detenu the facts or the reasons which impel it to feel satisfied that it is necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, describes the same as the grounds on which the order for his detention is based but then as mentioned above, there is a clear line of demarcation between the communication of the grounds on which order of detention is based and communication of the facts/reasons/material which lead the detaining authority to feel satisfied that the person concerned is likely to act in a prejudicial manner. This distinction between the grounds for detention and the reasons/material which lead the detaining authority to feel satisfied about the existence of such grounds is borne out from the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Shibban Lal Saksena. v. State of U. P. and others. In that case Shibban Lal Saksena was directed to be detained under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) to section 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 on two-fold grounds falling respectively under the two categories mentioned in sub-clauses (ii) and (ii) of section 3 (I) (a) of the Act. The communication made to the detenu indicated that the detaining authority had passed the detention order for reasons (i) that the detenu had in the course of speeches delivered at Ghugli exhorted and enjoined upon the cane growers of that area not to supply sugarcane to the sugar mills or even to withhold supplies to them and had thereby interfered with the maintenance of supplies sugarcane essential to the community and (ii) by using certain expressions specified in the communication, he had incited the cane-growers and the public to violence, against established authority and in defiance of lawful orders and directions issued by Government officers and thereby seriously prejudiced the maintenance of public order. Eventually the State Government, after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board, informed the detenu that order for his detention was being confirmed only under sub clause (ii) of section 3 (1) (a ). Eventually the State Government, after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board, informed the detenu that order for his detention was being confirmed only under sub clause (ii) of section 3 (1) (a ). It was urged before the Supreme Court that from the communication made to the detenu (described as grounds served) it appeared that the grounds which weighed with the detaining authority in depriving the petitioner of his liberty were (i) that his activities were prejudicial to maintenance of supplies essential to the community and (ii) those activities were injurious to maintenance of public order. The communication made by the Government, however, indicated that first of the two grounds did not exist and as a matter of fact the D. P. Government had actually revoked the order under clause (iii) of section 3 (1) (a) of the said Act. The detaining authority had thus proceeded to detain the petitioner of that case on two grounds, one of which was nonexistent. Accordingly the order of detention stood vitiated. This submission prevailed before the Supreme Court, which while dealing with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner made the following observation It has been repeatedly held by this court that the power to issue a detention order under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act depends entirely upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority specified in that section. The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based, provided they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the legislative prevision cannot be challenged in a court of law, except on the ground of mala fides. ( 11 ) IT is clear that in the context what the expression Tsufficiency of the groundst occurring in the aforementioned observation made by the Supreme Court conveys is that the reasons or the material on which the satisfaction of the District Magistrate (which constitutes the foundation for making the detention order) is based are not open to scrutiny by the court, except on the ground that such fact or material has no probative value or that they are extraneous to scope and purpose of the Act. In other words, in case the material relied upon by the detaining authority, for arriving at the satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person with a view to prevent him from acting in a particular objectionable planner, has a probative value vis-a-vis the question as to whether such person is in future I likely to indulge in such prejudicial activity, reliance placed on such fact or material will not have the effect of vitiating the order. All that is required in this connection is that the incident/fact/material relied upon by the detaining authority should be such which by itself or in conjunction with other facts or circumstances is such which indicates that if not detained, the detenu is likely to indulge in an objectionable activity of the nature mentioned in section 3 of the Act The satisfaction that detenu is likely to indulge in objectionable activity can be arrived at on the basis of various activities carried on by the deterin even if individually they may not be sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the detenu will in future, indulge in an objectionable activity. Accordingly the reasons given by the detaining authority for arriving at the requisite satisfaction have necessarily to be read as a whole. ( 12 ) THERE is a long line of decisions by the Supreme Court beginning with the case of Shibban Lal Saksena, Supra which have firmly established the principle that an order of detention gets vitiated not only when it is based on the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is likely to act in a prejudicial manner which is not of the nature specified by section 3 (2) of the Act or that the nature of such satisfaction is not clear or that the detention order has been passed without actually reaching such satisfaction (that is the grounds for detention in the sense explained above) but also in cases where any of the facts/reasons relied upon or the reasons communicated by the detaining authority for concluding that it is necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him rom acting in a prejudicial manner, are found to be vague irrelevant or non-existent. ( 13 ) THE satisfaction that a person is likely to act in a prejudicial manner is in the very nature of things, to be arrived at in the light of the past history and activities of the person which may indicate the manner in which he is likely to act in future as also the effect which such activity is likely to have in view of the prevailing conditions in the society. Viewed in this light, all such facts, antecedents and past activities of the detenu as also the context in which such activities are likely to take place in future which make it probable that the detenu is likely to act in a prejudicial manner Le. , which have a probative value, would all be reasons which cumulatively lead the detaining authority to feel satisfied that the concerned person is going to act in a prejudicial manner. Of course, if the past activities are so remote or are of such a nature from which, the tendency of the person to act in an objectionable manner, is not discernible and such an activity has been taken into consideration by the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction, it would mean that the detaining authority bas taken an relevant fact into consideration in arriving at the satisfaction. Likewise where the past activity which has no probative value has been taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion about the manner in which the person is likely to act in future, it would mean that the detaining authority has taken an irrelevant matter into consideration. In the same way, where the detaining authority, for concluding that the detenu is likely to act in a prejudicial manner, takes into consideration a non-existent fact that the satisfaction in such a case may also stand vitiated. ( 14 ) WE will accordingly proceed to judge, whether in the instant case all of the reasons mentioned by the District Magistrate, impelling him to feel satisfied that the petitioners were likely to indulge ill activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order are irrelevant or are such which have no probative value, in the light of the discussion made above. ( 15 ) IN this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners confined his sub-mission only to first two reasons, namely, involvement of the two petitioners in the incident that is said to have taken place, on 29th of April, 1983 in which petitioners are said to have assaulted Vijaipal Singh and Chet Ram and the incident dated 18th of May 1983 in which they had assaulted Man Sing and his brother Ram Sajiwa n. According to the learned counsel, there was trade union rivalry in Modi Nagar and the first two incidents are incidents of mar feet which are quite common where ever there is such rivalry amongst members of different labour trade unions and such incidents do not have any impact on even low of life in the community. Accordingly these two incidents had no probative value so far as the like hood. of the two petitioners acting in a pre Judicial manner in future was concerned and the District Magistrate was not justified, in basing his satisfaction on their basis. Assuming that learned counsel for the petitioners is right in submitting that incidents of the nature mentioned in Grounds no. 1 and 2 are common features of trade union rivalry and that generally such incidents do not affect the public order, but then it cannot be doubted that in the context of the trade union rivalry, the persons concerned in the incidents are, likely to repeat their activity with a view to avenge the supposed wrongs done by members of rival group. The escalation of bad blood amongst the members of various trade unions can assume a magnitude in which even such incidents which normally do not have an impact on public order, may trigger off reactions which, may lead to disturbance of public order. The third incident adverted to by the District Magistrate certainly indicated that such a situation had been reached. Accordingly, if due to trade union rivalry the petitioners repeated the activities of the nature that took place on 29th of April, 1983 and 18th of May, 1983 as they were, in the prevailing circumstances, likely to do, such activity could lead to the same consequences which ensued as a result of their activity of 9th of July, 1983. Accordingly, if due to trade union rivalry the petitioners repeated the activities of the nature that took place on 29th of April, 1983 and 18th of May, 1983 as they were, in the prevailing circumstances, likely to do, such activity could lead to the same consequences which ensued as a result of their activity of 9th of July, 1983. Viewed in this context, it cannot be Slid that reference by the District Magistrate to first two incidents that took place on 29th of April, 1983 and 18th of May, 1983 did not have any probative value or were irrelevant for purposes of the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that the petitioners were likely to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. ( 16 ) IN the view which we have taken, it is neither necessary nor. appropriate for us to notice various cases which the learned counsel for the petitioners cited with regard to distinction between law and order and public-order as also on the question that even where a single ground is found to be irrelevant, vague or non-existent, the entire order of detention stands vitiated. ( 17 ) IN the result, we find that the District Magistrate did not, while arriving at the satisfaction that the two petitioners were likely 10 act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order and that it was necessary to detain them with a view to prevent them from so acting take any irrelevant fact/ground into consideration and that the impugned orders do not stand vitiated on that account. ( 18 ) NO other informity in the said orders was attempted to be brought to our notice. ( 19 ) IN the result, both the petitions fail and are dismissed. Writs dismissed .